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1  Introduction 
An important feature of the German labour market is the coexistence of perma-
nent contracts which  are associated with high institutional firing costs due to 
dismissal protection legislation and fixed-term contracts (FTCs) which establish 
employment relationships for a limited duration of time. FTCs expire automati-
cally without dismissal at the end of the agreed term. The employment relation-
ship is either terminated or the employer can decide to offer the worker a perma-
nent position or, under certain circumstances, another FTC. Obviously, the avail-
ability of FTCs leads to a substantial alteration of the framework in which the 
optimisation behaviour of actors in the labour market takes place.  
This is all the more likely as the importance of FTCs in the West German la-
bour market has been underestimated not only in the political discussion, but also 
by economists so far. The reason may be that many studies have focussed on ag-
gregate employment stocks, which conceal most of the employment dynamics. In 
West German private sector establishments FTCs constitute only 6–7% of all 
jobs, but about 30% of all hirings and separations are based on them (see Sub-
chapter 4.5). This discrepancy indicates the necessity to look at micro data, i.e., 
information on the individual behaviour of workers and firms. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of FTC employment suggests that the usual assumption of a rigid la-
bour market in Germany, which is contrasted with a flexible U.S. labour market, 
seems to be an oversimplification. Besides the obvious policy relevance, this may 
be one reason why the labour market effects of flexible employment contracts 
have become an important and prolific field of research in labour economics in 
recent years.1  
FTCs were liberalised in Germany by the Employment Promotion Act in 1985 
as a reaction to the unemployment crisis. Besides, temporary work agencies have 
been liberalised for several times since 1985. Recently, both types of atypical 
work have been further facilitated by the so-called “Hartz Reform”. Therefore, 
Germany is a typical example of a partial deregulation of the dismissal protection 
legislation (BLANCHARD and LANDIER, 2002), being observed in many European 
countries, where kinds of temporary work such as FTCs were introduced, while 
keeping institutional firing restrictions on permanent contracts constant.    
Of course, the aim of the reforms was to alleviate the unemployment problem 
(or to increase employment), which has increasingly become a problem of low-
qualified  workers  being  affected  by  international  trade  („globalisation“)  and 
technological change.2 The government’s official objectives of the liberalisation 
have been expressed in a number of communiques (see JAHN, 2002). 
                                              
1   See, for example, the symposium on temporary work in the Economic Journal 112, June 2002. 
2   See  EISEN  (2001)  for  a  discussion  of  both  sources  of  unemployment  of  low-qualified  workers. 
FITZENBERGER (1999) provides an empirical analysis of this issue.    14 
Before 1985, the objective of the permission to conclude FTCs was to give 
firms the possibility of dealing with unexpected events and short-term peaks in 
labour demand. The objectives of the reform in 1985 can be summarised as fol-
lows (see JAHN, 2002). FTCs should (1.) increase the overall flexibility of the 
labour market, (2.) increase the individual employment opportunities of workers, 
especially of those who are protected by special dismissal protection rules (e.g., 
disabled workers), (3.) lead to a reduction of long-term unemployment, and (4.) 
reduce the amount of overtime work. An “unofficial” objective of the govern-
ment has always been to avoid an extensive reform of the dismissal protection 
legislation for permanent contracts despite the unemployment crisis3, which can, 
obviously, be explained by political factors.4 All the intended effects of FTCs 
except point (4.) are at least partly evaluated throughout this study.  
Although a number of extensive German studies including research on the la-
bour market effects of FTCs already exists5, there is still a lack of empirical and 
in particular econometric analyses attempting to shed light on causal relation-
ships. 
Chapter 2 starts with a definition of fixed-term versus permanent contracts and 
provides a brief overview of the institutional background with respect to dis-
missal protection for permanent contracts, the regulation of FTCs, and the role of 
works councils and collective wage agreements. Afterwards, the  potentials as 
well as the limitations of the individual level and establishment level datasets 
used in the subsequent chapters are discussed. Subchapter 2.3 provides a first 
view on the empirical picture of FTCs in West Germany by presenting some de-
scriptive statistics on the incidence of FTCs in demographic groups and along the 
business cycle as well as information on the duration of FTCs.  
In the course of the study, microeconometric analyses attempting to identify 
causal relationships are presented. In Chapter 3 it is stressed that the underlying 
questions are in many cases comparable and can be analysed within the frame-
work of the so-called potential-outcome approach to causality (see ROY, 1951; 
RUBIN, 1974), which has particularly been applied to the evaluation of active la-
bour market programmes so far. The microeconometric methods applied in this 
study are presented and their assumptions and limitations are discussed. 
Chapter 4 provides theoretical as well as empirical analyses of the role of FTCs 
in labour demand and makes attempts to reveal whether and to what extent FTCs 
increase the overall flexibility of the labour market as intended by the reform of 
                                              
3  This statement is based on a verbal information from a ministry official at the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Employment.     
4   The political economy of partial versus general labour market reforms is beyond the scope of this 
study.  A  theoretical  model  formalising  this  argument  is  provided  by  CAHUC  and  POSTEL-VINAY 
(2002). DOLADO, GARCÍA-SERRANO, and JIMENO (2002) apply some of the arguments to the Spanish 
case. SAINT-PAUL (2000) provides an extensive discussion of the political economy of (partial) labour 
market reforms. 
5   See, for example, LINNE (1991), WALWEI (1991), BIELENSKI, KOHLER, and SCHREIBER-KITTL (1994), 
ZIMMERMANN (1997), SCHÖMANN, ROGOWSKI, and KRUPPE (1998), and JAHN (2002).   15 
1985. From an employer’s point of view, the most relevant differences between 
FTCs and permanent contracts are the lower institutional firing costs of FTCs 
and the higher turnover rate of FTC workers. By presenting dynamic labour de-
mand and matching models it is shown that there are three categories of reasons 
for firms to use FTCs. Firstly, FTCs may be used as ‘buffer stock’, that is, as an 
adjustment instrument to cope with demand or productivity shocks. Secondly, 
FTCs  may  be  used  as  a  screening  device  (prolonged  probationary  period)  in 
presence  of asymmetric information on the  workers’ ability  (or productivity). 
Thirdly, FTCs are used to substitute a certain proportion of permanent workers 
by FTC workers if job positions that are inherently permanent are (repeatedly) 
filled by FTC workers.  
These three categories of reasons for using FTCs have different welfare impli-
cations (see VAREJÃO and PORTUGAL, 2003). For example, if FTCs are exclu-
sively  used  as  buffer  stock,  they  facilitate  firing  in  downturn,  reduce  labour 
hoarding, and thus foster productivity. However, as FTC workers have a lower 
job stability, the use of FTCs as buffer stock also hampers learning and training 
on-the-job. Furthermore, the use of FTCs as buffer stock may also raise the wage 
pressure of the permanent contract workers (see Section 5.2.1). The effects on the 
chances of unemployed workers to get a job offer (either FTC or permanent) are 
ambiguous  in  theoretical  models  (see  Subchapter  4.2).  If  FTCs  are  used  as 
screening devices, they may lead to better job matches and therefore more stable 
employer-employee  relationships.  Furthermore,  unemployed  workers  with  ad-
verse signals may have the chance to enter into a permanent contract by using an 
initial FTC as stepping stone (see Chapter 6). If FTCs are used as substitute for 
permanent workers on inherently permanent jobs, they may have adverse effects 
on productivity growth, again because they reduce investments in training, and 
because otherwise good matches are terminated and replaced by matches of un-
certain values (see Subchapter 5.2). Substitution, as long as it is not based on 
deputising an absent permanent worker, is obviously the main point in which 
policy makers and the public are most concerned about. 
Subchapter 4.4 provides an empirical analysis of the firms’ reasons for using 
FTCs focussing on the econometric identification of the link between dismissal 
protection for permanent contract workers and the firms’ use of FTCs. Further-
more, a comparison with the determinants of the use of two other types of atypi-
cal work (freelance workers and workers from temporary work agencies) is pro-
vided. Subchapter 4.5 includes an analysis of the role of FTCs in worker flows 
(inflows into and outflows from establishments) since, as discussed in the course 
of Chapter 4, dismissal protection legislation and FTCs may be more relevant for 
worker flows than for changes in employment stocks. The analysis reveals the 
proportion of FTCs transformed into permanent contracts within establishments 
and thus gives a first impression of the role of FTCs as screening devices and 
stepping stones towards permanent contracts. Furthermore, it is investigated to 
what extent FTC workers are hired and fired without changing the number of the   16 
establishments’ employees and thus the relevance of the role of FTCs as a substi-
tute is revealed.  
Chapter 5 evaluates the short-run causal effect of being employed on a FTC 
(compared to a permanent contract) on workers’ subjective assessments of work-
ing conditions as well as wages. One theoretical prediction discussed in the chap-
ter is that FTC workers should be compensated for the lower employment stabil-
ity by higher wages, given the assumptions of a perfect labour market hold. An-
other  strand  of  the  literature  introduces  asymmetric  information  and  workers 
maximising their lifetime utility or earnings. This introduces the possibility of 
FTCs being investments from  the workers’ point of view, and probationary peri-
ods or incentive schemes from the employers’ point of view. The econometric 
analysis is based on a large cross-sectional dataset of German employees allow-
ing to perform separate analyses for different sub-groups of workers.  
Chapter 6 provides the most important analyses of this study as two important 
policy goals of FTCs are touched, that is, whether taking up a FTC increases the 
individual employment opportunities in the long-run (stepping stone effect) and 
whether  FTCs  affect  the  job-finding  behaviour  of  unemployed  job  searchers. 
Chapter 6 consists of  three parts. In Subchapter 6.2 the conditions for unem-
ployed job searchers to enter into a FTC job instead of a permanent contract job 
are derived mainly within the framework of the job search theory. Furthermore, it 
is discussed under which conditions FTCs may be stepping stones towards per-
manent contracts. From a theoretical point of view, the result that FTCs are step-
ping stones towards permanent jobs is far from being ambiguous. The issue is 
complicated by the fact that one has to ask counterfactual questions.  For exam-
ple, if an unemployed job searcher had kept on searching instead of entering into 
a FTC, she or he had possibly got a permanent contract job with better working 
conditions and career  opportunities. Furthermore, there are theoretical  models 
even suggesting that the partial deregulation in European countries is not a rem-
edy, but part of the unemployment problem. Subchapter 6.3 provides a micro-
econometric unemployment duration analysis distinguishing between both types 
of contracts as destination states when leaving unemployment. This analysis re-
veals  whether  FTCs  and  permanent  contracts  are  behaviourally  distinct  states 
with respect to the job searchers’ characteristics and regional labour market con-
ditions. It is focused on the effect of unemployment duration (duration depend-
ence) as well as adverse worker characteristics on the transition to FTCs versus 
permanent contract. Finally, Subchapter 6.4 analyses the effects of entering into 
FTCs from unemployment on future employment opportunities. Are FTCs step-
ping stones for the unemployed or are FTCs dead ends leading to recurrent peri-
ods of temporary jobs and unemployment? The econometric analysis is again 
based on a potential-outcome approach to causality attempting to account for the 
sequential problem job searchers face when deciding to take up a FTC job.  
All chapters include a summary and conclusion. Chapter 7 provides an overall 
summary and conclusion of the study containing hints for future research.   17 
2  Fixed-Term Employment Contracts in Germany: Defini-
tion, Institutional Background, and Empirical Relevance 
2.1  Definition of Fixed-Term versus Permanent Employment Contracts 
First of all, the terms ‘fixed-term contract’ (synonym: ‘temporary contract’ or 
‘limited  term  contract’)  and  ‘permanent  contract’  (synonym:  ‘indefinite  term 
contract’ or ‘unlimited term contract’) have to be defined. Fixed-term contracts 
(FTCs) define temporary employment relationships, which expire automatically 
without dismissal at the end of the agreed term, after the completion of a speci-
fied task, or the occurrence of a specified event (see WALWEI, 1990). After the 
expiration of the contract, the employment relationship is terminated, or the em-
ployer can decide to offer the worker a permanent position or, under certain cir-
cumstances, another FTC.  
FTC work has to be distinguished from other kinds of temporary and atypical 
work, such as temporary work agencies (TWAs), freelancers (FLs), trainees, or 
other  types  of  subcontracting.6  In  contrast,  permanent  contracts  end  either 
through dismissal by the employer, quit  of the worker, a dissolution contract 
(‘Aufhebungsvertrag’), the transition to retirement, or due to the death of the 
worker.  
It should be kept in mind that a permanent contract does not automatically im-
ply a long-term employment relationship and that a FTC does not necessarily 
imply a temporary one. These institutional terms may be used for a large number 
of  very  heterogeneous  employment  relationships.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  some 
specific worker-job matches based on FTCs are more stable than other matches 
based on permanent contracts. Furthermore, it is an empirical question to which 
extent a FTC makes an employment relationship more unstable. If, for example, 
institutional restrictions are far less important than economic factors for the sta-
bility of matches, it is at least a theoretically admissible possibility that the type 
of employment contract does not matter for the duration of an employment rela-
tionship. Furthermore, a FTC does not necessarily need to be associated with a 
higher unemployment risk than a permanent contract as rational FTC workers are 
likely to be more engaged in on-the-job search.  
                                              
6   For definitions of temporary work see POLIVKA and NARDONE (1989), ATKINSON (1984), or KELLER  
and SEIFERT (1995). A definition of temporary work agency employment can be found in BROSE,  
SCHULZE-BÖING, and MEYER (1990) as well as in MAURER (1995). The distinction between free-
lancers and other self-employed workers on the one hand, and dependent employment on the other is 
discussed in DIETRICH (1999).   18 
2.2  Institutional Background in Germany 
The institutional background relevant for the subsequent analyses consists of 
the protection against dismissal legislation and the regulation of FTCs between 
1991 and 2001. Furthermore, it is necessary to describe the legal rights and the 
influence capabilities of works councils and of collective wage agreements for 
the analyses in Chapter 4. 
Dismissal Protection 
German protection against dismissal legislation is based on legal regulations as 
well as on decisions of labour courts. Collective wage agreements sometimes 
contain additional clauses in favour of employees. These regulations make indi-
vidual or collective dismissals costly either in terms of time, money or procedural 
complexity (HUNT, 2000).  
In general, it is distinguished between ordinary and extraordinary dismissals 
(‘ordentliche’  versus  ‘außerordentliche  Kündigung’).  Extraordinary  dismissals 
(§626 German Civil Code; ‘Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’, BGB) are legal, for ex-
ample, in case of criminal offences. Ordinary dismissals are associated with peri-
ods of notice depending on age and job tenure of the worker to be dismissed. In 
absence of individual or collective agreements, the period of notice is one month 
for two years of job tenure and goes up to 20 months for 20 years of job tenure 
(§622 German Civil Code). In addition, the Protection Against Dismissal Law 
(‘Kündigungschutzgesetz’, KschG) stipulates conditions under which a dismissal 
is socially unjustified. A worker who has been dismissed unfairly is entitled to 
severance payments. These depend on age, job tenure, and earnings and amount 
to a maximum of 12 monthly earnings or up to 18 monthly earnings if the dis-
missed employee is at least 55 years old and has been employed in the firm for at 
least 20 years. In addition, there is a special protection against dismissal (‘spe-
zieller Kündigungsschutz’) for some groups of workers. Inter alia, members of 
the works council, disabled persons, and pregnant women are specially protected.  
Before the second Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act came into 
force in October 1996, all permanent employees with an employment duration of 
at least 6 months in establishments with 6 or more employees covered by social 
security (threshold level) were within the scope of the Protection Against Dis-
missal Law. The second Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act raised 
the threshold level for the application of the Protection Against Dismissal Law to 
11 employees. However, employees which had been covered by the Protection 
Against Dismissal Law in September 1996 retained their coverage under the old   19 
regulation for three years (until September 1999). In December 1998, the new 
German government lowered the threshold level back to 6 employees.7  
According  to  the  Workplace  Labour  Relations  Act  (‘Betriebsverfassungsge-
setz’, BetrVG), the works council (‘Betriebsrat’) must be consulted before an 
employee can be dismissed. If the works council disagrees, the worker may ap-
peal to the labour court. In case of mass dismissals the consultation with the 
works council is more extensive and the regional employment office (‘Landesar-
beitsamt’) must be informed. The employment office can decide that the em-
ployer has to wait for up to 2 months (normally 1 month) before proceeding with 
redundancies. Establishments with at least 20 employees have to negotiate a so-
cial plan (‘Sozialplan’)  with the works council, including redundancy payment 
and payment of re-training measures.  
In establishments with at least 20 employees, works councils also have to agree 
on the recruitment of new employees (§ 99 BetrVG). The works council can re-
fuse to agree if the recruitment leads to dismissals or is otherwise detrimental for 
the current staff. In this case, the employer can appeal to a labour court for an 
approval of the recruitment. Thus although works councils cannot ultimately pre-
vent the employer from hiring new workers, they can increase the procedural 
complexities and the costs of hiring. Apart from these general provisions, the 
Workplace Labour Relations Act does not provide works councils with a man-
date to negotiate with employers over the use of atypical employment.8 
In international comparisons, e.g., provided by the OECD (1999), the German 
system of protection against dismissal legislation for permanent contract workers 
is assessed as being relatively strict: In the late 1980s, Germany is on position 13 
out of 20 OCED countries, with the first place being the country with the less 
strict protection against dismissal (U.S.). In the late 1990s, Germany is assessed 
to be on position 21 out of 27 OECD countries.  
Fixed-Term Contracts 
The most important restrictions on the use of FTC work are the objective rea-
sons which must be given for employing workers on FTCs, the maximum num-
ber of renewals of FTCs, and finally, the maximum cumulated duration of these 
contracts with one employer.   
The first legal basis for the use of FTCs is the German Civil Code. Employers 
have to justify the use of FTCs by objective reasons and can conclude a FTC 
with a maximum duration of 6 months. Accepted objective reasons are, inter alia, 
                                              
7   This variation (interpreted as ‘natural experiment’; see Section 3.2.4) in dismissal protection legisla-
tion allows to assess the effect of firing costs of permanent contract work on the use of FTC work in 
Subchapter 4.4. 
8   The Law on Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment Contracts of 2001 (see the next paragraph) 
introduced the right of the works council to be informed about the number and proportion of employ-
ees with fixed-term contracts (§20). However, no right of co-determination concerning the type of 
contract offered is included in the law.   20 
seasonal fluctuations in demand, temporary high volumes of work, deputising a 
person, carrying out special tasks, on-the-job-training, public employment meas-
ures, probationary periods, and a FTC at the request of the employee (see WAL-
WEI, 1990). The public sector as well as particular categories of occupations have 
special regulations which facilitate the use of FTCs. This is relevant, among oth-
ers, for scientists and executive employees as well as for research and education 
positions. According to the Civil Code there are no restrictions with regard to 
repeated use. Thus workers can be repeatedly employed on FTCs lasting at most 
6 months at the same employer, provided that the employer proves objective rea-
sons. Objective reasons were not explicitly stated in the law until January 2001, 
when the Act on Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment Relationships came into 
force.9  
Until 1985 the Civil Code was the only regulation for the use of FTCs. The use 
of FTCs was liberalised by the first Improvement of Employment Opportunities 
Act (‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’, BeschFG) in May 1985 (see Box 1 for an 
overview). From 1985 on, employers were free to hire new employees on FTCs 
without objective reasons for a duration of up to 18 months. The same was true 
for  workers  directly  after  the  completion  of  their  apprenticeship.  For  start-up 
businesses, the maximum duration was extended to 24 months. However, under 
this Act a FTC had to be converted into a permanent contract if the worker was 
to be retained after expiration of the contract. To prevent conversions of perma-
nent into temporary employment contracts, FTCs were not allowed if the worker 
had been employed by the same employer (on either type of contract) during a 
period of four months prior to the commencement of the FTC.  
This regulation is of practical relevance for FTCs with a duration of more than 
six months in establishments with at least 6 employees as only these establish-
ments and employees are within the scope of the Protection Against Dismissal 
Law (see WALWEI, 1990). 
When the second Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act came into 
force  in  October  1996,  the  maximum  duration  of  FTCs  was  extended  to  24 
months, and a maximum of three contract renewals were allowed. In January 
2001, the Act on Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment Relationships (‘Teil-
zeit- und Befristungsgesetz’, TzBfG) came into effect, replacing the Improve-
ment of Employment Opportunities Act. FTCs without objective reasons are now 
only allowed in case of hiring new employees (i.e., employees who have never 
before worked for the employer). The law explicitly states that the maximum du-
ration of FTCs and the number of renewals can be regulated by collective agree-
ments, even in the case they should be less restrictive than the law.  
Already before 2001, some collective wage agreements regulated the conditions 
under which FTCs were permitted, the maximum duration of FTCs, and the pre-
                                              
9  The objective reasons were developed by case law. WALWEI (1990) provides a historical view.    21 
conditions  for  the  repeated  use  of  FTCs  (see  WALWEI,  1990;  ZIMMERMANN, 
1997).      
The relevance of the legal grounds for the use of FTC work can be evaluated 
analysing the IAB establishment panel for 2001. According to my own calcula-
tions based on the IAB Establishment Panel for Baden-Wuerttemberg, 5% of all 
FTC workers are participants in public employment measures, 54% are on FTCs 
justified by objective reasons, and about 41% without objective reasons.  
Box 1: Regulations of FTCs in Germany – Overview 
§620 Civil Code (BGB)  
-  use of FTCs has to be justified by objective reasons 
-  maximum duration of 6 months 
-  repeated use of more than one FTC at the same employer possible (if justified by objective 
reasons)  
 
Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act (01 Mai 1985) 
-  coexistent with the Civil Code regulations 
-  legalisation of one nonrecurring FTC without necessity of justification by objective rea-
sons  
-  maximum duration of FTCs: 18 months (24 months for business start-ups) 
-  only newly hired workers or former trainees if no permanent position is available 
  
Second Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act (01 October 1996) 
-  coexistent with the Civil Code regulations 
-  maximum duration of FTCs: 24 months 
-  three renewals within the maximum duration of 24 months possible 
-  no limitations on the use of FTCs for employees being at least 60 years old 
-  former trainees can be hired on FTCs even if permanent positions are available 
 
Act on Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment Relationships (01 January 2001) 
-  inclusion of objective reasons in the law: objective reasons are now statutory defined 
-  no limitations on the use of FTCs for employees being at least 58 years old 
Sources: WALWEI (1990), RUDOLPH (2000), OBERTHÜR and LENZE (2001), JAHN (2002).  
 
2.3  Empirical Relevance of Fixed-Term Contracts in West Germany 
As this is an empirical study, the reliability of the results crucially depends on 
the quality of the underlying datasets. The following microeconomic datasets are 
used: the German Microcensus, the BIBB/IAB dataset 1998/99 (see Subchapter 
5.4), the IAB Establishment Panel (see the Sections 4.4.2 and 4.5.3), and the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (see Section 6.3.4).  
Information on the type of the contract (FTC versus permanent  contract) is 
available in a number of micro datasets, however, the underlying definitions are   22 
often different.10 For example, the German Microcensus and the IAB Establish-
ment Panel do not allow to distinguish between regular unsubsidised FTCs and 
participants in public employment measures. This problem may not be too severe 
since public employment measures are far less important in West Germany than 
in East Germany as already indicated by the numbers in the previous subsec-
tion.11 Trainees in the German apprenticeship system hold, by definition, FTCs. 
However, these should obviously not be mixed-up with other FTC employment 
relationships. 
Another fundamental problem common to every survey is that the interviewee 
can interpret the question in two ways: either she or he understands it in the sense 
of the contractual arrangement “fixed-term employment contract” or, rather fac-
tual, as her or his employment relationship being temporary or permanent. The 
latter possibility cannot be ruled out in many cases.  
A further issue is the definition of the samples. It would be useful to define the 
samples used in different analyses in a way that they always represent one spe-
cific underlying population, for example, the labour force in West Germany in 
1995–2000, without participants in public employment measures, without per-
sons in vocational training and without the public sector etc. This is not possible 
here due to various reasons. First of all, the underlying populations of the surveys 
are often different. For example, the population of the IAB Establishment Panel 
consists of all West German Establishments with at least one employee covered 
by  social  security.  The  definition  of  the  term  “establishment”  (in  contrast  to 
“company”) will be presented in Section 4.4.2. In contrast, the population of the 
BIBB/IAB dataset consists of all employees aged between 16 and 65. Perhaps 
more  relevant  than  the  underlying  population  is  the  definition  of  the  sample, 
which is driven by restrictions due to the sample size as well as particularities of 
some variables. For example, in Chapter 6 a sample of persons entering into un-
employment during the period 1991–2000 is defined, but the public sector is not 
excluded since the sample would otherwise become too small. In the empirical 
analysis for the second half of the 1990s in Subchapter 4.4, not only the public 
sector is excluded but also financial institutions and insurance companies since 
they do not report sales as a measure for their business activity.  
All empirical analyses of this study are restricted to West Germany. The most 
important  reason  is  that  the  particularities  of  the  East  German  labour  market 
would require separate analyses in either case.12 
                                              
10  For a discussion of the measurement of FTC work in Germany see BIELENSKI (1998). 
11  For example, the absolute number of FTC workers (only blue- and white collar workers including 
public employment measures) in April 1999 in West Germany was according to the Microcensus 
about 1.59 million. According to the public employment office, the stock of participants in public 
employment measures in West Germany was 71,608 persons in this month, which is a proportion of 
less than 5%. 
12  An open question is whether to include West Berlin in the analyses, since it has evolved with respect 
to its labour market problems more into East German conditions after the unification. Nevertheless, 
as there is rather a shortage of observations and since West Berlin can still be distinguished from East   23 
The different sample designs imply that the analyses of this study cannot be 
compared on a one-to-one basis but must be interpreted as “jigsaw pieces” which 
hopefully coalesce into general insights into the labour market effects of FTCs.  
How important are FTCs in the German labour market in general and for dif-
ferent groups of workers? The aim of this subsection is to provide a first view on 
the empirical relevance of FTCs in West Germany. More detailed descriptive 
analyses are presented in the subsequent chapters.  
Figure 1: Proportion of FTCs in Total Dependent Employment in West Germany 
(Percentages) 
Sources: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (2003); German Microcensus. 
Notes:  Measured  in  April  each  year. Excluding  persons in  vocational training, and including 
participants in public employment measures.  
 
Figure 1 depicts the proportion of FTCs in total dependent employment (blue 
collar  and  white  collar  workers  without  self-employed).  Since  the  underlying 
data  source  is  the  German  Microcensus,  participants  in  public  employment 
measures are included. The proportion of FTCs remained in a 5–6% interval over 
the period 1985–1996. There was a decline to about 5% after the post-unification 
boom ended in 1993 and a subsequent increase reaching more than 7% between 
1999 and 2001. In 2002 the proportion declined to 6.8%. It is an open question 
whether  the  increase  after  1997  may  be  interpreted  as  a  long-term  shift  to  a 
higher level or whether the proportion will fall back to 5–6% in the future. Fur-
thermore, it is unclear to which extent the rise after 1996 can be attributed to the 
                                                                                                                                     
Berlin in all datasets used it is included. While this may be a moot point, it is unlikely to change the 
result to a large extent.  
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deregulation by the second Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act (see 
Box 1). Moreover,  illustrates that omitting the public sector (where many public 
employment measures are implemented) as well as the farming and fishing in-
dustry does not affect the overall picture of the evolution of FTCs.  
Figure 2: Index of Permanent Contract and FTC Employment in West Germany–  
Excluding the Public Sector as well as Farming and Fishing (1995=100%) 
Source: INSTITUT FÜR ARBEITSMARKT- UND BERUFSFORSCHUNG (2003); German Microcensus. 
Notes:  Measured  in  April  each  year. Excluding  persons in  vocational training, and including 
participants in public employment measures.  
 
Figure  2  depicts  the  evolution  of  FTC  and  permanent  contract  employment 
(without public sector as well as farming and fishing) as an index with the re-
spective type of employment defined as 100% in 1985. Besides the impressions 
(already found in ) that the increase after 1997 could be a general shift out of the 
range of 100–130% (corresponding to 5–6% in ) there are some basic findings 
with regard to the behaviour along the business cycle: FTC employment is more 
volatile than permanent contract employment. Focussing on the years around the 
German unification in 1990, there is an interesting pattern which has similarly 
been observed for Sweden (see HOLMLUND and STORRIE, 2002): FTC employ-
ment increases earlier than permanent employment during the starting economic 
upturn (1985–1989),  it decreases when the  first indications of the end of the 
boom are revealed (1991–1992) and increases in the economic downturn (1993–
1995) while permanent employment decreases.  
The major problem with this interpretation of the figure is that the period under 
observation  includes  three  law  changes  (May  1985,  October  1996,  January 
2001). Hence, economic forces may be superposed by institutional changes. Un-
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fortunately, there is no dataset for Germany available which starts before the first 
law change came into force in 1985. 
The German Microcensus is the only German dataset containing information on 
the duration of FTCs. Employees holding FTCs are asked about the duration of 
their current FTCs. Note that this information is fundamentally different from 
information on the elapsed duration of ongoing employment relationships (job 
tenure).13  
A general methodological problem results from the fact that the distribution of 
ongoing spells (for example job tenure, unemployment, etc.) measured at a point 
in time is subject to two off-setting biases, which may either over- or underesti-
mate the true distribution of the spells (SALANT, 1977 and FARBER, 1999): (1.) 
Spell truncation means that the observed duration of a spell is a lower bound for 
the completed duration because the spell has not ended at the date of the survey 
interview. (2.) Length-bias means that spells of short duration are less likely to be 
observed on any given date than longer spells, so that the observed average dura-
tion of the observed spells is longer than the average duration of all spells.14  
Table 1: Duration of FTCs in 1998 (Percentages) –  
Excluding the Public Sector as well as Farming and Fishing 
  Men  Women 
Duration in 
months 
Proportion  Cumulated        
Proportion 
Proportion  Cumulated        
Proportion 
1  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2 
2  1.6  2.8  1.3  2.4 
3  5.8  8.5  4.4  6.9 
4  1.6  10.1  2.0  8.9 
5  1.3  11.4  1.3  10.1 
              6  17.2  28.6  15.8  26.0 
  7–9  5.4  34.1  4.6  30.6 
10–12  29.5  63.6  31.6  62.2 
13–15  1.3  64.9  1.7  63.9 
16–18  4.6  69.4  5.1  69.0 
19–21  0.3  69.8  1.1  70.0 
22–24  13.6  83.3  12.2  82.3 
25–29  0.4  83.8  0.7  83.0 
30–36  6.2  90.0  8.8  91.8 
³ 37  10.0  100.0  8.2  100.0 
Source: German Microcensus 1998; own calculations. 
Notes: Measured in April 1998. Excluding persons in vocational training, and including 
participants in public employment measures. Weighted figures are obtained using the 
individual weights (inflation factors) included in the German Microcenus. 
 
The contract duration information from the German Microcensus 1998 is not 
subject to spell-truncation since persons are not asked about the elapsed duration 
of their job, but on the duration which is specified in their contract. Since only 
length-bias is relevant in this case, the following statistics should be interpreted 
                                              
13  The latter is analysed in Subchapter 5.4. 
14  Both types of bias will be relevant in the context of different analyses in the subsequent chapters.    26 
as an upper bound for the true duration distribution of FTCs (see Table 1). Put 
differently,  the  proportion  of  short  FTCs  is  relatively  underestimated  and  the 
proportion of long FTCs is relatively overestimated. Table 1 indicates that there 
seem to be no clear-cut differences between men and women. More than 25% of 
all FTCs are not longer than 6 months, more than 60% of all FTCs are 12 months 
at most, and approximately 83% are not longer than 24 months. The remainder of 
about 17% of FTCs being longer than 24 months must be in accordance to spe-
cial regulations for certain occupations (see Subchapter 2.2) or it is based on 
measurement errors since neither the Civil Code nor the Improvement of Em-
ployment Opportunities Act permit FTCs to be longer than 24 months in general.  
Some further descriptive statistics on the proportion of FTCs in different groups 
of employees are depicted in Table 2. The underlying dataset is the BIBB/IAB 
survey for 1998/99, which allows to distinguish between FTC workers and par-
ticipants in public employment measures (see Subchapter 5.4).15 First of all, it is 
worthwhile noting that the proportion of FTCs according to the BIBB/IAB data-
set (men: 5.2%, women: 6.7%) is very similar to what can be found with the 
German Microcensus for 1998 (which includes participants in public employ-
ment measures) using a comparable sample definition (5.5% and 6.6%).  
In  the  first  column  of  Table  2  (unrestricted  tenure)  the  proportion  of  FTC 
workers in total dependent employment is depicted. Since the probability to ob-
serve workers on FTCs decreases with job tenure (Table 1 indicates that 78% of 
all FTCs are not longer than 2 years), it may be misleading to use this sample. 
FTC workers have on average a much shorter job tenure than permanent contract 
workers.16 Therefore, the analysis is restricted to workers with a job tenure of 2 
years at most (tenure £2 years) in the right column of Table 2. Thus the left col-
umn depicts all jobs, and the right column includes “new” jobs only.  
While the proportion of FTCs seem to be almost monotonically declining with 
age in the unrestricted sample, the sample for tenure £2 years indicates no clear 
relationship. It suggests, very different from what is usually stated in the litera-
ture (see, e.g., JAHN, 2002; OECD, 2002), that FTC employment is not a phe-
nomenon which is prevalent to the youth labour market: More than 23% of male 
workers aged between 42 and 65 and a job tenure of 2 years at most are em-
ployed on FTCs. Put differently, older male workers seem not to have a lower 
risk of holding a FTC when taking up a new job than younger workers. The dis-
crepancy can be explained by the obvious fact that on the one hand older workers 
have a longer job tenure on average, and that on the other hand FTCs are usually 
only permitted at the start of an employment relationship. However, the fact that 
the common legal limitations on the use of FTCs are not applied to employees of 
                                              
15  Participants in public employment measures, persons younger than 18 or older than 65 years, em-
ployees in the public sector or in the farming and fishing sector, persons in mini-jobs, persons in mili-
tary or civilian service, trainees, pupils, students and pensioners are excluded (see Subchapter 5.4 for 
a detailed description).  
16  This issue will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.   27 
at least 60 years during the period under observation (1998/99) is not reflected in 
the numbers.17 The upward shift in the proportion of FTCs for women from the 
age group ‘34–37’ to the age group ‘38–41’ is remarkable. This may result from 
women returning to work after career interruptions, e.g., due to parental leave.  
Table 2: Proportion of FTCs in Total Dependent Employment in 1998/99  
(Percentages)  
 
Unrestricted tenure  Tenure  £ £ £ £ 2 years 
Group of employees  Men  Women   Both  Men  Women   Both 
All  5.2  6.7  5.8  19.4  19.7  19.5 
Age group             
18–21  20.8  22.1  21.3  22.9  33.0  27.0 
22–25  14.6  13.5  14.1  23.6  23.8  23.7 
26–29  8.2  8.4  8.3  17.1  18.6  17.7 
30–33  5.1  7.3  5.9  14.2  20.0  16.5 
34–37  4.1  5.9  4.7  17.7  14.5  16.4 
38–41  4.6  6.9  5.5  20.0  22.9  21.4 
42–45  3.6  5.8  4.4  23.5  14.8  19.1 
46–49  3.8  4.8  4.2  23.8  20.9  22.2 
50–53  2.8  5.0  3.7  23.5  15.4  19.5 
54–65  2.5  2.8  2.6  23.7  9.2  16.7 
             
Formal qualification             
Without   10.7  10.1  10.4  24.2  26.6  25.4 
Vocational training  4.7  6.0  5.2  18.2  17.6  17.9 
Master craftsman  2.7  2.4  2.6  17.0  12.4  15.8 
Polytechnic  4.4  5.3  4.6  15.9  12.9  15.2 
University  5.1  7.7  5.8  23.3  26.7  24.5 
Nationality             
Foreigner  9.7  10.0  9.8  23.1  22.8  23.0 
German  4.9  6.5  5.5  19.0  19.5  19.2 
Hours of work             
Part-time job  8.9  7.0  7.2  23.5  16.9  17.7 
Full-time job  5.1  6.5  5.5  19.2  23.0  20.2 
Kind of establishment             
Industry  5.6  8.5  6.3  23.9  29.0  25.4 
Craft  5.9  6.3  6.0  15.7  16.5  15.9 
Trade  6.7  7.7  7.3  18.9  20.1  19.6 
Others (services)  7.7  6.5  7.0  17.5  16.7  17.1 
Numb. of observations  11,420  7,522  18,942  1,725  1,408  3,133 
Source: BIBB/IAB dataset 1998/99; own calculations. 
Notes: Sample as described in the text and in Chapter 5 but age 18-65. Weighted figures are 
obtained  using the  individual  weights (inflation factors) included  in the BIBB/IAB dataset. 
Part-time is defined as £30 hours of work per week. 
 
In the sample for tenure £2 years the proportion of FTCs declines with formal 
qualification with the exception of employees holding a university degree. Work-
ers holding a university degree have almost the same probability to be employed 
on FTCs as workers without any formal qualification. In the sample with unre-
stricted tenure the proportion of FTCs among workers holding a university de-
                                              
17  Due to the sample size it is not feasible to show the results for the age group of workers being at least 
60 years old.     28 
gree is about half the proportion of FTCs among the workers without a formal 
qualification. One possible explanation of the discrepancy between the samples 
may be that workers holding a university degree may have shorter FTC spells 
and may have a higher probability of getting their FTCs converted into a perma-
nent one than workers without qualification.  
The incidence of FTCs by nationality again depends on the sample chosen: 
while the sample with unrestricted tenure clearly indicates that foreigners are 
much more likely to be employed on FTCs, this result is less clear-cut for the 
tenure  £2  years  sample.  This  could  be  caused  by  German  workers  holding 
shorter FTCs and having a higher probability to enter into permanent contracts 
afterwards.   
There is no clear-cut positive association between FTCs and part-time work: 
For women in the sample for tenure £2 years the proportion of FTCs among 
part-timers is even lower (16.9%) than among the full-timers (23.0%).18  
In the BIBB/IAB survey workers are asked in quite general terms about the sec-
tor of their establishment. Some numbers are shown in Table 2. A more detailed 
analysis on differences by industry sectors, with more reliable and detailed sector 
information, is presented in Subchapter 4.5. For both men and women in the 
sample for tenure £2 years the highest proportion of FTCs is in the establish-
ments of the ‘industry’ sector. Approximately 25% of all workers in new jobs 
(tenure £2 years) are employed on FTCs.  
Even though this is a purely descriptive analysis, which does not allow to ex-
tract any causal statements, one important finding is that it may be quite mislead-
ing simply to compare mean characteristics of all FTC workers with all perma-
nent workers without considering the effect of differences in job tenure. This is 
an important result since this issue is not taken into account in most national as 
well as international descriptive studies on the incidence of FTC work (see, e.g., 
OECD, 2002). 
                                              
18  In the causal analysis of Subchapter 5.7 it is, however, found that FTCs have either no significant 
effect (for women) or only a moderately negative effect (for men) on working hours.   29 
3  Methodological Background: Identification of the Effects of 
Institutions and Policy Interventions  
3.1  Introduction: Estimation of Causal Effects of Binary Treatments 
Using Microeconometric Methods 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of some of the econo-
metric methods used in the analyses of the subsequent chapters.19 It is shown that 
the underlying econometric problems are comparable and can be tackled within 
the same framework. In the subsequent chapters, the following questions are ana-
lysed: 
(1.) What is the effect of the Protection Against Dismissal Law for permanent 
workers on the use of FTC workers (Subchapter 4.4)? 
(2.) What is the effect of FTCs on wages and subjective assessments of working 
conditions (Chapter 5)? 
(3.) What  effect  do  FTCs  have  on  employment  opportunities  of  those  unem-
ployed entering into FTCs (Subchapter 6.4)?  
What these questions have in common is that all institutions, policy interven-
tions, or regulations which are to be analysed may be interpreted as so-called 
treatments (see WOOLDRIDGE, 2002: Chapter 18) implying that the so-called po-
tential-outcome approach to causality may be applied (see ROY, 1951; RUBIN, 
1974).20 The questions require the comparison of ‘treated’ individuals or firms 
with  an  unobserved  counterfactual,  i.e.,  a  hypothetical  state  of  the  world  in 
which the same individual or firm is unaffected by the institution, regulation, or 
policy intervention of interest.21 The counterfactual framework clarifies the dis-
tinction between associations and causal effects. Thus the questions can be re-
phrased as follows:  
(1.) How does firms’ use of FTCs change due to the fact that they are acting 
within the scope of a law leading to higher firing costs for permanent workers 
compared to the counterfactual situation the same firms would be outside the 
scope of this law?  
(2.) How do the workers’ wages and assessments of working conditions change 
due to the fact that they are employed on a fixed-term basis in comparison to be-
ing employed on a permanent basis?      
                                              
19  Parts of this chapter are a based on HAGEN and FITZENBERGER (2004) discussing the applicability of 
microeconometric methods for the evaluation of the “Hartz Reform”.    
20  Following the literature, which is strongly linked to statistics and biometrics, the terms “treatment”, 
“programme”, “policy”, and “participation” are used interchangeably throughout this study. 
21  Note that the approach is not limited to persons but it can also be applied to firms, regions, or indus-
tries. Nevertheless, the terms “individual” and “person” are used throughout this chapter.    30 
(3.) How do employment opportunities of the unemployed change due to the fact 
that they enter into FTCs instead of continue searching for a job?  
In recent years, the development of econometrics of evaluation of active labour 
market  policy  (ALMP)  has  made  important  contributions  to  methods  dealing 
with these and similar questions.22 What follows is a presentation of methods 
applied in the econometric analyses of the subsequent chapters. 
3.2  Basics 
3.2.1  The Evaluation Problem in General and the Parameters of Interest 
Besides the exact definition of what the ‘treatment’ actually is, implying the 
definition  of  the  counterfactual  and  the  choice  of  untreated  individuals  as  a 
source of potential control groups, one has to be aware of the parameter of inter-
est which is to be estimated (see HECKMAN, LALONDE, and SMITH, 1999: Sub-
chapter 3.2 for a general discussion). In the evaluation literature various parame-
ters are estimated. The parameter of interest in most evaluation studies is the av-
erage effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) representing the mean effect 
for those who actually participate in the treatment. Another parameter often esti-
mated  is  the  average  treatment  effect  (ATE),  which  is  the  expected  effect  of 
treatment on a randomly drawn person from the population. The average effect of 
treatment on the untreated (ATU) measures the expected treatment effect for an 
individual  drawn  from  the  population  of  non-participants.  If  one  finds  that 
ATT>ATU, one can conclude that the participants are those individuals who gain 
the most with respect to their outcome variable.23 In the context of the method of 
instrumental variable estimation (see Section 3.3.3) there is another parameter in 
the presence of heterogeneous effects, the so-called local average treatment ef-
fect (LATE). The LATE is the average treatment effect induced by variation of the 
instrument. Since this parameter is not relevant for the empirical analyses in the 
subsequent chapters, it is not discussed any further.24  
What is the causal effect of a treatment 1, relative to another treatment 0, or 
non-treatment respectively, on an outcome variable of interest Y ?  
Let Y1 be the outcome that would result if an individual was exposed to treat-
ment 1, and Y0 the outcome that would result if the same individual received no 
                                              
22  The starting point of the econometric literature may be the seminal work by LALONDE (1986). For 
methodological surveys see HECKMAN, LALONDE, and SMITH (1999); BLUNDELL and COSTA DIAS 
(2002); ANGRIST and KRUEGER (1999); SMITH and TODD (2003); HUJER and CALIENDO (2001). A 
survey on the practical experiences with the evaluation of ALMP in Germany is provided by FITZEN-
BERGER and HUJER (2002).  
23  Note that ATT>ATU implies ATT > ATE > ATU.  Hence, if ATT<ATU, then also ATT < ATE < ATU. 
This holds since the ATE is a weighted average of the ATT and the ATU.  
24  Recently it  has been  shown  by HECKMAN and VYTLACIL (2001) that all parameters  used in the 
evaluation literature are weighted versions of one parameter, the so-called Marginal Treatment Effect. 
This parameter is also not discussed any further.  
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treatment.  { } 0,1 CÎ  is a dummy variable indicating, whether the treatment is ac-
tually received, i.e., C=1 in case of participation.  
For  an  individual  i,  the  actually  observed  employment  probability  is 
( ) 0 1 0 i i i i i Y Y C Y Y = + - . However, the individual causal effect  1 0 i i Y Y -  cannot be es-
timated,  since  an  individual  i  can  never  be  observed  in  two  different  states 
( ) 1 0 , i i Y Y  at the same point in time. Put differently, the counterfactuals ( ) 1 , 0 i i Y C =  
as well as  ( ) 0 , 1 i i Y C =  are not observable. While estimating the causal effect for 
an individual  ( ) 1 0 i i Y Y -  is never possible, it is possible for the mean (or other 
quantities) in samples of the population (see LECHNER, 1999). 
As mentioned above, the parameter of interest in most evaluation studies is the 
average effect of the treatment on the treated                  
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 ATT E Y Y C E Y C E Y C = - = = = - = ,          (1) 
which is the average effect on those who actually receive the treatment. In the 
application of Subchapter 6.4, for example, the  ATT  measures the change in the 
future  employment  prospects  of  unemployed  individuals  entering  into  FTCs 
which is caused by the fact that they actually entered into FTCs (C =1). The last 
term in Eq. (1) describes the hypothetical average employment probability, if the 
FTC workers had stayed unemployed. Of course, this term is not observable and 
has to be estimated using a control group of unemployed workers. Therefore, the 
evaluation problem can also be interpreted as a missing data problem. However, 
the average future employment probability of a randomly chosen unemployed 
worker is typically unsuitable since unemployed persons entering into FTCs and 
unemployed persons not entering into FTCs differ in characteristics which affect 
their future employment probability 
( ) ( ) 0 0 1 0 E Y C E Y C = ¹ = .                  (2) 
Eq. (2) states that using the (future) outcome variable of an untreated individual 
as an estimate for the hypothetical situation in which a treated individual had not 
participated is in general not valid. The groups differ due to observable and un-
observable characteristics giving rise to selection bias: the workers entering into 
FTCs are not a random sample of the population, but they may select themselves 
or may be selected on the basis of characteristics which influence their outcome 
(e.g., their future employment prospects).  
Accordingly, the average effect of treatment on the untreated (ATU) is  
   ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 = - = = = - = ATU E Y Y C E Y C E Y C ,      (3) 
which is the average treatment effect for an individual drawn from the population 
of  non-participants.  Obviously,  the  unknown  counterfactual  in  Eq.  (3)  is 
( ) 1 0 = E Y C , that is, the average outcome of non-participants if they had partici-
pated. The ATE is simply the weighted average of the ATT and the ATU 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 0 1 0 Pr 1 1 Pr 0 0 ATE E Y Y C E Y Y C C E Y Y C = - = = × - = + = × - = ,  (4)   32 
and denotes the average outcome of a person randomly drawn from the popula-
tion, which is treated with the probability  ( ) Pr 1 = C  and untreated with the prob-
ability  ( ) Pr 0 C = .  In  the  following,  the  estimation  techniques  are  mainly  dis-
cussed for the ATT, since the estimation procedures for the ATU and the ATE are 
quite similar. 
3.2.2  Regression: Homogeneous Versus Heterogeneous Effects and 
Sources of Selection Bias 
In this section, the evaluation problem is illustrated in terms of regression func-
tions for the more general case that panel data are available.25 For this purpose 
general outcome equations (invoking additive separability of the error terms) are 
assumed, with the individual denoted by i and the time period by t: 
   ( ) 1 1 1 it it it Y g X U = +                  (5) 
   ( ) 0 0 0 it it it Y g X U = + .   
The two potential outcomes  1 Y  and  0 Y  are explained through the functions  ( ) 1 g ×  
and  ( ) 0 g ×  by the vector of observable variables  it X . The unobserved error terms 
1it U and  0it U  are independently distributed across individuals and are uncorrelated 
with X and  ( ) 1 0 it E U =  and  ( ) 0 0 it E U = .  
Furthermore,  it  is  assumed  that  an  individual’s  decision  to  participate  in  a 
measure (or, for example, to take up a FTC job), can be parameterised as follows. 
For each individual i there is an index  i IN , which is explained through a function 
( ) f ×  by observable variables  i Z   
     ( ) i i i IN f Z V = +                 (6) 
with  i V  denoting an unobserved error term. Participation occurs if the index is 
larger than zero, that is, 
     
1      if   0
0     otherwise.
i i
i
C IN
C
= >
=
 
For some methods presented in the following sections Eq. (6) is estimated by a 
probability  model  for  ( ) Pr 1 C Z = .  This  is  termed  propensity  score,  selection 
equation, or control function, depending on the method used and the assumptions 
imposed.   
As described in the previous section, the observed individual outcome variable 
is  ( ) 1 0 1 it i it i it Y CY C Y = + - . Taking Eq. (5) into account this can be written as  
( ) ( )
*
0 0     it it it it i it Y g X X C U a = + +             (7)   
with  ( )
*
it it X a  denoting the individual-specific treatment impact for individual i 
given her or his characteristics  it X : 
      ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
*
1 0 1 0 1 0 it it it it it it it it X Y Y g X g X U U a = - = - + -     .      (8) 
                                              
25  This section is mainly based on BLUNDELL and COSTA DIAS (2002) as well as HECKMAN (2001). The 
special case of linear outcome equations is discussed in HECKMAN and ROBB (1985).   33 
Eq.  (8)  states  that  the  individual  treatment  effect  is  determined  through 
( ) ( ) 1 0 it it g X g X -     by observable differences  it X  as well as by differences in 
unobservable variables  [ ] 1 0 - it it U U . Since the treatment impact varies across in-
dividuals  (that  is,  their  observable  and  unoberservable  characteristics),  this  is 
called heterogeneous treatment effect. Hence, it can be distinguished between 
heterogeneity of the effect with respect to observable variables (characteristics) 
and heterogeneity of the effect with respect to unobserved variables (characteris-
tics).  
The treatment effect is homogeneous, leading to the common effect model, if 
the following conditions are simultaneously satisfied: 
–  There are no differences in the impact of unobserved variables (individuals’ 
characteristics)  between  the  treated  and  untreated  persons,  that  is, 
1 0 it it it U U U = =  (no heterogeneity with respect to unobservables); 
–  ( ) ( ) 1 0 it it g X g X -  is constant with respect to  it X , that is, individuals with dif-
ferent observable characteristics (old vs. young, women vs. men etc.) have the 
same individual-specific treatment effect. 
The homogeneous (common) effect model implies that the treatment effect is the 
same for every individual and, therefore, ATT = ATE = ATU and the outcome 
Eq. (7) simplifies to  ( )
*
0 = + + it it it i it Y g X C U a .  
Selection bias, as defined in Eq. (2) for the general case, is relevant in the re-
gression model (5), if   ( ) 0 it i E U C ¹ , that is, the participation dummy is correlated 
with the error term in the outcome equation. This, in turn, can be attributed to 
two reasons which are not mutually exclusive (see HECKMAN, ICHIMURA, SMITH, 
and TODD, 1998: 1029): First, the dependency between the error term ( ) 1 0 , it it U U  
in Eq. (5) and the observable variables  i Z  in Eq. (6), given the identity of  i Z  and 
it X  in Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), being termed selection on observables. Second, the 
dependency between the error terms ( ) 1 0 , it it U U  and  i V , being termed selection on 
unobservables.  
More generally, three sources for an inconsistent estimation of the treatment ef-
fect can be identified: 
First, there may be (as already mentioned) differences in the distribution of X 
variables among participants and non-participants (selection on observables). In 
the extreme case, for particular values or ranges of observable variables neither 
participants nor non-participants do exist. This is termed lack of common sup-
port. For some nonexperimental approaches, such as the propensity score match-
ing estimator, the common support condition is crucial: a person with particular 
observable X variables can be participant as well as nonparticipant with a prob-
ability strictly larger than zero and smaller than 100%, that is,  ( ) 0 Pr 1 1 < = < C X . 
In empirical (labour) economics many examples for lack of common support can 
be found:   34 
–  in case of the evaluation of the employment effects of a training measure for 
unemployed workers without formal qualification it is obviously difficult to 
define a reliable control group of non-participants if all unemployed persons 
without qualification within a particular local labour market participate in this 
measure; 
–  when estimating the productivity effects of further training on productivity at 
the firm level it turns out that there are hardly any larger firms which do not 
offer further training. Thus without further (parametric) assumptions, it may 
be impossible to generate a reliable control group for larger firms.  
Lack of common support does not imply that treatment effects cannot be identi-
fied in general. Some methods (difference-in-differences, see Section 3.4.2 and 
the so-called regression discontinuity design) are based on the fact that an exoge-
nous policy variation (so-called natural experiments, see Section 3.2.4) induces 
that some persons are participants or non-participants in a measure with a prob-
ability of (almost) 100%. 
Even if one decides to compare treated and untreated persons only within the 
common support, both groups may still be different with respect to the distribu-
tion of their X variables. Assuming that there are also non-participants from the 
training measure for unemployed in above example, participants may be younger 
on average, and thus may have better labour market prospects. 
Second, there may be selection bias due to (unobserved) variables which are not 
included in the vector X, but which affect participation as well as outcome (selec-
tion on unobservables).26 These variables may be unobserved since they are ei-
ther not included in the dataset, or it is generally impossible or difficult to collect 
these variables. For example, important variables such as a person’s ability or 
motivation  are  usually  not  directly  measurable.  Taking  up  the  example  from 
above, one may assume that it is possible to generate a control group for the par-
ticipants in training, which has, on average, the same observable characteristics 
(age, sex, health status, place of residence etc.) as the group of participants. Nev-
ertheless, participants may be more motivated to take up a job on average and 
therefore more willing to invest in human capital by participating in a training 
measure. This example demonstrates that selection on unobservables is likely in 
practice. Therefore, when applying methods based on the assumption that selec-
tion on unobservables is not relevant, a justification based on theoretical consid-
erations is necessary. 
Third, the treatment effect may be inconsistently estimated in case of specifica-
tion errors in the participation Eq. (6) and/or the outcome Eq. (5). This is espe-
cially relevant in case of parametric (regression) approaches. For example, cer-
tain assumptions with regard to the (joint) distribution of the error terms could be 
incorrect. Assumptions with regard to the functional form of the equations could 
                                              
26  This corresponds to the classical selection problem as addressed in the models by HECKMAN (1978, 
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be wrong, that is, the imposed  ( ) it g X  may not correspond to the true relationship. 
Particularly, the heterogeneity of the effects requires a corresponding interaction 
of effects in parametric approaches, which may be mistakenly omitted by the re-
searcher. 
3.2.3  Social Experiments 
Social experiments randomly choose participants from a group of people who 
are potential participants. This implies that the assignment to treatment is com-
pletely independent of the possible outcome or the treatment effect. The group of 
untreated is statistically equivalent to the treated group in all dimensions except 
for the treatment status. Even though social experiments are not relevant for the 
subsequent  analyses  they  are  an  interesting  benchmark  for  non-experimental 
econometric approaches. First of all, the performance of non-experimental esti-
mators has been checked by using experimental data.27 Second and more impor-
tant,  non-experimental  estimators  attempt  to  simulate  experimental  situations 
(“quasi-experimental methods”). Social experiments should not be mixed up with 
natural experiments, which are discussed in the following section. 
3.2.4  Natural Experiments 
A  natural  experiment  is  an  exogenous  source  of  (policy)  variation,  which 
causes a randomly chosen subpopulation to participate in a measure or to be 
within the scope of a regulation or reform, while other subpopulations do not par-
ticipate or are not within the scope of the regulation or reform. The central as-
sumption states that the assignment to the groups is exogenous with respect to the 
outcome  variable  (policy  exogeneity).  ‘Group’  may  mean  age-group  or  other 
demographic characteristics, region, or (as in Subchapter 4.4) establishment-size-
group. By definition, the common support assumption is not given as the prob-
ability of participation of non-participants equals zero. Thus methods being based 
on the common support condition such as propensity score matching are not suit-
able in this case.   
In empirical economics there are various examples for policy changes being in-
terpreted as natural experiments in order to estimate causal (treatment) effects:  
–  In the eighties, entitlement to unemployment benefit was extended for older 
workers in Germany. This has been used in a couple of studies, starting with 
HUNT (1995), to identify the effect of unemployment benefit entitlement on 
unemployment duration (see Section 3.4.2).  
–  AUTOR (2003) assesses whether there is a causal relation between the increase 
of  dismissal  protection  (in  terms  of  decline  of  “employment-at-will”28)  in 
                                              
27  See, for example, SMITH and TODD (2003). 
28  The common law doctrine of employment-at-will, which has been recognised throughout the U.S. 
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some federal states of the U.S. and the growth of temporary work agency em-
ployment. Using the state level variation as a natural experiment within a dif-
ference-in-differences framework (see Section 3.4.2), the result is obtained 
that the increase in firing costs explains as much as 20% of the growth of 
temporary employment between 1973 and 1995. 
In Subchapter 4.4, a change of the employment threshold for the application of 
the Protection Against Dismissal Law is used to estimate the effect of firing costs 
for permanent workers on the establishments’ use of FTC work.  
If the policy exogeneity assumption is fulfilled, natural experiments can be used 
straightforward by difference-in-differences estimators (see Section 3.4.2) for the 
estimation of treatment effects.  
However, exogenous policy variations do not always generate clearly defined 
groups  of  treated  and  untreated  individuals.  Instead  it  may  only  increase  the 
probability of participation for certain groups while the participation is also af-
fected by other factors (see MEYER, 1995). In this case, natural experiments can 
be used within an instrumental variable approach. 
3.2.5  SUTVA: Possible General Equilibrium Effects and Indirect Effects 
of Fixed-Term Contracts  
A fundamental requirement for the validity of empirical studies based on partial 
equilibrium estimators is the stable unit-treatment value assumption (SUTVA; see 
RUBIN, 1980b and WOOLDRIDGE, 2002): there is no interference between indi-
viduals leading to different outcomes depending on treatments other individuals 
received. In particular, the labour market situations of the control group (consist-
ing of non-participants) must not be affected by the participating individuals. If 
the SUTVA is violated, the causal effect estimated by the partial analysis at the 
microeconomic level is not informative with regard to the impact on the econ-
omy at large.29 In the context of the evaluation of ALMP these effects on non-
participants are called indirect effects of the treatment. HECKMAN, LALONDE, and 
SMITH (1999: Subchapter 9.1) cite the following indirect effects: displacement 
effects, i.e. jobs created by one programme are at the expense of other jobs; sub-
stitution effects, i.e. jobs created for a certain category of workers replace jobs for 
other categories because relative wage costs have changed; deadweight effects, 
i.e. subsidising hiring that would have occurred in the absence of the programme; 
tax effects, i.e. effects of taxation required to finance the programmes on the be-
haviour of everyone in the society. 
What does this assumption mean for the analyses at hand and what may be indi-
rect effects in the context of FTCs? Obviously, the SUTVA is very likely to be 
                                                                                                                                     
ment relationships at any time for any reason unless explicitly contracted otherwise (see AUTOR, 
2003).  
29  Put  differently,  if  the  SUTVA  is  violated  the  “no-treatment”  benchmark  is  contaminated  by  the 
treatment (see HECKMAN, LALONDE, and SMITH, 1999: 2035).    37 
violated in reality, a statement which is also predicted by theoretical models ex-
plaining the macroeconomic impact of FTCs.30 Nevertheless, in line with previ-
ous literature, the microeconometric analysis is regarded here as a complemen-
tary starting-point for further analyses using other (macroeconomic or general 
equilibrium) methods. Nonetheless, the plausibility of the SUTVA and possible 
implications of its violation are discussed in the context of the analyses in the 
respective chapters. 
3.2.6  Basic Approaches for the Generation of Control Groups 
Depending on the dataset used, there are generally two different possibilities to 
generate the counterfactual outcome by a control group: the control group con-
sists of participants prior to entering the programme or the control group consists 
of persons who (at least) do not participate during the treatment under observa-
tion. Given these possibilities, there are three general approaches to estimate the 
mean counterfactual situation  ( ) 0 1 E Y C = : (1.) before-after, (2.) cross-section, or 
(3.) difference-in-differences estimators (see HECKMAN, LALONDE, and SMITH, 
1999). All estimators presented in the following sections belong to one of these 
approaches.   
 The applicability of the methods presented in the next sections depends on the 
availability of panel data or cross-section data, on the relevance of the different 
components of the selection bias (as previously discussed), and finally, on the 
researcher’s willingness to impose assumptions with respect to functional forms, 
distribution of error terms, and exogeneity of variables.  
In Section 3.4.1, it is discussed that the before-after estimator, which in princi-
ple  means  to  compare  treated  persons  with  themselves  before  the  treatment 
(treated persons serve as their own control group), is based on assumptions which 
may not be realistic in many cases. Therefore, one usually tries to generate the 
control group of untreated persons in order to apply a cross-section or a differ-
ence-in-differences estimator. However, it is not necessary to impose that an un-
treated person is a person that never participates. For example, it suffices to de-
fine a control group in such a manner that a control individual is not treated be-
fore calendar period t+1, given that the corresponding treated person participates 
in period t (see Subchapter 6.4).31  
                                              
30  For example, BOERI (1999) predicts that re-employment chances of the unemployed are reduced by 
the fact that they have to compete with FTC workers on vacancies; BENTOLILA and SAINT-PAUL 
(1992) indicate that FTCs increase employment stability of permanent workers; and BENTOLILA and 
DOLADO (1994) point to positive effects of FTCs on aggregate wages (see Subchapter 4.2). 
31  To the best of my knowledge, this approach was proposed for the first time by SIANESI (2004). Ru-
diments can already be found in LECHNER (1999) and BRODATY, CÉPON, and FOUGÈRE (2001). Re-
cently this approach has been formalised by FREDRISKSSON and JOHANSSON (2003). LECHNER and 
MIQUEL (2002) show that the approach may be included in the framework of dynamic treatments and 
derive the identifying assumptions.    38 
3.3  Evaluation Methods Requiring Cross Sectional Data 
The methods presented in the following sections can be applied to the case of 
treated and untreated individuals being observed only for one time period. This 
does not imply that they are not applicable to panel data.  
3.3.1  Propensity Score Matching 
In recent years, propensity score matching has probably become the most popu-
lar approach to the evaluation of labour market programmes.32 It is, furthermore, 
increasingly applied to other topics as well.33 The basic idea of matching is to 
match a (group of) untreated individual(s) with similar characteristics to every 
treated individual. The resulting control group is used to estimate the counterfac-
tual outcome. In Chapter 5 propensity score matching is applied to estimate the 
ATT of FTCs on wages and subjective assessments of the working conditions, 
using a control group of permanent workers. In Subchapter 6.4, the ATT of enter-
ing into FTCs from unemployment on long-term employment prospects is esti-
mated using a control group of unemployed persons who do not enter into FTCs 
in the same months. 
Basic Assumptions 
In this subsection, only the estimation of the ATT is discussed in detail. The es-
timation of the ATE and ATU is analogous in many respects. Whenever the esti-
mation of the ATE requires further assumptions, it is mentioned explicitly.   
Let X again be a vector of (pre-treatment) conditioning variables that are unaf-
fected by the treatment, such as sex, age, and qualification. The statistical match-
ing estimator may solve the problem of selection bias (due to differences in ob-
servable characteristics) by imposing the Conditional Independence Assumption 
(CIA) 
0 ^ Y C X     (for ATT)                  (9) 
        1 0 , ^ Y Y C X     (for ATE)            (10) 
where ^ denotes independence.34 Assumption (9) for the ATT states that the out-
come of the untreated individuals is independent of the participation status C, 
after controlling for observable variables X (see  LECHNER, 1998). Assumption 
(10) states that the estimation of the ATE requires that the outcome variable is in 
both states independent of the participation status, after conditioning on X.35 The 
                                              
32  See, e.g., HUJER and CALIENDO (2001). 
33  For example, BLACK and SMITH (2003) estimate the effects of college quality on earnings. LECHNER 
and VAZQUEZ-ALVAREZ (2003) use matching to identify the effect of disabilities on labour market 
outcomes.   
34  The CIA is also termed ‘ignorability of treatment’ or ‘selection on observables’.  
35  It actually suffices to impose the conditional mean independence assumption if one only wants to 
estimate the mean ATT. This assumption is weaker than the CIA since it requires only the mean out-
comes to be independent of  the treatment conditional on  X (see WOOLDRIDGE 2002: Subchapter   39 
CIA means, for example, that the individual participation decision ( i C ) must not 
depend on heterogeneity of the effect with respect to unobserved variables (char-
acteristics) of the individual. If the treatment effect is higher for motivated indi-
viduals and if these persons participate with a higher probability, the CIA is vio-
lated and a selection bias remains. Obviously, the vector X should contain all 
variables that are thought to simultaneously influence participation and outcome. 
If this condition is fulfilled, one can assume that 
( ) ( ) 0 0 1, 0, = = = E Y C X E Y C X .            (11) 
By using this expression it is possible to estimate the ATT expressed in Eq. (1) 
consistently. The plausibility of the CIA is discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 
in the context of the applications.  
Particularly, if the vector X is large and contains many continuous variables, it 
may be quite unlikely that a match between all members of the treatment and 
non-treatment groups can be found for every combination of X (‘curse of dimen-
sionality’; HECKMAN, ICHIMURA, and TODD, 1997). However, as ROSENBAUM 
and RUBIN (1983, 1985) show, it suffices to match treated and untreated persons 
on the conditional probability of participation given the vector of observed char-
acteristics.  This  conditional  probability  of  participation  ( ) ( ) Pr 1 e X C X º =   is 
called the propensity score. For the ATT the result by ROSENBAUM and RUBIN 
(1983) implies that if the outcome  0 Y  is independent of programme participation 
conditional on X, it is also independent of programme participation conditional 
on  ( ) e X . So Eq. (11) can be rewritten as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0 1, 0, E Y C e X E Y C e X = = = .                   (12) 
Eq. (12) allows to reduce the high-dimensional vector X to a one-dimensional 
probability  ( ) e X  and reduces the problem of finding appropriate matches. The 
propensity score  ( ) e X  can be estimated by standard parametric approaches like 
the probit or the logit model (see DEHEJIA and WAHBA, 1999).  
A further necessary assumption is to rule out the possible phenomenon of per-
fect predictability of the participation status C conditional on X. Therefore, a 
common support condition has to be imposed 
      ( ) Pr 1 1 C X = <         (for ATT)            (13) 
( ) 0 Pr 1 1 C X < = <         (for ATE).           (14) 
Assumption (14) for the ATE guarantees that persons with the same values of 
their X variables all have a positive probability of being both participants and 
non-participants, i.e., any individual constitutes a possible participant and possi-
ble non-participant (see HECKMAN, LALONDE, and SMITH, 1999: 1920). Assump-
tion (13) for the ATT is weaker since it only requires that every participant could 
also be a nonparticipant. In terms of the analysis of Chapter 6, this means that 
                                                                                                                                     
18.3).  However,  following  the  bulk  of  the  literature,  the  CIA  is  used  (see  LECHNER,  2002:  62). 
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every individual entering into a FTC could, given her or his characteristics, in 
general also have stayed unemployed in order to keep on searching. In Chapter 5, 
this means that every FTC worker could in principle also hold a permanent con-
tract.  
 In concrete terms, propensity score matching estimators work as follows. In the 
first step, a probability model is used to explain the participation status C by the 
vector  X  (possibly  including  interaction  terms  and  polynomials  of  X).  Subse-
quently, for each person (that is, for treated and untreated persons) the propensity 
score  ( ) e X  is predicted using the estimated equation from the first step. Follow-
ing the literature, the predicted linear index rather than the predicted conditional 
probability is used in both analyses of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 (see LECHNER, 
1998). The reason for this is that individuals in the tails of the distribution can be 
distinguished more exactly. Nevertheless, to simplify matters the term ‘propen-
sity score’ is also used for the predicted linear index in the following. In the third 
step, for each person i from the treatment group, a (group of) comparable un-
treated  person(s)  is  matched.  Matches  are  constructed  on  the  basis  of  a 
neighbourhood  ( ) i e ￿ , where  i e  is the estimated propensity score for a treated 
person i. Let  0 N  denote the number of observations in the subsample of the un-
treated, and  1 N  the number of observations in the subsample of the treated. Then 
the individuals in the untreated subsample who are neighbours to i, are individu-
als  { } 0 j C Î =  for whom  ( ) j i e e Î￿ , i.e., the set of persons  ( ) { } i j i A j e e = Î￿ .  
The effect of the treatment for each observation i in the treatment group is esti-
mated by subtracting the weighted average of the outcome of the untreated group 
observations from the outcome of the treatment observation i (see HECKMAN, 
LALONDE, and SMITH, 1999). Hence, the ATT is estimated by  
  ( )
0 1
1 0
1 1 1
1
,
N N
i j
i j
Y w i j Y
N = =
 
-  
  ∑ ∑ .                         (15) 
Different  matching  estimators  differ  in  the  weights  ( ) [ ] , 0,1 w i j Î   (with 
( )
0
1
, 1
N
j
w i j
=
= ∑ ), which are associated to the members of the control group and in 
the way the neighbourhood is defined. Basically, there is a negative association 
between  ( ) , w i j  and  i j e e - . The more dissimilar j is to i, in terms of the esti-
mated propensity scores, the smaller is the associated weight  ( ) , w i j  of the con-
trol individual j. The extreme case is nearest neighbour matching (see next sub-
section), where only one nearest neighbour in terms of the estimated propensity 
score is used as a control for one treated person, that is,  ( ) , w i j  is either 1 or 0.       
Asymptotically all matching estimators produce the same results, because in an 
arbitrarily large sample they all compare only exact matches (see BLACK and 
SMITH, 2003). “In finite samples, different matching estimators produce different 
estimates because of systematic differences between them in which observations   41 
they assign positive weight, how much weight they assign them, and how they 
handle (implicitly) the support problem.” (BLACK and SMITH, 2003: 17). This is 
also  found  here:  In  the  application  of  Subchapter  6.4,  nearest-neighbour 
matching  seems  to  generate  the  most  reliable  results,  while  the  analyses  in 
Chapter 5 seem to be in favour of kernel-based matching. 
Nearest-Neighbour Matching 
Nearest-neighbour matching (NN-matching) defines the neighbourhood  i A  of 
the treated individual i in such a way, that only the untreated j is selected as a 
control individual that is closest to i in terms of  i e  and  j e : 
{ } { }
0 1,...,   min i i j j N A j e e
Î = - ,                         (16) 
where   is a metric measuring the distance between  i e  and  j e . Eq. (16) states 
that the unemployed worker j with the value of  j e  that is nearest to  i e , is selected 
as a match and is defined as a control for the treated (FTC worker) i. The weight 
( ) , w i j =1 is attached to this selected control, i.e., there is only one control per 
treated individual.   
NN-matching can either be performed with or without replacement. With re-
placement means that each untreated individual can serve as a control for more 
than one treated individual. This can improve the matching quality, but it in-
creases the related standard error of the estimated effect, which has to be consid-
ered when estimating the standard errors (see the subsection below for the calcu-
lation of the standard errors). In order to reduce the risk of ‘bad matches’, a 
modified version of NN-matching, called ‘caliper matching’, can be used (see 
COCHRAN and RUBIN, 1973). For a pre-specified level of tolerance  0 Y >  (cali-
per), the treated individual i is matched to the untreated individual  j so that: 
  i j e e - < Y.                                (17) 
If none of the untreated persons is within the interval (caliper)  Y  around the 
treated individual i, the individual i is left unmatched and is not used for the es-
timation. This is one possible method for imposing the common support condi-
tion (see subsection below for a discussion of this issue). 
Kernel-Based Matching Approaches 
Simple NN-matching uses only a fraction of the information on the untreated 
individuals, as only one untreated individual is matched to one treated individual. 
Therefore, it is associated with a loss of efficiency (see FRÖLICH, 2004). In the 
extreme case, kernel-based matching estimators construct matches by calculating 
weighted averages of the outcomes of all individuals in the sample of untreated 
(within the common support), with the weights depending on the similarity of the 
treated and the untreated individuals in terms of distance between  i e  and  j e . Thus 
the variance of the estimate is reduced (efficiency gain), which may, however, be 
associated with an increased bias (imbalance in observable characteristics). In   42 
general,  there  is  a  trade-off  between  minimising  the  bias  and  minimising  the 
variance when choosing a  matching estimator (see the discussion in SIANESI, 
2004). 
As discussed in detail by SMITH and TODD (2003), the non-treatment outcome 
of the treated individuals can be estimated using a nonparametric kernel regres-
sion as weighted outcome of all untreated individuals within a neighbourhood. 
For Eq. (15) the weight is estimated as 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) 0
,
j i
j i
k C
G e e h
w i j
G e e h
Î =
-
=
- ∑
 ,            (18) 
where  ( ) G ×  is a kernel function, and h is a bandwidth parameter which goes to 
zero as  0 N  goes to infinity. The smaller the bandwidth the higher is the weights 
( ) , w i j  associated to dissimilar individuals. The neighbourhood depends on the 
kernel used (see SMITH and TODD, 2003). 
In Chapter 5 another kernel-based matching estimator is checked, called local 
linear matching. This is the preferred one by HECKMAN, ICHIMURA, SMITH, and 
TODD  (1998)  as  well  as  by  BERGEMANN,  FITZENBERGER,  and  SPECKESSER 
(2004). The non-treatment outcome of the treated individuals is estimated by a 
local linear estimator (see FAN, 1992). The associated weighting function can be 
found, for example, in SMITH and TODD (2003).36 As discussed in greater detail 
by SMITH and TODD (2003) as well as by FRÖLICH (2004), local linear matching 
may have advantages over kernel matching under certain assumptions.  
For the implementation of kernel and local-linear matching, one has to choose a 
specific kernel function  ( ) G ×  and a bandwidth parameter h. It is accepted opinion 
that the choice of kernel is not as important as the choice of bandwidth (see FAN 
and GIJBELS, 1997; PAGAN and ULLAH, 1999).37 In the analyses of the subse-
quent chapters an Epanechnikov kernel is used. An attractive feature of the Epan-
echnikov kernel is that it converges at a faster rate than, for example, the Gaus-
sian kernel because it implicitly imposes the common support condition through 
the choice of bandwidth (see BLACK and SMITH, 2003).  
Following  a  couple  of  studies38,  the  bandwidth  is  chosen  according  to 
SILVERMAN’s  (1986)  rule  of  thumb  ( ) ( ) ( )
25 75
0.2 0.9 min sd ,
1.349
i i
i
q e q e
h e N
-   -
= × ×  
 
, 
where  ( ) sd i e  is the standard deviation of the estimated propensity score,  ( )
25
i q e  
and  ( )
75
i q e  are the 25
th  and 75
th  quantile of  i e , and N is the sample size. 
Recently, BLACK and SMITH (2003) proposed leave-one-out validation for the 
bandwidth choice, which may be more appropriate than Silverman’s rule (see 
                                              
36  This complex formula is not presented here, since it does not lead to additional insights.   
37  The kernel function has only to fulfil the requirement to be non-negative, symmetric and unimodal.  
38  See, for example, BERGEMANN, FITZENBERGER, and SPECKESSER (2004) as well as HECKMAN, ICHI-
MURA, SMITH, and TODD (1998).   43 
also FRÖLICH, 2004). The basic idea of leave-one-out validation is to leave an 
untreated observation  out and to minimise the forecast error in out-of-sample 
predictions of the untreated observation left out (see PAGAN and ULLAH, 1999). 
In Chapter 5, this approach turns out to be not feasible due to computational rea-
sons.  
Mahalanobis Distance 
In  previous  empirical  research  the  so-called  Mahalanobis  distance  has  fre-
quently been used as a method of matching on additional variables besides the 
predicted propensity score (see, for example, LECHNER, 1999; HUJER, MAURER, 
and  WELLNER,  1998).  Using  variables  (a  subset  of  conditioning  variables  in-
cluded in X which are assumed to be important) in addition to the predicted pro-
pensity score may decrease the selection bias, and may function as an additional 
protection against any impact due to inconsistent estimation of the propensity 
score.  The  propensity  score  in  combination  with  the  additional  variables  is 
termed balancing score  ( ) b X  (see ROSENBAUM and RUBIN, 1983). Matching on 
the balancing score is performed using the Mahalanobis distance (see RUBIN, 
1980a), which is again a method of obtaining a one-dimensional measure of simi-
larity. Again, NN-matching as well as different kernel-based matching estimators 
are applicable. 
Imposing the Common Support Condition 
Unlike parametric estimators, the consistency of matching crucially depends on 
the common support condition. In case of propensity score matching the condi-
tion requires the distribution of the estimated propensity of the treated 
1 e  to be 
entirely overlapped by the distribution of the propensity score of the untreated 
0 e . For example, in case of the analyses of Chapter 6, this means that for every 
unemployed person entering into a FTC a sufficiently similar person (in terms of 
the estimated propensity score) staying unemployed in the same calendar month 
has to be available. 
Usually there are two approaches to the problem of lacking common support 
(see LECHNER, 2001a): Either matching is performed only for the sub-population 
within the common support, or the problem is simply ignored. In case of NN-
matching the latter may imply using untreated neighbours who are very different 
from the treated individuals. This approach can obviously lead to biased esti-
mates due to ‘bad matches’. Although the first approach is appropriate for obtain-
ing a consistent estimate for the region of common support (i.e., the region of the 
distribution in which each treated individual is juxtaposed to a sufficiently simi-
lar untreated individual in terms of the propensity score), it may be misleading: 
“When treatment effects are heterogeneous inside and outside the common sup-
port, then the estimated effect does no longer correspond to the original parame-
ter of interest.” (LECHNER, 2001a: 21). Otherwise, if the treatment effect is ho-  44 
mogeneous at least within the treatment group, no additional problems appear 
besides the loss of information and thus loss of efficiency of the estimator (see 
BLUNDELL and COSTA DIAS, 2000). 
In concrete terms, the following approaches are used to impose the common 
support condition represented in Eq. (13) and Eq. (14): 
–  The treatment observations whose estimated propensity score is higher than 
the maximum or less than the minimum estimated propensity score of the 
controls are dropped.  
–  Using caliper matching: Imposing a caliper, that is, dropping treated observa-
tions for which no sufficiently similar controls can be found, is a way of im-
posing the common support. 
–  Choosing a kernel which does not have a positive density over the whole real 
line, that is, a kernel which is zero outside a neighbourhood of the origin. This 
is true for the Epanechnikov and the Triangle kernel but not for the Normal 
kernel.   
Further approaches, not being applied in this study, can be found in LECHNER 
(2001a) and HECKMAN, ICHIMURA, SMITH, and TODD (1998).  
Obtaining Standard Errors 
In order to test the statistical significance of the estimated treatment effects, 
standard errors have to be computed. A potential difficulty arises from the fact 
that the estimated variance of the treatment effect should also include the vari-
ance  due  to  the  estimation  of  the  propensity  score  and  the  imposition  of  the 
common support. A possible solution to the problem is calculating the variance 
based on bootstrapping (see LECHNER, 2002).39 Each bootstrap draw includes a 
re-estimation of the propensity score, imposing the common support, and (in case 
of kernel-based matching) the re-calculation of the optimal bandwidth.  
The method of bootstrapping is a popular re-sampling method used to estimate, 
inter alia, standard errors in case analytical estimates are biased or even unavail-
able. The basic idea can be described for a sample mean as follows (see BROWN-
STONE and VALLETTA, 2001): The mean of an observed sample typically differs 
from the mean of the underlying population due to sampling errors. The sampling 
distribution  (including  the  standard  error)  summarises  how  the  sample  means 
would vary, if a large number of samples were drawn from this population. Now, 
the essential idea is to assume that the observed sample is the population and to 
draw (bootstrap) samples from this approximate population (which is actually the 
sample) to estimate the sampling distribution. The bootstrap samples are drawn 
from the observed dataset (sample) with replacement, and the mean is computed 
for each boostrap sample. Thus drawing N bootstrap samples leads to N esti-
                                              
39  For kernel matching estimators, HECKMAN, ICHIMURA, and TODD (1998) present analytical formulae 
for the estimation of the variance. To the best of my knowledge, this has not been used in applied 
work so far, possibly due to complexity.    45 
mated means. The distribution of these means approximates the sampling distri-
bution (and thus the standard error) of the population mean. In case of kernel-
based matching estimators of Chapter 5, this bootstrap approach is adopted.   
The obvious practical problem is that bootstrapping is very time-consuming. In 
case of 500 draws (which seems to be rather a lower limit in the literature), all 
estimation steps described above have to be repeated 500 times. Therefore, in the 
analysis of Subchapter 6.4 boostrapping turns out to be infeasible. For the esti-
mated ATT by NN-matching, the following formula may be applied (see HUJER, 
CALIENDO, and THOMSEN, 2003 as well as  LECHNER, 2001b):   
( ) ( )
( )
( )
0
2
1
1 0 2
1 1
1
1 0
N
j
j Var ATT Var Y C Var Y C
N N
w
= = = + =
∑
,      (19) 
which takes into account that matching with replacement is performed, i.e., an 
untreated individual can serve for more than one treated individual as a control. 
j w  denotes the number of times an untreated person is used as a control. As men-
tioned above, the variance increases with w . When using Eq. (19), independent 
observations, fixed weights, and homoskedasticity of the outcome variable within 
the treated and the control group have to be assumed. Furthermore, the variance 
is assumed not to depend on the fact that the propensity score is estimated and 
that the estimated probabilities are applied to a reduced sample due to the com-
mon support condition. Using Eq. (19)  may be justified by the result that there 
seems to be little difference between the bootstrapped variance and the variance 
calculated using this formula (see LECHNER, 2002). 
Estimating Heterogeneous Effects Using Propensity Score Matching 
It is quite straightforward to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects with re-
spect to observable variables X. Note that this corresponds to simple interactions 
between X variables and the treatment dummy within a regression approach. In 
general, there are three different valid approaches used in applied studies: (1.) 
one may perform the whole analysis (the estimation of the propensity score as 
well as the matching) completely separate for each subgroup (applied in Chapter 
5); (2.) one may use the whole sample, but may include subgroup dummies in the 
mahalanobis distance and thus imposing that only individuals within the same 
group  are  matched  (applied  in  Subsection  6.4.6.3);  (3.)  one  may  first  do  the 
whole analysis for the whole sample and afterwards estimate regressions with 
interaction effects on the matched sample.  
3.3.2  Parametric Regression Methods Versus Matching  
As indicated in Section 3.2.2, using parametric methods may be associated with 
some drawbacks in comparison to propensity score matching methods (see, e.g., 
BLACK and SMITH, 2003):   46 
(1.) regression models often impose the assumption of a linear functional form 
and linear additive (common) effects; 
(2.) regression  models  can  be  estimated  in  areas  without  common  support  by 
their functional form assumptions. Put differently, parametric models conceal the 
common support problem and may lead to results which are not justified by the 
underlying data; 
(3.) estimating regression equations requires  ( ) , 0 E U X C = , while matching only 
needs  ( ) ( ) 1 0 , 1 , 0 E U X C E U X C = = = . 
However, arguments (1.) and (2.) are not conclusive against regression meth-
ods. A linear model can approximate non-linear functional forms to a large de-
gree by using higher order and interaction terms (see WOOLDRIDGE, 2002: 612). 
Furthermore, the estimation could be restricted to the common support. The area 
of common support is, however, harder to be defined without a propensity score.  
Point (3.) is a remaining advantage of matching methods over regression analy-
ses: The dependency of C (and X) with the error term U does not have to be zero 
as in regression analysis, but it has to be the same in the treatment and control 
group. Put differently, matching does not require the absence of selection bias 
(selection on unobservables), but the selection bias to be balanced in the treat-
ment and the control group conditional on X. Furthermore, assuming that the de-
pendency between X and U is balanced in the treatment and the control group by 
the matching estimator, one can use conditioning variables which would be cor-
related  with  the  error  term  in  a  parametric  regression  model  (see  LECHNER, 
1998). In Chapter 5 and Subchapter 6.4, this property is repeatedly used to justify 
the CIA and the application of propensity score matching.      
3.3.3  Instrumental Variable Approaches and Selection Models 
The approaches addressed in the following may eliminate bias due to selection 
on  unobservables  without  the  necessity  of  panel  data  to  be  available.  In  ex-
change, exogeneity assumptions and/or assumptions on the (joint) distribution of 
error terms have to be imposed, which are partly untestable. Since the application 
of these approaches does not yield reasonable and presentable results in Chap-
ter 5, only the basic idea is presented.   
All Instrumental Variable (IV) approaches (and selection models, see below), 
are based on the assumption that there is at least one IV 
* Z , which affects par-
ticipation (C), but has no direct effect on the outcome (Y). There is an analogy 
between IVs and experiments: As flipping a coin in case of an experiment deter-
mines participation but not the outcome, an IV affects C but not Y. For the exam-
ple of a linear model, the following two conditions are prerequisites for a variable 
* Z  to be a suitable IV:    
( ) ( )
* * Pr 1 , Pr 1 , ' C X Z z C X Z z = = ¹ = =          (20)   47 
where  z  and  ' z  are two values of 
* Z . The assumption of Eq. (20) simply states 
that changes in the value of 
* Z  (which must have at least two values  z  and  ' z ) 
must affect the conditional participation probability. The condition  
( ) ( )
* , , , E U X Z C E U X C = ,            (21) 
requires that 
* Z  is unrelated to the error term in the outcome equation(s), condi-
tional on the included observable variables X. Thus the only way 
* Z  is allowed to 
affect the outcomes is through the participation status (exclusion restriction). In 
practice, it turns out that it is often difficult or even impossible to find reliable 
exclusion restrictions. In case of the analyses of Chapter 5, one needs an IV af-
fecting the probability of holding a FTC (instead of a permanent contract) but not 
wages. Recent literature states that valid IVs are generated by natural experi-
ments (see ANGRIST and KRUEGER, 2001). In Chapter 5, the reverse direction of 
the reform of the Protection Against Dismissal Law (lowering the employment 
threshold) as discussed above, is used as an IV (which, however, turns out to be 
not suitable as it is not sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variable). 
Selection models and switching regression models are akin to IV methods. An 
important result is found by VYTLACIL (2002). He shows that the non-parametric 
identification of selection models and instrumental variable models require ex-
actly the same assumptions and, hence, both models identify the same causal ef-
fect. Non-parametric selection models and instrumental variable models are iden-
tical.  
3.4  Evaluation Methods Requiring Panel Data 
If longitudinal data are available, that is, individuals are observed for at least 
one period before and one period after the treatment, there are more possibilities 
to estimate the hypothetical outcome of non-treatment for the treated. Assuming 
that the error term can be additively decomposed into a (time invariant) individ-
ual-specific effect  i a , a common macroeconomic time effect  t q , and a random 
individual effect  it e  (classical error term), Eq. (5) can be re-written as    
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 it i it i it i t it Y C g X C g X a q e = + - + + + .        (22) 
3.4.1  Before-After Estimator 
The basic principle of this approach is to use the pre-treatment outcome as an 
estimate for the unobserved counterfactual outcome of the participants in case of 
nonparticipation by differencing out the unobserved individual effects  i a . The 
approach can be interpreted as a fixed-effects estimator. To  simplify  matters, 
only two time periods are assumed in the following: t´ denotes the period before 
and  t  the  period  after  the  treatment.40  The  identifying  assumption  is  (see 
HECKMAN, LALONDE, and SMITH, 1999: 1892) 
                                              
40  A generalisation is straightforward and does not lead to additional insights.   48 
( ) 0 0 1 0 t t E Y Y C ¢ - = = .              (23) 
If this is valid, the before-after estimator is given by   
( ) 1 0 1 t t C Y Y ¢ = -                   (24) 
where C=1 means, that only individuals are taken into account which participate 
between t´ and t, and the bar denotes sample means. The individual treatment 
effect for every  individual i may be written as 
    ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 0 0 0 it it it it it it Y Y Y Y Y Y ¢ ¢ - = - + - .            (25) 
The last term  ( ) 0 0 it it Y Y ¢ -  is the  bias of the estimated  individual effect, which 
stems from the fact that one assumes  ( ) ( ) 0 0 1 1 t t E Y C E Y C ¢ = = = . The assumption 
is valid, if the expected value of  ( ) 0 0 it it Y Y ¢ -  is zero. The assumption is not ful-
filled, if macroeconomic conditions affecting Y change between t´ and t (that is, 
if there is a time-specific intercept  t q ), or if the participation (which takes place 
between t´ and t) already affects  0t Y ¢ (anticipatory effects). 
The following example highlights a situation in which the before-after estima-
tor leads to biased results. Assume one wants to evaluate the effects of FTCs on 
the workers’ subjective assessments of their career opportunities. Assume, fur-
thermore, that workers hold permanent positions in t´ and FTCs in t. If macro-
economic conditions get worse between and t´ and t (which negatively affects 
career opportunities), the career opportunities in t´ are obviously not a valid esti-
mate of the counterfactual of the career opportunities in t.  
Anticipatory effects are relevant for the before-after estimator as well as the dif-
ference-in-differences estimator, described in the next section. It has been ob-
served in a number of studies, that, shortly before participating in a certain train-
ing programme, earnings and employment situations of the future participants 
deteriorate,  which  has  been  termed  “Ashenfelter’s  Dip”  (see  HECKMAN  and 
SMITH 1999; FITZENBERGER and PREY 2000; BERGEMANN, FITZENBERGER, and 
SPECKESSER 2004).41 Usually, this transitory decline in employment probabili-
ties and wages of participants is explained by anticipatory effects: In expectation 
of participation, search activities are reduced, leading on average to reduced em-
ployment probabilities and wages. In either case, this implies that the outcome of 
the treated in t´ is (even conditional on X) not a valid estimate of the hypothetical 
outcome in t in case of non-participation, that is,  ( ) ( ) 0 0 , 1 , 1 t t E Y X C E Y X C ¢ = ¹ = . 
Not only are anticipatory effects relevant in case of ALMP measures, but also for 
policy changes in general. For example, rational employers may try to take an-
nounced changes of dismissal protection legislation into account by  adjusting 
their hiring and firing decisions. A possible solution is to define t´ in a way, that 
the period of time between t´ and the start of the treatment is longer (see BERGE-
MANN, FITZENBERGER, and SPECKESSER, 2004).  
                                              
41  This phenomenon was observed for the first time by ASHENFELTER (1978) for the earnings effects of 
a training programme.   49 
Although the before-after estimator is not reliable in many situations, it has 
some advantages: non-participants are not required since it suffices to have in-
formation on participants and their pre-participation histories, implying that the 
common support condition has not to be fulfilled in a strict sense.  
3.4.2  Difference-in-Differences Estimator 
The difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator is based on panel data, and can 
be applied without invoking strong assumptions, if there are exogenous policy 
changes (natural experiments, see Section 3.2.4). The DiD estimator can again be 
applied as a simple difference in means, but also within a regression framework. 
Furthermore, propensity score matching may be combined with the DiD estima-
tor. The DiD approach estimates the treatment effect as the difference between 
the change of the outcome variables of the treated over time and the change of 
the outcome variable of the untreated over time. Here, only the more relevant 
DiD estimator is presented, which conditions on X. Assuming that, conditional 
on X, the change in the non-treatment outcome of the treated equals the change of 
the non-treatment outcome  
( ) ( ) 0 0 0 0 , 1 , 0 t t t t E Y Y X C E Y Y X C ¢ ¢ - = = - = ,        (26) 
the ATT can be estimated as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 0 | 1, | 1, | 0, | 0, t t t t E Y C X E Y C X E Y C X E Y C X ¢ ¢     = - = - = - =    .  (27) 
This is also true in presence of (time invariant) unobserved heterogeneity and all 
kinds of heterogeneity of the treatment effect.  
The assumption in Eq. (26) is less restrictive as in case of the before-after-
estimator since also (macroeconomic) time effects  t q , equally affecting the out-
come of both groups, can be differenced out. Hence, the DiD estimator elimi-
nates both unobserved fixed individual effects  i a  as well as unobserved fixed 
time effects  t q .  
The DiD approach can also be used within (parametric) regression models (see 
MEYER, 1995).42 A seminal example for the application of the DiD approach 
within  a  hazard  rate  model  for  the  analysis  of  unemployment  duration  is  the 
study by HUNT (1995).43 She analyses the effects of unemployment benefit on 
unemployment duration by interpreting the extension of unemployment benefit 
entitlement for older workers in the eighties as a natural experiment. The group 
of  untreated  individuals  are  younger  unemployed  which  are  not  (directly)  af-
fected by the reform. The effect is the difference in the change of the hazard rate 
over time between treated and untreated unemployed persons. The hazard rate 
from unemployment  ( ) t l  is (represented in a simplified way) specified as 
                                              
42  Note that this may be interpreted as a reduced form IV approach (see ANGRIST and KRUEGER, 2001).  
43  This study was an impetus for more microeconometric research on the effects of the unemployment 
insurance in Germany (see, for example, STEINER, 1997; HUJER and SCHNEIDER; 1996, 1998). A  
hazard rate model for the analysis of unemployment duration will be presented in Subchapter 6.3.    50 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 2 3 4 exp t t t X after C after C l l b b b b = + + + ´       (28) 
where  afteris a dummy variable which is one after the reform and zero other-
wise. The participation dummy  C  is one for the age group of older unemployed 
affected by the reform, after C ´  is an interaction effect, and X are characteristics 
of the unemployed and further explanatory variables. Since the analysis results in 
a significantly negative estimate of  4 b , one may conclude that the reform has led 
to a lower hazard rate and, therefore, a longer unemployment duration for the 
older unemployed. Of course, the simplified parametric specification in Eq. (28) 
may lead to biased results as the heterogeneity of the effect is not taken into ac-
count.44  
In case the analysis is not based on a natural experiment, that is, the assignment 
to the treatment or non-treatment group is not exogenous, the DiD approach is 
only valid, if conditioning on X eliminates the bias due to selection on observ-
ables. Furthermore, selection on unobservable must be time constant and linear-
additive in order to be differenced out.   
The DiD approach is inconsistent if, 
–  0t Y ¢is affected by anticipatory effects (Ashenfelter’s Dip; see previous sec-
tion); 
–  treated and untreated individuals are affected in a different way by (unob-
served) macroeconomic shocks  t q .45 For example, the hazard rate of older 
unemployed  may  be  affected  by  the  business  cycle  in  a  different  way  as 
younger unemployed; 
–  the policy is endogenous.46 
3.5  Pre-Program Test 
If the pre-treatment values of the outcome variable ( ) 1 0 , ¢ ¢ t t Y Y  are available in the 
dataset, it is possible to test to which extent the approach used is able to eliminate 
selection  bias.  The  “Pre-Program  test”,  proposed  by  HECKMAN  and  HOTZ 
(1989), is based on the consideration that, if there is no selection bias left, there 
are no significant differences between the mean outcome variables of the group 
of treated and the group of controls before the start of the treatment (t´). Put dif-
ferently, the ATT (or the treatment effect in general) before the treatment should 
be  zero.  In  case  of  matching  methods,  one  can  test  the  null  hypothesis  that 
                                              
44  Further critique of HUNT’s (1995) study with respect to the policy exogeneity has been expressed by 
EISEN (1997).  
45  BLUNDELL and COSTA DIAS (2002: 29) propose an adjustment method for this case. 
46  Further reasons for inconsistency are presented in MEYER (1995) as well as BLUNDELL and COSTA 
DIAS (2002).   51 
( ) ( ) 1 0 | 1, | 1, ¢ ¢ = = = t t E Y C X E Y C X , that is,  ￿ ( ) 0 ¢ = t ATT X .47 However, this test is 
obviously unsuitable, if anticipatory effects are relevant. 
Not  all  studies  are  based  on  panel  data  or  have  information  on  the  pre-
programme outcome variable (see, for example, BLACK and SMITH, 2003). In 
this case, however, evaluating programmes or interventions by non-experimental 
econometric techniques based on untestable assumptions, such as the CIA, is “an 
act of faith” (HECKMAN, 2001: 718), since there is no possibility to get an idea of 
the reliability of the assumptions. This problem has to be faced in Chapter 5. 
3.6  Summary 
The empirical questions raised in the introduction to this chapter are addressed 
in the following analyses. Subchapter 4.4 analyses whether there is a causal rela-
tionship between firing costs for permanent positions and the firms’ use of FTC 
workers (and other types of atypical work) by using the change in the threshold 
level for the application of the Protection Against Dismissal Law as a natural ex-
periment within a difference-in-differences framework.  
Chapter 5 applies (mainly kernel-based) propensity score matching estimators 
to estimate the causal effects of FTCs on wages and subjective assessment of 
working conditions by using a control group of permanent workers as an estimate 
of the counterfactual. Furthermore, some attempts are made taking selection on 
unobservables into account by using a further change in the Protection Against 
Dismissal Law as an instrumental variable. This, however, turns out to be unsuc-
cessful.  
Subchapter 6.4 uses NN-matching estimators to identify the causal effects of 
entering into a FTC from unemployment on future employment  prospects (in 
permanent jobs), by generating a control group of unemployed who have not yet 
entered into a FTC. The corresponding propensity score is estimated by a hazard 
rate model for the transition from unemployment to FTC jobs.  
 
                                              
47  In case of regression methods the test can be performed by including a dummy variable, which is one 
for treated individuals before the treatment and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient can be in-
terpreted as remaining selection bias.   52 
4  The Role of Fixed-Term Contracts in Labour Demand 
4.1  Overview: Why Do Firms Use Fixed-Term Contracts? 
In this chapter, the role of FTCs in firms’ labour demand decisions is analysed. 
From the employers’ point of view, the most relevant differences between fixed-
term and permanent contracts are not only the lower firing costs, but also the 
higher turnover rate of FTC workers. The latter may stem from the fact that many 
FTCs are not converted into permanent contracts, and hence imply worker out-
flows as well as a higher quit rate of FTC workers, as they anticipate their higher 
unemployment risk. Thus using FTCs forces firms to engage in search for new 
workers more often, creating costs that have to be weighed against the advantage 
of low firing costs (see HOLMLUND and STORRIE, 2002).  
In the course of this chapter, it is emphasised that it is essential to differentiate 
between job flows (or job turnover, respectively) on the one hand and worker 
flows (or worker turnover, respectively) on the other hand. Job flows refer to 
changes in the number of filled jobs within a firm reflecting expansions and con-
tractions. Worker flows refer to the flow of workers through those jobs. 
In the literature, several reasons have been identified that may render FTC work 
and other types of temporary work profitable for firms. Following VAREJÃO and 
PORTUGAL (2003), all these reasons can be, at least loosely, attributed to one of 
the following three roles:  
–  FTCs are used as a buffer stock, that is, as an adjustment instrument to cope 
with demand or productivity shocks; 
–  FTCs are used as a screening device (prolonged probationary period), in pres-
ence of asymmetric information on the worker’s ability (productivity); 
–  FTCs are used as a substitute for a certain proportion of permanent workers. 
Job positions that are inherently permanent are (repeatedly) filled by FTC 
workers. Jobs are inherently permanent, if they are filled with permanent con-
tract  workers  in  the  (unobserved)  hypothetical  situation  in  which  no  FTC 
workers are available.48 
The reasons can be summarised as follows. They are discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent sections and chapters.  
(1.)  Firms can use temporary employment to adjust more efficiently to tempo-
rary demand fluctuations. Similar to overtime work, temporary workers are used 
more frequently during booms and fewer during recessions (see Section 4.2.3). 
Furthermore, if employers are uncertain about whether a rise in demand is tem-
                                              
48  VAREJÃO and PORTUGAL (2003) use the term “churning” for substitution. Since the term churning is 
used in Subchapter 4.5 in a related but not identical meaning, the term “substitution” is preferred 
throughout this study.     53 
porary or permanent, they may be reluctant to increase the number of permanent 
workers, but rather rely on temporary workers until the economic outlook be-
comes more certain. Temporary work serves as a buffer stock or means of ad-
justment.   
(2.)  By employing temporary work, firms may insulate their permanent work-
force from the effects of changing product demand conditions. This insulation 
may help firms to reduce firing costs and secure firm-specific human capital. It 
may also be used to obtain wage and work rule concessions from permanent 
workers in exchange for greater employment stability (see BÜRKLE, 2004; BEN-
TOLILA and DOLADO, 1994). Again, temporary work serves as a buffer stock.  
(3.)  If asymmetric information on the ability (and therefore productivity) of 
applicants and workers is relevant, and matches are experience goods (JOVANO-
VIC, 1979), firms may use a temporary job as a prolonged  probationary period 
for screening prospective permanent employees. The effect of asymmetric infor-
mation on workers’ and applicants’ productivity is discussed in greater detail 
Subchapter 5.2.  
(4.)  It may be an optimal equilibrium phenomenon to have a substitution strat-
egy,  that  is,  to  substitute  a  certain  proportion  of  permanent  workers  by  FTC 
workers, independent of the business development (see VAREJÃO and PORTU-
GAL, 2003). Job positions that are inherently permanent (for example, cashiers) 
are repeatedly filled by FTC workers in order to reduce labour costs, given that 
wages for temporary workers are lower (see Chapter 5), or that wages (or fringe 
benefits, or days of holiday entitlements) rise automatically with age or job ten-
ure (such as in the public sector). This incentive is enhanced by the fact that peri-
ods of notice also depend on age and job tenure (see Subchapter 2.2). However, 
such a substitution strategy by the firm can obviously only be optimal in case of 
jobs with sufficiently low hiring costs and jobs with low requirements for firm-
specific human capital.  
(5.)  According to empirical findings, search costs borne by the employer in-
crease  with  labour  market  tightness  (see,  e.g.,  BURGESS,  1988). Furthermore, 
job-to-job worker mobility increases with a better state of the labour market. A 
tighter labour market makes it relatively more advantageous to hire workers on 
permanent contracts since permanent contracts avoid to some extent worker quits 
that are more costly when workers are more difficult to find (see WASMER, 1999; 
HOLMLUND and STORRIE, 2002).  
(6.)  Assuming imperfect information on the workers’ effort, shirking can be 
avoided by paying efficiency wages to permanent workers and by relating the 
probability of conversion or renewal of FTCs to the productivity of FTC workers 
(see GÜELL, 2000 and Subchapter 5.2). Again, it may be an optimal equilibrium 
strategy to fill permanent positions by temporary workers. Furthermore, if work-
ers exhibit career concerns, they may increase their effort and thus their output 
(given their wages) in order to get their contract renewed (see Subchapter 5.2). 
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ers, initial FTCs may increase productivity since workers on FTCs are willing to 
spend more effort.  
(7.)  Again,  assuming  asymmetric  information  on  ability,  workers  on  FTCs 
may deter from asserting their rights, such as parental leave, since taking up their 
claims may be interpreted as low ability by the employer which, in turn, leads to 
a lower conversion probability. The reason is that a loss of work experience due 
to  parental  leave  affects  wages  of  high-ability  workers  relatively  more  than 
wages of low-ability workers. Hence, loss of work experience is associated with 
higher opportunity costs for high-ability workers.49 To my knowledge, this ar-
gument has never been brought forward yet, but it may be an explanation why 
FTCs seem to have an adverse effect on fertility in Spain (see DOLADO, GARCÍA-
SERRANO, and JIMENO, 2002). Again, it may be optimal to fill existing perma-
nent jobs by FTC workers.   
(8.)  Temporary work may be used in case of temporary absences of permanent 
employees due to illness, holidays, or parental leave (see Section 4.2.5).  
(9.)  The previous point is related to the following situation, described in the 
literature (see LINNE, 1991). A particular worker is to be hired on a permanent 
job. However, there is a temporal mismatch in the sense that this worker can take 
up  the  job  only  later.  In  the  meantime  the  position  is  filled  by  a  temporary 
worker. If the hiring process is very time-consuming (e.g., due to skill mismatch 
in the local labour market), the situation is similar. The job may be filled by a 
temporary worker until a more suitable person is found. 
There are two further arguments. However, these seem to be less relevant for 
FTC workers than for workers from temporary work agencies (TWAs in the fol-
lowing) and freelance work (FL in the following): It may be cost-effective for 
small- or medium-sized firms to hire FL or TWA workers instead of permanent 
workers for particular tasks. ABRAHAM and TAYLOR (1996) cite the example of 
computer support activities inside smaller firms often being carried out by FL 
workers. Finally, using FL workers instead of permanent employees may be ad-
vantageous for firms in order to avoid paying social security contributions. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, theoretical models are 
described explaining the role of FTCs in labour demand. Subchapter 4.3 summa-
rises findings from previous empirical studies which are complementary to the 
empirical analyses in this chapter. In Subchapter 4.4, firms’ reasons for using 
FTCs are empirically analysed and compared with the use of TWA and FL work. 
This comparison may reveal the role of flexible forms of work and the extent to 
which they are substitutes for permanent labour better than an exclusive analysis 
of FTCs. Subchapter 4.4 focuses on the econometric investigation of the link be-
                                              
49  To the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on the link between ability and wage 
effects of the loss of work experience. There are, however, results available that are related to formal 
qualification, which is usually assumed to be correlated with ability (see BEBLO and WOLF, 2002): 
Estimation results for German women suggest that any deviation from full-time employment is asso-
ciated with significant wage cuts. The wage cuts are relatively higher for highly qualified women.     55 
tween dismissal protection for permanent contract workers and the firms’ use of 
FTCs. Subchapter 4.5 provides an analysis of the role of FTCs in worker flows 
(inflows into and outflows from establishments) since, as discussed in the follow-
ing, dismissal protection legislation and FTCs may be more relevant for worker 
flows than for changes in employment stocks. 
 
4.2  Theoretical Considerations  
4.2.1  Introduction 
The objective of this section is to provide insights into some theoretical models 
describing how the existence of FTCs may affect firms’ labour demand deci-
sions. As pointed out by DOLADO, GARCÍA-SERRANO, and JIMENO (2002), exist-
ing models dealing with the labour market effects of FTCs can be classified as 
one of the following four types of models. First, there are dynamic labour de-
mand models. Second, there are equilibrium matching and search models. Third, 
there are efficiency  wage  models.  Fourth, there are wage bargaining  models. 
This chapter focuses on labour demand and matching models. Efficiency wage 
and search models, considering the workers’ perspectives, are discussed in Sub-
chapter 5.2 and Subchapter 6.2. Wage bargaining is picked up in Subchapter 5.2 
as well. Section 4.2.2 briefly summarises how protection against dismissal legis-
lation is usually modelled in economic theory. Afterwards, Section 4.2.3 pro-
vides an overview of recent theoretical  models on labour demand with firing 
costs taking into account FTCs. Section 4.2.4 presents the results of several equi-
librium and matching models taking labour supply and, particularly, asymmetric 
information as well as worker mobility into account. Finally, Section 4.2.5 pro-
vides an overview of theoretical arguments describing the possible impacts of 
German institutions, such as collective wage agreements and works councils.  
Note that a duality of the labour force, as predicted by older segmented labour 
market theories (see, e.g., CHAIN, 1976; TAUBMAN and WACHTER, 1986), is de-
rived in the following approaches within a neo-classical framework (augmented 
by information asymmetries or institutional features), without the necessity to 
give up the basic assumption of rational individuals and firms maximising their 
utility and profit (see, e.g., ERKE, 1993; SAINT-PAUL, 1996).50 For this reason, 
‘traditional’ segmented labour market theories are not discussed.   
 
 
 
                                              
50  As stated by TAUBMAN and WACHTER (1986: 1184), one main feature of ‘traditional’ segmented 
labour market theories is that “... labor market problems are viewed in a dynamic context, where 
maximizing behavior, to the extent that it does exist, is unimportant for the market outcomes...”    56 
4.2.2  Protection Against Dismissal in Economic Theory and Structure of 
Adjustment Costs in Labour Demand 
In economic models protection against dismissal is generally interpreted as fir-
ing costs, i.e., adjustment costs in labour demand which are incurred by dismiss-
als  of  workers  by  employers  (see  BLAU  and  KAHN,  1999;  ADDISON  and 
TEIXEIRA, 2001).51 It is distinguished between direct effects on employment via 
firms’ incentives to hire and fire workers, and the indirect effects on wage setting 
behaviour, worker mobility, and further macroeconomic factors (see BLAU and 
KAHN, 1999).  
With regard to the direct effects, LAZEAR (1990) argues that the effects of firing 
costs could be completely offset by an efficient contract charging an entry fee to 
newly employed workers, that is, by lower starting wages. More general, a trans-
fer from the worker to the employer could completely compensate for the firing 
costs. In this case, severance payments would not have any allocative effects. 
However, in practice such transfers from workers to firms are not seen as feasi-
ble for many reasons (see BLAU and KAHN, 1999). It is more reasonable to inter-
pret institutional firing costs to be lost resources, if one defines them as time, 
money, or procedural complexity for the employer (see HUNT, 2000). All theo-
retical models presented in the following assume that dismissal protection is not 
associated with an according compensation by transfers from workers to employ-
ers (see BLANCHARD and LANDIER, 2002). This seems to be not too far from re-
ality in the German labour market (see FRANZ, 2003: 416). 
Before turning to labour demand models, the dimensions by which the structure 
of adjustment costs can be characterised have to be outlined (see HAMERMESH, 
1993; KÖLLING, 1998). First, it can be distinguished between adjustment costs 
resulting  from  economic,  technological,  or  institutional  reasons  (see  FRANZ, 
2003). For the analysis at hand, institutional reasons are obviously most relevant, 
i.e., firing costs due to dismissal protection. Furthermore, economic reasons (e.g., 
initial skill adoption training or search costs) may also be relevant for the firms’ 
decisions to perform a ‘high-worker-turnover strategy’ using FTCs.   
Second, an important distinction is the one between net costs and gross costs of 
adjustment (see HAMERMESH, 1995). Gross costs are incurred when a worker is 
dismissed or hired. They are independent of the impact of these worker flows on 
the level of employment. Net costs of adjustment are incurred, if the level of em-
ployment changes. They reflect changes in the number of jobs rather than the 
flows of workers. Hence, gross costs arise from worker flows and net costs arise 
from net employment changes. For economic models this distinction is impor-
tant, if labour is heterogeneous, or if there are worker quits in case of homogene-
ous labour. Otherwise, net costs and gross costs are identical. Since dismissal 
costs are obviously related to worker (out-)flows and since two types of work 
                                              
51  For an overview of adjustment costs in factor demand see HAMERMESH and PFANN (1996) as well as 
KÖLLING (1998).    57 
(FTCs versus permanent contracts) shall be considered, gross costs of adjust-
ments are clearly more relevant for the question at hand.  
A third distinction is the one between symmetric and asymmetric adjustment 
costs. Only for tractability reasons, traditional economic and econometric models 
assume symmetric adjustment costs, that is, hiring a number of workers (increas-
ing total employment by a number of jobs) incurs the same costs as firing the 
same number of workers (decreasing total employment by the same number of 
jobs). This assumption has been rejected by many empirical analyses (see, e.g., 
PFANN and PALM, 1993), and is obviously not well-suited for analysing the ef-
fects of two types of work differing in their firing costs, if there are no good rea-
sons to assume that labour with high firing costs is also associated with high hir-
ing costs.   
A fourth dimension is the functional form of the adjustment costs (see HAMER-
MESH and PFANN, 1996). Again, due to its simplicity in econometric models, 
symmetric convex (quadratic) adjustment costs have been assumed in many em-
pirical applications. The underlying assumption is that hiring and firing costs per 
worker increase with the total number of hirings and firings. In more recent theo-
retical models linear adjustment costs are assumed, with the costs proportionally 
increasing with the number of workers hired or fired. Indeed, linear firing costs 
seem to be a reasonable approach to model the effects of protection against dis-
missal legislation (see BERTOLA, 1990). Lumpy costs are a further alternative: 
they occur independently of the size of the employment change. Note that differ-
ent adjustment costs imply different optimal patterns of adjustment for the firm 
(see NICKELL, 1986; HAMERMESH, 1993). For example, in case of convex ad-
justment costs, it is optimal to smooth the dynamic time path of employment 
over time in order to avoid increasing marginal costs of adjustment. In contrast, a 
firm facing linear adjustment costs has no advantage of postponing adjustment 
into the future and may change employment within one period, however, possi-
bly not complete to the new equilibrium. As shown, for example, in the model by 
BENTOLILA and SAINT-PAUL (1994), discussed in the section below, it may even 
be optimal not to change employment at all, if the shock falls within an inaction 
range.         
4.2.3  Dynamic Labour Demand with Firing Costs and Availability of 
Fixed-Term Contracts 
Available theoretical models can be distinguished by the assumptions whether 
they only take direct effects of firing costs on labour demand into account or also 
indirect effects, and whether demand or productivity changes are stochastic or 
deterministic. The models analyse effects on steady state employment levels (av-
erage employment over the business cycle) and employment adjustment along 
the business cycle or as reactions to shocks.    58 
Models without Fixed-Term Contracts 
The well-known “traditional” model of dynamic labour demand (see SARGENT, 
1978; NICKELL, 1978, 1988) comes to the conclusion that adjustment costs not 
only reduce labour fluctuation over the cycle, but also average employment (see 
ADDISON and TEIXERIA, 2003). The reason is that, in steady states, adjustment 
costs drive a wedge between the wage and the marginal productivity of labour. 
During periods of declining product demand, adjustment costs lead to fewer fir-
ings or job destruction (labour hoarding). During periods of increasing demand, 
the firm may not only take wage costs, but also expected future firing costs into 
account. These firing costs increase the present value of the costs of a recruitment 
and, therefore, reduce hirings. 
More recent studies show that direct effects of firing costs on average employ-
ment are ambiguous and depend on the type of shock, the functional form of the 
labour demand schedule52, the discount rate (with which future adjustment costs 
are discounted), and worker quits, which do (by definition) not incur any institu-
tional firing costs (see BERTOLA, 1999). Worker quits are, however, assumed to 
be exogenous since labour supply is not modelled, resulting from the partial equi-
librium character of the models.  
 In a discrete-time dynamic labour demand model with uncertainty about busi-
ness conditions53, BERTOLA (1990) shows that (asymmetric) linear hiring and 
firing costs do not bias labour demand towards lower average employment at 
given wages. Even though adjustment costs decrease the firm’s operating prof-
its54, average employment does not need to be lower because adjustment costs 
lower employment within a good business environment, but increase it in bad 
times. The underlying mechanism is that the firm’s current hiring decision not 
only depends on current wages and hiring costs, but also on (expected) future 
firing costs. Since future firing costs are discounted, their effect on current hiring 
decisions is small. The effect of firing costs on the current firing decision is lar-
ger, since the current firing costs are certain in cases of dismissals and they are 
not discounted. In the same manner, the firm’s current firing decisions depend on 
future hiring costs. The negative effect of future firing costs on current hiring 
increases with the probability that a good state comes to an end.  
Thus firing costs have an ambiguous effect on average employment, but unam-
biguously  decrease  employment  variability.  In  contrast,  hiring  costs  do  never 
increase employment in this context. 
                                              
52  BLAU and KAHN (1999) illustrate the effect of the functional form of the labour demand schedule 
during intervals of high and low employment. If the slope of the demand curve is flat during reces-
sions and steep during booms, firing costs may raise average employment.  
53  Business conditions can only be in two states, that is, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (two-state Markov process).  
54  It is a standard result in dynamic labour demand models that firing costs reduce the firm’s profit (see 
DOLADO, GARCÍA-SERRANO, and JIMENO, 2002). This implies that including an investment decision 
into the model may lead to the result that firing costs reduce investments, which, in turn decreases la-
bour demand.    59 
Imposing slightly different assumptions about the nature of the shocks and us-
ing continuous-time instead of discrete-time models, BENTOLILA and BERTOLA 
(1990)55, BENTOLILA and SAINT-PAUL (1994)56, and BERTOLA (1992)57 yield 
comparable results.58  
Models with Fixed-Term Contracts 
BENTOLILA and SAINT-PAUL (1992) augment the model by BERTOLA (1990) 
outlined above by introducing two types of workers (on FTCs versus permanent 
contracts). The workers differ in their productivity, wages, and firing costs. As 
pointed out by the authors and discussed in detail in Chapter 5, there are theoreti-
cal (as well as empirical) reasons to assume that the wage paid to permanent 
workers is higher than the wage paid to FTC workers. Additionally, the produc-
tivity of FTC workers is assumed to be lower. The first reason stated is that per-
manent workers may receive more training (see Section 5.2.2 for an extensive 
discussion). The second reason stems from an efficiency wage argument (see 
again Section 5.2.2): It may be profitable to pay efficiency wages to permanent 
contract workers, while monitoring FTC workers (leading to lower wages) or 
letting FTC workers shirk (leading to lower productivity). Moreover, BENTOLILA 
and SAINT-PAUL (1992) assume that dismissing permanent workers is associated 
with firing costs in contrast to FTC workers. Two firing strategies are possible in 
the model: Either the firm uses mass dismissals which are associated with fixed 
costs per worker (linear firing costs), or the firm uses a gradual strategy which is 
associated with quadratic firing costs. The introduction of FTCs leads to a duality 
of the workforce within the firm, with FTC workers being used to deal with fluc-
tuation in product demand. In detail the model yields the following results: (1.) 
With respect to average employment, the introduction of FTCs is equivalent to a 
reduction in firing costs in homogeneous labour demand models: Firms in a good 
business state hire more workers since the marginal worker holds a FTC which is 
                                              
55  BENTOLILA and BERTOLA (1990) use a continuous-time model with stochastic but permanent (ran-
dom-walk) shocks. Again, firing costs reduce the variability of employment along the business cycle. 
The overall effect of firing costs on employment is small but positive. 
56  The results in the discrete-time model by BENTOLILA and SAINT-PAUL (1994) are slightly different: 
(1.) rising firing costs reduce firm’s willingness to hire and fire; (2.) more surprising, average steady-
state labour demand decreases with firing costs if firing costs are small, but increases when they are 
high enough; (3.) for small firing costs a decreasing quit rate increases the negative effect of firing 
costs on average labour demand, and for large firing costs a decreasing quit rate decreases the nega-
tive effect on average employment; (4.) higher uncertainty in output causes average labour demand to 
rise but lowers it in comparison to the case of no adjustment costs. 
57  The model by BERTOLA (1992) yields additional insights even though it is non-stochastic. Again, 
higher firing costs reduce the variability of employment along the business cycle, while the effect on 
average employment is ambiguous, depending on the form of the labour demand function, on the dis-
count rates, the quit rates, and on the relative size of hiring and firing costs. If discount rates and quit 
rates are positive, firing costs can again increase average employment.  
58  There are also several general equilibrium analyses on the effects of firing costs. LJUNGQVIST (2002) 
provides a survey and an evaluation of different approaches.   60 
associated with a lower shadow marginal cost than a permanent worker, who will 
incur firing costs in a future recession with a positive probability. Therefore, the 
firm hires less permanent contract workers compared to the situation in which 
FTCs are not available. This effect may be interpreted as a kind of substitution. 
On the other hand, all FTC workers are fired, if the firm is in a recession. To-
gether with the mechanism of less permanent workers being hired during boom-
ing periods due to substitution, there is even a slightly negative effect on average 
overall employment. (2.) Analogously to a reduction in firing costs in a homoge-
neous labour demand model, the availability of FTCs increases the fluctuation of 
employment along the business cycle and decreases the persistence of the short-
term employment effects of shocks, that is, it increases the speed of employment 
adjustment. (3.) The introduction of FTCs increases the employment stability of 
permanent contract workers, even though the labour market is more flexible from 
an aggregate point of view. Workers on FTCs bear the burden of employment 
adjustment and face even less employment stability than in case of uniformly 
reduced firing costs. Put differently, FTCs generate a dual labour market and 
serve as buffer stock. However, the model neglects the possibility of conversions 
of FTCs into permanent ones.  
Comparable results are generated in the model by SAINT-PAUL (1991). How-
ever, in his  model duality  within firms arises endogenously due to efficiency 
wages. Workers are assumed to be homogeneous. Institutional firing costs and 
FTCs do not exist. He shows that it may be optimal for the firm to have a dual 
structure, with a stable pool of permanent workers who are paid efficiency wages 
and a fluctuating pool of temporary workers being monitored, even though all 
workers are homogeneous. An increase in the volatility of demand implies a par-
tial substitution of permanent by temporary workers. 
BOOTH, FRANCESCONI, and FRANK (2003) obtain a similar result based on the 
behaviour of the firm to train only some workers and to use the other (temporary 
workers) as buffer stock (see Section 5.2.2). Again, duality arises endogenously, 
even if all workers are ex ante identical.  
NUNZIATA and STAFFOLANI (2002) extend the model by BENTOLILA and BER-
TOLA (1990) by introducing FTCs and legal quota constraints on the use of FTC 
workers. FTC and permanent contract workers are close substitutes, but not per-
fect ones. All new workers are assumed to be hired on FTCs. According to the 
firms’ needs, FTCs are transformed into permanent contracts. In every period the 
number of FTC workers is assumed to suffice to cover the expected increase in 
permanent employment in the following period. Dismissing permanent workers 
is associated with linear firing costs. A further central assumption is that the pro-
ductivity of FTC workers positively depends on the share of permanent (experi-
enced) workers in total employment. This mechanism ensures that not all perma-
nent  workers  are  substituted  by  FTC  workers.  NUNZIATA  and  STAFFOLANI’s 
(2002)  model  yields  the  following  results:  Higher  firing  costs  of  permanent 
workers induce    61 
–  a reduction of permanent employment in good states and an increase in bad 
states, implying an increase of the employment stability of permanent work-
ers; 
–  a rise in FTC work in good states and a reduction in bad states, that is, an in-
crease in the variability of FTC work; 
–  an increase in total employment in bad states and a decrease in good states 
with an ambiguous average employment effect.  
In addition, results are derived for the case that the firm is constrained in its use 
of FTC work. It is assumed that the government or a collective wage agreement 
defines a maximum FTC proportion in the firm’s total employment. If the con-
straint is binding, an increase in firing costs reduces permanent, FTC, and total 
employment in good states and increases them in bad states. If the constraint is 
strengthened (i.e., the legal maximum proportion of FTCs is reduced), FTC em-
ployment  decreases,  permanent  employment  increases,  and  total  employment 
decreases. Put differently, restrictions on the use of FTCs reduce overall em-
ployment compared to the situation that no restrictions are imposed.   
The basic theoretical model by ABRAHAM (1988) shows that an increase in the 
uncertainty in product demand (formalised as dispersion of demand) raises the 
expected ratio of FTC to permanent work.  
DOLADO, GARCÍA-SERRANO, and JIMENO (2002) provide a general model of 
dynamic labour demand along the lines of BENTOLILA and SAINT-PAUL (1992). 
The model explains the average steady state proportion of FTCs in total em-
ployment. The proportion of FTC jobs increases with (1.) the productivity of 
FTC relative to permanent contract workers, (2.) the elasticity of substitution be-
tween both types of work, (3.) the wage of permanent contract relative to FTC 
workers, (4.) firing costs of permanent contract relative to FTC workers, (5.) hir-
ing costs of permanent contract relative to FTC workers, and (6.) the volatility of 
business conditions.  
4.2.4  Matching and Equilibrium Labour Market Models with Fixed-Term 
Contracts 
So far, only partial equilibrium (labour demand) models have been presented. 
Possible approaches to integrate labour demand, labour supply, and particularly  
job-to-job  mobility  and  asymmetric  information  into  dynamic  analyses  are 
matching models.59 The key element of matching models is the matching process 
of  workers  and  firms  under  uncertainty,  where  productivity  is  specific  to  a 
worker-job match. Matching models allow to account for (frictional) unemploy-
ment as well as wage formation. 
An important basic model is the one proposed by JOVANOVIC (1979), explain-
ing worker mobility caused by incomplete information on the value of a specific 
worker-job match. The only possibility of workers and employers to learn about 
                                              
59  For a general overview of matching models see MORTENSEN and PISSARIDES (1999).   62 
the value of a specific match is to enter the employment relationship and to ex-
perience it. Hence, employment relationships are experience goods.60 The model 
predicts that workers remain in jobs in which their productivity turns out to be 
relatively high, and that they select themselves out of jobs in which their produc-
tivity is revealed to be low.   
A synopsis of equilibrium and matching models taking account of FTCs can be 
found in Table 3. BOERI (1999) proposes a matching model with exogenous crea-
tion and destruction of jobs and on-the-job search. His major assumption is that 
FTC jobs and periods of notice (due to dismissal protection) are basically the 
same, in the sense that both definitely lead to a termination of the employment 
relationship. Hence, FTC jobs are assumed to be really inherently temporary, that 
is, they are destroyed after the contract expires.61 Thus the possible role of FTCs 
as screening device is neglected. The motivation of the model is the empirical 
finding that annual job turnover rates (sum of job creation and destruction rela-
tive to the stock of employment) in high-firing-cost European countries are not 
lower than in the low-firing-cost U.S. labour market (see Subchapter 4.3). How-
ever, more in line with theory, there are lower inflows into and outflows from 
unemployment. BOERI’s (1999) model predicts that the relatively high job turn-
over rates in high-firing-cost European countries result from the partial deregula-
tion: The job turnover is linked to job-to-job transitions of FTC workers, who 
change their jobs without an intervening unemployment spell (and thus without 
inflows into and outflows from unemployment). While job movers from perma-
nent jobs lead to vacancies which may be filled by unemployed persons, FTC 
jobs are destroyed at the end of the period. Workers on FTCs are forced to search 
on-the-job in order to avoid becoming unemployed in the next period. If their on-
the-job  search  is  successful,  and  they  leave  their  firm  before  their  job  is  de-
stroyed, they  are not  replaced, so that no ‘vacancy chain’ is set  in  motion.62 
Therefore,  workers  on  FTCs  compete  with  the  unemployed  for  jobs  (BOERI, 
1999). On the other hand, job-to-job mobility of permanent workers declines due 
to the existence of FTCs. Thus periods of notice and FTCs increase unemploy-
ment  duration,  decrease  the  probability  of  dismissals  and  quits  of  permanent 
workers, and hence strengthen the duality of the labour market.  
VAREJÃO and PORTUGAL (2003) propose a two period matching model with in-
complete information on the worker productivity that highlights the roles of sub-
stitution and screening, but neglects the buffer stock function. Firms do not de-
cide on the level of their workforce (which is given as the product demand is cer-
tain and constant), but on the structure with respect to the types of contracts. 
Permanent and FTC workers receive the same wages, but permanent workers 
                                              
60  “…the only way to determine the quality of a specific match is to form the match and ‘experience it’.” 
(JOVANOVIC, 1979: 973) 
61  The analogy of periods of notice and FTCs in their effect on on-the-job search is also stressed by 
GARIBALDI (2002). See also SWAIM and PODGURSKY (1990). 
62  Vacancy chains are discussed, e.g., by AKERLOF, ROSE, and YELLEN (1988).    63 
have a higher expected productivity, higher firing as well as higher hiring costs.63 
FTCs last for one period. All workers are hired at the beginning of the first pe-
riod. At the end of the first period firms have revealed the workers’ productivity 
and decide whether to employ the workers for a second period. Those workers 
who do not meet the critical match value are fired. The firm faces three (interde-
pendent) decisions: At the beginning of the first period the firm makes a decision 
to which extent existing vacancies are filled by FTC or permanent contract work-
ers; at the end of the first period the firm decides whether to keep or replace per-
manent workers, and whether to keep or to replace FTC workers. The latter deci-
sion is related to the question under which conditions FTCs lead to permanent 
contracts (screening device) and when jobs are repeatedly filled by new FTC 
workers (substitution). The results can be summarised as follows: 
(1.) The expected productivity of a permanent match within the following two 
periods must be high enough to compensate for the additional hiring and firing 
costs permanent matches incur relative to FTC matches. 
(2.) Permanent matches are retained for the second period, if their true productiv-
ity exceeds the expected productivity of a new match plus the incurred hiring and 
firing costs.  
(3.) For the decision whether to retain FTC workers, one can distinguish between 
two cases. If conversion clauses (a worker on a FTC can only be retained for an-
other period, if her or his contract is converted into a permanent one) do not ap-
ply, the decision is essentially the same as for permanent workers in (2.). If con-
version clauses apply, the firm has to take the additional firing costs in case of 
the conversion into a permanent contract into account. Given a certain expected 
productivity of a new FTC match, replacement of a FTC match is more likely, if 
hiring and firing costs of FTCs are low, and the relative costs of firing a perma-
nent worker are high.  
 
                                              
63  The higher hiring costs of permanent workers are motivated by the assumption that permanent work-
ers enter the firm through a more demanding pre-hiring screening process as they are more costly to 
dismiss, which seems to be reasonable (see the study by GOUX, MAURIN, and PAUCHET, 2001 de-
scribed in Section 4.5.1). The pre-hiring screening process also explains the higher mean productivity 
of permanent workers.   64 
Table 3: Overview of Matching and Equilibrium Models with FTCs 
Features / Assump-
tions  
BOERI (1999)  VAREJÃO and PORTUGAL 
(2003) 
MAURIN (2000)  CAHUC and POSTAL-
VINAY (2002) 
BLANCHARD and 
LANDIER (2002) 
Job creation /  
Job destruction  
exogenous   no  
 
endogenous 
 
endogenous; type of contract 
is partly exogenous 
   
endogenous 
 
Product market shocks  no  no  productivity shocks to the 
firm (‘good’ and ‘bad’ state)  
match-specific productivity 
shocks 
match-specific productivity 
shocks 
Wage formation  no  no  flexible wages that adapt to 
productivity; however, 
minimum wage 
bargaining between firm and 
worker; FTC workers have 
the same power   
Nash bargaining with con-
tinuous renegotiations both 
in FTC and permanent jobs   
FTC versus PERM work-
ers 
 
FC(PERM) > FC(FTC) 
W (PERM)> W (FTC) 
HC(PERM) > HC(FTC) 
FC(PERM) > FC(FTC) 
W (PERM)= W (FTC) 
Y(PERM)>Y(FTC) 
HC(PERM)=HC(FTC)=0 
FC(PERM) > FC(FTC) 
 
HC(PERM)=HC(FTC) 
FC(PERM) > FC(FTC) 
 
HC(PERM)=HC(FTC)=0 
FC(PERM) > FC(FTC) 
W (PERM)> W (FTC) 
Y(PERM)>Y(FTC) 
Asymmetric information  on productivity of future job-
worker match 
 on  productivity  of  job-
worker match  
no  on productivity of job-
worker match 
on productivity of job-
worker match 
Dismissal initiated by the 
employer  
exogenous   yes  yes  yes  permanent employment 
relationships end with re-
tirement; permanent workers 
are never dismissed 
Endogenous on-the-job 
search and mobility 
 
yes   no  yes  no  no 
Conversions of FTCs into 
permanent contracts at the 
same employer  
  
no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Further essential assump-
tions 
FTC  ￿  period of notice  ￿  
intermediate  and  transitory 
labour market state between 
employment  and  unemploy-
ment  
 
 
two period model; 
no  unemployed  (job  search-
ers) 
  FTCs are preferred by firms 
and workers; 
any FTC must be exoge-
nously approved by the 
government, otherwise it is 
immediately converted into a 
permanent contract 
job searchers can enter em-
ployment only through 
FTCs; 
permanent jobs can only be 
entered through FTC jobs;  
   65 
Table 3 continued.... 
Main Effects of FTCs 
on 
BOERI (1999)  VAREJÃO and PORTUGAL 
(2003) 
MAURIN (2000)  CAHUC and POSTAL-
VINAY (2002) 
BLANCHARD and 
LANDIER (2002) 
Unemployed persons  increase duration of UE  not modelled  re-employment probability 
increase 
if firing costs for permanent 
workers are high, FTCs 
increase UE inflows and UE 
level 
decrease duration of UE; 
increase the UE probability 
of FTC workers 
Employed persons  increase stability of perma-
nent jobs; permanent work-
ers reduce quits; workers on 
FTCs are more engaged in 
on-the-job search  
 
increase stability of perma-
nent jobs  
decrease stability of perma-
nent jobs  
  decrease probability of get-
ting a permanent contract; 
even if a FTC match is pro-
ductive, the firm may in 
many cases not transform the 
FTC into a permanent one 
Further findings   unemployed have to compete 
with FTC workers engaged 
in on-the-job search on 
existing vacancies 
 
 
FTCs are used as a substitute 
(and not as probationary 
period), if relative hiring and 
firing costs of FTCs are low  
decrease quit rates and in-
crease dismissal rates 
the higher the firing costs for 
permanent workers, the 
lower the share of FTCs 
being transformed into per-
manent contracts  
increase the bargaining 
position of permanent work-
ers 
           
Notes: HC = hiring costs; FC = hiring costs; JC= job creation; Y=output per worker (productivity); UE = unemployment. 
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MAURIN (2000) proposes a competitive equilibrium model with worker mobil-
ity and the restriction that employers cannot renew FTCs after one period, but 
have to convert the contracts into permanent ones, if they want  to retain the 
workers. The predictions of the model can be summarised as follows: FTCs re-
duce the average duration of both unemployment and employment spells. FTCs 
increase the employment prospects of unemployed workers and decrease the em-
ployment stability of permanent contract workers. This contradicts the result of 
the labour demand and matching models that FTCs create dual labour markets. 
The overall impact of FTCs on average employment depends on the parameter 
constellation. For most realistic parameter values, the average employment effect 
is positive.   
BLANCHARD and LANDIER (2002) propose a matching model with wage bar-
gaining and the assumption that workers can enter (permanent) employment only 
by taking up a FTC job (entry-level job). Again, the aim of the model is to dem-
onstrate the effect of a partial reform (being typical for European countries such 
as  Germany  )  consisting  of  lowering  firing  costs  for  entry-level  jobs  (FTCs) 
while  keeping  them  constant  for  permanent  jobs.  BLANCHARD  and  LANDIER 
(2002) show that such a partial reform may have adverse effects: It makes firms 
more willing to hire workers by using the entry-level FTC job as probationary 
period. However, the reform renders firms reluctant to convert FTCs into perma-
nent contracts. Even if a job-worker match turns out to be productive, the firm 
may still prefer not to convert the FTC into a permanent one (that is, to fire the 
FTC worker), and to hire a new worker on FTC. Workers may be worse-off as 
they experience multiple spells of unemployment and FTC employment before 
getting a permanent job. In contrast to other models, FTC work cannot lead to 
high job stability as permanent workers are dismissed with a zero probability (all 
permanent workers leave the firm due to retirement). However, FTCs lead to 
higher wages for permanent contract workers. 
CAHUC and POSTAL-VINAY (2002) obtain comparable results. If firing costs for 
permanent workers are high, FTCs increase unemployment inflows and the un-
employment level. The higher the firing costs for permanent workers, the lower 
is the share of FTCs being transformed into permanent contracts. 64 
4.2.5  Further Considerations on Institutional Reasons for Using Fixed-
Term Contracts 
If wages of permanent contract workers were perfectly flexible, quantitative ad-
justments of firms’ workforces, such as the employment of temporary workers, 
would not be necessary as a response to changing demand and supply conditions 
(see BENTOLIA and ROGERSON, 1997). In reality, wage rigidities are prevalent, as 
                                              
64  Another matching model,  which is not taken into account, is proposed by WASMER (1999). The 
model explains the rising proportion of temporary work in Europe by macroeconomic factors. It pre-
dicts that a slowdown in the growth of labour productivity can lead to an increase in FTC work.     67 
several studies confirm (see, e.g., FRANZ and PFEIFFER, 2003). One explanation 
of wage rigidities at the firm level is the presence of industry-wide collective 
agreements. Thus adjustments may be made by changing quantities rather than 
(input) prices. 
The advantages and disadvantages of employing temporary labour rather than 
using other quantitative adjustment instruments depend on economic and institu-
tional factors. Alternative instruments of adjustment are, in particular, adapting 
the number of employees or the number of working hours, or making use of in-
ventories. The latter is not considered in the following.  
In Germany, several institutional arrangements may influence the use of atypi-
cal work. On the one hand, there are legal limits on the use of FTCs, TWA, and 
FL employment.65 However, there are indirect effects of collective wage agree-
ments and works councils which influence firms’ decisions to offer permanent or 
atypical contracts. 
Firstly, as many collective wage agreements restrict the amount of overtime 
work or fix overtime  premiums, establishments which apply collective agree-
ments may have higher costs of changing working hours. They may also have 
greater difficulties in adjusting the number of permanent employees, since collec-
tive  wage  agreements  often  contain  clauses  regarding  employment  protection 
rules, in particular clauses which protect specific groups of workers, such as sen-
ior employees (see KAISER and PFEIFFER, 2001). Thus these establishments may 
have a higher probability of using atypical labour.  
Secondly, since works councils have to agree to the introduction of overtime, 
companies with works councils may be prevented from using overtime as an in-
strument of adjustment. In addition, works councils can increase the firing costs 
of  permanent  workers  by  increasing  the  procedural  complexity  of  individual 
dismissals  or  of  mass  redundancies  (see  Subchapter  2.2).  Firms  which  have 
works councils may thus exhibit a higher propensity to adjust through the use of 
temporary work.  
On the other hand, collective agreements and works councils may also provide 
an obstacle to the use of atypical work. Since unions mobilise against the use of 
atypical labour, its use may be lower in firms which adhere to collective agree-
ments.  
One might also presume that the probability of using atypical workers is lower 
in firms with works councils, since hiring decisions fall within the scope of co-
determination, and works councils must specifically be heard on the issue of em-
ploying atypical workers.66  
                                              
65  The institutional background for FTCs is described in Subchapter 2.2, and the regulation on TWA 
work is summarised in Box 5 in the Appendix. 
66  An  extensive  discussion  on  the  effects  of  works  councils  on  the  use  of  FTCs  can  be  found  in 
BOOCKMANN and HAGEN (2003).   68 
Further reasons for employing temporary  workers are illness or other unex-
pected absences of employees (due to parental leave etc.). In a theoretical model, 
ABRAHAM (1988) formalises the notion that stochastic absence time of employ-
ees is a reason both for overstaffing and employing temporary workers. Since the 
number of absence workers varies from period to period, it is not possible to hire 
exactly the number of permanent workers additionally needed in each period. 
The use of temporary work becomes more likely, if the variability of the firm’s 
absenteeism rate rises. 
4.2.6  Summary and Conclusions from the Theoretical Considerations 
Section 4.2.3 has described labour demand models considering FTCs. All mod-
els come to the conclusion that the introduction of FTCs increases the overall 
variability of employment (job turnover). This increased variability results, how-
ever, only from a higher turnover in FTC work, while the job turnover of perma-
nent work declines, that is, employment stability of permanent workers increases. 
This corresponds to the buffer stock role of FTCs. Since permanent employment 
decreases to a certain extent in equilibrium (in comparison to a world without 
FTCs), also substitution prevails.    
Section 4.2.4 has presented models taking two further crucial aspects of em-
ployment relationships into account: ex ante, the productivity of the worker-job 
match is (possibly for both contracting parties) unknown and has to be experi-
enced. This gives rise to on-the-job search and worker mobility. Furthermore, it 
creates an additional decision problem for employers, that is, whether to fire a 
worker after her or his contract is terminated, or to give her or him a permanent 
job, if her or his productivity turns out to be high enough. Two of the models 
presented highlight the following mechanism. A FTC job may be a probationary 
period that may serve as a stepping stone to a permanent job, if firing costs of 
permanent workers are not ‘too high’, and if relative hiring and firing costs of 
FTCs are not ‘too low’. Put differently, if it is much easier for a job searcher to 
get a FTC job than a permanent contract job, the FTC job serves less likely as a 
stepping stone.67 A further result is that FTC workers are likely to be more en-
gaged in on-the-job search. If FTC workers are exclusively employed at inher-
ently  temporary  jobs,  their  on-the-job  search  might  negatively  affect  the  re-
employment chances of unemployed job searchers (see BOERI, 1999).  
Even if the results of the models differ somehow, the majority of them con-
cludes that the introduction of FTCs is associated with adverse labour market 
effects. 
Section 4.2.5 has discussed institutional reasons (works councils and collective 
wage agreements) for the use of FTCs. Collective wage agreements (unions) and 
works councils may affect the use of temporary work through four channels: (1.) 
                                              
67  The role of asymmetric information and the stepping stone effect is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.   69 
direct  effect,  i.e.  possible  opposition  of  unions  and  employee  representatives 
against the use of FTCs; (2.) indirect effect, i.e. increase in firing costs of perma-
nent workers; (3.) indirect effect, i.e. raising the costs of overtime work as an 
alternative  adjustment  instrument;  (4.)  wage  rigidities  (from  collective  wage 
agreements) increasing the necessity of numerical adjustments.   
 
4.3  Previous Empirical Results on the Effects of Dismissal Protection 
and Fixed-Term Contracts 
What follows is a summary of empirical findings that may be complementary to 
the empirical analysis in Subchapter 4.4 and Subchapter 4.5 and may, therefore, 
be important for drawing conclusions. 
Summary of the Empirical Findings on the Labour Market Effects of Dis-
missal Protection for Permanent Contract Workers 
The empirical findings on the effects of dismissal protection legislation have al-
ready been discussed in a number of studies.68 Therefore, the results are only 
briefly summarised here.  
The following effects of dismissal protection legislation for permanent con-
tracts seem to have become widely accepted: (1.) if there is an expansive effect 
on the level of unemployment, it is probably weak; (2.) the average duration of 
unemployment increases, the risk of becoming unemployed decreases, and aver-
age job tenure increases. This means lower worker turnover (hirings and separa-
tions relative to total employment) and reallocation of workers between jobs and 
other labour market states; (3.) the structure of the pool of the employed and the 
unemployed is affected: the relative employment chances of youths and women 
decrease; (4.) the use of overtime increases; (5.) the use of forms of temporary 
work and (spurious) self-employment increases.  
The effects on overall employment are controversial, reflecting the theoretical 
ambiguity. While NICKELL and LAYARD (1999) state that there are no significant 
effects, ADDISON and TEIXEIRA (2003) do find negative effects. 
A further issue of interest is the observation that annual job creation and job 
destruction rates (created and destroyed jobs relative to total employment) are 
not  lower in many (high firing-costs) European countries than in the (low-firing 
costs) U.S. labour market. For example, NICKELL and LAYARD (1999: Table 19) 
report annual job turnover rates (sum of the rates of job creation and job destruc-
tion) in continuing establishments of 12.1% for Germany and of 7.7% for the 
U.S. Four interpretations of this puzzle have been put forward: 
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(1.) Protection against dismissal does not affect job creation and destruction and 
thus changes in net-employment, since, at least in the long-run, economic forces 
prevail institutional rigidities, or since firms and workers make arrangements to 
offset the regulations (e.g., in the sense of LAZEAR’S, 1990 model mentioned in 
Section 4.2.2).  
(2.) While protection against dismissal legislation hampers job creation and de-
struction  in  Europe,  the  stronger  wage  inflexibility  at  the  establishment  level 
(preventing employers from wage adjustments) promotes it (see BERTOLA and 
ROGERSON, 1997).   
(3.) Coexistence  of  permanent  and  temporary  employment  relationships  in 
Europe: an average job turnover rate may be the result of high job turnover of 
temporary work and low job turnover of permanent contract work. BOERI (1999) 
provides a similar explanation: the job turnover in Europe is linked to job-to-job 
transitions of workers on FTCs who change their job without an intervening un-
employment spell (see Section 4.2.4).  
(4.) BLANCHARD and PORTUGAL (2001) point to the following issue: while (in 
the example of the Portuguese and the U.S. labour market) there are no signifi-
cant differences in annual job creation and destruction rates, there are consider-
able differences when looking at quarterly rates. The authors explain this dis-
crepancy by decomposing the firm’s desired employment level into a transitory 
and a permanent component. The higher the adjustment costs, the more a firm 
may smooth the transitory component, while the firm cannot smooth the perma-
nent component. The lower the frequency of data on employment changes, the 
more important is the permanent component relative to the transitory component, 
and thus the smaller may be the effect of dismissal costs on the measured em-
ployment movements. 
Fixed-Term Contracts and the Speed of Employment Adjustment  
One strand of the literature measures employment flexibility in the framework 
of traditional dynamic labour demand  models, assuming that net  employment 
changes cause adjustment costs. In order to estimate the effects of FTCs on the 
flexibility  of  the  employment  stock,  before-after  (the  deregulation  of  FTCs) 
comparisons are applied.  
The traditional dynamic labour demand equation (also termed ‘partial adjust-
ment model’) can be described as follows (for a formal derivation see NICKELL, 
1986; SARGENT, 1978; KÖLLING, 1998). Although this model has been criticised 
in many points, it is widely used in empirical research because of its simplicity.  
Adjustment costs  t CA  take the adaptively-separable quadratic form  
( )
2
1 0.5 t t t CA b E E - = - ,  
with b being assumed to be a positive constant, and  t E  denoting the employment 
level in the current period t. A representative firm maximises the expected pre-
sent value of its stream of future profits. There are some exogenous variables   71 
(such as product demand) affecting the firm’s demand for  t E . The firm is a risk-
neutral decision maker with rational expectations about the paths of shocks. Un-
der certain assumptions about the process generating (product demand) shocks, 
the closed form solution of the firm’s optimisation problem at time t is given by  
( )
*
1 1 , t t t E E E l l - = + -                (29) 
where 
*
t E  is the desired level of employment, and  l  captures the speed of ad-
justment. 
*
t E  is based on rational expectations about future wages, product de-
mand, and further determinants. 
After some rearranging and further assumptions (see NICKELL, 1986 and KÖL-
LING, 1998) an estimation equation derived from Eq. (29) can be written as 
( ) 1 ln ln t t t t E E L X e l b - ¢ = + + ,            (30) 
where  ln t E  is the natural logarithm of employment in period t, L is a lag opera-
tor, X is a vector of explanatory variables,  b¢ is a vector of coefficients to be es-
timated, and  t e  is an error term. The parameter of interest is the adjustment pa-
rameter  l .  l  is close to 1, if the costs of adjustment are much higher than the 
costs of being in disequilibrium. The lower the parameter  l , the higher is the 
adjustment speed towards the desired level of employment. 
The vector X may include a constant a , output  t Y , wage costs, and other cost 
components, a time trend t, and further explanatory variables affecting employ-
ment. If panel data are used, the error term  t e  may consist of firm- (or industry-) 
specific (fixed) effects ci, time-specific effects tt, and a classical error term eit. 
From the estimated coefficients  ˆ l , it is possible to calculate the median length of 
the adjustment lag, i.e., the time it takes the establishment to move halfway to the 
new equilibrium in response to a shock (see HAMERMESH, 1993: 248). 
This framework is used in the following empirical studies for Germany to as-
sess the impact of the deregulation of FTCs on employment adjustment at the 
industry level, without observing the actual amount of FTC employment.  
ABRAHAM and HOUSEMAN (1994) analyse the effect of the Employment Pro-
motion Act which liberalised the use of FTCs in Germany (see Subchapter 2.2) 
by estimating the equation 
   
2
1 1  1 1 1 1 2 ln ln ln ln ln t t t t t t E aft E E aft Y Y aft t t a a l l b b d d e - - = + + + × + + × + + + , (31) 
with aft denoting a dummy variable, taking the value of one from the first  quar-
ter of 1985 onwards (after the use of FTCs was liberalised) and a value of zero 
before this date. If employment becomes more responsive after the law change, 
the  estimated   1 l   should  be  statistically  significant  negative.  ABRAHAM  and 
HOUSEMAN  (1994) use quarterly industry level data for the period 1970–1990 
for West Germany. Neither for the manufacturing industry as a whole, nor for 
any of the eight industries, a significantly negative   1 l  can be found.  
KRAFT (1993) uses a modified version of Eq. (30), which may be interpreted as 
a simplified error correction model. His analysis is based on a panel of annual   72 
data for the period 1970–1987 on 21 German manufacturing industries. The re-
sults even suggest a reduction in adjustment speed during the period 1985–1987. 
HUNT (2000) uses monthly industry level data for 201 industries over the pe-
riod 1977–1992. A panel data estimation technique is applied to a modified ver-
sion of Eq. (30) allowing the adjustment pattern to be different in upturns and 
downturns. A random coefficients model is used, which means that some coeffi-
cients may be industry-specific. Again, a before-after comparison in the fashion 
of Eq. (31) is applied. Well in line with ABRAHAM and HOUSEMAN (1994) and 
KRAFT (1993), no evidence in favour of employment adjustment being faster af-
ter 1985 is found.  
Aggregate data, as used in the presented studies, may conceal the firms’ ad-
justment processes and may therefore lead to an underestimation of the effects of 
FTCs. For this reason, I took up an approach proposed by BENTOLILA and SAINT-
PAUL (1992) for Spain in a previous study, to identify the role of FTCs for net 
employment adjustment in West Germany using a large panel of establishment 
level data (see HAGEN, 2003). The crucial assumption is that it is possible to 
make inference about the differences in adjustment speed between FTC and per-
manent contract employment by comparing the estimated adjustment coefficients 
of dynamic labour demand equations for total employment 
 TOTAL l  and for per-
manent contract employment 
 PER l , respectively.69 Eq. (30) is estimated sepa-
rately for total and permanent employment by a dynamic panel data estimator for 
the period 1997–2000.70 The analysis is based on the IAB Establishment Panel 
(see Section 4.4.2). In all specifications the estimated 
 TOTAL l  is smaller than the 
estimated 
 PER l . In the preferred specification the estimated 
 TOTAL l  is 0.20  and 
the estimated  
 PER l  is 0.26, implying a median adjustment lag of 5.1 months (to-
tal employment) versus 6.1 months (permanent contract employment). 
The study by BENTOLILA and SAINT-PAUL (1992), using Spanish firm level 
data for the period 1985–1988, also leads to the result that the adjustment of total 
employment is faster than the adjustment of permanent employment. Moreover, 
in contrast to the results for Germany, cyclical response of Spanish employment 
is larger after FTCs have been deregulated.  
HOLMLUND and STORRIE (2002) provide a macroeconometric model describing 
the role of FTC and permanent contract employment along the business cycle in 
the  Swedish  labour  market.  Based  on  aggregate  quarterly  data  for  the  period 
1987–2000, they simulate the response of permanent and FTC employment to a 
transitional negative output shock. The negative output shock lasts for 5 years 
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and its maximum is reached after 2.5 years with -3% GDP. The evolution of both 
types of employment is as follows: When the recession starts, there is an initial 
steep fall in FTC employment. From the trough and onwards, FTC work rises 
steeply, being above its initial level by the end of the recession (overshooting). 
After the end of the recession FTC employment gradually falls back to its initial 
level. In contrast, the decline in permanent work during the downturn starts later 
and is much less pronounced. Permanent employment starts to rise after the end 
of the recession, without overshooting.  
Considering BENTOLILA and SAINT-PAUL’s (1992) result that the introduction 
of FTCs has increased adjustment speed in Spain, the question arises how the 
results for Germany are to be interpreted. Three German studies using aggregate 
(industry level) data could not find evidence for the introduction of FTCs to in-
crease the overall speed of adjustment. HUNT’s (2000) interpretation for the re-
sult  is  that  either  institutional  firing  costs  are  less  important  than  commonly 
thought, or that works councils and unions were able to convince employers of 
converting more FTCs into permanent ones than employers actually wanted. As 
already mentioned, the results for Germany may also be based on a methodical 
problem, as aggregate data may conceal the firms’ adjustment processes. 
Another possible explanation is based on the prediction of the majority of the 
theoretical models described above: The use of FTC workers may reduce the 
turnover of permanent contract workers by decreasing their probability of being 
dismissed and their propensity to quit. Hence, the impact of the availability of 
FTCs  on  the  adjustment  speed  of  total  employment  may  be  smaller  than  ex-
pected. This explanation does not contradict my previous result that adjustment 
speed  of  total  employment  is  faster  than  adjustment  speed  of  permanent  em-
ployment (HAGEN, 2003). However, the liberalisation of FTCs has not increased 
overall employment flexibility since the stability of permanent contract employ-
ment has increased, because FTC work serves as buffer stock.71  
Of course, there are reasons to assume that the presented estimation results are 
biased. Convex and symmetric adjustment costs may be a poor approximation to 
the true structure of the adjustment costs. Even more important, net adjustment 
costs may not be the relevant category to describe differences in firing costs be-
tween FTCs and permanent contracts.  
So the question about the role of FTC work in firms’ hiring and firing decisions 
arises. This can only be analysed using worker flow data. Subchapter 4.5 presents 
an empirical analysis based on worker flows for West Germany. 
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Aggregate Employment Effects of Fixed-Term Contracts  
There is only sparse empirical evidence on the effect of FTCs on total employ-
ment at the firm level or at the macroeconomic level, i.e., whether FTCs lead to 
an increase in total employment independent of the business cycle. The main rea-
son is that such approaches have to be based on quite restrictive assumptions and 
small datasets. The major underlying identifying problem is that there are no 
counterfactuals  for  the  existence  of  FTCs  available  within  countries.  Hence, 
within countries the best that can be done is to use before-after estimators (see 
Section 3.4.1). 
An alternative approach is to use aggregate data of (EU or OECD) countries. 
The  OECD  (1999)  uses  data  for  19  countries  for  2  periods  (1985–1990  and 
1992–1997) and cannot find any significant effect of the strictness of the regula-
tion of FTCs on the levels of unemployment and employment. 
NUNZIATA and STAFFOLANI (2002) test the hypothesis derived from their theo-
retical model, described in Section 4.2.3, by using a panel of aggregate annual 
data of 15 European countries for the period 1983–1998. They use time-varying 
indicators for the strictness of labour market regulations on dismissal protection 
for permanent contracts as well as FTCs and temporary work agencies.72 The 
employment-population ratio (permanent and total) is regressed within a static 
fixed-effects  specification  on  a  vector  of  employment  regulation  indicators,  a 
vector of control variables for other labour market institutions (union density, 
bargaining co-ordination, tax wedge etc.), a vector of interaction terms between 
institutions, and a set of time dummies. The results can be summarised as fol-
lows: 
–  Temporary Employment (that is, FTC as well as TWA work) is positively cor-
related with permanent employment protection. Furthermore, temporary em-
ployment is negatively correlated with the strength of FTC regulation. There 
is, furthermore, an interaction effect: the stricter the dismissal protection for 
permanent contracts, the larger the impact of the strictness of regulation of 
FTCs and TWAs. 
–  Permanent employment is negatively affected by the strictness of the regula-
tions of FTCs. The authors interpret this result as evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that FTCs serve as stepping stones towards permanent jobs.  
This  type  of  studies  is  associated  with  some  methodological  problems  which 
hamper a causal interpretation. Besides the problem of the small sample size, the 
static specification, and the common-effect assumption (see Subchapter 3.2), po-
tential  endogeneity  of  institutions  are  fundamental  problems  (see,  e.g., 
CALIENDO, HAGEN, and HUJER, 2004).  
KRAFT (1996) analyses the employment effects of the Employment Opportu-
nity Act which came into effect in 1985 (see Subchapter 2.2). He explains the 
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relative change in total employment in a panel of firms for 1987 (after) to 1985 
(before) by the proportion of hirings into FTCs based on the Employment Oppor-
tunity Act (without justification by objective reasons) and further variables. He 
finds a positive effect on labour demand and estimates a positive overall em-
ployment effect of 70,000-80,000 employees in West Germany. The major re-
striction of this study is the assumption that the use of first differences rules out 
the endogeneity of the hiring decision.   76 
4.4  Why do Employers Use Fixed-Term Contracts? Evaluating the Ef-
fects of Firing Costs of Permanent Work on the Use of Atypical 
Work 
4.4.1  Introduction 
In this section, panel data for West German establishments are used to uncover 
the conditions under which atypical work is used. By analysing FTCs as well as 
TWA and FL work it will be revealed what makes FTCs different from other 
types of atypical work.73 
Apart from economic factors, the data also allows to assess the impact of insti-
tutional factors, such as dismissal protection legislation, works councils, and col-
lective agreements. In particular, the change of the employment threshold for the 
application of the Protection Against Dismissal Law in 1996 is used to identify 
the effect of institutional firing costs of permanent contract workers on the use of 
atypical workers within a difference-in-differences framework. 
Most available empirical studies on the reasons for firms’ use of atypical work 
are available for the U.S. The empirical study by ABRAHAM (1988) shows that 
firms subject to high seasonal or year-to-year variations in demand make greater 
use of temporary workers than other firms. ABRAHAM and TAYLOR (1996) find 
that a firm’s decision to use FL work rather than its own employees is influenced 
by wage and benefit savings, the volatility of its output demand, and the avail-
ability of specialised skills possessed by FL workers. If FL workers are employed 
in low-skilled activities, the decision is motivated mainly by savings in wage 
costs. GRAMM and SCHNELL (2001) find that the higher the share of employees 
with union representation, the lower the propensity to use flexible types of con-
tracts. Firms having a “low-cost producer strategy” are more likely to rely on 
TWA workers. The hypothesis that temporary work is used to increase the job 
stability of the permanent workforce is investigated by CAPPELLI and NEUMARK 
(2001). The results indicate that firms using temporary work have significantly 
higher dismissal rates also for the permanent staff, i.e., the hypothesis is rejected. 
VAREJÃO  and  PORTUGAL  (2003)  provide  an  empirical  analysis  for  Portugal. 
Their main conclusion is that screening (and not substitution or adjustment) is the 
major motivation for employing workers on FTCs.  
Using a dataset of German firms from the service sector, KAISER and PFEIFFER 
(2001)  investigate  under  which  conditions  firms  use  FTC  and  FL  work  as  a 
means of adjustment. The probability of using FTCs increases with the size of 
the firm, the significance of demand changes, and the share of low-skilled work-
ers. Furthermore, if a firm is bound to a collective wage agreement, the prob-
ability of using FTC workers increases as well. Contrary to these results, FL 
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work is used with a lower intensity, if the firm applies a collective wage agree-
ment. The use of FL work increases with the share of high-skilled workers. 
BOOCKMANN and HAGEN (2003) analyse the role of works councils in the de-
mand for FTC employment using the IAB Establishment Panel for West Ger-
many. Works councils may have a direct and various indirect effects on the use 
of atypical work (see Section 4.2.5). The empirical results reflect this ambiguity: 
the existence of a works council has a significantly positive effect on the prob-
ability of employing at least one FTC worker, but not on the proportion of FTC 
workers. A further result is that the regional unemployment rate increases the use 
oft FTCs, which may be interpreted as evidence that job searchers are forced to 
enter FTCs in regional labour markets with high unemployment. Furthermore, 
since hiring costs increase with labour market tightness (that is, a low unem-
ployment rate), firms may prefer a low turnover strategy using permanent work-
ers in regional labour markets with low unemployment rates. Further empirical 
results, compatible with both hypotheses, are presented in Chapter 5 and 6. 
This Subchapter is structured as follows. The following section introduces the 
dataset and describes the specification of the econometric model. Section 4.4.3 
presents the estimation results. Section 4.4.4 provides a summary. 
 
4.4.2  Dataset, Model Specification, and Estimation Technique 
Sample 
The empirical analysis is based on five waves of the IAB Establishment Panel 
from 1994 until 1998 for West Germany, which contains over 4000 usable inter-
views per year.74 The same data base is used in Subchapter 4.5 for an analysis of 
FTC versus permanent contract worker flows. The unit of observation of the data 
is not the company, but the establishment. “Establishment” refers to “the local 
unit in which the activities of a company, that is, the production of goods or ser-
vices, are actually carried out” (KÖLLING, 2000: 293). Since the scope of the 
German  Protection  Against  Dismissal  Law  differs  according  to  establishment 
size, this principle of data collection is well suited for the analysis. The popula-
tion of the panel consists of establishments with at least one employee covered 
by social security. Therefore, establishments with no employees covered by so-
cial  security  are  excluded,  particularly  those  establishments  with  only  self-
employed persons in the definition of the social security system (farmers, artists, 
publicists) as well as public sector offices exclusively employing civil servants. 
The IAB Establishment Panel is a stratified random sample of establishments. 
Larger establishments have a higher probability of being selected into the sample 
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than smaller ones. 75 In addition, the probability of being selected into the sample 
differs across industries (see KÖLLING, 2000). In each year, the establishments 
taking part in the survey are interviewed on the number and structure of their 
employees as of June 30th. Except for 1995, the interviews contained questions 
regarding the number of FTC workers; however, due to further data limitations 
only information for the three years from 1996 to 1998 could be used for the 
analysis of FTC work. Complete information on TWA and FL workers is avail-
able for the years from 1994 to 1998. The way of questioning in the interviews 
should rule out to a large extent trainees to be counted as FTC workers or as free-
lancers. However, it cannot be ruled out that participants in public employment 
measures  are  included.  Since  non-profit  organisations,  the  government  sector, 
public social security institutions, and agricultural enterprises are excluded, this 
is probably a minor problem. Financial institutions and insurance companies also 
cannot be used in the analyses, since they do not report sales as a measure of 
their business volume.  
To the extent that they report sales as a measure for their business volume, es-
tablishments from the sector ‘education, research, and publication’ are included. 
Even though this sector is likely to contain also some public sector establish-
ments, the sector is not excluded, since it may be of particular interest due to spe-
cial regulations (see Subchapter 2.2).     
Hypotheses and Explanatory Variables 
The objective is to estimate a reduced-form model of the demand for FTC, 
TWA, and FL employment in West German establishments. The dependent vari-
ables are dummies indicating whether the respective types of labour are used 
(that is, if there is at least one worker holding the particular type of contract) by 
the establishment at the time of the interview.  
The reason for estimating a reduced-form approach, instead of a heterogeneous 
labour demand function with different types of labour and further input factors, is 
that no information on input prices (i.e., wages for permanent contract, FTC, FL, 
and TWA work) is available. Therefore, one has to assume that, by controlling 
for  a  rich  set  of  explanatory  variables  as  well  as  unobserved  establishment-
specific effects, an omitted variable bias is avoided.  
The reason for not analysing the proportion or the absolute number of atypical 
workers in the establishment results from methodological problems. Usually one 
would estimate a censored regression model (e.g., a tobit model) to deal with the 
fact that many establishments do not use the particular type of atypical work at 
the time of the interview. However, the tobit model is based on the assumption 
that the decision to employ at least one FTC worker is determined by the same 
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stochastic process as the decision of how many FTC workers to employ (see 
GREENE, 2003: Chapter 22). As only 38% of all establishments in the unweighted 
sample use FTCs (the numbers for FL and TWA work are even smaller), this as-
sumption seems quite unrealistic. Alternatively, one could use a sample selection 
model (also termed “tobit type II” model) which allows both stages (the decision 
to employ at least one FTC worker and the proportion of FTC workers condi-
tional on employing at least one) to differ. However, sample selection models 
require an exclusion restriction, that is, at least one variable which affects the 
decision to employ at least one FTC worker and not the proportion of FTC work-
ers in order to avoid that identification solely relies on functional form assump-
tions.76 Unfortunately, it turned out that there is no reliable exclusion restriction 
for a sample selection model. Thus only the probability of employing at least one 
FTC (or FL or TWA) worker can be analysed.   
To test whether atypical work is used as a means of adjustment to changing 
demand conditions, the management’s assessment of expected change in sales for 
the current year (given at June 30th of each year) as a measure for expected 
changes in product demand are included. Using the actual changes in sales ap-
pears less sensible, since the amount of sales refers to the whole year, whereas 
employment (and the use of atypical work) is measured in June. Moreover, it is 
not feasible to subtract the material inputs in order to obtain a measure for ex-
pected change in value added due to many missing answers with regard to mate-
rial inputs. Since expected sales are included as first differences in the regres-
sions and it is controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, this is possibly a minor 
issue. Expected sales are deflated with the price index of net output from national 
account data for different industries provided by the Federal Statistical Office 
(Statistisches Bundesamt). 
A dummy variable indicating whether there are seasonal fluctuations in the de-
mand  for  the  establishment’s  product,  using  the  management’s  subjective  as-
sessment contained in the 1993 and 1996 surveys, is included.77 This variable is 
used to check whether establishments subject to recurrent changes in demand 
conditions rely more heavily on atypical work as an adjustment mechanism, as 
the labour demand models, presented in Subchapter 4.2, suggest. 
Apart from variables relating to demand changes, it is controlled for a number 
of establishment characteristics. A set of establishment size dummies (defined 
according to total employment) is included in order to control for the fact that the 
probability of using atypical work is higher, if the workforce is greater. To con-
trol for the industrial relations practices in the establishment, dummy variables 
indicating whether the establishment is bound to an industry level or a firm level 
collective wage agreement and whether a works council exists are used.  
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The role of the capital stock and technological change has not been addressed 
so far. New technologies often require further training. Since employers’ and 
employees’ incentives to engage in job-specific training increase with the ex-
pected  duration  of  the  employment  contract,  a  firm  may  not  hire  temporary 
workers for tasks linked with new technologies (see BOOTH, FRANCESCONI, and 
FRANK, 2003; AUTOR, 2003 as well as Subchapter 5.2). One would, therefore, 
expect the probability of employing temporary workers to decline with the tech-
nological  level  of  the  production  technology.  On  the  other  hand,  SEGAL  and 
SULLIVAN (1997) stress that the trend towards open standards, such as those that 
allow for different kinds of computer hardware and software to be used together, 
leads organisations to avoid solutions that are highly firm-specific which, in turn, 
facilitates the use of temporary work (see also NEUMARK and REED, 2004). Two 
variables capture the effect of the technology used in the establishment on the 
probability of employing atypical work. As a measure for capital input and tech-
nological change firms’ own assessment of the state of their capital stock com-
pared to other establishments in the same industry in the previous year is used 
(possible answers range from “state of the art” to “obsolete”). Besides, indicators 
for the kinds of investments undertaken in the previous year are included. One 
dummy variable indicates investment into information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT), another represents ‘other investments’, mainly investment into 
real estate as well as office and traffic equipment. 
In most theoretical models it is assumed that permanent and atypical workers 
are substitutes in production, which is the case only if their skills are not too dif-
ferent. If atypical and permanent employees have different skill levels and thus 
may be complementary, the dynamic properties of labour demand are likely to be 
significantly  altered.  As  in  the  German  labour  market  many  TWA  and  FTC 
workers  have  lower  qualifications,  only  firms  with  low-qualified  permanent 
workers  may  use  atypical  workers  as  substitutes  or  for  screening  purposes. 
Among the characteristics of the workforce included is the proportion of workers 
with formal qualification. The expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is 
theoretically ambiguous: On the one hand, one might expect the variable to have 
a negative effect, if it describes the skill-requirements of the usual tasks in the 
firm. On the other hand, firms might want to use temporary work to insulate their 
qualified workers from changing demand conditions. A further control variable is 
the proportion of women in the workforce. 
In the IAB survey, establishments are asked whether they expect problems with 
the workforce to arise due to sickness or parental leave within the next two years. 
Two dummy varaiables are created accordingly and their one-year-lagged values 
are added as explanatory variables. Sickness or other unexpected absences of 
employees (due to parental leave etc.) are often seen as important reasons for 
employing TWA workers, and they are also legally accepted reasons for employ-
ing FTC workers in Germany (see Subchapter 2.2 and Section 4.2.5). The dum-
mies may serve as proxies for actual absenteeism.     81 
Among the variables relating to labour market institutions, dummy variables for 
the existence of a works council in the establishment and for the application of 
industry level or firm level collective wage agreements are included.  
Variation of the Protection Against Dismissal Law as a Natural Experiment 
The variation of the minimum employment threshold level for the application 
of the Protection Against Dismissal Law in 1996 (see Subchapter 2.2) may be 
used to evaluate the effect of institutional firing costs for permanent workers on 
the use of atypical employees.78 The hypothesis of interest is that after October 
1996 establishments with 6 to 10 employees use atypical employment with a 
lower probability than before this date. The protection of confidence for employ-
ees which had been covered by the Protection Against Dismissal Law in Septem-
ber 1996 seems to be no serious limitation, since the decision whether to use 
FTCs is only relevant for new employees. Furthermore, the law change may af-
fect the number of FTC workers getting their contracts transformed into perma-
nent ones. Unfortunately, the use of FTC work was liberalised at the same date: 
the maximum duration was prolonged to 24 months and the legal number of re-
newals was increased to three (see Subchapter 2.2). To the extent that this has a 
common and additive effect on all establishments, it is captured by time fixed-
effects.   
The policy change is interpreted as a natural experiment within a difference-in-
differences (DiD) framework (see Section 3.4.2). Thus the group of establish-
ments with 6 to 10 employees are interpreted as “treatment group”. The other 
establishments, which are not within the scope of the policy change, form the 
control group. The DiD estimator for this problem can be written as  
( ) ( ) 1 1 0 2 3 Pr 1 ,
f
it it i it it it it it it i E X X after C before C after a a b d b b ³ = F + + ´ + ´ + ,  (32) 
with  { } FTC, TWA, FL f Î , 
where 
f
t E  is the number of atypical workers of type f,  it X  is a vector of explana-
tory variables (including the sub-vector  1it X , as well as time and treatment dum-
mies), and  i a  is an unobserved establishment-specific effect which is modelled as 
a random effect.79  F denotes the cumulative normal distribution (leading to a 
probit model), before is a time dummy being one before the law change, after is a 
time dummy equalling one after the law change, and  it C  is the treatment dummy 
being one for the establishments in the treatment group (6-10 employees) and 
zero otherwise. The causal effect of the treatment is estimated as  3 2 ˆ ˆ b b - . If this 
                                              
78  Since data for the years 1999 and 2000 was not available at the time this research was performed, it 
was not possible to also take the second reform into account when the minimum employment thresh-
old level was set back to its pre-1996 reform level (see Subchapter 2.2 and Subchapter 5.5).   
79  For a further example of a difference-in-differences approach within a random effects probit model 
see MADRIAN (1994).    82 
difference is significantly negative, a reduction in institutional firing costs for 
permanent workers indeed reduces the probability of using flexible workers.80  
As  a  kind  of  sensitivity  check,  Eq.  (32)  is  augmented  by  further  interacted 
dummy variables. The establishment size dummies neighbouring to the size of 
the treatment group, that is, establishments with 1-5 employees and establish-
ments with 11–19 employees, are also interacted with before and after dummy 
variables. If for these groups the interacted before and after dummies are not sta-
tistically significantly different, this may be interpreted as evidence in favour of 
the assumption that controlling for observable and unobservable variables helps 
to isolate the law change effect. 
As discussed in detail in Section 3.4.2, this approach identifies the causal effect, 
if the following assumptions hold. Firstly, the change in regulation has to be ex-
ogenous, i.e., not affected by the use of atypical work. This assumption would, 
for example, be violated, if the government had increased the threshold level 
(lowered the firing costs for the treatment group establishments) in order to re-
duce  the  number  of  establishments  using  atypical  work.  This  seems  to  be 
unlikely since the use of FTCs was liberalised at the same time.  
Secondly, one has to assume that this law change was unexpected, since antici-
pation would have led to altered behaviour even before the law change. A possi-
ble anticipatory effect of establishments in the treatment group would be to post-
pone hirings of permanent workers to the period after the law change takes place 
as there is protection of confidence for employees which were hired before. This 
behaviour, which may bias the result, cannot be ruled out.  
What does the SUTVA mean for the analysis at hand (see Section 3.2.5)? One 
has to assume that establishments which were not within the scope of the change 
of the Protection Against Dismissal Law are not affected in a way which influ-
ences their demand for FTCs. This seems to be realistic.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the unweighted estimation sample 
can be found in Table 67 and Table 68 in the Appendix.  
Descriptive Evidence 
The share of establishments using atypical workers based on weighted data in 
the sample can be seen from Table 4. The numbers in Table 4 are likely to be 
downward biased due to the stock sampling problem, as discussed in Subchapter 
2.3.  Comparable  magnitudes  can  be  found,  for  example,  in  BÜCHTEMANN 
(1993). One explanation of the small numbers is the high proportion of small es-
tablishments which may employ (by pure chance) not any atypical worker at the 
time of the interview. Note that the proportion of firms using atypical workers is 
much larger in the unweighted estimation sample (see Table 67 in the Appendix).  
                                              
80  Note that Eq. (32) is completely analogous to the form presented in Eq. (28) in Section 3.4.2 and can 
easily be rearranged in that form.   83 
A breakdown of firms using atypical work by establishment size and by indus-
try is provided in Table 5. As expected, the proportion of establishments employ-
ing atypical workers increases with the total number of employees. However, the 
size effect is stronger for FTC and TWA employees than for FL work. A reason 
could be that small and medium-sized firms use FL workers for very specialised 
tasks of intermittent nature for which hiring permanent or FTC employees does 
not pay. The table also shows that TWA employment is used predominantly by 
establishments in the supply of energy and water, as well as in the basic and in-
vestment goods industry. FTCs are frequent in the same industries, but also in 
some of the service sectors. Establishments using FL work, by contrast, are con-
centrated in industries which provide human capital intensive services, such as 
education and business related services. 
The role of flexible working contracts can be gathered from assessments of the 
establishments’  managements.  In  the  1996  survey  of  the  IAB  Establishment 
Panel, establishments were asked whether they had experienced expected or un-
expected fluctuations in demand and production during the year and which in-
struments of adjustment they had used. The results can be seen in Table 6. FTCs 
are  much  more  frequently  mentioned  than  TWA  employment,  particularly 
amongst companies affected by expected demand changes. Only  3% of these 
companies used TWA employment as a means of adjustment, while TWAs were 
used by 6% of the establishments affected by unforeseen demand changes. This 
difference  may  be  explained  by  lower  search  costs  (hiring  costs),  but  higher 
overall labour costs for TWA workers (due to charges in favour of the agency) in 
comparison to FTC workers. A firm which needs to react quickly to an unex-
pected positive shock in the very short run may have no time to search for new 
employees on the labour market, while a firm which has more time for adjust-
ment may engage in search activities in order to avoid TWA charges. 
 
Table 4: Share of Establishments Using Atypical Work (Percentages) 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  Average 
FTC workers      6.7  7.8  8.4  7.6 
TWA workers  2.1  2.3  1.4  1.9  2.3  2.1 
FL workers  4.4  4.8  3.6  4.4  4.7  4.4 
Notes: Weighted by the inverse of the sampling probability as inflation factor. As in the 
estimation sample, establishments which did not report their sales as revenues (finan-
cial institutions, insurance companies, non-profit organisations, the government sector, 
public social security institutions, and agricultural enterprises) are excluded. 
Source: Own  estimations  based  on the  IAB  Establishment Panel for West Germany 
(1994–1998).   84 
Table 5: Share of Establishments Using Atypical Workers by Number of Em-
ployees and Industry  (Percentages) 
  FTC workers 
1996–1998 
TWA workers 
1994–1998 
FL workers 
1994–1998 
Number of employees       
1–5  2.4  0.9  3.4 
6–10  6.8  1.5  3.8 
11–19  11.9  1.8  5.2 
20–49  24.0  5.3  8.3 
50–99  36.6  11.2  11.4 
100–199  56.6  24.9  11.7 
200–499  69.8  30.2  17.2 
500–999  80.0  31.6  21.3 
1000–4999  80.0  43.1  25.0  
5000 and more  *    49.1  24.1 
Industry       
Mining, electricity, water supply  24.0  7.2  2.7 
Basic industry  12.8  8.6  3.4 
Investment goods industry  11.0  5.5  3.9 
Consumer goods  8.2  1.7  1.9 
Construction   5.7  4.9  3.5 
Wholesale, retail  7.4  1.1  2.5 
Transport, telecommunication  9.9  1.4  3.6 
Hotels, restaurants  8.9  0.5  0.8 
Education, research, publication  6.9  *  14.8 
Health services  7.4  0.4  2.7 
Business related services  5.5  1.5  13.8 
Other services  9.3  2.9  8.8 
Total   7.6  2.1  4.4 
Notes: * denotes inadequate number of observations. Weighted by the inverse of the sampling 
probability as inflation factor. As in the estimation sample, establishments which did not report 
their sales as revenues (financial institutions, insurance companies, non-profit organisations, the 
government sector, public social security institutions, and agricultural enterprises) are excluded.  
Source: Own estimations  based on the IAB  Establishment Panel for West Germany (1994–
1998). 
 
Table 6: Means of Adjustment to Expected or Unexpected Demand Changes 
During the Year in West Germany in 1996 (Percentages) 
  Kind of prevailing demand changes 
  Expected  Unexpected 
Inventories    12  12 
Overtimes hours / extra-shifts  35  31 
Shifting of holiday or free-time periods  43  37 
Short-time working  2  5 
Additional FTC workers  20  15 
Additional TWA workers  3  6 
Hiring / firing of staff  10  15 
Notes: Weighted by the inverse of the sampling probability as inflation factor.  
Source: Own Estimations based on the IAB Establishment Panel for West Germany (1996).   85 
In the 1993 survey of the IAB Establishment Panel, establishments were asked 
whether they had regular fluctuations and how they coped with them. The ques-
tion distinguished between adjustment instruments for positive and for negative 
changes in demand. Unfortunately, the questions did not differentiate between 
FTCs and other kinds of temporary employment. Table 7 contains the propor-
tions of establishments using the specified instrument relative to all establish-
ments which were subject to fluctuations in demand. The most important adjust-
ment  instruments  for  increasing  and  decreasing  demand  seem  to  be  overtime 
hours and extra-shifts. The employment of additional temporary workers is the 
second most frequently mentioned instrument of adjustment to positive changes 
in demand. In contrast, the hiring or firing of permanent staff seems to be rather 
avoided by firms, which can be explained by their higher firing costs. 
Table 7: Means of Adjustment to Increasing and Decreasing Demand in West 
Germany in 1993 (Percentages) 
Increasing demand   
Overtime hours / extra-shifts  49 
Postponing holidays  24 
Hiring TWA workers or FTC workers  29 
Hiring new permanent staff  11 
Decreasing demand   
Reducing overtime / extra-shifts  35 
Giving earlier holidays  27 
Short-time work  7 
Not replacing labour turnover  8 
Dismissing permanent staff / termination of contracts  12 
Notes: Weighted by the inverse of the sampling probability as inflation factor. 
Source: Own Estimations based on the IAB Establishment Panel for West Ger-
many (1993). 
Estimation Technique 
The panel character of the data allows to control for unobserved establishment-
specific  heterogeneity  i a .  For  this  purpose,  the  random  effects  probit  model, 
proposed by BUTLER and MOFFIT (1982), is applied. The underlying assumption 
is that the random effect  i a  and the explanatory variables are independent and 
that  i a  has a normal distribution (see WOOLDRIDGE, 2002: Chapter 15). One pos-
sibility of evaluating the relevance of establishment-specific heterogeneity (ran-
dom effects) is to calculate the proportion of the total variance contributed by the 
panel-level  variance  component.  If  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  proportion  of 
panel-level variance r  equals zero is not rejected, there is no difference between 
a  pooled  probit  and  a  random  effects  probit  estimator  (WOOLDRIDGE,  2002: 
Chapter 15).    86 
A potential drawback of the random effects probit model is that it is calculated 
using Gauss-Hermite quadrature as an approximation for the high-dimensional 
integral  that  is  part  of  the  likelihood  function  (see  GREENE,  2003:  Appendix 
E.5.4). This requires the integrated function to be well-approximated by a poly-
nomial. The approximation is appropriate, if changing the number of quadrature 
points does not affect the results. The estimation results turn out to be robust 
concerning the number of quadrature points.81 Therefore, one can conclude that 
the Gauss-Hermite quadrature method is appropriate and the random-effects pro-
bit is applicable. 
4.4.3  Estimation Results 
Note that all estimated coefficients presented in the following are informative 
only with regard to the sign and statistical significance of the effects, but not 
with regard to the magnitudes. The reason is that the estimated coefficients do 
not correspond to marginal effects on the probability (see WOOLDRIDGE, 2002: 
458). Even if it is generally possible to estimate the corresponding marginal ef-
fects,  these  time-consuming  calculations  could  not  be  performed  here  due  to 
time-restrictions at the federal employment office.  
The estimation results are depicted in Table 8. It is ex ante unclear whether the 
demand for atypical workers reacts symmetrically to increases and decreases in 
output. Therefore, likelihood ratio tests are used to find out whether the estima-
tion of separate coefficients for positive and negative output changes (the unre-
stricted model) or a common coefficient for output changes (the restricted model) 
is appropriate. Only in the case of FL workers the likelihood-ratio test indicates 
that the unrestricted model should be preferred: positive expected output changes 
have a significantly positive effect on the use of FL work, whereas negative out-
put changes have no effect.  
The result that the use of FTC work is not significantly affected by expected 
output changes may be explained by two opposite effects: On the one hand, an 
output increase may make it more necessary to use FTCs in order to adjust to a 
temporary positive demand shock. On the other hand, if the shock turns out to 
last longer, firms may start to convert FTCs into permanent contracts. Note that if 
there was indeed no effect of demand changes on the use of FTCs, then this 
would render it more possible that FTCs are only used for substitution of perma-
nent workers or for screening purposes. However, in a comparable study we find 
a positive effect of actual output increases on the use of FTCs (see BOOCKMANN 
and HAGEN, 2003). Thus the use of FTCs as a means of adjustment should not be 
rejected from this finding.     
For TWA work expected output changes have a significantly positive effect, 
which may indicate that TWA work is indeed used for adjustment purposes. Ex-
                                              
81  This is simply checked by comparing the results using different number of quadrature points. The 
results are hardly affected.    87 
pected positive output changes increase the use of FL work. The result of nega-
tive output changes not reducing the use of FL work may indicate that firms may 
outsource permanent jobs by using FL workers during economic downturns.   
The qualitative indicators for the state of capital stock as well as the sum of in-
vestments in the previous year are found to have no significant effect in all speci-
fications. Therefore, these variables are not included  in the  specifications de-
picted in Table 8. By contrast, the coefficient of the dummy variable indicating 
ICT investment in the previous year is significantly positive for all three kinds of 
atypical employment. This may be a confirmation of the specialisation argument, 
particularly in the case of FL workers: for many smaller firms it may be profit-
able to contract out services associated with the establishment’s own ICT equip-
ment (see Section 4.4.2).  
The existence of collective wage agreements has no significant effect on the 
probability of using FTC or TWA work. An interpretation is that the negative 
direct and the countervailing positive indirect effects described in Section 4.2.5 
are balanced. By contrast, collective wage agreements (particularly, those con-
cluded at the industry level) have a significantly negative effect on the probabil-
ity of employing FL workers. KAISER and PFEIFFER (2001) obtain similar results 
for the German service sector. This may be explained by the fact that FL workers 
are often covered by collective wage agreements. In establishments which apply 
collective agreements, the cost advantage of FL work may therefore be lower.  
The estimated coefficient for the existence of works councils is in line with the 
preponderance of the indirect effect (see Section 4.2.5). It suggests that estab-
lishments with works councils tend to use FTCs more frequently. The main ex-
planation may be that works councils increase firing costs for permanent work-
ers,  which  decreases  the  relative  firing  costs  of  FTC  workers.  All  theoretical 
models presented in Section 4.2.5 predict a positive link between firing costs of 
permanent workers and the use of FTC work. However, works councils do not 
seem to influence the use of the other two types of atypical work. When inter-
preting the results one should, however, keep in mind that the existence of a 
works council is assumed to be strictly exogenous conditional on the other ex-
planatory variables. Recent studies on the effects of works councils on firm per-
formance have cast doubt on this exogeneity assumption (see, e.g., ADDISON et 
al., 2004). In this application it is conceivable that FTC workers are less inter-
ested in co-determination than permanent workers. This would make the exis-
tence of works councils in establishments using FTCs less likely. This form of 
endogeneity  would  exert  a  downward  bias  on  the  estimated  impact  of  works 
councils on FTC employment.    
 
 
 
 
   88 
Table 8: Determinants of Employing FTC, FL, or TWA Workers 
  FTC 
(1996–1998) 
FL 
(1994–1998) 
TWA 
(1994–1998) 
  Coeff.    Std.err.  Coeff.    Std.err.  Coeff.    Std.err. 
Expected output increase        0.558  ***  0.197       
Expected output decrease        0.487    0.449       
Expected output change   0.299   0.188       0.457 ***  0.170 
Seasonal fluctuations  0.150 *  0.085  -0.074   0.084  -0.061   0.634 
                
Collective wage: firm level  
                            industry level 
-0.117 
-0.158 
  0.141 
0.106 
-0.246 
-0.543 
* 
*** 
0.139 
0.115 
-0.053 
-0.074 
  0.305 
0.524 
Works council  0.325 ***  0.107  -0.052   0.128  0.214   0.147 
                
Share of workers with qualification  -0.039   0.133  0.575 ***  0.145  0.166   0.992 
Share of women   -0.225   0.169  -0.213   0.187  -1.226 ***  0.242 
                
ICT investments (t-1)  0.200 ***  0.067  0.621 ***  0.104  0.314 ***  0.114 
Other investments (t-1)  0.101   0.073  0.326 ***  0.114  0.156   0.121 
                
Problems due to parental leave (t-1)  0.361 ***  0.124  -0.122   0.115  -0.252 **  0.126 
Problems due to sickness (t-1)  -0.017   0.091  -0.154 *  0.087  0.059   0.503 
                
Wave 1995           0.091  0.003   0.106 
Wave 1996          0.097  -0.049   0.112 
Wave 1997  0.014   0.075  0.015   0.099  0.131   0.113 
Wave 1998  0.378 ***  0.082  0.113   0.100  0.432 ***  0.116 
                
Reference: ³ 5000 employees                
1– 5    employees x before   -5.127 ***  0.727  -2.446   0.376  -2.504 ***  0.479 
1– 5    employees x after  -4.853 ***  0.668  -2.190   0.380  -3.226 ***  0.556 
6– 10  employees x before   -3.834 ***  0.666  -1.915   0.371  -2.560 ***  0.515 
6– 10  employees x after  -4.352 ***  0.661  -2.282   0.406  -2.628 ***  0.490 
11–19 employees x before  -3.397 ***  0.652  -1.889   0.370  -1.952 ***  0.421 
11–19 employees x after  -3.575 ***  0.641  -1.776   0.380  -2.140 ***  0.433 
20–49 employees  -3.142 ***  0.626  -1.561 ***  0.331  -1.619 ***  0.348 
50–99 employees  -2.819 ***  0.624  -1.218 ***  0.327  -1.077 ***  0.337 
100–199 employees  -2.068 ***  0.617  -0.839 ***  0.315  -0.174   0.321 
200–499 employees  -1.558 **  0.612  -0.567 *  0.304  -0.042   0.313 
500–999 employees  -1.246 **  0.618  0.026   0.308  0.096   0.320 
1000–4999 employees  -0.932   0.614  -0.061   0.299  0.281   0.310 
                
Reference: Construction                
Mining, electricity, water supply  0.399   0.306  -0.584 *  0.327  -0.053   0.343 
Basic industry   0.619 ***  0.176  -0.317 *  0.192  0.770 ***  0.214 
Investment goods industry  0.783 ***  0.163  0.143   0.171  0.945 ***  0.201 
Consumer goods  0.406 **  0.175  -0.110   0.198  0.214   0.938 
Wholesale, retail   0.420 **  0.167  -0.154   0.188  0.018   0.230 
Transport, telecommunication  0.120 ***  0.210  -0.247   0.247  -0.020   0.278 
Hotels, restaurants   0.774 ***  0.213  -0.123   0.257  -0.467   0.381 
Education, research, publication  1.016 ***  0.331  1.354 ***  0.292  0.025   0.440 
Health services  1.024 ***  0.278  0.309   0.282  0.620   0.378 
Business related services  0.342 *  0.206  1.033 ***  0.206  0.337   0.278 
Other services  0.245   0.262  0.148   0.294  0.211   0.359 
 
 
 
   89 
Table 8 continued... 
  FTC  FL  TWA 
  Coeff.    Std.err.  Coeff.    Std.err.  Coeff.    Std.err. 
Reference: Bavaria                   
Berlin West  0.422 **  0.221  0.066   0.194  0.422 *  0.221 
Schleswig-Holstein  0.151 ***  0.295  -0.047   0.254  0.151   0.295 
Hamburg  1.060   0.256  0.431 **  0.216  1.060 ***  0.256 
Lower Saxony  -0.275   0.184  -0.362 **  0.160  -0.275   0.184 
Bremen  0.173   0.368  -0.183   0.329  0.173   0.368 
North Rhine-Westphalia  0.184   0.140  -0.057   0.124  0.184   0.140 
Hesse   0.194   0.184  -0.053   0.165  0.194   0.184 
Rhineland-Palatinate  -0.175   0.213  -0.281   0.190  -0.175   0.213 
Baden-Wuerttemberg  0.041   0.152  0.106   0.131  0.041   0.152 
                
Constant   -1.191 **  0.438  0.270   0.133  -1.191 ***  0.438 
                
Std. err. of random effects  0.868 ***  0.088  1.154 ***  0.076  1.286 ***  0.081 
r   0.430 ***  0.050  0.567 ***  0.032  0.623 ***  0.030 
                
LR-Tests for joint significance                
Industry dummies   43.07 ***  0.000  87.73 ***  0.000  64.16 ***  0.000 
Wave dummies  26.4 ***  0.000  4.160   0.385  27.66 ***  0.000 
Firm size dummies  250.07 ***  0.000  131.00 ***  0.000  155.99 ***  0.000 
Federal state dummies  19.74 **  0.030  17.42 **  0.045  29.88 ***  0.000 
Number of observations  3,735  6,303  7,207 
Number of establishments   2,344  2,928  2,843 
Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significant at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
Source: Own Estimations based on the IAB Establishment Panel for West Germany (1994–
1998). 
 
The proportion of employees with a formal qualification has a positive effect on 
the probability of using FL workers. This may indicate that FL workers are used 
more often in establishments with tasks that require a qualification. In addition, it 
may reflect the finding that adjustment costs for qualified permanent workers are 
generally higher than for unskilled permanent workers (see, e.g., HAMERMESH, 
1993). Ceteris paribus, an increase in adjustment costs for permanent workers 
raises the probability of using temporary workers, if both are substitutes in pro-
duction.  
The effect of the indicator variable for problems with parental leave is highly 
significant  in  the  case  of  FTC  workers,  which  is  in  line  with  the  hypothesis 
posed. However, for FL workers and TWA workers the results reject the hy-
pothesis.  
As  the  descriptive  tables  already  indicated,  the  highest  probability  of  using 
TWA workers is found among establishments in the basic and investment goods 
industry. In contrast, FL workers are used with a higher probability in the busi-
ness-related service sector, which seems to be plausible. Furthermore, they are 
frequently used in the education, research, and publication sector. The highest 
probability of establishments to use FTC workers is in the health services sector, 
in the education, research, and publication sector, in the investment goods indus-
try, and in hotels and restaurants.    90 
 Another interesting result are the significant differences between the federal 
state dummies. In the city states of West Berlin and Hamburg, establishments 
employ TWA workers with a significantly higher probability than in the base 
category (Bavaria), which is a territorial state. This may reflect supply restric-
tions as it seems plausible that the density of temporary work agencies increases 
with urbanity. An exception is Bremen which does not have significantly more 
establishments employing atypical workers than Bavaria. Comparable results are 
not found for FL and FTC work, which rely on bilateral contracts between firms 
and worker without the use of an agency as intermediary.  
Table 9 describes the estimated effects of the increase in the minimum em-
ployment threshold level for the Protection Against Dismissal Law in October 
1996 on the probability of using atypical work. The table reports the coefficients 
of the interaction terms and Wald tests with the null hypothesis that the differ-
ences in the coefficients are zero. The specifications are the same as in Table 8.  
Table 9: Effects of the Increase in the Minimum Employment Threshold Level 
for the Protection Against Dismissal Law in October 1996 
  FTC  FL  TWA 
Numb. 
of         
em-
ployees 
Coeff.  
(Std.err.) 
before 
Coeff. 
(Std.err.) 
after 
Wald test 
p-value 
Coeff. 
(Std.err.) 
before 
Coeff. 
(Std.err.) 
after 
Wald test 
p-value 
Coeff. 
(Std.err.) 
before 
Coeff. 
(Std.err.) 
after 
Wald test 
p-value 
1–5   -5.13 
(0.73) 
-4.85 
(0.67) 
0.46  -2.45 
(0.38) 
-2.19 
(0.38) 
0.29  -2.50 
(0.48) 
-3.23 
(0.56) 
0.17 
6–10   -3.83 
(0.67) 
-4.35 
(0.66) 
0.05  -1.92 
(0.37) 
-2.28 
(0.41) 
0.20  -2.56 
(0.52) 
-2.63 
(0.49) 
0.60 
11–19   -3.40 
(0.65) 
-3.56 
(0.64) 
0.43  -1.89 
(0.37) 
-1.18 
(0.38) 
0.67  -1.95 
(0.42) 
-2.14 
(0.43) 
0.13 
Notes: Estimation results from Table 8. 
 
The probability of using TWA workers decreases in all three firm size groups, 
but the differences are not statistically significant. In the case of FL workers, the 
probability decreases only in establishments with 6-10 employees, which con-
forms with the expectation. However, the differences are not statistically signifi-
cantly different from zero.  
Most interesting is the result for the probability of using FTC workers: The in-
crease in the minimum employment threshold for the application of the Protec-
tion Against Dismissal Law significantly lowers the probability of using FTC 
workers for establishments with 6-10 employees, while there are no significant 
changes in the two contiguous establishment size groups. This may suggest that 
firing costs of permanent contract employees are more important as a reason for 
using FTC workers than for using TWA or FL workers. Indeed, it appears plau-
sible that FTC workers are closer substitutes for permanent employees in produc-
tion than TWA or FL workers.   91 
4.4.4  Summary of the Empirical Analysis of the Firms’ Use of Atypical 
Work 
Using a change in dismissal protection legislation as a natural experiment, some 
evidence is found that the stringency of dismissal protection for permanent work-
ers has a positive effect on the probability of using FTC workers. This indicates 
that firms do indeed use FTC workers as a more flexible alternative to permanent 
employment. By contrast, a similar effect for TWA and FL workers cannot be 
identified, which may indicate that permanent and FTC workers are closer substi-
tutes than permanent workers and TWA and FL workers.   
This result should, however, be interpreted with care: it is (in case of FTCs) 
based on data given only one year before and two years after the policy change. 
Furthermore, one cannot rule out that anticipatory effects are relevant, i.e., that 
the hiring behaviour changed already before the law change was implemented. 
Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first microeconometric 
study that can reveal this association between firing costs and FTCs at the firm 
level.82 Other studies have either used country level or regional data to attempt to 
identify  this  relationship  (see  NUNZIATA  and  STAFFOLANI,  2002  and  AUTOR, 
2003).  
Works councils may also raise firing costs of permanent employees in Ger-
many.  In  accordance  with  this  hypothesis,  the  probability  of  employing  FTC 
workers is influenced positively by the existence of a works council. Collective 
wage agreements as another potential institutional source of firing costs do not 
influence the probability of employing FTC and TWA workers. Supposably, the 
direct effect (unions opposing against the use of atypical work) outweighs the 
indirect effects (unions increasing firing costs of permanent workers; raising the 
costs of overtime; increasing wage rigidities).  
Furthermore, establishments facing problems due to parental leave use FTCs 
more often. This has been interpreted as evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
FTCs are used in case of stochastic absence time of permanent contract workers. 
                                              
82  Furthermore, it is the first study using this policy variation in Germany as a natural experiment. This 
variation could be used for a number of related questions.     92 
4.5  Empirical Analysis of the Role of Fixed-Term Contracts in Worker 
and Job Flows 
4.5.1  Introduction 
The analysis of the previous section was based on an employment stock ap-
proach, since not inflows (hirings) and outflows (separations) of FTC workers 
were explained, but the existence of FTC jobs. However, the difference in firing 
costs between FTC and permanent contract workers refers to worker flows.  
Therefore, this subchapter takes a step back to a simple descriptive analysis of 
worker flows and job flows based on the IAB Establishment Panel.83 Again, it is 
not possible to evaluate whether FTCs increase employment flexibility or even 
the employment level. However, avoiding unrealistic assumptions as imposed in 
econometric studies, cited in Subchapter 4.3, such as symmetrical and convex 
adjustment costs, it is possible to gain some insights into the role of FTCs in dy-
namic labour demand.  
There  is  a  growing  literature  on  the  “flow  approach  to  labour  markets” 
(BLANCHARD and DIAMOND, 1992) and especially on worker flows at the firm 
level (see, e.g., BURGESS, LANE, and STEVENS, 2001). The fundamental reason 
for focussing on worker flows is the well-known result that most employers are 
simultaneously  hiring  and facing separations, that  declining firms  continue to 
hire,  and  that  growing  firms  continue  to  lose  workers.  Furthermore,  workers 
mostly enter jobs which already existed before the contract is signed and which 
will not be destroyed when the worker quits or is dismissed. The phenomenon of 
worker turnover exceeding job turnover is termed ‘rotation’ or ‘churning’ (see, 
e.g., SERRANO, 1998; BURGESS, LANE, and STEVENS, 2001). The role of FTCs in 
these dynamic processes is almost unknown for Germany. This subchapter aug-
ments the framework of the worker turnover and job turnover literature (see, e.g., 
DAVIS and HALTIWANGER, 1999, SCHETTKAT, 1996 as well as BURDA and WY-
PLOSZ, 1994) by taking FTCs versus permanent contracts into account.  
Churning is a matter of particular interest in the analysis of this subchapter as it 
is linked to the three categories of reasons for the use of FTCs (buffer stock, 
screening, and substitution): if the churning rate (the proportion of worker turn-
over that is not associated with job creation and destruction) of FTCs is close to 
100%, then this may be interpreted as evidence for the hypothesis that an existing 
FTC job is inherently permanent, but repeatedly filled by FTC workers. Even 
though it is not possible to directly conclude from this result that this reflects the 
underlying role of FTCs as a substitute for permanent contracts (as there can still 
                                              
83  Throughout this Subchapter the terms “inflows”, “recruitments”, and “hirings” as well as “outflows”, 
“separations”, and “firings” are used interchangeably. Formally, it is incorrect to term all worker out-
flows from establishments as firing, since also quits, retirements etc. are included.   93 
be a constant number of probationary period jobs), this would indicate that FTC 
workers are not used for adjustment purposes (buffer stock). A churning rate for 
FTC work of zero would indicate that every inflowing FTC worker occupies a 
newly created job and every outflowing FTC worker represents a destroyed FTC 
job. In this case FTC work would be exclusively used for adjustment purposes. 
However, since there may be a simultaneous creation of one type of jobs (e.g., 
FTC jobs) and destruction of the other type (e.g., permanent contract jobs), this 
simple concept has to be augmented in the course of this subchapter.    
In detail, the aim of the following descriptive analysis is to shed light on the 
following questions.84 How widespread is FTC employment in West Germany? 
The descriptive analyses in Subchapter 2.3 and in the previous subchapter could 
only reveal the proportion of FTC jobs and the proportion of establishments us-
ing FTCs measured at a certain date. Hence, how large is the proportion of FTCs 
in worker flows? Which fraction of an establishment’s FTCs is converted into 
permanent contracts? The larger this proportion, the more important is obviously 
the role of FTCs as screening device. How big is the fluctuation within the group 
of fixed-term employees and the group of permanent employees within estab-
lishments? To which extent do inflows into and outflows from establishments 
occur simultaneously, and to which extent do inflows and outflows lead to job 
creation and destruction? Are simultaneous outflows of permanent workers and 
inflows of FTC workers observable?  
So far, empirical evidence on the significance of FTCs in worker flows at the 
firm level is only available for France, Spain, and Portugal.85  
For France, ABOWD, CORBEL, and KRAMARZ (1999) show that during the pe-
riod 1987–1990 about 70% of all hirings are on FTCs, whereby this share is even 
larger in establishments with decreasing employment. More than half of the total 
outflows is due to expired FTCs. The separation rate of FTCs (outflows of FTCs 
relative to FTC employment) is even higher in growing businesses. About one 
third of all fixed-term contracts are converted into permanent ones. 
SERRANO (1998) finds similar results for Spanish companies with more than 
500 employees during the period 1993–1994. Accordingly, 85% of all firms’ in-
flows and 79% of all outflows are based on FTCs. While about 3% of all em-
ployees with permanent contracts are hired or fired by a company (worker turn-
over) during each quarter, this ratio is about 57% for the group of FTC workers. 
This high FTC worker turnover results to a large extent from churning.  
For the Portuguese labour market during the period 1991–1998, VAREJÃO and 
PORTUGAL (2003) find that the proportion of FTCs in the employment stock is 
on average about 14%. However, the proportion of FTCs in hirings is about 62% 
and in firings about 43%. The quarterly worker turnover rate is about 31%, indi-
                                              
84  Of course, these questions should not be interpreted as causal in the sense defined in Chapter 3. 
85  For Germany worker flows on the basis of establishment level data are analysed by BELLMANN and 
BOERI (1998). However, they do not take the role of FTCs into account.   94 
cating that approximately one in three FTC workers either joins or leaves her or 
his employer every quarter. In contrast, the worker turnover rate for permanent 
workers is about 5%. 
The  econometric  study  by  GOUX,  MAURIN,  and  PAUCHET  (2001)  interprets 
FTC and permanent work as two different factors in production. This is possible 
since their panel dataset for French firms for the period 1988–1992 provides in-
formation on wage costs of both types of work. Furthermore, the authors are able 
to make inference on the structure of gross adjustment costs, since they have data 
on inflows and outflows of permanent contract and FTC workers. The results can 
be summarised as follows: it is more costly to adjust permanent contract workers 
than FTC workers, firing permanent workers is much more expensive than hiring 
them, hiring costs of FTC workers are slightly lower than hiring costs of perma-
nent  workers,  and  the  transformation  of  FTCs  into  permanent  contracts  is  a 
means of permanent (long-term) labour adjustment.86 
This subchapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces measures 
describing job and worker flows by type of contract. Section 4.5.3 describes the 
dataset and explains how the data can be weighted in order to be estimates either 
for the population of establishments or for the population of employees in West 
Germany. The results are presented in Section 4.5.4. A summary of the findings 
is provided in Section 4.5.5. 
 
4.5.2  Methodology 
Terminology87 
To simplify matters, assume one establishment i. The hiring rate HRit and the 
separation rate SRit of the establishment i for the period between dates t-1 and t 
is given by  
it
it
it N
H
HR = , 
it
it
it N
S
SR = ,              (33)  
with Hit denoting the number of hirings during this period, Sit is the number of 
separations, and Nit is the stock of total employment in the establishment. Total 
employment Nit is defined as the average of the employment stocks Li at the dates 
t-1 and t, that is,  ( ) it it it L L N + = -1 2
1 . 
The (worker) turnover rate  it WTR  is the sum of the hiring rate ( it HR ) and the 
separation rate ( it SR ) in the respective establishment88, that is, 
                                              
86  The lower hiring costs for FTCs may be interpreted as evidence in favour of a less demanding pre-
hiring screening process, as FTC workers can be screened on-the-job. 
87  The definitions and the terminology in this Subchapter follow the literature to a large extent (see 
DAVIS and HALTIWANGER, 1999).  
88  Note that, under certain assumptions, there is a simple negative connection between the average dura-
tion of an employment relationship and the worker turnover rate (see CRAMER and KOLLER, 1988).   95 
it it it WTR HR SR = + .                (34) 
Worker turnover can be decomposed into two components. The first component 
consists of hirings and separations which are associated with job creation or job 
destruction, that is, net changes in total employment of the establishment. This 
can be expressed in terms of the job creation rate  it JCR  and the job destruction 
rate  it JDR  
it it it SR HR JCR - =    for  1 it it L L - > - 0 and 0 otherwise,        (35) 
it it it SR HR JDR + - =    for  1 it it L L - < - 0 and 0 otherwise.       (36) 
By using this concept, it is assumed that job creation and destruction is reflected 
in a net employment change within the establishment. Following the literature, 
simultaneous creation and destruction of job positions within the establishment 
has to be neglected (see, e.g., SERRANO, 1998). Put differently, if one job posi-
tion (e.g., with low skill requirements) is destroyed, and one job position (e.g., 
with high skill requirements) is created within the same establishment (as sug-
gested by the literature on technological change), this is not counted as creation 
or destruction of jobs.  
Job creation and job destruction rates are associated with the rate of net em-
ployment change. The absolute value of the growth rate of the employment stock 
is given by 89 
     it it it it it GR HR SR JCR JDR = - = - .           (37) 
The job turnover rate is not depicted in the following analyses. However, it can 
simply be computed as the sum of the job creation and destruction rates.  
The second component of worker turnover consists of hirings and separations 
which are not related to a net change in employment. This phenomenon is de-
noted  as  rotation  or  churning.  Rotation  or  churning  may  result  either  from 
worker mobility between job positions at different employers (e.g., due to per-
sonal factors, low job satisfaction, higher career opportunities at other employ-
ers), or from the decision of the employer (workers are exchanged at a given job 
position because the match turns out to be poor, there is technological or organ-
isational change, or churning is a cost-minimising equilibrium strategy).90 The 
rotation rate  it RR  is the part of the turnover rate that is not associated with a net 
employment change, i.e., 
it it it it it it it it it it RR WTR GR WTR JCR JDR HR SR HR SR = - = - - = + - - .  (38) 
                                              
89  This rate corresponds to the absolute value of (Lit -Lit-1) / 0.5·(Lit+Lit-1) which is a growth rate in dis-
crete time.  
90  Remember again, that a simultaneous creation and destruction of job positions which is not associ-
ated with net employment changes within an establishment is treated as churning or rotation even if 
there is destruction of old jobs and creation of new jobs. Thus rotation or churning is likely to be 
overestimated.   96 
Relating the rotation rate to the turnover rate leads to  the so-called churning 
rate91  
it it it CR RR WTR = .                    (39) 
The churning rate  it CR  indicates the proportion of worker turnover that cannot be 
attributed to net changes in employment. Obviously,  it CR  is not defined for a 
single establishment that neither has worker inflows nor outflows during the pe-
riod ( 0 it WTR = ). An  it CR  close to 100% means that almost all hirings and separa-
tions are associated with replacements of workers on existing jobs, for example, 
since all employment relationships turn out to be mismatches (from the worker’s 
or the employer’s point of view).  
Two Types of Contracts 
The concept is now defined separately for FTC and permanent contract (PER) 
work (an overview is provided in Box 2).92 For example, the hiring rate of FTC 
work 
FTC
it HR  indicates the number of hirings on FTCs relative to the stock of FTC 
employees in the establishment. After the termination of a FTC, two destination 
states can be distinguished. Either the employee leaves the establishment due to 
the expiration of her or his FTC (included in the separation rate 
FTC
it SR of FTCs), 
or the FTC is transformed into a permanent contract. This is expressed in the 
transformation rate, which is defined as 
    
it
it FTC
it
TF
TFR
N
= ,                (40) 
where  it TF  denotes the number of transformations from FTCs into permanent 
contracts within the establishment.  
A problem arises due to the fact that, although there is information on worker 
quits and retiring, it cannot be identified whether these belong to FTC or perma-
nent contract workers. Since economic theory predicts that the quit rate of FTC 
workers is higher than the quit rate of permanent contract workers, this may be a 
serious limitation. Due to the lack of reasonable alternatives, the number of sepa-
rations of permanent workers is simply defined as 
PER FTC
it it it S S S = - , with 
FTC
it S  
consisting only of FTC worker outflows due to the termination of their FTCs.  
Hence, all quits and retirings are counted as permanent worker separations, im-
plying that 
PER
it SR  overestimates the true permanent worker separation rate, and 
FTC
it SR  underestimates the true FTC worker separation rate.93  
                                              
91  Note that the literature suggests different definitions of the churning rate. However, all definitions 
have comparable meanings (see BURGESS, LANE, and STEVENS, 2001). Here the definition proposed 
by BELLMANN and BOERI (1998) is applied.  
92  In the following, the superscripts FTC and PER stand for fixed-term and permanent contracts, respec-
tively. 
93  Note that most firm level data are associated with similar problems. SERRANO (1998) faces exactly 
the same problem and seems to use a comparable definition.   97 
The respective rotation rates of fixed-term and permanent contract work can be 
defined analogously to Eq. (38) as 
FTC FTC FTC FTC FTC FTC FTC
it it it it it it it RR HR SR HR SR WTR GR = + - - = - ,    (41)  
PER PER PER PER PER PER PER
it it it it it it it RR HR SR HR SR WTR GR = + - - = - . 
Note that these rotation rates do not include transformations of FTCs into perma-
nent contracts. This flow is taken into account by another measure introduced 
below. 
The churning rates for the two types of contracts can be analogously to Eq. 
(39) defined as  
FTC FTC FTC
it it it CR RR WTR = , 
PER PER PER
it it it CR RR WTR = .  
The rotation rates of FTC and permanent contract employment defined in Eq. 
(41) do not sum up to the rotation rate of total employment in Eq. (38), since the 
denominators are different (they are either 
FTC
it N or 
PER
it N ). Additionally, it is not 
taken into account that there may be outflows from one type of contract, but in-
flows into the other type of contract within the establishment. Given the assump-
tion discussed above, this may be interpreted as substitution and, therefore, as an 
additional kind of rotation or churning. In order to account for this, the flows for 
each type of contract are related to total employment  it N . One receives the fol-
lowing alternative rotation rates for both types of contracts 
k
it
k
it
k
it
k
it
k
it SRR HRR SRR HRR RRR - - + = ,    { } , k FTC PER Î ,     (42)
where 
k k
it it it HRR H N =  and 
k k
it it it SRR S N = . The additional ‘R’ at the variables in-
dicates that the flows are related to total employment instead of contract-specific 
employment. Similarly, the transformation rate  it TFRR is defined by relating  it TF  
to  it N .     
The difference between total rotation in the establishment as defined in Eq. (38) 
and the sum of the rotation within the two types of contracts in Eq. (42) leads to 
the cross rotation rate: 
cross FTC PER
it it it it RRR RR RRR RRR = - - .              (43) 
The cross rotation rate 
cross
it RRR is zero, if FTC employment as well as permanent 
contract employment increases, or if FTC employment as well as permanent con-
tract employment decreases. The cross rotation rate is calculated as 
0                                                                           if  >   >  
0                                                                           if 
FTC FTC PER PER
it it it it
cross
it i
H S H S
RRR H =
Ù
( )
<   <    
2 min ,  otherwise. 
FTC FTC PER PER
t it it it
FTC FTC PER PER
it it it it
S H S
HRR SRR HRR SRR × - -

  Ù 

 
(44) 
The cross rotation rate can be interpreted as follows: It is the part of turnover of 
the establishment’s total workforce which emerges from the fact that under one 
type of contract employment is created, while at the same time employment is   98 
reduced under the other type. For example, if an establishment has outflows of 
permanent staff and replaces it by FTC employees without changing its total em-
ployment, this is neither rotation of FTC employment (
FTC
it RR  ), nor rotation of 
permanent employment (
PER
it RRR ), but cross rotation (
cross
it RRR ).94 Note that cross 
rotation is a new concept which has not been introduced to the literature so far. 
Box 2: Measures to Describe Worker and Job Flows 
Name  Notation  Variable in numerator 
Denominator: Stock of employed of contract type  { } , k FTC PER Î   
Hiring rate 
k HR   hiring on contract type k 
Separation rate 
k SR   outflow from the establishment from employment with 
contract type k 
Worker turnover rate 
k WTR   sum of hiring rate and separation rate for contract type k 
Job creation rate 
k JCR   created job positions for contract type k 
Job destruction rate 
k JDR   destroyed job positions for contract type k 
Rotation rate 
k RR   turnover rate of contract type k less hirings on and separa-
tions from contract type k which are associated with crea-
tion or destruction of jobs of contract type k  
Churning rate 
k CR   rotation rate in relation to turnover rate  
Transformation rate  TFR   transitions from FTC in permanent contracts within the 
establishment  
     
Denominator: Stock of total employment 
Hiring rate  k HRR   analogous to HR 
Separation rate 
k SRR   analogous to SR  
worker turnover rate 
k WTRR   analogous to TR 
Rotation rate 
k RRR   analogous to RR 
Cross Rotation rate 
cross RRR   Part of total turnover which is associated with a simultane-
ous reduction in the workforce of one type of contract, and 
an increase in the workforce of the other type of contract 
Transformation rate  TFRR  analogous to TFR  
Note: If the superscript k is not used, the corresponding measure is for total employment without 
distinguishing between the type of contract. 
                                              
94  Cross rotation can be further split up according to whether permanent employees are replaced by FTC 
employees or vice versa. However, it complicates the analysis without enhancing the understanding 
of the issue.     99 
4.5.3  Dataset and Weighting 
For the empirical analysis again the IAB Establishment Panel (already intro-
duced in Section 4.4.2) for the years 1997–1999 as well as 2000 is used. The 
farming and fishing industry as well as the public sector are again excluded from 
the analysis. Using the sampling weights (or the inflation factors, respectively) it 
is possible to estimate statistics of the measures previously introduced describing 
the population, i.e., an average establishment in West Germany or total employ-
ment in West Germany. Weighting is necessary because the dataset is a stratified 
sample with large establishments and certain sectors being overrepresented (see 
KÖLLING, 2000). For an unbiased estimation of the corresponding standard er-
rors, the sample design (stratification and clustering) is taken into account (see, 
e.g.,  DEATON,  1997).  The  number  of  missing  observations  due  to  item  non-
response is very low. Therefore, this issue is not further addressed.   
Box 3: Two Concepts of Representativeness (Example: Hiring Rate) 
Average rate (representative of the popu-
lation of establishments) 
Aggregate rate (representative of the  
population of employees) 
The average hiring rate of all establishments 
in the population (establishments in West 
Germany) is the weighted average of  it HR  
over all  1,..., i J =  establishments in the 
sample with the weight being the inflation 
factor  i w :   
1
i it
i
HR w HR
J
= × ∑  
 
HR is the estimated hiring rate of an aver-
age establishment in West Germany  
The aggregate hiring rate is the weighted aver-
age of  it HR  over all  1,..., i J =  establishments, 
with the weight consisting of  the inflation fac-
tor  i w  and the proportion of employees in es-
tablishment i in total employment ( / ) it t N N : 
× ×
= × × = =
×
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
i it i it
it i i
i it
i t i it t
i
w H w H
N
HR w HR
N w N N
. 
HR  is the estimated hiring rate of total em-
ployment in West Germany, given by the ratio 
of the estimated hirings in the population and 
the estimated total employment in the popula-
tion.    
Notes: The sample consists of  1,..., i J =  establishments, with 1 i w  denoting the probability that 
an establishment from the population (West Germany) is sampled, implying an inflation factor of 
i w  as included in the IAB Establishment Panel. The total employment stock in an establishment 
i  is  it N . The aggregate total employment in the population  t N  (estimated total employment in 
West Germany) is given by the weighted sum of the employment  it N  over all  1,..., i J =  estab-
lishments, that is,  t i it
i
N w N = × ∑ .  
 
Weighting the introduced measures by inflation factors allows to draw infer-
ence about two different populations (see the overview in Box 3).  It is possible 
to estimate average rates over all establishments in West Germany, which de-  100 
scribe the expected value of a rate of an establishment randomly drawn from the 
population of all establishments in West Germany. However, these average rates 
over all establishments are not informative with regard to their impact on total 
employment. Aggregate rates take this aspect into account. Aggregate rates are 
calculated by weighting the single establishment rates by the inflation factor as 
well as the proportion of the establishment’s employment in total employment.  
Average rates which are estimated to draw inference about the population of es-
tablishments are denoted by  HR,  SR , etc. Aggregate rates which are estimated 
to draw inference about the population of employees are denoted by HR, SR, etc. 
Using the IAB Establishment Panel for the period 1997–1999 is associated with 
at least two fundamental caveats. The inflows as well as the outflows always re-
late to the first six months of each calendar year only. In contrast, the employ-
ment stocks  it L  (as well as 
FTC
it L , 
PER
it L ) are measured at the end of June each year, 
that is, at the end of the six months period in which the worker flows are meas-
ured.  The  average  employment  between  dates  t-1  and  t,  is  determined  as 
( )
1
, 1 2 it i t it N L L - = + . Thus  it L  as well as  , 1 i t L -  are necessary. The first best solution 
would be to define  , 1 i t L - to be the stock of employment at the beginning of the 
year (January) using the identities  
it it it t i S H L L + - = -1 , ,               (45) 
and  
, 1
FTC FTC FTC FTC
i t it it it it L L H S TF - = - + + .             (46) 
Unfortunately,  it TF  is only available for the year 2000, but not for 1997–1999.95 
For this reason, the stock of total employment in January  , 1 i t L -  is estimated as the 
average of total employment in June and total employment in June of the previ-
ous year. For  , 1
FTC
i t L -  and  , 1
PER
i t L -  this approximation is used in an analogous way. This 
approach implies that Eq. (45) and (46) hold only approximately. Furthermore, 
due to possible seasonal effects, the calculated measures always have to be inter-
preted keeping in mind that they refer to the first half of the calendar year. 
4.5.4  Results 
Total Employment 
Table 10 presents the means of the rates for total employment, that is, without 
distinguishing between the type of contract. The aggregate rates depicted in the 
first row suggest that during the first half of the years 1997–1999 more employ-
ees were hired than separations took place (HR > SR). Accordingly, more jobs 
were created than destroyed (JCR > JDR). However, one should take into ac-
count that this net employment increase refers to the first six months and is, 
                                              
95  On the other hand, this year does not include information on FTC hirings and thus cannot be used for 
the other questions posed.     101 
therefore, likely to be overestimated due to seasonal effects (see Eq. (35) and 
(36)).   
The worker turnover rate WTR indicates that during a six-months period 12.6% 
of all workers enter into or leave an establishment. The difference between the 
net change in employment and the WTR  leads to the rotation rate:  RR indicates 
that 5.9% of the employees are affected by worker flows that are not associated 
with the creation or destruction of jobs. Relating rotation to turnover results in a 
churning rate CR of 47%. Put differently, almost half of the turnover serves for 
the exchange of employees on a constant number of job positions without being 
associated with creation or destruction of jobs within a six-months period. 
Table 10: Means of Job and Worker Flow Rates for Total Employment 
(Percentages, Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Aggregate rates 
HR   SR   JCR   JDR   WTR   RR   CR   Obs. 
6.44 
(0.18) 
6.19 
(0.16) 
3.47 
(0.13) 
3.22 
(0.12) 
12.62 
(0.29) 
5.93 
(0.22) 
47.00 
(1.08) 
7,631 
Average rates 
HR   SR   JCR   JDR   WTR   RR   CR  
 
Obs. 
5.95 
(0.27) 
7.07 
(0.35) 
3.75 
(0.23) 
4.88 
(0.32) 
13.02 
(0.47) 
4.39 
(0.30) 
27.44 
(1.18) 
7,631 
Source: Own  estimations  based  on the  IAB  Establishment Panel for West Germany 
(1997–1999) 
 
The second row of Table 10 depicts the estimated results of the averages rates 
(representative of the population of establishments) which do not take the size of 
the establishments’ workforces into account. It can be seen that the results are 
now reversed, that is, now  JCR JDR <  and  HR SR < . The discrepancy to the ag-
gregate numbers could be explained by differences in the development of smaller 
and larger establishments: In the aggregate rates the larger establishments (which 
increase employment) outweigh the smaller establishments (which reduce em-
ployment). The difference in the churning rates (CR >CR) indicates a greater 
importance of churning within large establishments.96 
Following the literature, Table 11 differentiates between growing ( , 1 it i t L L - > ), 
contracting ( , 1 it i t L L - < ), and establishments with stable employment ( , 1 it i t L L - = ), 
measured as the change in employment in the first half of each year.97 The well-
                                              
96  However, creation or destruction of jobs that is spuriously counted as churning is also more likely in 
large firms.  
97  One may argue that defining the evolution of establishments by more long-term employment growth 
measures, such as employment changes within a two-year period, would be more suitable. However, 
using the presented definitions of employment evolution ensures that some properties of the concept 
are fulfilled making the results easier to interpret. For example, the definition used here leads to the 
result that for establishments with stable employment JCR=JDR=0% and CR=100% hold.     102 
known result that contracting establishments still hire workers and that growing 
establishments still have outflows is confirmed.98 It can even be seen that grow-
ing establishments have a slightly higher  SR  than establishments with stable em-
ployment. This phenomenon is discussed in greater detail below where it is dis-
tinguished between FTCs and permanent contracts. It is not surprising that grow-
ing and contracting firms have a much higher WTR  than firms with stable em-
ployment. The proportion of rotation in total turnover (the churning rate  CR) is 
not much lower in contracting establishments than in growing establishments. 
Possibly,  firms  try  to  create  better  job-worker  matches  in  times  of  shrinking 
business development, or workers increase their job-to-job mobility in case of the 
threat of a future dismissal. Of course, FTCs may be important in this process. In 
line with the definition in Eq. (39), the CR has to be 100%, if  , 1 it i t L L - = , that is, 
WTR  equals  RR: Since neither new jobs are created, nor old ones are destroyed 
(JCR = JDR = 0), all recruitments and separations serve for churning. 
Table 11: Means of Job and Worker Flow Rates by Employment Trend  
(Percentages, Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Aggregate rates   
  HR   SR   JCR   JDR   WTR   RR   CR   Obs. 
, 1 it i t L L - >   15.22 
(0.44) 
4.00 
(0.25) 
11.23 
(0.36) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
19.22 
(0.62) 
7.99 
(0.49) 
41.58 
(1.66) 
2,139 
, 1 it i t L L - =   2.49 
(0.15) 
2.49 
(0.15) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
4.98 
(0.30) 
4.98 
(0.30) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
3,140 
, 1 it i t L L - <   2.52 
(0.17) 
12.36 
(0.39) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
9.84 
(0.34) 
14.89 
(0.62) 
5.05 
(0.35) 
33.91 
(1.68) 
2,352 
  Average rates   
  HR   SR   JCR   JDR   WTR   RR   CR   Obs. 
, 1 it i t L L - >   24.20 
(0.76) 
2.57 
(0.31) 
21.64 
(0.73) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
26.77 
(0.91) 
5.13 
(0.62) 
14.45 
(1.03) 
2,139 
, 1 it i t L L - =   2.21 
(0.20) 
2.21 
(0.20) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
4.43 
(0.40) 
4.43 
(0.41) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
3,140 
, 1 it i t L L - <   1.74 
(0.22) 
30.35 
(1.31) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
28.61 
(1.30) 
32.10 
(1.35) 
3.48 
(0.44) 
8.85 
(0.69) 
2,352 
Source: Own estimations  based on the IAB  Establishment Panel for West Germany (1997–
1999). 
 
 
 
                                              
98  When  comparing  establishments  with  growing,  contracting,  and  stable  employment,  it  should  be 
noted that small establishments are overrepresented among establishments with stable employment, 
as for them Lit=Li,t-1 holds with a higher probability.   103 
Permanent Versus Fixed-Term Contracts 
In this subsection, the results of Table 10 and Table 11 are differentiated be-
tween fixed-term and permanent contracts. For reasons of clarity, only the aggre-
gate rates are presented in the following.99 As expected, hiring and separation 
rates  are  much  higher  for  FTC  employment  than  for  permanent  employment 
(
FTC PER HR HR >  and  
FTC PER SR SR > ). There are about 44 hirings on FTCs per 100 
FTC employees within the first six months of each year (Column 1, Table 12), 
whereas there are only 3.9 hirings on permanent contracts per 100 permanent 
workers. The turnover rate of FTC work (
FTC WTR ) of 62.4% is much larger than 
the turnover rate for permanent workers of 9.3%. This difference reflects the 
much lower average job tenure of FTC work when the match is dissolved. Note 
that the result is in line with the predictions of the theoretical models presented in 
Subchapter 4.2: As FTC workers are associated with lower firing costs than per-
manent workers, they are more often hired and fired (that is, not getting their 
contract renewed or transformed into a permanent one).  
Table 12: Means of Job and Worker Flows by Type of Contract  
(Percentages, Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
FTC HR  
FTC SR  
FTC WTR
 
FTC JCR
 
FTC JDR
 
TFR  
(2000) 
FTC RR  
FTC CR   Obs. 
(2000) 
FTC 
44.21 
(1.47) 
18.16 
(1.25) 
62.37 
(2.03) 
32.28 
(1.47) 
6.24 
(0.93) 
9.07 
(1.01) 
23.85 
(1.84) 
38.24 
(2.23) 
7,484 
(3,131) 
 
PER HR  
PER SR  
PER WTR
 
PER JCR
 
PER JDR
 
  PER RR  
PER CR   Obs. 
PER 
3.88 
(0.14) 
5.39 
(0.15) 
9.28 
(0.23) 
2.15 
(0.11) 
3.66 
(0.12) 
  3.47 
(0.17) 
37.36 
(1.27) 
7,484 
Source: Own estimations based on the IAB Establishment Panel for West Germany (1997–1999 
and 2000). 
 
Is this higher flexibility in terms of higher FTC worker flows associated with 
higher flexibility in terms of FTC job flows? The results in Table 12 indicate 
much larger job creation and job destruction (job turnover) within FTC employ-
ment (
FTC PER JCR JCR >  and 
FTC PER JDR JDR > ). This result is in line with my pre-
vious econometric dynamic labour demand study, where I find evidence that the 
speed  of  adjustment  is  faster  for  the  total  employment  stock  (including  FTC 
work) than for the permanent contract employment stock (see Subchapter 4.3 and 
HAGEN, 2003). As already discussed in Subchapter 4.3, this does not necessarily 
mean that overall job turnover increases since most theoretical models presented 
in Subchapter 4.2 predict that the employment stability of permanent workers 
increases with the use of FTCs.   
                                              
99  Considering the average rates does not lead to additional insights.    104 
Both worker flow and job flow rates indicate a net increase in FTC employment 
(
FTC FTC HR SR >   and 
FTC FTC JCR JDR > ),  while  permanent  contract  employment 
rates suggest a decrease. However, one should keep the following issues in mind: 
Firstly,  it  may  simply  be  explained  by  the  seasonal  effect  already  mentioned 
above since  JCR and  JDR are calculated by hirings and separations during the 
first six months of each year. Secondly, transformations from FTCs into perma-
nent contracts may take place, which are not considered by the worker flow and 
job flow rates. According to the transformation rate (TFR), 9.1% of all employ-
ees with FTCs get their contracts transformed into a permanent one during the 
first six months of the year 2000. Assuming that the amount of transformations 
of contracts has not significantly changed between 1997–1999 and 2000100, one 
may conclude (by considering that 
FTC SR = 18.2%) that approximately one third 
of all FTCs lead to permanent contracts within the same establishment, and two 
thirds of FTC workers leave the establishment with the expiration of their con-
tracts.101  
To which extent are FTC and permanent contract worker flows used for the re-
placement of workers? The rotation rate 
FTC RR of approximately 24% indicates 
that, at a given number of FTC jobs, almost one in four FTC workers is replaced 
by  another  FTC  worker  within  six  months.  The  churning  rate  for  FTC  work 
FTC CR  of 38% equals approximately the churning rate of permanent employment 
PER CR . However, it should be kept in mind that the proportion of FTC employees 
being replaced by other FTC employees is far greater in absolute numbers than in 
the group of permanent staff (
FTC PER RR RR > ). Furthermore, the discrepancy be-
tween the churning rates within the two types of contracts (
FTC CR ,
PER CR , Table 
12) and the much higher total churning rate of 47% (CR, Table 10) can be ex-
plained by the fact that cross rotation only affects CR, but not 
FTC CR and 
PER CR . 
Put differently, in addition to churning or rotation within the two types of work, 
there is churning between these types, leading to the concept of cross rotation. 
This issue is discussed in greater detail in the subsection below.   
In Table 13 the results of Table 12 are again differentiated between growing, 
shrinking, and establishments with stable employment. An interesting result is 
the hiring rate of fixed-term contracts (
FTC HR ) in contracting firms, which stays 
at the high level of approximately 23% in establishments with stable employ-
ment. At the same time the separation rate of FTCs 
FTC SR in shrinking firms is far 
higher  than  elsewhere.  Taking  into  account  that 
PER HR is  only  about  1.3%  in 
shrinking establishments and that in Table 15 it is depicted that more than 50% 
of all hirings are on FTCs in shrinking establishments, a reasonable explanation 
is that vacancies are to a large extent filled by FTC workers as their future de-
struction probability is high. This is also in line with the finding for shrinking 
                                              
100 At least, it can be shown that the SR
FTC has not changed significantly: With 18.9% for 2000 it almost 
equals the number for 1997–1999.    
101 This corresponds to the magnitude found by ABOWD, CORBEL, and KRAMARZ (1999) for France.   105 
establishments  that  the 
PER JCR   is  not  statistically  significantly  different  from 
zero, while the 
FTC JCR  is still about 7.4%. According to the 
FTC JDR , 18.4% of all 
FTC jobs are destroyed within six months in shrinking establishments. The hy-
pothesis that existing permanent job vacancies in shrinking establishments (and 
therefore jobs with an increased probability to be destroyed in near future) are 
filled by FTC workers is also in line with the relatively high values of 
FTC RR  and 
FTC CR  indicating substitution.   
Table 13: Means of Job and Worker Flow Rates by Type of Contract and Em-
ployment Trend (Percentages, Standard Errors in Parentheses)                                           
FTC 
FTC HR
FTC SR
FTC WTR
FTC JCR
FTC JDR TFR  
(2000) 
FTC RR
FTC CR
Obs. 
(2000) 
, 1 it i t L L - >
 
63.90 
(2.20) 
12.52 
(1.46) 
76.42 
(2.62) 
51.59 
(2.66) 
0.21 
(0.06) 
7.70 
(1.20) 
24.62 
(2.92) 
32.22 
(3.36) 
2,063 
(793) 
, 1 it i t L L - =
 
23.21 
(2.49) 
6.95 
(1.53) 
30.16 
(3.31) 
18.50 
(2.26) 
2.24 
(0.92) 
16.70 
(4.45) 
9.42 
(2.54) 
31.23 
(6.54) 
3,110 
(1,399) 
, 1 it i t L L - <
 
22.58 
(1.62) 
33.52 
(3.06) 
56.10 
(3.40) 
7.44 
(0.87) 
18.38 
(2.77) 
7.31 
(12.54) 
 
30.28 
(2.87) 
54.00 
(3.73) 
2,311 
(939) 
PER  PER HR  
PER SR  
PER WTR
 
PER JCR
PER JDR   PER RR  
PER CR  
Obs. 
, 1 it i t L L - >
 
9.62 
(0.38) 
3.03 
(0.18) 
12.65 
(0.49) 
7.31 
(0.33) 
0.71 
(0.06) 
  4.62 
(0.36) 
36.54 
(1.97) 
2,063 
, 1 it i t L L - =
 
1.78 
(0.13) 
2.24 
(0.14) 
4.02 
(0.27) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.53 
(0.07) 
  3.42 
(0.26) 
85.15 
(1.79) 
3,110 
, 1 it i t L L - <
 
1.26 
(0.14) 
11.11 
(0.36) 
12.36 
(0.43) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
9.86 
(0.32) 
  2.49 
(0.27) 
20.17 
(1.78) 
2,311 
Source: Own estimations based on the IAB Establishment Panel for West Germany (1997–1999 
and 2000) 
 
One would expect growing firms to transform more FTCs into permanent con-
tracts. Surprisingly, the transformation rate  TFR  is significantly lower among 
growing establishments than among establishments with stable employment. This 
holds when looking at the ratio  /
FTC TFR SR : the highest ratio can be found among 
establishments with stable employment, the lowest among shrinking establish-
ments. The latter seems to be more in line with what one would expect. The find-
ing of less FTCs being transformed (relative to FTC separations) in growing es-
tablishments than in establishments with stable employment may be explained by 
considering the much higher 
FTC WTR  in growing establishments:   106 
–  some of the growing establishments may interpret the employment increase as 
a temporary positive shock, e.g., due to a seasonal effect. If the maximum du-
ration of a FTC is reached, employers terminate the contract and prefer to hire 
a new worker on the FTC job. Theoretical models suggest that the negative 
effect of future firing costs on a current FTC conversion (which is analogous 
to a hiring on a permanent contract) increases with the probability that good 
business conditions come to an end (see Subchapter 4.2); 
–  some  fast-growing  establishments  may  omit  an  expansive  and  time-
consuming  pre-hiring  screening  process  for  permanent  workers  by  hiring 
workers on FTCs. This may, in turn, lead to many unproductive matches and 
thus separations.  
Both  hypotheses  may  explain  why  almost  25%  of  the  FTC  worker  turnover 
(
FTC RR ) is not associated with a change in the number of FTC jobs in growing 
establishments. 
Fixed-Term and Permanent Contracts in Relation to Total Employment 
Some of the figures in Table 12 are now reproduced in Table 14, which relates 
the flows to total employment. For example, the number of hirings into FTCs 
(
FTC H ) is related to total employment  N  and not only to FTC employment and is 
denoted by  HRR. As discussed in Section 4.5.2, this may help to reveal the role 
of both types of contracts in total worker turnover and provides a possibility to 
decompose total rotation into a within (type of contract) component and a be-
tween component.  
Table 14: Decomposition of Worker Flows by Type of Contract 
(Percentages, Standard Errors in Parentheses)                                              
  HRR   SRR   WTRR  RRR  TFRR  
(2000) 
Obs. 
(2000) 
Total 
6.36 
(0.18) 
6.19 
(0.16) 
12.55 
(0.29) 
5.84 
(0.22) 
  7,484 
(3,131) 
FTC  2.73 
(0.13) 
1.12 
(0.09) 
3.85 
(0.20) 
1.47 
(0.14) 
0.59 
(0.05) 
 
PERM  3.66 
(0.14) 
5.05    
(0.14) 
8.71 
(0.23) 
3.24 
(0.15) 
   
CROSS 
     
      1.13 
(0.07) 
   
Source: Own estimations based on the IAB Establishment Panel for West Germany (1997–1999 
and 2000). 
   107 
The first row of Table 14 (approximately) equals the first row of Table 10.102 
The second row indicates that, on average, hirings on FTCs equal 2.73% of the 
total employment stock and the third row shows that hirings on permanent con-
tract are 3.66% of total employment (HRR). 
Table 14 provides a decomposition of the rotation rate (RRR) into rotation rates 
for  both  types  of  contracts  (
FTC RRR   and 
PER RRR )  and  the  cross  rotation  rate 
CROSS RRR . The largest part of rotation is within permanent contract employment: 
PER RRR  equals 3.25%. Hence, the proportion of permanent rotation in total rota-
tion is approximately 55%. The 
FTC RRR  of 1.47% indicates that about 25% of 
total rotation is due to cases in which FTCs terminate or new workers are hired 
on FTCs without changing the number of FTC jobs in the establishment. This 
seems to be quite high as the proportion of FTC workers in the employment 
stock is only about 6.1% (see Table 15). The remainder of the  RRR of nearly 
20% is cross-rotation 
cross RRR , i.e., the simultaneous creation of jobs for one type 
of contract type and destruction of jobs of the other type of contract. 
Table 15: Share of FTCs in Total Worker Flows  
(Percentages, Standard Errors in Parentheses)                                               
 
FTC N N   FTC H H  
FTC S S   FTC WT WT   Obs. 
Total  6.08 
(0.23) 
42.79 
(1.49) 
18.19 
(1.34) 
30.68 
(1.22) 
7,484 
           
, 1 it i t L L - >   10.25 
(0.57) 
43.92 
(1.86) 
32.76 
(3.63) 
41.61 
(1.99) 
2,063 
, 1 it i t L L - =   2.78 
(0.20) 
27.31 
(2.74) 
8.56 
(1.84) 
17.93 
(1.87) 
3,110 
, 1 it i t L L - <   5.84 
(0.40) 
52.77 
(3.44) 
15.88 
(1.58) 
22.10 
(1.71) 
2,311 
Source: Own estimations based on the IAB Establishment Panel for West Germany (1997–
1999 and 2000) 
 
Table 15 relates the flows of FTC employment to those of total employment. 
The first column additionally presents the proportion of the FTC employment 
stock in the total employment stock ( FTC N N ). The proportion of FTCs in the 
stock of employees approximately corresponds to what has been found in Sub-
chapter 2.3 based on individual level data. Although only 6.1% of all employees 
hold FTCs, the proportion of FTCs among hirings ( FTC H H ) is 42.3%.103 About 
                                              
102 The small differences result from a slightly reduced sample (Table 10: 7,631 establishments and 
Table 14: 7,484 establishments) using only establishments for which information on the type of con-
tract in worker stocks and flows are complete. A comparison between Table 10 and Table 14 reveals 
that the results are only slightly affected.  
103 This result is above the one of BIELENSKI, KOHLER, and SCHREIBER-KITTL (1994) who find about one 
third of all hirings to be on FTCs. Their study is based on a representative survey among private en-
terprises with at least five employees in 1992.    108 
18.2% of all separations are due to expiring FTCs ( FTC S S ). The proportion of 
FTC turnover in total worker turnover ( FTC WT WT ) is about 31%. 
In the next rows, the results are again differentiated between growing, shrink-
ing, and establishments with stable employment. As expected from the previous 
results in this section, the proportion of FTCs in employment stocks is lower in 
establishments with stable employment.  
The proportion of FTCs in hirings (
FTC H H ) is larger in shrinking establish-
ments than in growing establishments. This is again in line with the hypothesis 
that a shrinking establishment may hesitate to hire a worker on a permanent con-
tract, if it has to fill a vacancy of a permanent position, which will be destroyed 
with a high probability in the near future.  
The fact that 
FTC S S  is larger in growing than in shrinking establishments can 
simply be explained by the finding from Table 11: Growing establishments have 
a much smaller overall separation rate than shrinking establishments (4.0% vs. 
12.4%).  Hence,  as  many  FTCs  are  not  transformed  into  permanent  contracts, 
growing establishments have, given their high 
FTC HR of 64% (Table 13), a large 
value of 
FTC S S . 
Finally, Table 16 depicts some of the worker flow and job flow rates for differ-
ent industries. It can be seen that there is a considerable heterogeneity. Results of 
particular interest are: 
–  with 21.2% the ‘education, research, and publication’ sector is by far the one 
with  the  highest  proportion  of  FTCs  in  the  employment  stock.  Likewise 
above-average rates can be found in ‘other services’ (9.7%) as  well as in 
‘construction’ (7.2%); 
–  high worker turnover rates of FTCs (and thus on average short FTC employ-
ment spells) can be found in ‘other services’, ‘hotels, restaurants’, ‘construc-
tion’ and ‘basic industry’. Low worker turnover rates of FTCs (on average 
long FTCs relationships) can be found in the ‘banking’, ‘mining, electricity, 
water supply’, ‘health services’, and ‘education, research, publication’; 
–  ‘education, research, publication’ is the only sector where a high average sta-
bility of permanent workers (a small value of 
PER WTR ) is associated with a 
high proportion of FTCs in total employment stock as predicted by most theo-
retical models, presented in Subchapter 4.2; 
–  a relatively high proportion of contract transformation (measured as the ratio 
of  TFR and 
FTC SR ) can be found in ‘transport, telecommunication’, in the 
‘health service’ as well as ‘hotels, restaurants’. The latter may simply be ex-
plained by the fact that many hotels and restaurants are possibly not large 
enough to be within the scope of the Protection Against Dismissal Law and 
thus there is in fact no a large difference between FTC and permanent con-
tract workers in terms of firing costs. In contrast, a low proportion of trans-
formation of FTCs into permanent contracts can be observed in ‘education, 
research, publication’ as well as ‘other services’.     109 
Table 16: Worker Flows by Contract Type and Industry (Percentages)  
      FTC N N
    WTR  
FTC WTR  
PER WTR  
    CR  
FTC CR  
PER CR  
    TFR  
(2000) 
FTC SR  
(2000) 
Obs. 
(2000) 
Mining, electricity, water supply  2.9  6.2  43.0  5.3  23.3  23.3  11.8  8.7  25.0    149   (47) 
Basic industry   3.4  9.7  79.5  7.3  35.5  11.9  31.6  20.5  7.2    386 (259)  
Investment goods   4.8  10.6  60.3  8.1  39.5  38.1  30.1  18.6  19.9    880 (572)  
Consumer goods  4.6  11.5  73.1  8.7  42.7  22.3  34.0  20.5  16.3    534 (261)  
Construction  7.2  19.2  78.8  14.7  45.1  28.2  37.6  9.9  24.1   1,331 (493)  
Wholesale, retail   3.3  9.5  57.8  7.7  45.3  36.1  37.2  19.6  20.8   1,038 (368)  
Transport, telecommunication  2.2  9.1  74.7  7.5  41.2  15.9  37.1  15.9  12.9    330 (114)  
Banking   2.6  4.8  36.8  4.0  39.3  39.6  25.6  11.1  22.3    117   (47)  
Insurance   2.2  8.2  73.5  6.0  19.8  29.4  12.0  *  *     58   (17)  
Hotels, restaurants   4.0  14.7  81.8  11.5  52.7  20.8  50.5  9.1  7.1    667 (231)  
Education, research, publication  21.2  14.3  49.5  5.0  61.2  57.4  30.1  2.2  20.6    613 (230)  
Health services  4.5  8.3  44.5  6.5  50.0  47.0  33.3  11.0  9.3    551 (207)  
Business related services  5.1  12.3  56.5  9.9  41.2  40.5  30.7  8.7  18.7    686 (250)  
Other services  9.7  32.3  102.0  24.5  63.1  52.5  63.0  3.1  25.2    146   (51)  
Average rates /  
Absolute number of observations 
6.1  12.6  62.4  9.3  47.0  38.2  37.4  9.1  18.9  7,486 (3,147) 
Notes: * denotes numbers not displayed due to a too low number of observations (17). All measures except for TFR  and 
FTC SR  are for 1997–1999.  
Source: Own estimations based on the IAB Establishment Panel for West Germany (1997–1999 and 2000).    110 
4.5.5  Summary of the Empirical Analysis of the Role of Fixed-Term Con-
tracts in Worker and Job Flows  
The possibly most important result of this Subachpter is the finding that FTCs 
are much more important for gross employment dynamics in the German labour 
market  than  previously  found  in  the  literature,  being  based  on  employment 
stocks. According to the IAB Establishment Panel, on average only 6.1% of all 
employees (except those of the public sector, agriculture and forestry) work on 
the basis of a FTC in West Germany in the period 1997–1999. However, almost 
43% of all hirings are based on FTCs. This reflects the substantial worker turn-
over of this type of employment which is hidden behind the low stock of FTC 
employment. The turnover of FTC workers accounts for almost 31% of the total 
worker turnover. One explanation for this surprising magnitude, which should be 
kept in mind, is that the flows are observed only for the first six months of each 
year, that is, they may be affected by seasonal effects.  
As expected, FTCs are used in growing firms. The proportion of FTCs in em-
ployment stock is more than 10%. The proportion of FTCs in worker turnover is 
about 40%, indicating that 4 in 10 hirings and separations are based on FTCs in 
growing establishments. These results are in line with the labour demand models 
predicting that FTCs are used during economic upturns.  
More surprising is the amount of FTC work in shrinking establishments. The 
share of fixed-term employment in total employment in shrinking firms is 5.8%, 
with 52.8% of all hirings being based on FTCs. The widespread use of FTCs in 
shrinking establishments may be explained by the consideration that shrinking 
establishments hesitate to hire workers on permanent contracts, if a permanent 
position has to be filled (e.g., due to worker quits) since the future destruction 
probability of the job is high and so are the expected firing cost. Hence, this find-
ing is insofar in line with theoretical models in Subchapter 4.2 as they predict 
that the negative effect of future firing costs on current hiring decisions increases 
with the probability that the respective job is destroyed in the future.   
The empirical findings cannot reject any of the three categories of reasons for 
using FTCs introduced in Subchapter 4.2 (buffer stock, screening, substitution): 
(1.) Obviously, FTC jobs serve for adjustment purposes (buffer stock) as the job 
turnover rate of FTCs (sum of job creation and destruction rates) is approxi-
mately six times larger than the job turnover rate of permanent workers. Whether 
and to what extent FTCs increase the stability of permanent contract jobs cannot 
be evaluated. A comparison between sectors in Table 16 does not indicate evi-
dence in favour of this hypothesis. 
(2.) The overall rotation rate indicates that about 5.8% of all hirings and separa-
tions are not associated with net employment changes. One quarter of this rota-
tion is based on FTCs, although the proportion of FTCs in total employment 
stock is only 6.1%. Thus many hirings and firings of FTCs are not associated   111 
with net employment changes and, hence, FTCs may be frequently used as sub-
stitutes for permanent workers to fill permanent positions.   
(3.) One third of all FTC workers get their contract converted into a permanent 
one within the same establishment and two thirds of FTC workers leave the es-
tablishment. Although this result does not state anything about causal relation-
ships, the hypothesis of FTCs as a screening device (prolonged probationary pe-
riod) cannot be rejected. Hence, the hypothesis of FTCs exclusively being dead 
ends, as they are exclusively used as buffer stock or for substitution purposes, 
can clearly be rejected.    
4.6  Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the role of FTCs in labour demand. In addition to ad-
justment purposes (buffer stock) and screening (probationary period) it has been 
discussed that another reason for using FTCs may be a substitution strategy: In-
herently permanent jobs are repeatedly filled by FTC workers. 
It has been empirically shown that firing costs for permanent workers matter for 
the use of FTCs, and that FTCs and permanent contract work may be closer sub-
stitutes than permanent workers on the one hand and TWA and FL work on the 
other. Furthermore, the empirical results indicate that none of the three categories 
of reasons for the use of FTCs can be rejected. However, the idea of FTCs exclu-
sively being dead ends can clearly be rejected. 
A final conclusion is that firms seem to be interested in long-term employment 
relationships,  otherwise  all  hirings  would  be  on  FTCs  and  no  conversions  of 
FTCs into permanent contracts would occur.104 The firm has to trade-off a high-
worker-turnover strategy associated with low firing costs but high total hiring 
costs as well as possibly lower worker productivity and wages against a low-
worker-turnover strategy associated with high firing costs but lower total hiring 
costs as well as possibly higher productivity and wages. The optimal solution 
appears to be a mixture of both and depends, inter alia, on the specific tasks in 
the job and the firm’s business environment. This may to some extent explain the 
large differences found between industry sectors. 
 
                                              
104 It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss all the pros and cons of long-term employment relation-
ships from the employers’ point of view. Overviews can be found, e.g., in SCHASSE (1991) and FAR-
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5  Do Temporary Workers Receive Risk Premiums? – Effects 
of Fixed-Term Contracts on Working Conditions and 
Wages in the Short-Run 
5.1  Introduction 
Even though it would be incorrect to equate FTCs with temporary jobs and 
permanent contracts with long-term employment relationships, it seems plausible 
to expect FTC workers to bear on average a higher risk of unemployment and 
discontinuity than permanent workers (see Subchapter 2.1). Descriptive evidence 
in favour of lower objective stability of FTC jobs has been presented in Subchap-
ter 4.5 (in terms of higher worker turnover) and is presented in the Appendix 
(Table 78). In this chapter, it is shown that lower job stability and poorer career 
opportunities are also perceived by FTC workers in terms of subjective assess-
ments of their jobs.  
What effects do FTCs have on individual wages? The well-known theory of 
compensating differentials states that disadvantages among work activities are 
equalised by wage differentials (see ROSEN, 1986). Therefore, higher risk of un-
employment or generally uncertain prospects for the future working life due to a 
FTC may be compensated for by higher wages in a competitive labour market.105 
For example, a worker holding a FTC may receive a higher wage that equalises 
the  loss  of  the  expected  value  of  the  redundancy  payment  (see  BOOTH, 
FRANCESCONI, and FRANK, 2002). 
On the other hand, there are also reasons for expecting FTCs to have negative 
effects on wages. For example, some economic models, presented in the previous 
chapter, predict that groups of workers with higher turnover (low expected job 
tenure) are paid less. FTCs may also serve as probationary period with lower 
wages at the beginning of an employment relationship, or as an incentive mecha-
nism to avoid shirking during an initial period.  
While available studies find some evidence for compensating wage differentials 
for jobs with a higher unemployment risk in the U.S. (see ROSEN, 1986), only 
negative effects of FTCs on wages have been found so far. Before analysing 
compensating differentials it should be tested whether and to what extent FTC 
jobs are associated with attributes decreasing the utility of FTC workers, in com-
parison to the hypothetical situation in which the same worker holds a permanent 
contract. Even though it is obvious that the objective stability of FTC jobs is 
                                              
105 It seems to be common practice to cite Adam Smith in this context. He writes about wages and job 
stability: “The wages in different occupations vary with constancy or inconstancy of employment. ... 
The high wages of those workmen, therefore, are not so much the recompense of their skill, as the 
compensation of the inconstancy of their employment.” (SMITH, 1776, Vol I: 120).     113 
lower,  it  is  ex  ante  unclear  that  this  aspect  is  associated  with  ‘psychological 
costs’ and thus a reduction of the workers’ utilities. Since the theory of compen-
sating differentials is based on the assumption that workers maximise their util-
ity, subjective assessments may be even more relevant than objective outcomes.  
Therefore,  the  effects  of  FTCs  on  two  subjective  outcome  variables  are  esti-
mated: (1.) the worker’s assessment of the risk of dismissal or termination of the 
contract, respectively, and (2.) the worker’s job satisfaction with regard to career 
opportunities. 
The subsequent Subchapter presents some theoretical approaches to the wage 
effects of FTCs and discusses the use of subjective outcome variables. Subchap-
ter 5.3 gives an overview of previous empirical studies. An introduction to the 
dataset and detailed descriptive statistics are provided in Subchapter 5.4. Sub-
chapter 5.5 leads to the empirical analysis  by discussing the econometric ap-
proach. The estimated determinants for holding a FTC are presented in Subchap-
ter 5.6. Subchapter 5.7 contains the econometric analysis of the short-run effects 
of FTCs on wages and subjective assessment of working conditions using a pro-
pensity score matching estimator. A summary and conclusions can be found in 
Subchapter 5.8.   
 
5.2  Theoretical Considerations 
5.2.1  Compensating Wage Differential for Workers on Fixed-Term Con-
tracts 
The theory of compensating differentials assumes a competitive market. The 
most important assumptions are (see ROSEN, 1986): (1.) Workers seek to maxi-
mise their utility, which not only depends on income, but also on other utility-
related aspects of the job. (2.) Workers form expectations about the relative risks 
and attributes of different jobs, i.e., they are sufficiently informed. (3.) Workers 
have a range of job offers from which to choose. The latter may result from high 
occupational or regional mobility of workers.  
The influential theoretical study by ABOWD and ASHENFELTER (1981) models 
the competitive equilibrium wage rate under the assumption that job offers vary 
according to the amount of (1.) anticipated unemployment and (2.) unemploy-
ment risk.  
(1.) Unemployment is modelled as a predictable constraint in the hours of work 
(for example within one year), which prevents workers from working the number 
of hours they would like to work. For example, FTCs may be used for seasonal 
jobs, so that workers can work less than they would like to within a year. If 
workers had the choice, they would always prefer the unconstrained job to the 
constrained job with the same wage rate. In a perfect labour market the compen-  114 
sating wage differential for anticipated unemployment is simply an increase in 
the wage rate eliminating the utility differences.  
(2.) Unemployment risk is modelled by the assumption that the hours constraint 
is not known with certainty, but is a random draw from a known hours distribu-
tion and, therefore, a known mean hours constraint. Sign and magnitude of the 
compensating differential for the risk depends on the worker’s attitude towards 
risk. Imposing the assumption that workers are risk averse, that is, their utility 
function is convex due to diminishing marginal utility of income, there must be a 
positive differential. Thus an equilibrium requires the wage rate to compensate 
for the mean constraint in hours worked as well as for the risk of fluctuation in 
hours worked.  
BOOTH, FRANCESCONI, and FRANK (2002) argue that workers on FTCs, given 
the assumption of the theory of compensating differentials, may receive a higher 
wage that offsets the loss of the expected value of the redundancy payment.106 
The compensating differential depends on the probability of the worker receiving 
a permanent contract  afterwards (or the probability  of losing  the  job, respec-
tively), the worker’s attitude towards risk, and the features of the unemployment 
insurance system.  
5.2.2  Wage Penalty for Workers on Fixed-Term Contracts 
There is a number of reasons why workers holding FTCs may not receive a 
compensating differential, but even (contemporaneously) lower wages.107  
First of all, the problems employers face in their hiring decision and in the ini-
tial period of the employment relationship after the match is formed are summa-
rised. In principle, all models are based on this framework, albeit some aspects 
may be omitted in the respective model (see GIBBONS and WALDMAN, 1999). 
Generally, it is assumed that the output (or productivity) of a worker in a given 
job is a function of her or his observable characteristics (qualification, age, etc.), 
her or his ability (which is unobservable to the employer), and her or his effort 
(possibly also unobservable to the employer). Effort is associated with individual 
costs for the worker. The employer can assess the applicant and the employed 
worker only by her or his observable characteristics, her or his signals, and her or 
his output. The employer has to decide whether to hire a particular applicant, 
whether to retain her or him after an initial period (or recurrently in every pe-
riod), and how to provide appropriate incentives for the worker (see GIBBONS 
                                              
106 This is familiar with the model of LAZEAR (1990) outlined in Section 4.2.2. Lazear’s model predicts 
the neutrality of firing costs, since in efficient bargaining models legally mandated severance pay-
ments may be entirely offset by payments from workers to firms. Payments from firms to workers (as 
a compensating differential) in case of FTCs obviously are the other side of the same coin. Lazear’s 
model differs, however, with respect to one important assumption from the theory of equalising dif-
ferences: workers do not maximise their utility but earnings.  
107 Some of these issues will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 in the context of the long-term 
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and WALDMAN, 1999). In general, the underlying problems can be characterised 
as follows:   
Before hiring: Applicants have some characteristics which are observable for 
the employer and some which are unobservable (e.g. ability). Hence, ex ante, the 
match-specific productivity is to a certain extent unknown and has to be experi-
enced by forming the match (see JOVANOVIC, 1979), or it is revealed by a sorting  
mechanism (see WEISS, 1995). Employers try to learn something about the unob-
servable  characteristics  (ability)  of  the  applicants  by  interpreting  their  labour 
market history. For example, if there are two applicants with otherwise identical 
observable characteristics, employers may decide to hire the one with the shorter 
unemployment spell (see BLANCHARD and DIAMOND, 1994), or the one who has 
not been dismissed by one of her or his previous employers (see GIBBONS and 
KATZ, 1991).   
After hiring: During an initial period (which may be a probationary period) em-
ployers are still uncertain about the true ability of the new worker and try to learn 
something by assessing the output or productivity of the worker (screening).  
Workers try to signal their ability, e.g., by entering or not entering specific jobs 
(see the discussion on probationary periods below). After the match has been 
formed workers may try to signal high productivity by increasing their output 
through choosing their level of effort. However, since exerting effort is associ-
ated with costs for workers, it may also be optimal for the worker to shirk (see 
GIBBONS and WALDMAN, 1999).  
A number of efficiency wage models, based on the moral hazard problem asso-
ciated with shirking, explain how duality of the workforce may arise inside firms. 
For example, in the tradition  of the SHAPIRO and STIGLITZ (1984) efficiency 
wage model, REBITZER and TAYLOR (1991) show that wages paid to permanent 
workers exceed those paid to temporary workers, if one assumes monitoring of 
workers to be costly, and product demand to be uncertain. It is profitable for the 
firm to pay efficiency wages to permanent workers, while monitoring temporary 
workers, which leads to lower wages, although both are perfect substitutes. The 
efficiency wage model by SAINT-PAUL (1991), already presented in Subchapter 
4.2, yields the same results. An interesting feature of this model is that the duality 
within firms arises endogenously without the existence of two types of contracts. 
However, both models have the drawback that the possibility of FTC workers 
becoming permanent workers within the same firm is neglected. 
 GÜELL (2000) provides an efficiency wage model in which the possibility to 
convert a FTC into a permanent contract is used by employers as an incentive 
mechanism. While shirking of permanent contract workers is prevented by effi-
ciency wages, this is unnecessary for FTC workers since their conversion prob-
ability is positively linked to their productivity and hence their effort. During the 
FTC job, wages provide no incentive for effort. Therefore, wages can be reduced 
in comparison to permanent workers.    116 
Another strand of the theoretical literature views an initial FTC as a probation-
ary  period  providing  the  employer  with  the  possibility  of  learning  about  the 
worker’s ability without incurring institutional firing costs in case the match is 
resolved (see BOOTH, FRANCESCONI, and FRANK, 2002 as well as Subchapter 
4.2). As pointed out by LOH (1994), probationary periods with lower wages may 
induce self-selection of workers with higher abilities because they have a higher 
probability of obtaining permanent contracts afterwards. FTCs with lower initial 
wages may therefore function as a sorting device implemented by firms since 
low  wages  during  the  FTC  period  will  be  compensated  for  by  higher  future 
wages at the same employer. Hence, high-ability workers may select themselves 
into low-paid FTC jobs.  
In Subsection 6.2.2, it is discussed in greater detail that a worker’s labour mar-
ket history may be interpreted as a signal by potential employers in the presence 
of incomplete information on the ability of job searchers (or applicants). If a job 
searcher’s employment history involves adverse signals, employers may hesitate 
to offer her or him a permanent contract, but prefer to offer a FTC first. Hence, if 
adverse signals are indeed correlated with unobservables (such as ability), it is 
possible that low-ability workers have to enter into FTCs as they receive perma-
nent contract job offers only with a low probability. Note that this statement is 
contrary to the prediction of LOH’s (1994) model.  
In presence of asymmetric information on ability and so-called career concerns 
of workers, another phenomenon may occur which highlights the investment na-
ture of a job’s initial period (see GIBBONS and MURPHY, 1992). It is assumed that 
an employer cannot distinguish between a worker’s ability and effort. Therefore, 
the employer has to assess the worker by her or his output. In general, career 
concerns arise, if the internal or external labour market uses a worker’s current 
output to update its belief about the worker’s ability, and bases decisions on fu-
ture wages on these beliefs. The worker has an incentive to invest in effort to in-
crease her or his output in order to influence the market’s (employer’s) belief. In 
equilibrium,  however,  the  market  anticipates  this  incentive  and  draws  correct 
inference about the worker’s ability from the observed output. The model has 
some interesting implications: At the beginning of her or his career a worker has 
more incentives to invest in additional effort because a longer prospective career 
increases the return to changing the market’s belief. In an optimal incentive con-
tract, current pay is most sensitive to current performance for workers close to 
retirement  and  for  workers  with  low  career  opportunities.  Put  differently,  for 
workers with career opportunities (such as a possible conversion from a FTC into 
a permanent contract) additional output related pay is less necessary than for 
workers with no career opportunities (such as permanent contract workers near 
retirement). Although GIBBONS and MURPHY (1992) do not take probationary   117 
periods or FTCs explicitly into account, their result is in line with lower wages 
during FTC periods due to the workers’ willingness to invest in effort.108  
A further explanation of lower wages of FTC workers can be derived from a 
human capital argument. Expected job tenure of permanent contract workers is 
higher. Hence, permanent workers and their firms have more incentives to invest 
in human capital than FTC workers and their employers due to the well-known 
hold-up problem109. This may lead to higher wages. BOOTH, FRANCESCONI, and 
FRANK (2003) develop a simple labour demand model with stochastic product 
demand in which dualism inside firms arises endogenously due to human capital 
investment decisions and temporary workers serving as buffer stock (see Sub-
chapter 4.2). The distinction between temporary and permanent work arises by 
the decision of firms to train some of their employees. After the training, trained 
(permanent) and untrained (temporary) workers are treated differently in terms of 
wages and firing probability. The wage differential is caused by the fact that 
training always incorporates a specific as well as a general component of human 
capital. Untrained temporary workers may have fewer outside opportunities, and 
hence may be paid lower wages. The model implies that, even if all workers are 
ex ante identical, it is optimal for the firm to offer relatively stable employment 
relationships with high training to some of its new employees, and to offer unsta-
ble employment with low training to others. Hence, trained permanent workers 
gain rents in the model: although they do not contribute to the cost of training 
their wages are higher since firms pay more in order to avoid quits. 
Another reason for negative wage effects may be relevant, if FTC workers are 
more  frequently  employed  in  low  unionised  sectors  or  firms  (see  SEGAL  and 
SULLIVAN, 1998). However, in Subchapter 4.4 no significant effect of collective 
wage agreements on the firms’ use of FTCs has been found. Therefore, this is 
probably a minor issue in practice. 
Finally, FTC workers may be outsiders in the wage bargaining process. The 
augmented insider-outsider model proposed by BENTOLILA and DOLADO (1994) 
shows that, if unions represent mainly the interests of workers on permanent con-
tracts, but set wages for all workers, the existence of FTCs increases the unions’ 
bargaining power. If FTC employment serves as a buffer against the negative 
effects of wage rises on the employment probability of permanent contract work-
ers, the aggregate wage level may be higher, the higher the proportion of FTCs 
is. If firms can pay lower wages to FTC workers, this may compensate the firms 
for the wage rise, and the firms’ overall labour costs may not change or may de-
                                              
108 The  application  of  GIBBONS  and  MURPHY’s  (1992)  model  to  FTCs  has  been  proposed  by  
ENGELLANDT and RIPHAN (2003). 
109 See GIBBONS and WALDMAN (1999) for a survey of the hold-up problem. See AUTOR (2003) for a 
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crease in the proportion of FTCs (see DOLADO, GARCÍA-SERRANO, and JIMENO, 
2002).110  
Recapitulating the theoretical arguments, there are four reasons for paying a 
worker less because she or he holds a FTC instead of a permanent contract: 
(1.) in case of insider power of permanent contract workers and the firm’s possi-
bility to pay FTC workers lower wages;  
(2.) in case of hold-up problems caused by human capital investments for perma-
nent workers; 
(3.) in the presence of incomplete information on the ability of job applicants, 
FTCs are used as a screening device with lower wages, which may lead to a sort-
ing effect and higher effort during the FTC jobs. The initial FTC job may even be 
a regular part of the career path;111 
(4.) in the presence of hidden actions (shirking), permanent workers receive effi-
ciency wages, while FTC workers do not so, since (a) they are monitored or (b) 
the probability of conversion into a permanent contract is related to their effort. 
The last two points lead to the insight that it may be quite misleading to focus 
exclusively on contemporaneous wages and utility during a FTC job, instead of 
looking at expected lifetime wages and utility. Workers may enter into low-paid 
FTC jobs since this is an investment with returns in future periods. If the theo-
retical models are relevant and FTCs are nothing but probationary periods lead-
ing to a sorting mechanism, there should not be a strong negative effect of hold-
ing a FTC on job satisfaction with regard to the career opportunities.112  
A remaining issue is how employers in practice pay FTC workers lower wages 
than permanent workers. There is anecdotal evidence that FTC workers are not 
discriminated on given positions by circumventing the standards fixed in collec-
tive agreements or standards which are common in the firm (see LINNE, 1991). A 
more  likely  way  may  be  to  assign  FTC  workers  to  a  lower  pay  scale  group 
(‘Tarifgruppe’) with the prospect of an advancement in case the contract is con-
verted into a permanent one, after the initial FTC period (see LINNE, 1991). Fur-
thermore, there may be the possibility to vary the amount of bonus payments 
which are not stipulated by collective wage agreements.   
                                              
110 On the other hand, there may be a disciplinary effect: Due to their lower employment stability, FTC 
workers are wary of engaging themselves in strikes led by the insiders (permanent workers). Thus 
permanent workers fear to be replaced by FTC workers in case of strikes. Hence, the power of per-
manent workers erodes as the proportion of FTC workers increases (see DOLADO, GARCÍA-SERRANO, 
and JIMENO, 2002). 
111 As stressed by MCGINNITY and MERTENS (2003), for some professional careers, such as teachers, 
researchers, and doctors, FTC jobs are an important part of acquiring further experience before finally 
reaching a permanent position. 
112 The obvious problem is, that it is unclear what “strong negative effect” means in terms of magnitude.   119 
5.2.3  Worker Preferences for Fixed-Term Contracts 
A FTC at the request of the employee is a legally accepted reason for the justi-
fication of the use of FTCs by objective reasons in Germany (see Subchapter 
2.2). Assuming that there is no compensating wage differential and that the in-
vestment and screening character of FTCs, as described in the previous section, 
is not given: Are there any reasons for a worker to choose a FTC, if she or he can 
also get a permanent contract, with otherwise identical job attributes, with the 
same employer?113  
The analysis of ABOWD and ASHENFELTER (1981) introduced above can be ap-
plied to highlight the conditions under which workers may prefer FTCs. Remem-
ber that unemployment is modelled as a predictable constraint in the hours of 
work. If the hours constraint refers to one year, it is obvious that some workers 
may prefer a seasonal full-time job for some months to a part-time job for the 
whole year, given they prefer less than one year full-time. However, the seasonal 
work schedule of the job does not need to be implemented by a FTC job. The 
same seasonal job could be stipulated in a permanent contract, which would pro-
vide the worker with a higher security for getting the same seasonal job again in 
the subsequent year. Put differently, individuals do not prefer the FTC, but the 
associated arrangement with regard to the hours of work. If it was possible to 
have the same arrangement within a permanent contract, workers would again 
prefer the permanent contract to the FTC. The same is true for workers preferring 
a temporary job because they want to take up another job at a later date, want to 
start an apprenticeship, or study at a university. Workers can quit a (permanent) 
job any time (considering a certain notice period) to take up another activity (see 
LINNE, 1991).    
There may be one reason for workers to prefer FTCs resulting from an incen-
tive created by the German unemployment insurance system: If workers really 
prefer a job to be temporary (due to the reasons previously mentioned), they are 
better-off when becoming unemployed due to the termination of a FTC in com-
parison to quitting the job. The reason is that quitting one’s job leads to a period 
of exclusion (‘Sperrzeit’) from unemployment compensation (see LINNE, 1991).  
5.2.4  Heterogeneity of Fixed-Term Contract Jobs 
The discussion has already suggested that there may be important differences in 
the effects of FTCs on working conditions and wages, which may depend on the 
type of job as well as on the characteristics of the workers. There may be ‘bad 
FTC jobs’ which are used solely for adjustment and substitution purposes (see 
Subchapter 4.2) and ‘good FTC jobs’ which serve as extended probationary pe-
                                              
113 See HOLMLUND and STORRIE (2002) for a comparable discussion on the relevance of workers’ pref-
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riod, or are even a common part of the career path. MCGINNITY and MERTENS 
(2003) term this idea “two-tier labour market for FTCs”.114  
It seems reasonable to assume that ‘bad FTC jobs’, requiring only low human 
capital endowment of the workers, are more likely to be affected by ‘dual labour 
market effects’ (i.e., low wages, low career opportunities, and low job stability) 
than  ‘good  FTC  jobs’  for  highly  qualified  workers  (see  MCGINNITY  and 
MERTENS, 2003).  
However, with respect to the wage effects the predictions are ambiguous. If a 
FTC serves as probationary period, it may be associated with a low initial wage 
level but a high wage growth (see WANG and WEISS, 1998; MCGINNITY and 
MERTENS, 2003).115 Especially persons with career concerns may be more will-
ing to accept low initial wages in FTC jobs in exchange for career opportunities. 
It seems reasonable to assume that young individuals with high formal qualifica-
tion are more likely to be concerned about their career. In contrast, if a FTC 
worker is used only for substitution or as a means of adjustment, and thus the 
conversion probability is rather low, workers may not be willing to accept lower 
wages. This may, for example, be more relevant for workers with low qualifica-
tion. More general, the higher the transformation probability, the lower the com-
pensation FTC workers demand. Hence, it is an empirical question how the wage 
effects of FTCs differ between groups of persons. If a FTC serves as a probation-
ary period for one group of persons (e.g., highly qualified workers) more than for 
another  group  of  persons  (e.g.,  low-qualified  workers),  then  the  wage  effect 
should be more negative.     
5.2.5  Use of Subjective Outcome Variables in Economic Analysis  
As mentioned in the introduction, besides the wage level, also two subjective 
outcome variables (assessment of the risk of dismissal or termination of the con-
tract, and job satisfaction with regard to career opportunities) are used.  
The main reason for using subjective outcome variables is that they may be 
more strongly correlated with utility than ‘objective’ job attributes.116 As docu-
mented in an ongoing discussion, subjective variables are likely to be noisy due 
to various reasons (see, e.g., FREEMAN, 1978; CLARK; 1997, 2001; HAMERMESH, 
2001; CLARK ET AL., 2004).117 Since picking up the whole discussion would be 
beyond the scope of this chapter, only some crucial issues are mentioned. As 
                                              
114 MCGINNITY and MERTENS (2003) assume that the heterogeneity may be taken into account by esti-
mating the wage effect for different quantiles of the wage distribution. 
115 Unfortunately, analysing wage growth is not possible within the analysis of this chapter since the 
underlying dataset is a single cross-section. 
116 See FREY and STUTZER (2002) for a general discussion on the use of subjective variables (especially 
about subjective well-being) in economic analyses.  
117 FREEMAN (1978: 135): “... while there are good reasons to treat subjective variables gingerly, the 
answers to questions about how people feel toward their job are not meaningless but rather convey 
useful information about economic life that should not be ignored.”   121 
suggested by CLARK (1997), one source of bias, which may be particularly rele-
vant for between group comparisons of subjective variables, is that utility (and 
thus job satisfaction) may be determined by relative values and expectations. He 
analyses the phenomenon of women usually reporting a higher level of job satis-
faction than men, even though their jobs are worse in terms of objective stan-
dards. He finds evidence in favour of the hypothesis that satisfaction is deter-
mined by a comparison of the present situation to a comparison level, which is 
mainly given by the workers’ own experiences in the past. Hence, the higher job 
satisfaction of women is explained by their lower expectations resulting from 
worse experiences in the past.  
This issue may also be relevant for the analysis at hand. For example, univer-
sity graduates may have a higher demand for career opportunities than workers 
without formal qualification. Hence, at a given job the former are more likely to 
be dissatisfied than the latter. Since FTC workers are only compared with a con-
trol group with on average similar observable characteristics, this issue may not 
be relevant here. Furthermore, one can assume that, if expectations are generated 
by labour market experiences, using a control group of workers with on average 
similar labour market experiences, balances differences in expectations between 
FTC workers and the control group of permanent workers.  
A more difficult problem arises, if the type of contract itself affects the com-
parison level, that is, if FTC workers only compare their situation with other FTC 
workers but not with all workers. For example, if FTC workers have lower ex-
pectations with regard to their career opportunities and job security due to the 
fact that they hold FTCs, this would systematically bias the (expected negative) 
treatment effects on job security and career opportunities towards zero. As the 
majority of workers still holds permanent contracts and since permanent con-
tracts are still the standard type of employment relationship in the public percep-
tion, this bias is unlikely.    
A remaining problem is that comparisons of the estimated effects of FTCs on 
subjective outcome variables between different groups of workers (men versus 
women; young versus old etc.) may be meaningless. Different groups of workers 
have different expectations and hence comparison levels. Therefore, the effects 
of FTCs on subjective outcome variables of different groups of workers are esti-
mated and presented, but not compared between groups. 
  
5.3  Previous Empirical Results 
Empirical  studies  may  be  classified  by  whether  they  are  static  or  dynamic. 
Static in this context means that contemporaneous or short-term effects of FTCs 
in comparison to permanent contract jobs are analysed. The underlying counter-
factual is the hypothetical situation of the FTC workers holding permanent con-
tracts. Dynamic means that also long-term (especially wage) effects of having   122 
been in a FTC job in the past on future outcome variables are analysed in com-
parison to having been in a permanent job in the past.  
Starting  with  contemporaneous  wage  effects,  BOOTH,  FRANCESCONI,  and 
FRANK (2002) find that FTC workers in the UK earn less than permanent work-
ers (men -8.9% and women -6%).  
In a previous study, I found that FTC workers earn 5% less than comparable 
permanent  contract  workers  using  the  method  of  propensity  score  matching 
based  on  a  cross-section  of  the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel  (GSOEP)  for 
West Germany in 1999 (see HAGEN, 2002). A comparable magnitude is found by 
SCHÖMANN and KRUPPE (1994) for West Germany using parametric regressions. 
MCGINNITY and MERTENS (2002) using the GSOEP do not find significantly 
negative wage effects for West Germany when applying an instrumental variable 
approach, that is, when also taking selection on unobservables into account (see 
Section 3.3.3). In order to reveal more about the distribution of the wage effect, 
MERTENS and MCGINNITY (2003) apply quantile regression techniques, that is, 
the effects are estimated for different quantiles of the wage distribution. It turns 
out that workers in the upper quantiles earn only slightly less than their perma-
nent counterparts, whereas workers in the lowest quantile earn considerably less.   
BROWN and SESSIONS (2003) use a switching regression approach and find a 
negative earnings effect of 13% for the UK. Furthermore, they apply an Oaxaca-
Decomposition of the earnings differential (see, e.g., GREENE, 2003 for a intro-
duction to this method). The purpose is to decompose the wage differential into 
an endowment component (characteristics of the workers such as qualification, 
experiences, and sex) and a price component (how this endowment is valued by 
the market in terms of earnings). It turns out that 70% of the earnings differential 
is due to a price component, that is, the endowment of the FTC workers is less 
valued in terms of earnings than the endowment of permanent workers (e.g., a 
human  capital  investment  has  a  lower  return  in  FTC  jobs  than  in  permanent 
jobs). The authors interpret the results as evidence for discrimination on the part 
of employers. However, this result is also in line with the idea of a FTC as a kind 
of investment.   
As mentioned in Section 5.2.2, one reason for lower wages may be lower in-
vestment  in  human  capital  in  combination  with  the  hold-up  problem.  Indeed 
ARULAMPALAM and BOOTH (1998) show for the UK that men on FTCs are 16% 
and women are 12% less likely to receive work-related training. This result has 
been confirmed by BOOTH, FRANCESCONI, and FRANK (2002) finding for men a 
12% and for women a 7% lower probability of work-related training.   
BARDASI and FRANCESCONI (2003) analyse the effects of FTCs on self-reported 
subjective wellbeing for the UK in the 1990s. They find no significant effect of 
FTCs on health. Only for women there is a significantly negative effect on life 
satisfaction.  The  study  by  BOOTH,  FRANCESCONI,  and  FRANK  (2002)  finds  a 
strong negative effect of FTCs on different aspects of job satisfaction for the UK. 
For both men and women there are no significant effects on overall job satisfac-  123 
tion, but negative effects on satisfaction with career opportunities and job secu-
rity. 
For Spain, there are two empirical studies highlighting another utility-related 
aspect of FTCs: Their effects on work accidents and injuries as well as illness 
rates. According to GUADALUPE (2003), there are two theoretical reasons for 
expecting FTCs to raise work accidents: (1.) lower investments in human capital, 
(2.) higher effort of FTC workers in order to increase the conversion probability. 
Using a panel of aggregate industry data, GUADALUPE (2003) finds that FTCs 
increase the probability of work accidents to happen by 5 percentage points. She 
concludes that the use of FTCs is associated with higher social costs and a pro-
ductivity loss. Using individual level data AMUEDO-DORANTES (2002) finds the 
opposite: Controlling for working conditions FTCs lead to a lower probability of 
work injuries and illness. However, GUADALUPE (2003) argues that this result 
may be biased by a number of factors, such as differences in reporting of work 
injuries between FTC and permanent workers.     
Absence from work (due to illness, accidents, and family matters) as well as 
unpaid overtime are interpreted by ENGELLANDT and RIPHAN (2003) as proxy 
variables for worker’s effort in an empirical analysis for Switzerland. The hy-
pothesis is that FTC workers have an incentive to signal their effort in order to 
increase the probability of getting their contract transformed into a permanent 
one,  as  suggested  by  the  model  of  GIBBONS  and  MURPHY  (1992)  discussed 
above. They find that FTC workers have a 60% higher probability of working 
unpaid overtime. Workers in positions with the potential for upward mobility 
have an even higher probability. However, ENGELLANDT and RIPHAN (2003) find 
no significant effect on the probability of absence from work.118 My interpreta-
tion is that the latter finding may result from two opposed effects:  FTCs increase 
illness and accidents on the one hand, but workers do not dare to be absent from 
work on the other.  
Note that the finding of ENGELLANDT and RIPHAN (2003) is in line with the 
hypothesis of a FTC job as an investment in lifetime earnings or utility, while the 
results with regard to the negative effects on satisfaction with career opportuni-
ties and job security as well as the negative effects on training opportunities seem 
to be more in line with the use of FTCs as a means of adjustment or substitution, 
and hence, adverse long-term effects on the individual career path.   
There are only few dynamic studies comparing the situation of having entered 
into a FTC job with the counterfactual situation of having entered into a perma-
nent job on future wages. The study for the UK by BOOTH, FRANCESCONI, and 
FRANK (2002), shows that workers holding a FTC job in the first period of their 
employment spell and getting a  permanent contract later, start with a lower wage 
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protection  against  dismissal  comes  into  effect)  among  Italian  bank  employees.  RIPHAN  and 
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level (men -8.9% and women -6%), but have a higher wage growth than compa-
rable permanent workers. After ten years, women who had been employed in 
FTC jobs, receive the same wage as those who started with permanent contracts. 
In contrast, men are not able to catch up and still receive a wage penalty of -5% 
after ten years of employment. For West Germany, MCGINNITY and MERTENS 
(2002) also find that an initial FTC increases wage growth.  
Note that the results are again in line with idea of a FTC as an investment pe-
riod  or  as  a  probationary  period.  On  the  other  hand,  the  result  by  BOOTH, 
FRANCESCONI, and FRANK (2002), that men who had a FTC ten years ago still 
have lower wages, seems to be contradictory.  
 
5.4  Data Base, Estimation Sample, and Descriptive Statistics 
Data Base and Estimation Sample 
In order to evaluate the effects of FTCs on individual wages and subjective as-
sessments of working conditions, the BIBB/IAB dataset, a representative sample 
of 0.1% of all individuals employed in Germany, is used.119 The survey is im-
plemented every seven years, but cannot be used as a panel. Here, the latest wave 
from the survey in 1998/99 is used. It includes more than 34,000 employees who 
were interviewed between October 1998 and March 1999. This cross-sectional 
dataset contains detailed information on the qualification and professional career 
of each employee, the organisational and technological environment of jobs, in-
formation about the employer as well as a variety of assessments of working 
conditions with regard to different job attributes.  
Starting with a sample of 27,634 employees living in West Germany the fol-
lowing persons are excluded: participants in public employment measures, per-
sons younger than 21 or older than 57, employees in the public sector or in the 
farming sector, persons in mini-jobs120, persons in military or civilian service, 
trainees  and  apprentices,  pupils,  students,  and  pensioners.  Furthermore,  only 
workers in their main jobs are included since the earnings information is avail-
able only for this group. Finally, approximately 12,800 persons are used in the 
econometric analysis.  
Specifically, the following variables are used. The central question defining the 
treatment status is: “Are you presently in a fixed-term or an undefined term em-
ployment relationship?” A dummy variable is created accordingly. The variable 
containing information on job tenure (in years), that is, the elapsed duration of 
                                              
119 The BIBB/IAB “Qualification and Career Survey” dataset is jointly collected by the Research Insti-
tute of the Federal Labor Office (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB Nuremberg) 
and the Federal Institute for Vocational Training (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung, BIBB Berlin). 
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the ongoing employment relationship with the present employer,  is generated 
from the following question: “Since when have you been employed at your pre-
sent employer? Please specify the year. –  In case you have been employed at 
your employer more than once: When has the current employment relationship 
started?”  
Table 17: Sample Means of Explanatory Variables (Unweighted) 
Variable  Description  Mean 
Age (years)    38.1 
(9.13)  
Vocational college  Germ.: Berufsfachschule  0.03 
Vocational training   Germ.: Betrieblicher Ausbilungsabschluss / Lehre  0.63 
Master craftsman  Germ.: Meistertitel  0.09 
Polytechnic  Germ.: Fachhochschulabschluss  0.04 
University  Germ.: Universitätsabschluss  0.05 
Children < 6   Children in the household younger than 6 years   0.19 
Children 6–17   Children aged between 6 and 17 years  0.31 
Foreigner  Not of German nationality  0.06 
Disabled  Disabled before taking up the job  0.03 
Spouse employed    0.43 
Ever changed occupation    0.32 
Ever moved due to job-related reasons    0.19 
Two employers so far    0.26 
Three employers so far    0.19 
Four employers so far    0.12 
Five or more employers so far    0.17 
Previous Job: dismissed  Reasons for leaving the last employer   0.08 
Previous Job: end of FTC  Reasons for leaving the last employer   0.05 
Previous Job: closure of a firm  Reasons for leaving the last employer  0.07 
Once unemployed so far  Number of previous unemployment spells   0.21 
Twice unemployed so far  Number of previous unemployment spells  0.06 
Three times unemployed so far  Number of previous unemployment spells    0.03 
Four or more times unemployed so far  Number of previous unemployment spells  0.02 
Duration of last unemployment spell 
(months) 
   2.85 
(9.25) 
Unemployed in the year taking up the job   Proxy for being hired from unemployment   0.14 
log Unemployment rate in the federal state     2.34  
(0.21) 
City (more than 50.000 inhabitants)  Place of residence  0.48 
Surrounding area  Place of residence  0.16 
Training in a farming occupation   Field of completed vocational training   0.01 
Training in an industry occupation     0.31 
Training in a health occupation     0.05  
Training in a technical occupation     0.09  
Source: Own calculations based on the BIBB/IAB dataset (Qualification and  Career Survey) 
1998/99. 
Notes: Sample as described above; standard deviations for continuous variables in parenthe-
ses; 12,802 observations.   126 
The following outcome variables are used. Hourly wages are calculated from 
earnings (including overtime) and actual weekly hours of work. The exact word-
ing of the question about earnings is: “How much are your monthly gross earn-
ings from your main activity? If your earnings fluctuate very much, please report 
your average earnings”. One problem arises due to the fact that the earnings 
variable  is  collected  not  as  a  continuos  number  but  in  bracket  form  with  19 
brackets. Following DINARDO and PISCHKE (1997) as well as FITZENBERGER and 
SPITZ  (2004),  the  approach  chosen  here  is  to  assign  the  midpoint  to  every 
bracket. For the highest category which is not bound above, the lower bound 
(15,000 DM; 7,669 Euro) is assumed.121 It has been shown, among others, by 
KUCKULENZ and ZWICK (2003) that the point estimates of coefficients in a Min-
cer-type earnings equation do not substantially  differ between OLS using the 
generate earnings variable and maximum likelihood interval regression models 
using  the  bracket  form.  For  calculating  hourly  wages  the  information  on  the 
usual weekly hours of work is used. 
The second outcome variable is subjective assessment of job security. Persons 
are asked the following question: “How do you assess the danger of being dis-
missed by your employer in the near future? / failing to get your contract re-
newed?” Possible answers are “very high danger”, “high danger”, “rather low 
danger”, and “no danger at all”. Four dummy variables are generated accord-
ingly. 
The third outcome variable is satisfaction with career opportunities at the pre-
sent job. Possible answers are “very satisfied”, “by and large satisfied”, “rather 
dissatisfied”, and “very dissatisfied”. Again, four dummy variables are generated 
for these answers.  
Table 17 provides a description of the explanatory variables (including German 
notions for formal qualifications) used in the econometric analyses and some de-
scriptive statistics. More descriptive statistics are presented in the next subsec-
tion. 
Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 18 the proportion of FTCs in different parts of the job tenure distribu-
tion of all workers is depicted. It is differentiated between unweighted sample 
means and weighted statistics being estimates for the means in the population 
(West  German  employees).  It  can  be  seen  that  the  weighted  and  unweighted 
means differ only slightly.  
However, as mentioned in Subchapter 2.3, the presented means are unsuitable 
for assessing the duration distribution of FTCs due to spell truncation and length 
bias. Nevertheless, Table 18 exposes at least one important fact for the further 
analyses. Almost 60% of all ongoing FTC employment spells are shorter than 2 
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years.122 This corresponds to the maximum duration stipulated by the Employ-
ment Promotion Act, which is in force for the period under observation. Thus 
FTC jobs with a duration of more than 2 years must be based on the regulations 
according to the Civil Code. More than 90% of ongoing FTC employment rela-
tionships are not longer than 10  years. The median duration of ongoing FTC 
spells is 2 years and of permanent contract spells is 8 years (this holds for the 
unweighted and the weighted sample).  
An important finding from this analysis is that it may be quite misleading sim-
ply  to  compare  mean  characteristics  of  all  FTC  workers  with  all  permanent 
workers, since there are very few FTC workers in the right tail of the tenure dis-
tribution (see also Subchapter 2.3). Put differently, since the probability to hold a 
FTC after being employed at the same employer for more than 10 years goes to 
zero, it does not make much sense to use permanent workers with more than 10 
years of job tenure for the estimation of the relevant counterfactual situation of 
FTC jobs. Therefore, in the econometric as well as the descriptive analyses, sam-
ples restricted to job tenure £10 years and job tenure £2 years are defined. Note 
that this is a first attempt to impose common support (see Section 3.3.1). 
Table 18: Number and Proportion of FTCs by Ongoing Job Tenure  
– Weighted and Unweighted Sample Means (Percentages) 
    Men      Women   
Tenure 
(years) 
number 
 
un-
weighted 
proportion 
 
un-
weighted 
cumulated 
proportion 
un-
weighted 
proportion  
 
weighted 
number 
 
un-
weighted 
proportion 
 
un-
weighted 
cumulated 
proportion 
un-
weighted 
proportion  
 
weighted 
0  32  29.09  6.02  28.59  23  27.38  5.35  25.57 
1  206  22.34  44.74  22.11  155  20.83  41.4  21.74 
2  82  13.16  60.15  12.91  72  14.40  58.14  15.12 
3  34  6.83  66.54  6.64  32  6.79  65.58  6.27 
4  24  4.73  71.05  4.61  30  7.08  72.56  7.50 
5  28  6.18  76.31  6.73  11  3.15  75.12  2.88 
6  18  4.36  79.69  4.20  17  5.04  79.07  6.31 
7-8  34  4.12  86.08  4.67  29  4.52  85.82  4.33 
9-10  23  2.66  90.40  2.20  27  4.32  92.10  4.96 
³ 11  51  1.44  100.00  1.40  34  1.92  100.00  2.03 
Total  532  6.07    5.88  430  7.23    7.28 
Source: Own calculations based on the BIBB/IAB dataset 1998/99.  
Notes: Sample as described in the previous subsection. Weighted figures are obtained using 
the individual weights (inflation factors) included in the BIBB/IAB dataset.  
 
                                              
122 In Subchapter 2.3, using a question from the German Microcensus which is not subject to spell trun-
cation, it turns out that approximately 83% of all FTCs are not longer than 24 months. Note, however, 
that in this chapter employment spell durations are analysed, while Subchapter 2.3 analyses durations 
of FTCs as stipulated in the contracts.    128 
Assuming that actual (in contrast to stipulated) hours of work reflect workers’ 
effort as suggested by ENGELLANDT and RIPHAN (2003), and that FTC workers 
invest more in effort, one would expect on average longer hours of work in FTC 
jobs. Of course, since the analysis in this subsection is a descriptive one, this hy-
pothesis cannot be tested in causal sense.123 Table 19 depicts the average usual 
weekly hours of work. For men the result is fairly clear: Permanent contract jobs 
are associated with significantly more working hours than FTC jobs. For women 
the results are different: Depending on the samples, the average weekly hours of 
work of female FTC workers are even larger. In the sample with tenure £2 years 
female FTC workers work 2.67 hours more per week than female permanent 
workers do (see Subchapter 2.3 for a complementary analysis).  
Table 19: Means of Usual Weekly Hours of Work by Type of Contract  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)   
    Men      Women   
Tenure 
(years) 
FTC  PERM  t-test   
(p-value)  
FTC  PERM  t-test      
(p-value)  
unrestricted   40.11 
(0.42) 
42.71 
(0.11) 
-6.03 
(0.00) 
29.94 
(0.61) 
31.03 
(30.70) 
-1.73 
(0.08) 
£10  39.93 
(0.48) 
41.29 
(0.12) 
-2.77 
(0.01) 
30.37 
(0.65) 
30.00 
(0.21) 
0.55 
(0.59) 
              £2  40.33 
(0.64) 
41.75 
(0.25) 
-2.08 
(0.04) 
30.54 
(0.82) 
27.87 
(0.42) 
2.88 
(0.00) 
Source: Own calculations based on the BIBB/IAB dataset 1998/99.  
Notes: Sample as described in the previous subsection. Weighted figures are obtained 
using the individual weights (expansion factors) included in the BIBB/IAB dataset.  
 
So far only the means of the weekly hours of work have been considered. In the 
following the whole distribution is taken into account. In Table 20 the null hy-
pothesis that the hours distribution of FTCs and the hours distribution of perma-
nent contracts are from populations with equal distributions is tested by perform-
ing a Wilcoxon ranksum test (also known as the Mann-Whitney two-sample sta-
tistic; see CONOVER, 1999). Furthermore, an estimate of the probability of the 
value of the working hours in permanent contract jobs being larger than the value 
of working hours in FTC jobs is presented (Pr(PERM>FTC)). In principle, this is a 
test for whether the hours distribution of permanent contract jobs is in the right of 
the hours distribution of FTC jobs. The results indicate for men that FTC and 
permanent jobs have significantly different distributions of hours of work, with 
evidence in favour of longer hours of work in permanent jobs. For women only 
the results for the unrestricted sample indicate that the FTC and the permanent 
contract hours distribution is significantly different at the 5% level. For tenure £2 
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years the results are even more in favour of longer working hours in FTC jobs, as 
already found in Table 19. 
 
Table 20: Two-Sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test for Differences in the Distribu-
tion of Usual Weekly Hours of Work by Type of Contract 
(p-Values and Estimated Probabilities) 
Tenure 
(years) 
  Men  Women 
unrestricted       H0: FTC=PERM  0.000  0.019 
      Pr(PERM>FTC)  0.574  0.533 
£10      H0:FTC = PERM  0.000  0.636 
   Pr(PERM = FTC)  0.564  0.507 
£2     H0:FTC=PERM  0.000  0.303 
      Pr(PERM>FTC)  0.582  0.479 
 
  
The distribution of monthly earnings can be found in Table 21. The tendency 
that not only the mean (see the last row) but the whole distribution of permanent 
contract workers’ earnings is in the right of the FTC workers’ earnings distribu-
tion seems to be obvious. Even though monthly earnings are not continuously 
measured, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is again applicable since the test requires 
at least an ordinal scale (see CONOVER, 1999). The differences in the earnings 
distribution is only for women with tenure £ 2 years not statistically significant.    130 
Table 21: Earnings Distribution by Type of Contract (Percentages)  
    Men      Women   
Tenure (years)  Unrestricted  Tenure £10  Tenure £2   Unrestricted  Tenure £10  Tenure £2 
Monthly Earnings Y in €   FTC  PERM  FTC  PERM  FTC  PERM  FTC  PERM  FTC  PERM  FTC  PERM 
               Y < 307   1.13  0.20  1.34  0.24  1.82  0.47  5.12  3.80  4.93  4.75  6.50  7.22 
   307 £ Y < 511  0.83  0.51  0.99  0.73  1.29  1.18  12.00  10.80  12.38  13.53  12.75  20.85 
   511 £ Y < 767   1.37  0.73  1.62  0.96  2.48  0.86  11.60  7.06  11.64  7.44  8.02  7.44 
   767 £ Y < 1,023   2.56  1.35  2.03  1.91  2.13  3.31  17.32  12.09  17.29  12.75  18.30  12.05 
1,023 £ Y < 1,278   10.00  4.01  10.84  5.74  10.38  7.08  16.99  16.17  15.90  15.19  20.16  14.29 
1,278 £ Y < 1,534   19.49  7.83  18.76  10.08  20.69  11.74  13.91  14.55  15.05  14.42  10.71  12.71 
1,534 £ Y < 1,790   19.54  12.44  19.18  14.83  15.59  17.55  12.85  12.12  12.58  11.88  12.04  8.89 
1,790 £ Y < 2,045   16.76  14.77  16.66  16.08  12.83  13.94  2.53  7.81  2.93  6.89  2.99  5.32 
2,045 £ Y < 2,301   9.24  15.57  9.58  14.06  11.15  12.05  1.91  5.31  1.88  4.61  2.77  3.06 
2,301 £ Y < 2,556   5.74  12.43  5.73  10.85  7.18  9.44  1.52  3.58  1.54  2.85  2.46  2.26 
2,556 £ Y < 2,812   3.66  7.68  3.92  6.59  4.78  5.68  1.72  2.03  1.99  1.78  1.49  1.72 
2,812 £ Y < 3,068   2.43  6.71  2.41  5.22  2.94  5.18  0.44  1.74  0.51  1.39  0.25  1.44 
3,068 £ Y < 3,579   2.27  6.57  2.17  5.04  2.19  4.97  1.17  1.17  0.97  1.02  1.33  1.06 
3,579 £ Y < 4,090   1.63  3.12  1.51  2.57  1.88  2.18  0.13  0.62  0.15  0.46  0.00  0.62 
4,090 £ Y < 4,602   1.69  2.13  1.79  1.82  1.85  1.23  0.11  0.49  0.13  0.48  0.21  0.19 
4,602 £ Y < 5,113   0.53  1.17  0.25  0.84  0.38  0.77  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.08 
5,113 £ Y < 7,663   1.02  2.14  1.07  1.88  0.44  1.85  0.68  0.51  0.14  0.41  0.00  0.80 
              Y ³7,663   0.12  0.64  0.14  0.55  0.00  0.51  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.00 
Rank-sum test                                 
p-value for H0: PERM = FTC   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.55 
Pr (PERM>FTC)   0.68  0.63  0.58  0.59  0.56  0.51 
Mean of constructed earnings in € 
(standard error) 
1,605 
(50.56) 
1,729 
(16.53) 
1,588 
(55.48) 
1,939 
(208.4) 
1,580 
(63.89) 
1,870 
(39.88) 
1,017 
(43.57) 
1,077 
(12.67) 
992 
(36.62) 
1,128 
(15.78) 
994 
(50.14) 
1,021 
(30.34) 
  t-test on differences in mean    
  earnings (p-value) 
-2.32 
(0.020) 
-5.92 
(0.000) 
-3.85 
(0.000) 
-1.32 
(0.185) 
-3.20 
(0.001) 
-0.44 
(0.664) 
Source: Own estimations based on the BIBB/IAB dataset 1998/99. 
Notes: The odd earning categories stem from the fact that earnings are collected in Deutsche Mark in the survey. Mean earnings are constructed, as 
described in Subchapter 5.4. Weighted figures are obtained using the individual weights (inflation factors) included in the BIBB/IAB dataset.    131 
Table 22 presents the mean hourly wage by type of contract and different sam-
ples.  In  the  unrestricted  sample  the  average  hourly  wage  of  male  permanent 
workers is about 13.0 € and the mean hourly wage of male FTC workers is about 
10.5 €. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Women in per-
manent jobs earn 10.2 € per hour and women in FTC jobs are paid an average 
wage of 9.5 € per hour. This difference is not statistically significant at the 10% 
level. The difference is, however, significant for women in the restricted samples. 
For women with job tenure £10 years the mean wage in FTC jobs is even higher 
than in permanent contract jobs.   
Table 22: Means of Hourly Wage by Type of Contract  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
    Men      Women   
Tenure 
(years) 
FTC   PERM  t-test   
(p-value)  
FTC   PERM  t-test                    
(p-value)  
Unrestricted   10.52 
(0.25) 
12.98 
(0.08) 
9.50 
(0.000) 
9.48 
(0.74) 
10.16 
(0.13) 
0.91 
(0.363) 
£10  10.52 
(0.28) 
12.07 
(0.10) 
5.21 
(0.000) 
9.64 
(0.30) 
8.71 
(0.30) 
2.78 
(0.005) 
£2  10.20 
(0.29) 
11.39 
(0.22) 
3.26 
(0.001) 
8.72 
(0.30) 
9.59 
(0.14) 
2.78 
(0.005) 
Source: Own calculations based on the BIBB/IAB dataset 1998/99.  
Notes: Sample as described in the previous subsection. Weighted figures are obtained using 
the individual weights (inflation factors) included in the BIBB/IAB dataset. 
 
From Figure 3 to Figure 6 the empirical distributions of hourly wages are de-
picted for the unrestricted sample and the sample with tenure £2 years124 esti-
mated by kernel density estimators.125  
Here the wage distribution functions are estimated by a so-called adaptive two-
stage kernel density estimator using the Epanechnikov kernel (see PAGAN and 
ULLAH, 1999). As discussed in BURKHAUSER et al. (1999), it has some advantage 
over the more common fixed (or global) bandwidth approaches, which tend to 
                                              
124 Since it does not lead to more insights, the figures for the sample with tenure £10 years are not pre-
sented.  
125 Kernel density estimation is an often applied nonparametric method for the estimation of the distribu-
tion of a variable without the necessity of an ex ante specification of the form of the distribution (such 
as the normal or the exponential distribution). The histogram can be interpreted as a crude density es-
timator. In contrast, kernel density estimators smooth the estimated distribution shape. An extensive 
representation is provided, for example, by PAGAN and ULLAH (1999). As stressed by BURKHAUSER 
et al. (1999), the method of kernel density estimation has some advantages in characterising distribu-
tions over other traditional summary measures such as the Gini coefficient or the coefficient of varia-
tion. It provides a picture of the whole distribution of wages. It captures absolute (descriptive) wage 
differentials between FTC and permanent workers as well as men and women via shifts in the density 
functions to the right or to the left.    132 
oversmoothing  in  areas  with  many  observations  and  undersmoothing  in  areas 
with only sparse observations (in the tails of the distribution).126  
It can be seen from Figure 3 and Figure 4 that the wage distribution of male 
FTC workers seems to be shifted to the left from the wage distribution of male 
permanent workers. This result is confirmed in Table 23 which indicates that the 
null  hypothesis  of  FTC  and  permanent  contract  wage  distributions  stemming 
from populations with equal distributions is clearly rejected for men. Further-
more, the result in Table 23 that Pr(PERM>FTC) > 0.5 is in line with the visual find-
ing that the wage distribution of FTC workers is shifted to the left.  
For women the difference in the wage distribution by type of contract is less 
clear-cut (Figure 5 and Figure 6), though the rank sum test (Table 23) indicates 
again a rejection of the null hypothesis of equal distributions and again the FTC 
wage distribution is shifted to the left (Pr(PERM>FTC)>0.5). Nevertheless, the dif-
ferences in the wage distribution between FTCs and permanent contracts seem to 
be larger for men than for women.   
  
Table 23: Two-Sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test for Differences in the Distribu-
tion of Hourly Wages in € by Type of Contract  
(p-Values and Estimated Probabilities) 
Tenure 
(years) 
  Men  Women  
Unrestricted  H0: FTC=PERM  0.000  0.000 
  Pr(PERM>FTC)  0.674  0.594 
£10  H0: FTC=PERM  0.000  0.000 
  Pr(PERM>FTC)  0.619  0.577 
£2  H0:FTC=PERM  0.003  0.011 
  Pr(PERM>FTC)  0.559  0.555 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
126 In concrete terms, in the first stage a fixed-bandwidth (using Sliverman’s rule of thumb; see Section 
3.3.1) density estimate is computed. In the second stage this estimate is used to adapt the size of the 
bandwidth for every data point. A formal representation can be found in BURKHAUSER et al. (1999).   133 
Figure 3: Kernel Density Estimation of the Hourly Wage (€) Distribution of Men 
by Type of Contract – Unrestricted Tenure 
Source: Own estimations based on the BIBB/IAB dataset 1998/99. 
Notes: Adaptive kernel density estimations (varying bandwidths) using the inverse sam-
pling weights as inflation factors. The estimation contains the whole distribution of the 
sample, but the figure is truncated at >30 € for the sake of clarity. 
 
Figure 4: Kernel Density Estimation of the Hourly Wage (€) Distribution of Men 
by Type of Contract – Tenure £2 Years 
For source and notes see Figure 3. 
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Figure 5: Kernel Density Estimation of the Hourly Wage (€) Distribution of 
Women by Type of Contract – Unrestricted Tenure 
For source and notes see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 6: Kernel Density Estimation of the Hourly Wage (€) Distribution of 
Women by Type of Contract – Tenure £2 Years 
For source and notes see Figure 3. 
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Finally, Table 24 and Table 25 depict the distributions of the two other outcome 
variables, that is, subjective assessment of job security as well as satisfaction with 
career opportunities at the present job. The numbers in Table 24 correspond to 
the expectations: (1.) FTC workers always assess their jobs as significantly more 
unstable, (2.) all in all, subjective job insecurity decreases with job tenure127,  
(3.) there is a high proportion of FTC workers assessing the instability of their 
FTC jobs as rather low or even perceiving no danger at all. 54.7% of all men and 
53.6% of all women in FTC jobs with job tenure £2 years see a rather low or no 
danger at all of not getting their contract renewed, that is, losing their job in the 
near future. This high amount may indicate that FTC holders are aware of the 
high conversion probability within the same establishment of approximately one 
third, as found in Subchapter 4.5.  
The numbers for men in Table 25  are in line with the hypothesis that the career 
opportunities are less satisfactory in FTC jobs. However, it is worth noting that 
the differences in three highest categories are not too large. Even more striking 
are the numbers for women: Focussing on tenure £2 years there are no significant 
differences between FTC and permanent jobs in two categories.  
It remains to be answered in the econometric analyses of the next subchapter, 
whether and to what extent the presented associations between the outcome vari-
ables and the type of contract are causal relationships, and for which groups of 
workers the wage effects of FTCs are more or less relevant. 
                                              
127 It is a well-known result that objective job stability increases with elapsed job tenure (see FARBER, 
1994).   136 
Table 24: Subjective Assessment of Job Insecurity Distribution by Type of Contract 
  Subjective assessment of danger of being dismissed / failing to get the FTC renewed 
  Very high danger  High danger  Rather low danger  No danger at all 
Tenure (years)  FTC  PERM  t-stat           FTC  PERM  t-stat           FTC  PERM  t-stat           FTC  PERM  t-stat           
Men                          
Unrestricted  20.7  3.3  8.13  22.9  8.8  6.28  39.4  58.3  -7.20  17.0  29.7  -6.07 
£10  22.4  3.4  7.88  22.1  9.6  5.17  39.0  39.0  -7.00  16.4  27.8  -4.88 
£2  23.7  5.2  6.09  21.5  11.9  3.18  40.1  55.9  -4.17  14.6  26.9  -4.27 
Women                         
Unrestricted   21.9  2.3  7.98  19.8  7.6  5.46  45.0  55.3  -3.50  13.2  34.8  -10.50 
£10  23.3  2.6  7.67  21.1  8.5  5.04  45.2  56.5  -3.58  10.5  32.4  -10.65 
£2  26.6  2.9  6.90  19.7  9.2  3.27  43.0  53.7  -2.56  10.6  34.1  -7.79 
Table 25: Subjective Assessment of Career Opportunities by Type of Contract 
  Subjective assessment of career opportunities 
  Very satisfied   “By and large” satisfied   Rather dissatisfied   Very dissatisfied  
Tenure (years)  FTC  PERM  t-stat           FTC  PERM  t-stat          FTC  PERM  t-stat           FTC  PERM  t-stat           
Men                          
Unrestricted   6.2  10.8  -3.44  42.7  57.3  -5.73  34.4  25.8  +3.57  16.7  6.1  +5.22 
£10  5.7  9.1  -2.44  45.0  54.8  -3.43  33.5  29.2  +1.63  15.7  6.9  +4.03 
£2  6.2  10.3  -2.12   44.2  55.1  -2.88  33.4  27.1  +1.83  16.2  7.5  +3.18 
Women                         
Unrestricted  5.1  9.0  -3.15  41.6  56.1  -5.00  35.5  26.7  +3.16  17.9  8.2  +4.44 
£10  5.8  6.6  -0.58  42.7  54.2  -3.62  33.6  30.3  +1.10  17.9  8.8  +3.87 
£2  6.7  6.0  0.35  43.1  53.1  -2.35  33.7  30.1  +0.90  16.5  10.8  +1.88 
Source: Own calculations based on the BIBB/IAB dataset 1998/99.  
Notes: Sample as described in the previous subsection. Weighted figures are obtained using the individual weights (inflation factors) included in the 
BIBB/IAB dataset.   137 
5.5  Econometric Approach 
The methodological discussion in this subchapter focuses on the estimation of 
the wage effects of FTCs. For both the other outcome variables the econometric 
approach is analogous.   
5.5.1  Characterising the Selection Problem 
First of all, what exactly is the treatment in this chapter? Of course, the treat-
ment is ‘being employed on a FTC instead of a permanent contract’. This in-
cludes in fact two decisions: (1.) the decision to enter into a FTC, and (2.) the 
decision to still hold a FTC at the time of the interview. The average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) is obviously the mean effect of being employed on 
FTC on wages (and subjective working conditions) of FTC workers in compari-
son to the hypothetical situation the same workers would be employed on perma-
nent contracts.  
Assume that the outcome Eq. (5) in Section 3.2.2 is a (Mincer-type) wage equa-
tion with  it Y  denoting the hourly wage128 of individual i, and  it X  being a vector 
of conditioning variables. Since only one period of time is considered, the index t 
can be dropped. As discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2, the selection problem 
occurs in Eq. (5), if the treatment dummy  i C  is correlated with the error term  i U , 
that is,  ( ) 0 i i E U C ¹ , which may be caused by selection on observables or selec-
tion on unobservables.  
If the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) holds (if solely selection on 
observables is relevant), the mean outcome of a control group of permanent con-
tract workers with similar mean values of X-variables is a valid estimate of the 
counterfactual (see Section 3.3.1). As discussed in greater detail in subsequent 
sections, the counterfactual outcome is estimated by a propensity matching esti-
mator (see Section 3.3.1) 
If  selection  on  unobservables  is  relevant,  the  analysis  becomes  much  more 
complicated. For example, selection on unobservables would imply in case of the 
theoretical model by LOH (1994), that high-ability workers enter into FTCs with 
a higher probability. The attempts to account for selection on unobservables are 
presented in the following section.  
5.5.2  Attempts to Account for Selection on Unobservables    
 As only a cross-sectional dataset is available, an instrumental variable (IV) is 
necessary for identification, that is, a variable affecting wages only through the 
treatment status (type of contract) but not directly (exclusion restriction; see Sec-
tion 3.3.3). Since the necessary statistical properties of an IV, as described in 
Section 3.3.3, are usually untestable, the choice of an IV should be justified by 
                                              
128 Using hourly wages instead of monthly earnings as outcome variable avoids the potential bias due to 
differences in working hours (see FRANZ and STEINER, 2000).   138 
theoretical considerations. The most plausible solution would be to find an ex-
ogenous variation generated by a policy change, that is, a natural experiment (see 
Section 3.2.4).  
One possible exogenous variation is the following: After having been increased 
to 11 employees on 01 October 1996, the employment threshold level for the ap-
plication of the Protection Against Dismissal Law was reduced to 6 employees 
per establishment on 01 December 1998. Assuming that the number of employ-
ees per establishment can be treated as exogenous with respect to the worker’s 
decision on the type of contract129, the hypothesis is that the probability of being 
employed on a FTC basis increases in establishments which came into the scope 
of the law on 01 December 1998, that is, establishment with 6-10 employees. 
There should be, ceteris paribus, no significant changes over time in the behav-
iour of the other establishments. Thus the hypothesis is complementary to the 
hypothesis tested in Subchapter 4.4, where establishment level data are used.  
I used this variation to explain the workers’ probabilities of being employed on 
FTCs by a probit model: 
( ) ( ) 1 1 0 2 3 Pr 1 5_9 5_9 C X X after size size after b d b b = = F + + + ´ ,  (47) 
where after is a dummy variable, which is one, if a person is interviewed after 01 
December 1998 and zero otherwise.130  5_9 size  is a dummy variable for estab-
lishments with 5-9 employees at the time of the interview since this is the nearest 
available category in the dataset.131  5_9 size after ´  is an interaction effect which 
serves as IV and 1 X  is a vector of further explanatory variables including the 
other establishment size dummies. Basically,  5_9 size after ´  is a valid IV, if it 
affects (conditional on the other explanatory variables in Eq. (47)) the worker’s 
probability of being employed on FTC, and if it does not affect wages directly 
(exclusion restriction; see Section 3.3.3). 
I estimated the basic Eq. (47) in several ways. A first approach was to assume 
that only new hirings were affected by the policy change, that is, only employees 
who were hired in 1998 or 1999. The interaction effect  5_9 size after ´  turned out 
to be weakly positively correlated with C, but the corresponding estimated coef-
ficient in Eq. (47) was far from statistical significance. The most obvious reason 
is that only 43 workers are observed in the sample which are hired from estab-
lishments with 5-9 employees after the reform (11 of these employees are hired 
on  FTCs).  In  a  second  approach  I  included  all  workers  (with  job  tenure  £10 
years), assuming that the law does not only alter the hiring decision with respect 
to the type of contract but also the decision whether or not to convert a FTC into 
a permanent contract. Again, the interaction term (IV)  5_9 size after ´  had no sig-
nificant effect when estimating Eq. (47).  
                                              
129 As discussed in the subsequent section, this assumption may not be realistic since the type of contract 
is likely to be simultaneously determined with establishment size.  
130 Remember that the interviews were conducted between October 1998 and March 1999.  
131 Obviously, size5_9 serves only as a proxy variable for establishments with 6-10 employees.    139 
I tried further IVs, which are, however, less convincing from a theoretical point 
of view. The aggregated labour force participation rates by age, qualification, and 
sex generated in a first step by the German Microcensus for 1998, were used. 
These turned out to be insufficiently correlated with the FTC dummy. Also the 
labour force participation rates by age, region (federal state), and sex had no sig-
nificant effect on the type of contract.132  
Due to the lack of a suitable IV, it is assumed that there is no selection on unob-
servables or that some of the observable conditioning variables serve as proxy 
variables  for  unoberservables  (see  the  section  on  the  implementation  of  the 
matching estimator below).  
5.5.3  Choice of Conditioning Variables  
As stated in Section 3.3.1, the vector of conditioning variables in the propensity 
score equation should contain all variables simultaneously affecting the participa-
tion decision as well as the outcome variables. From previous research and eco-
nomic theory it is not obvious which variables to choose and, particularly, which 
variables are admissible. EHRENBERG and SMITH (1991: 263) state that compen-
sating differentials are to be measured as follows: “The prediction is that, holding 
worker  characteristics  constant,  employees  in  bad  jobs  receive  higher  wages 
than those working under more pleasant conditions.” Hence, theory demands the 
worker characteristics to be held constant, i.e., to be used as conditioning vari-
ables.  
  The  empirical  literature  on  compensating  wage  differentials  is  quite  vague 
about whether and to what extent one should, additionally to worker characteris-
tics, condition on employer and job attributes, such as industry, firm size, job 
position etc.133 There are good reasons to take all possible factors into account: 
This  ensures  that  FTC  workers  are  compared  only  with  permanent  contract 
workers in equivalent situations and surroundings.   
However, the underlying problem is that, given worker characteristics, wages 
and all job and employer attributes are determined simultaneously. This is ex-
actly one crucial prediction of the theory of compensating wage differentials: A 
job is characterised by a bunch of attributes which may have positive or negative 
implications for a worker’s utility. An unfavourable attribute of the job (such as a 
FTC) may not be compensated for by a higher wage but, for example, by a higher 
position,  more  training  opportunities,  or  a  larger  firm  size  (which  provides  a 
large internal labour market).  
                                              
132 Also further variables from the BIBB/IAB dataset, such as having lost the last job due to firm closure 
or having been in military service, turn out to be not suitable. They have either no significant effect 
on the probability of being employed on FTCs or have a significant effect on wages. 
133 For example, while BOOTH, FRANCESCONI, and FRANK (2002) as well as WOLF (2002) control for all 
available job characteristics, ABOWD and ASHENFELTER (1981) do not control for job characteristics 
at all. BROWN and SESSIONS (2003) condition in addition to worker characteristics only on three dif-
ferent occupation classes.    140 
While the empirical literature on compensating wage differentials is ambiguous 
in  this  respect,  precise  guidelines  can  be  found  in  the  evaluation  literature. 
LECHNER (1998) terms this issue the admissibility problem: A variable is admis-
sible  as  a  conditioning  variable,  if  its  potential  values  do  not  depend  on  the 
treatment status. Put differently, an admissible conditioning variable is a pre-
treatment  variable.  Obviously,  all  job  and  employer  attributes  (industry,  firm 
size, job position etc.) are simultaneously determined with the type of contract, 
and are therefore not admissible to be included in the set of conditioning vari-
ables.  
A further challenge is how to deal with the information on job tenure, which 
has turned out to be crucial in the descriptive analyses (Subchapter 2.3 and 5.4). 
The object is to distinguish the job tenure effect from the FTC effect. From an 
econometric point of view the following issues have to be considered: (1.) Job 
tenure may capture the effects of the accumulation of firm-specific human capital 
(see TOPEL, 1991) as well as employers’ and workers’ learning about the quality 
of the match (see FARBER, 1999). However, it is well-known that job tenure is 
endogenous with respect to wages, since workers’ mobility decisions are based 
on current wages; (2.) job tenure is obviously directly determined by the type of 
contract. Put differently, job tenure is endogenous with respect to the type of con-
tract. 
A possible approach to the first point is to assume that the endogeneity of ten-
ure with respect to wages is cancelled out in the matching approach, if the prop-
erty  ( ) ( ) 1 0 , 1 , 0 E U X C E U X C = = =  holds (see Section 3.3.2). The second point 
seems to be more critical: Job tenure is obviously not an admissible conditioning 
variable since it is directly determined by the type of contract. 
The approach chosen here to deal with the issue of admissibility of conditioning 
variables (and especially of job tenure) is to check the sensitivity of the results 
with regard to the inclusion of these variables. In concrete terms the following 
specifications are used:  
Model A: Only admissible pre-treatment variables (worker characteristics) are 
included in the estimation equation of the propensity score.134 
Model B: Job tenure is included in the balancing score besides the propensity 
score (using the Mahalanobis distance, see Section 3.3.1) in order to impose that 
only persons with exactly the same value of job tenure are matched. 
                                              
134 The only set of variables which may be job-related are federal state dummies and unemployment 
rates at the federal state level, both referring to the place of residence and not the place of work. Here 
is an obvious trade-off: On the one hand the place of residence is likely to be determined simultane-
ously with the job and its characteristics. On the other hand, HECKMAN, ICHIMURA, and TODD (1997) 
emphasise the importance of comparing individuals within the same regional labour market. The nec-
essary assumption is that the federal state is not simultaneously determined with the type of contract. 
An example for the violation of this assumption is the following. A worker chooses a FTC job (in-
stead of a permanent job) because the permanent job requires that she or he has to move to another 
federal state.        141 
Model C : In addition, variables on the job and the employer are included in the 
propensity score equation. Job tenure is still part of the balancing score. Hence, 
the goal of this specification is to compare FTC workers with a control group of 
permanent workers with, on average, similar worker characteristics, job and em-
ployer related attributes, and the same distribution of job tenure.  
A further approach to the problem of admissibility is to truncate the distribution 
for the sample with regard to job tenure from the right, such as there are up to 5 
different samples (tenure £10, tenure £8 down to tenure £2 years), and to esti-
mate the effects for each sub-sample. Further reasons for doing this is to impose 
common support (see Section 3.3.1 and Subchapter 5.4), and to check the robust-
ness of the results with respect to an increasing proportion of FTCs which are 
justified by the Civil Code and not by the Employment Promotion Act.  
5.5.4  Further Specification Issues: Other Selection Problems 
In order to estimate the effect of FTCs on wages and subjective employment 
conditions consistently, it may be necessary to take another source of selection 
bias into account: The type of contract as well as wages can be observed only for 
those individuals who are actually employed. This corresponds to the classical 
sample selection problem, which is basically a problem of selection on unobserv-
ables (see HECKMAN, 1979). There may be unobserved factors influencing the 
decision whether to be employed as well as wages and the type of contract. This 
may bias the results, especially for women, who are much more likely to be non-
employed.135  
The major drawback of the dataset used is that it includes only employed indi-
viduals. Thus the problem cannot be taken into account.136 However, using a 
matching  estimator  one  can  again  assume  that  the  condition 
( ) ( ) 1 0 , 1 , 0 E U X C E U X C = = =  holds: By conditioning on a rich set of X variables 
(including previous labour market experiences) also the unobservables are bal-
anced between treated and control individuals. Nevertheless, it should be kept in 
mind that especially the results for women may be biased, if the condition is not 
fulfilled. 
5.5.5  Implementation of the Propensity Score Matching Estimator 
Three different matching estimators are compared137: (1.) NN-matching (with 
caliper and with replacement), (2.) kernel matching using an Epanechnikov ker-
                                              
135 To be exact, there is one more step (individual’s decision) to be taken into account: First, whether to 
be in the labour force, second whether to be employed, and third which type of contract to enter. 
136 In the previous study already described above, I used the GSOEP to estimate the impact of FTCs and, 
thus I could test the significance of the problem (see HAGEN, 2002). I found that neither the effect of 
FTCs on wages nor the probability model for the type of contract is affected by a sample selection 
bias.  
137 The analysis is performed using a modified version of “psmatch2” for STATA 8.0 implemented by 
LEUVEN and SIANESI (2003).    142 
nel, and (3.) matching based on nonparametric local linear regression using also 
an  Epanechnikov  kernel.  Nonparametric  (kernel  and  local  linear  regression) 
matching  estimators  may  be  better  suited  for  the  analysis  at  hand  than  NN-
matching since the ratio of treated to untreated workers is relatively large, imply-
ing that it may be often impossible to find sufficiently similar nearest neighbours.   
For the kernel-based matching estimators the bandwidth is chosen by Silver-
man’s rule of thumb (see Section 3.3.1).138 The standard errors are calculated by 
a bootstrap procedure using 500 replications (see Section 3.3.1). Each bootstrap 
includes re-estimation of the propensity score and the re-calculation of the opti-
mal bandwidth for the bootstrap sample. Thus the bootstrap procedure does not 
only take the variance due to the estimation of the propensity score into account, 
but also the variance due to the choice of the bandwidth (see Section 3.3.1). 
Since both the ATT as well as the Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated 
(ATU) are estimated, the stricter version of the CIA and the common support 
condition are necessary, that is,  ( ) 0 Pr 1 1 C X < = <  as well as  ( ) 1 0 , Y Y C e X ^  (see 
Chapter 3.3.1). The heterogeneity of the effects of FTCs is taken into account by 
estimating the ATT for different groups of workers and performing all the estima-
tion steps described for the pre-defined subsamples (see Section 3.3.1). 
Can the CIA assumed to be fulfilled? It would obviously be naive to assume 
that all variables that simultaneously affect participation (the probability to be 
employed on a FTC) as well as wages (and subjective assessment of working 
conditions) are observed in the dataset, and could be included in the conditioning 
set. Variables which may be missing (unobserved) are ability and motivation. 
Furthermore, the workers’ attitudes towards risk may, according to the theoreti-
cal considerations, influence the acceptability of a FTC job. There is insufficient 
information available describing the hiring process, the firms’ decisions to use 
FTCs, and the workers’ decisions to accept FTCs. Therefore, it has to be as-
sumed, that the rich set of variables describing workers’ labour market history 
may serve as proxies for unobserved variables. For example, the dummy vari-
ables ‘ever changed occupation’ and ‘ever moved due to job-related reasons’ 
may  be  correlated  with  the  (unobserved)  attitude  towards  mobility  and  may 
therefore also include information on motivation. The same is obviously true for 
the number of previous employment and unemployment spells as well as the du-
ration of the last unemployment spell. Hence, the underlying untestable assump-
tion is again that by controlling for various employment history variables also 
selection on unobservables is balanced. Again,  ( ) ( ) 1 0 , 1 , 0 E U X C E U X C = = =  is 
assumed to hold.  
 
 
 
                                              
138 Choosing the bandwidth by leave-one-out validation (see Section 3.3.1) turns out be computationally 
infeasible since the optimal bandwidth has to be calculated at every bootstrapping draw and, hence, 
the number of simulations gets too large.   143 
5.6  Determinants of the Type of Contract: Estimation of the Propensity 
Score 
In this Subchapter, the determinants of holding a FTC are analysed by estimat-
ing probit models. In the subsequent section these estimated equations are used 
for predicting the propensity score for every worker. For the search of specifica-
tion the so-called balancing score property of the estimated propensity score is 
used. For this purpose, the proposition 
( ) i i i X C e X ^   if  ( ) i e X  is the propensity score,      (48) 
by ROSENBAUM and RUBIN (1983) is applied (see also DEHEJIA and WAHBA, 
1999). Conditional on the propensity score  ( ) e X , the conditioning variables X 
are independent of the type of contract C, implying that for individuals with the 
same propensity score (probability to hold a FTC), the distribution of X should be 
the same in the groups of treated and untreated individuals.  
As described by DEHEJIA and WAHBA (1999), proposition (48) can also be used 
before performing the actual matching to assess the balancing score property of 
the  estimated  propensity  score.  For  a  given  specification,  observations  are 
grouped into strata of the estimated propensity score. Within each stratum it is 
tested whether the average propensity scores of treated and controls differ. If 
there is a significant difference, the stratum is again split until there are no sig-
nificant differences left. Then t-tests on differences in the means of the covariates 
X are performed within each stratum. If there are significant differences between 
the groups, then higher-order terms and interaction terms of X variables are in-
cluded in the propensity score equation until there are no significant differences 
in the tests.  
The balancing score property turns out to be satisfied with a quite parsimonious 
specification,  that  is,  without  any  interaction  effects.  Hence,  a  more  flexible 
specification seems to be unnecessary. Note that this test does not reveal any-
thing about the validity of the CIA.  
In Section 5.6.1 the results of the propensity score equation for Model A (only 
pre-treatment variables), and in Section 5.6.2 for Model C (including also job and 
employer attributes) is presented. 
5.6.1  Model A: Using only Pre-Treatment Variables 
Table 26 depicts the estimation results of the probit models for the probability 
of holding a FTC for men, and Table 27 provides the results for women, both for 
the samples with tenure £10 years as well as the sample with tenure £2 years.139 
Furthermore, corresponding marginal effects are depicted.140  
                                              
139 Among others, a dummy variable indicating if the person has ever been self-employed (which may be 
a proxy for risk aversion), and a dummy indicating if the person was unemployed directly after voca-
tional training have been included but turned out to be statistically insignificant in all specifications. 
140 The calculation of marginal effects in the probit model is described in GREENE (2003: 668).    144 
Starting with the results for men in Table 26, it can be seen that in the sample 
with tenure £ 10 years, age is modelled as a set of dummy variables. The results 
for the age dummies confirm the result from the descriptive analysis in Subchap-
ter 2.3, that there is no clear-cut negative relationship between age and the prob-
ability of being employed on FTC. Since age specified as a polynomial of third 
degree leads to a better property of the estimated propensity score (in terms of the 
balancing property in Eq. (48)), only the polynomial specification is used in the 
following.  
In addition to the federal state dummies the unemployment rate of the federal 
state is included. The reason for including both is simply that, when it is not pos-
sible to  match individuals within the same  federal state, including the unem-
ployment rate ensures that individuals in different federal states but with similar 
unemployment rates have more similar predicted probabilities of holding a FTC 
(propensity scores). Note that the estimated negative coefficient of the federal 
state unemployment rate is the result of multicollinearity resulting from the low 
variation. If federal state dummies are excluded, the estimated coefficient of the 
unemployment rate becomes positive (see Table 69 in the Appendix), i.e., the 
higher the unemployment rate the higher the probability of being employed on 
FTC. Various theoretical explanations are available for this result (see also Sub-
chapter 4.2 and Section 6.3.5). One is that workers are more willing to accept 
FTCs in bad labour market conditions. A second one is that firms may prefer a 
low turnover strategy using permanent workers in regional labour markets with 
low unemployment rates as hiring costs increase with labour market tightness. 
As the unemployed job searchers’ determinants of entering into FTCs are dis-
cussed in greater in detail in Subchapter 6.3, only some of the results are briefly 
summarised. Among others, the following variables have a positive effect on the 
probability of being employed on FTC for male workers (Table 26):  
Having been unemployed in the year taking up the job increases the probability 
of holding a FTC. Furthermore, workers whose last job ended because of dis-
missal or end of FTC (instead of quit) have a higher probability of holding a 
FTC. These results indicate that workers with adverse signals or with adverse 
unobservable characteristics enter into FTC jobs with a higher probability. Being 
disabled increases the probability of holding a FTC for men in the sample with 
tenure £10 years, albeit the level of statistical significance is low. The incentive 
to hire disabled persons on FTCs is likely to be enforced by the special dismissal 
protection for these persons (see Subchapter 2.2). More results in line with this 
hypothesis are presented in Subchapter 6.3. 
In Table 27  it can be seen that many results are similar for women. Exceptions 
are the statistically insignificant coefficients for being disabled and for end of 
previous job due to dismissal. Furthermore, for women the probability of being 
employed on a FTC decreases, if the spouse is employed. A possible interpreta-
tion  stems  from  a  reservation  wage  argument:  If  a  woman  has  an  employed 
spouse, she can afford to search for a permanent job for a longer period of time.    145 
Table 26: Propensity Score – Men (Model A) 
Men  Tenure £ £ £ £10 years  tenure £ £ £ £2  years 
  Coeff.   t-stat  Marg. eff.  X   Coeff.   t-stat  Marg. eff.  X  
Age (years)          -0.605  -2.71  -0.151  33.98 
Age
2 / 1,000           16.423  2.66  4.095  1.222 
Age
3 / 100,000          -14.427  -2.62  -3.597  0.465 
Age group (reference: 21-23 years)                 
   24-26      -0.245  -1.86  -0.029  0.09         
   27-29      -0.316  -2.44  -0.036  0.12         
   30-32      -0.599  -4.35  -0.060  0.15         
   33-35      -0.644  -4.53  -0.064  0.15         
   36-38      -0.690  -4.50  -0.064  0.12         
   39-41      -0.571  -3.69  -0.055  0.10         
   42-45      -0.581  -3.66  -0.056  0.09         
   46-49      -0.586  -3.47  -0.055  0.06         
   50-53      -0.544  -2.92  -0.051  0.04         
   54-57      -0.816  -3.54  -0.062  0.02         
Qualification (reference: no formal qualification)                   
  Vocational training  -0.086  -0.89  -0.012  0.59  -0.119  -0.85  -0.030  0.53 
  Vocational college   0.280  1.72  0.046  0.03  0.363  1.56  0.105  0.03 
  Master craftsman  -0.180  -1.39  -0.022  0.11  -0.128  -0.72  -0.030  0.11 
  Polytechnic  -0.010  -0.06  -0.001  0.05  -0.068  -0.30  -0.016  0.06 
  University  0.200  1.47  0.031  0.07  0.161  0.84  0.043  0.09 
Children < 6   -0.300  -3.95  -0.037  0.25  -0.305  -2.78  -0.070  0.21 
Children 6– 17   0.074  0.99  0.010  0.26  0.042  0.37  0.010  0.23 
Foreigner  0.167  1.72  0.025  0.09  0.026  0.19  0.007  0.10 
Disabled  0.257  1.71  0.042  0.03  0.132  0.59  0.035  0.03 
Spouse employed  -0.056  -0.86  -0.007  0.29  0.077  0.80  0.019  0.25 
Employment history                 
   Ever changed occupation  0.134  2.14  0.019  0.37  0.241  2.76  0.061  0.42 
   Ever moved due to job-related reasons  -0.017  -0.25  -0.002  0.25  -0.027  -0.28  -0.007  0.26 
   Two employers so far  0.021  0.21  0.003  0.25  -0.329  -2.05  -0.075  0.21 
   Three employers so far  0.016  0.14  0.002  0.22  -0.270  -1.58  -0.062  0.22 
   Four employers so far  0.096  0.79  0.014  0.14  -0.039  -0.21  -0.010  0.14 
   Five or more employers so far  0.169  1.42  0.025  0.23  -0.128  -0.72  -0.031  0.32 
   Previous job: dismissed  0.258  2.92  0.041  0.11  0.048  0.40  0.012  0.17 
   Previous job: end of FTC  0.511  5.14  0.095  0.06  0.546  4.04  0.164  0.09 
   Previous job: closure of a firm  0.083  0.83  0.012  0.10  0.001  0.01  0.000  0.11   146 
Table 26 continued... 
Men  Tenure £ £ £ £10 years  Tenure £ £ £ £2 years 
  Coeff.   t-stat  Marg. eff.  X   Coeff.   t-stat  Marg. eff.  X  
   Once unemployed so far  -0.046  -0.56  -0.006  0.24  -0.069  -0.59  -0.017  0.29 
   Twice unemployed so far  0.064  0.58  0.009  0.09  -0.035  -0.23  -0.009  0.12 
   Three times unemployed so far  -0.047  -0.32  -0.006  0.04  -0.015  -0.08  -0.004  0.06 
   Four or more times unemployed so far  0.395  2.94  0.069  0.04  0.302  1.67  0.084  0.07 
   Duration of previous unemployment spell in months  0.002  0.77  0.000  3.29  0.003  0.69  0.001  4.32 
   Unemployed in the year taking up the job   0.265  3.30  0.041  0.17  0.387  3.60  0.105  0.27 
Regional (place of residence) variables                 
  log unemployment rate of the federal state  -0.738  -1.61  -0.101  2.34  -0.791  -1.19  -0.197  2.35 
  Hamburg  0.089  0.44  0.013  0.02  -0.105  -0.34  -0.025  0.02 
  Lower Saxony  0.279  2.09  0.044  0.12  0.246  1.20  0.067  0.12 
  Bremen  0.487  2.12  0.092  0.02  0.459  1.52  0.138  0.02 
  North Rhine-Westphalia  -0.073  -0.54  -0.010  0.28  -0.099  -0.47  -0.024  0.29 
  Hesse  -0.150  -0.77  -0.019  0.09  -0.154  -0.51  -0.036  0.09 
  Rhineland-Palatinate  -0.413  -1.74  -0.043  0.05  -0.366  -1.02  -0.077  0.04 
  Baden-Wuerttemberg  -0.439  -1.61  -0.048  0.15  -0.500  -1.21  -0.104  0.15 
  Bavaria  -0.415  -1.56  -0.047  0.17  -0.453  -1.12  -0.097  0.17 
  Saarland  0.012  0.04  0.002  0.01  -0.248  -0.54  -0.055  0.01 
  City (more than 50.000 inhabitants)  0.085  1.25  0.012  0.49  0.198  1.98  0.049  0.52 
  Surrounding area  -0.192  -2.01  -0.024  0.15  -0.050  -0.37  -0.012  0.14 
Field of occupational qualification                 
   Training in farming occupation   -0.283  -1.01  -0.031  0.01  -0.234  -0.60  -0.052  0.01 
   Training in industry occupation   -0.141  -1.86  -0.019  0.45  -0.020  -0.17  -0.005  0.41 
   Training in health occupation   0.294  1.21  0.049  0.01  -0.090  -0.24  -0.022  0.01 
   Training in technical occupation   -0.031  -0.29  -0.004  0.12  -0.003  -0.02  -0.001  0.12 
Constant  0.838  0.70      8.170  2.63     
Log-Likelihood  -1207.2603  -622.56071 
Likelihood ratio test (p-value)  c
2 (51)   = 240.43 (0.0000)  c
2 (44)  = 125.08 (0.0000) 
No. of observations   4,435  1,421 
Notes: The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of continuous variables and for discrete changes of dummy variables from 0 to 1. 
Base category: 21-23 years old (specification with tenure £10 years), no formal qualification, no children, German nationality, not disabled, 
spouse not employed, never changed occupation, never moved due to job-related reasons, only one employer so far, quit previous job, never 
unemployed so far, not unemployed in the year taking up the job, living in West Berlin or Schleswig-Holstein, living in a rural area, field of occu-
pational qualification: no occupational qualification or occupational qualification in the service sector. 
Source: Own estimations based on the BIBB/IAB dataset 1998/99.     147 
Table 27: Propensity Score – Women (Model A) 
Women  Tenure £ £ £ £10 years  Tenure £ £ £ £2 years 
  Coeff.   t-stat  Marg. eff.  X   Coeff.   t-stat  Marg. eff.  X  
Age (years)          -0.187  -0.72  -0.048  34.86 
Age
2 / 1,000           5.850  0.81  1.497  1.29 
Age
3 / 100,000          -6.003  -0.92  -1.536  0.51 
Age group (reference: 21-23 years)                 
   24-26      -0.181  -1.35  -0.024  0.10         
   27-29      -0.252  -1.86  -0.032  0.11         
   30-32      -0.428  -2.93  -0.050  0.12         
   33-35      -0.306  -2.06  -0.038  0.11         
   36-38      -0.403  -2.55  -0.047  0.11         
   39-41      -0.426  -2.64  -0.049  0.10         
   42-45      -0.486  -3.02  -0.054  0.10         
   46-49      -0.535  -3.26  -0.057  0.09         
   50-53      -0.573  -3.08  -0.058  0.06         
   54-57      -0.706  -3.04  -0.064  0.03         
Qualification (reference: no formal qualification)                   
  Vocational training  -0.312  -3.74  -0.050  0.67  -0.216  -1.76  -0.056  0.61 
  Vocational college   -0.073  -0.46  -0.010  0.04  0.044  0.21  0.012  0.05 
  Master craftsman  -0.517  -3.05  -0.055  0.06  -0.262  -1.10  -0.060  0.05 
  Polytechnic  -0.436  -1.96  -0.048  0.03  -0.782  -2.04  -0.134  0.02 
  University  0.217  1.43  0.037  0.04  0.177  0.83  0.049  0.06 
Children < 6   -0.020  -0.22  -0.003  0.16  0.089  0.71  0.023  0.18 
Children 6– 17   0.104  1.28  0.016  0.33  0.008  0.07  0.002  0.35 
Foreigner  0.022  0.16  0.003  0.05  -0.011  -0.06  -0.003  0.07 
Disabled  0.072  0.28  0.011  0.02  0.340  0.91  0.100  0.01 
Spouse employed  -0.116  -1.77  -0.017  0.55  -0.161  -1.65  -0.041  0.49 
Employment history                 
   Ever changed occupation  -0.027  -0.39  -0.004  0.34  -0.066  -0.67  -0.017  0.40 
   Ever moved due to job-related reasons  0.102  1.25  0.016  0.17  0.005  0.04  0.001  0.20 
   Two employers so far  -0.135  -1.35  -0.019  0.27  -0.433  -2.74  -0.099  0.25 
   Three employers so far  -0.164  -1.46  -0.023  0.21  -0.586  -3.38  -0.126  0.21 
   Four employers so far  -0.220  -1.70  -0.029  0.14  -0.455  -2.43  -0.100  0.16 
   Five or more employers so far  0.142  1.15  0.022  0.19  -0.168  -0.93  -0.041  0.26 
   Previous job: dismissed  -0.032  -0.29  -0.005  0.09  -0.154  -1.04  -0.037  0.13 
   Previous job: end of FTC  0.440  3.65  0.084  0.05  0.415  2.45  0.123  0.07 
   Previous job: closure of a firm  0.006  0.05  0.001  0.07  0.112  0.62  0.030  0.08   148 
Table 27 continued...  
Women  Tenure £ £ £ £10 years  Tenure £ £ £ £2 years 
  Coeff.   t-stat  Marg. eff.  X   Coeff.   t-stat  Marg. eff.  X  
   Once unemployed so far  -0.001  -0.01  0.000  0.26  -0.085  -0.67  -0.021  0.30 
   Twice unemployed so far  0.142  1.13  0.023  0.08  0.040  0.24  0.010  0.12 
   Three times unemployed so far  0.088  0.50  0.014  0.03  -0.167  -0.71  -0.040  0.05 
   Four or more times unemployed so far  0.202  0.90  0.034  0.02  0.125  0.45  0.034  0.03 
   Duration of previous unemployment spell in months  0.009  3.65  0.001  3.93  0.004  1.14  0.001  5.15 
   Unemployed in the year taking up the job   0.140  1.44  0.022  0.14  0.295  2.24  0.082  0.21 
Regional (place of residence) variables                 
  log unemployment rate of the federal state  -1.121  -2.50  -0.165  2.34  -1.874  -2.48  -0.480  2.33 
  Hamburg  -0.395  -2.00  -0.045  0.04  -0.278  -0.94  -0.063  0.04 
  Lower Saxony  0.104  0.81  0.016  0.12  -0.012  -0.05  -0.003  0.11 
  Bremen  0.413  1.66  0.079  0.02  0.377  0.98  0.112  0.02 
  North Rhine-Westphalia  -0.315  -2.45  -0.042  0.26  -0.336  -1.49  -0.080  0.28 
  Hesse  -0.650  -3.34  -0.065  0.09  -0.792  -2.38  -0.142  0.08 
  Rhineland-Palatinate  -0.791  -3.22  -0.069  0.04  -0.825  -2.10  -0.140  0.04 
  Baden-Wuerttemberg  -0.860  -3.34  -0.085  0.16  -1.164  -2.59  -0.198  0.16 
  Bavaria  -0.973  -3.87  -0.095  0.18  -1.266  -2.88  -0.218  0.19 
  Saarland  -0.512  -1.57  -0.052  0.01  -0.803  -1.60  -0.134  0.01 
  City (more than 50.000 inhabitants)  -0.115  -1.53  -0.017  0.49  -0.102  -0.91  -0.026  0.50 
  Surrounding area  -0.143  -1.48  -0.020  0.15  -0.079  -0.55  -0.020  0.15 
Field of occupational qualification                 
   Training in farming occupation   0.224  0.95  0.038  0.01  0.320  0.86  0.094  0.01 
   Training in industry occupation   0.234  2.13  0.039  0.08  0.359  2.26  0.104  0.09 
   Training in health occupation   -0.068  -0.63  -0.010  0.10  -0.068  -0.41  -0.017  0.09 
   Training in technical occupation   -0.205  -1.05  -0.026  0.03  -0.332  -1.17  -0.073  0.04 
Constant  2.382  2.05      6.609  1.89     
Log-Likelihood  -1032.6939  -514.39375 
Likelihood ratio test (p-value)  c
2 (51) =197.39 (0.0000)  c
2 (44)   =  86.73 (0.0000) 
No. of observations   3,589  1,140 
Notes and Source: See Table 26.   149 
5.6.2  Model C: Accounting for Job and Employer Attributes  
 
Table 28 and Table 29 depict the estimated coefficients of the determinants of 
holding a FTC using job and employer attributes as additional explanatory vari-
ables. The following additional results are of interest. The worker assessment of 
a good or very good business situation of the establishment reduces the probabil-
ity of being on FTC for men and women. This is well in line with the theoretical 
and empirical findings of Chapter 4 that an employer hesitates to hire a person on 
a permanent contract, if the job is likely to be destroyed in the near future.  
Male workers in job positions with simple tasks (labourer or blue-collar worker 
with simple tasks) have a higher probability of holding FTCs. This result may be 
explained by lower on-the-job training requirements in these job positions. Only 
for women there seems to be a positive relationship between the establishment 
size and the probability of holding a FTC. A positive relationship may be ex-
plained  by  institutional  firing  costs  (due  to  dismissal  protection  or  co-
determination rights) increasing with establishment size.    
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Table 28: Propensity Score – Men (Model C) 
Men  Tenure £ £ £ £10 years  Tenure £ £ £ £2  years 
  Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X   Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X  
Age (years)  -0.636  -4.00  -0.08  35.07  -0.557  -2.41  -0.13  33.98 
Age
2 / 1,000   14.693  3.58  1.89  1.29  14.82  2.38  3.52  1.22 
Age
3 / 100,000  -11.823  -3.26  -1.52  0.50  -13.04  -2.37  -3.10  0.47 
Qualification (Reference: no formal qualification)                   
  Vocational training  0.155  1.44  0.02  0.59  0.119  0.75  0.03  0.53 
  Vocational college   0.558  3.27  0.10  0.03  0.625  2.52  0.19  0.03 
  Master craftsman  0.142  0.97  0.02  0.11  0.136  0.66  0.03  0.11 
  Polytechnic  0.338  1.89  0.05  0.05  0.272  1.10  0.07  0.06 
  University  0.604  3.87  0.11  0.07  0.543  2.47  0.16  0.09 
Children < 6   -0.289  -3.73  -0.03  0.25  -0.294  -2.61  -0.06  0.21 
Children 6– 17   0.060  0.78  0.01  0.26  0.004  0.04  0.00  0.23 
Foreigner  0.113  1.15  0.02  0.09  -0.007  -0.05  0.00  0.10 
Disabled  0.269  1.75  0.04  0.03  0.197  0.85  0.05  0.03 
Spouse employed  -0.012  -0.17  0.00  0.29  0.132  1.32  0.03  0.25 
Employment history                 
   Ever changed occupation  0.063  0.95  0.01  0.37  0.129  1.37  0.03  0.42 
   Ever moved due to job-related reasons  -0.002  -0.03  0.00  0.25  -0.006  -0.06  0.00  0.26 
   Two employers so far  0.083  0.80  0.01  0.25  -0.328  -1.99  -0.07  0.21 
   Three employers so far  0.085  0.74  0.01  0.22  -0.259  -1.47  -0.06  0.22 
   Four employers so far  0.176  1.39  0.02  0.14  -0.011  -0.06  0.00  0.14 
   Five or more employers so far  0.236  1.91  0.03  0.23  -0.126  -0.68  -0.03  0.32 
   Previous job: dismissed  0.237  2.62  0.03  0.11  0.038  0.31  0.01  0.17 
   Previous job: end of FTC  0.474  4.65  0.08  0.06  0.515  3.68  0.15  0.09 
   Previous job: closure of a firm  0.074  0.72  0.01  0.10  -0.014  -0.09  0.00  0.11 
   Once unemployed so far  -0.047  -0.56  -0.01  0.24  -0.042  -0.34  -0.01  0.29 
   Twice unemployed so far  0.089  0.79  0.01  0.09  0.019  0.13  0.00  0.12 
   Three times unemployed so far  -0.040  -0.27  0.00  0.04  -0.037  -0.18  -0.01  0.06 
   Four or more times unemployed so far  0.405  2.94  0.07  0.04  0.240  1.29  0.06  0.07 
   Duration of previous unemployment spell in months  0.001  0.22  0.00  3.29  0.001  0.17  0.00  4.32 
   Unemployed in the year taking up the job   0.234  2.86  0.03  0.17  0.348  3.12  0.09  0.27 
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Table 28 continued... 
Men  Tenure £ £ £ £10  years  Tenure £ £ £ £2 years 
  Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X   Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X  
Regional (place of residence) variables                 
  log unemployment rate of the federal state  -0.855  -1.81  -0.11  2.34  -0.911  -1.35  -0.21  2.35 
  Hamburg  0.133  0.64  0.02  0.02  -0.153  -0.48  -0.03  0.02 
  Lower Saxony  0.278  2.03  0.04  0.12  0.148  0.69  0.04  0.12 
  Bremen  0.469  1.99  0.08  0.02  0.376  1.22  0.10  0.02 
  North Rhine-Westphalia  -0.083  -0.60  -0.01  0.28  -0.189  -0.88  -0.04  0.29 
  Hesse  -0.179  -0.88  -0.02  0.09  -0.261  -0.85  -0.05  0.09 
  Rhineland-Palatinate  -0.436  -1.78  -0.04  0.05  -0.459  -1.24  -0.09  0.04 
  Baden-Wuerttemberg  -0.523  -1.85  -0.05  0.15  -0.642  -1.50  -0.12  0.15 
  Bavaria  -0.473  -1.73  -0.05  0.17  -0.616  -1.48  -0.12  0.17 
  Saarland  -0.048  -0.16  -0.01  0.01  -0.428  -0.89  -0.08  0.01 
  City (more than 50.000 inhabitants)  0.116  1.64  0.01  0.49  0.217  2.07  0.05  0.52 
  Surrounding area  -0.164  -1.67  -0.02  0.15  -0.035  -0.25  -0.01  0.14 
Field of occupational qualification                 
  Professional Training in Farming occupation   -0.438  -1.50  -0.04  0.01  -0.469  -1.13  -0.09  0.01 
  Professional Training in industry occupation   -0.232  -2.62  -0.03  0.45  -0.217  -1.62  -0.05  0.41 
  Professional Training in health occupation   0.040  0.14  0.01  0.01  -0.340  -0.78  -0.07  0.01 
  Professional Training in technical occupation  -0.061  -0.54  -0.01  0.12  -0.051  -0.32  -0.01  0.12 
Job Position (reference labourer)                 
  craftsman   -0.222  -2.44  -0.03  0.26  -0.090  -0.68  -0.02  0.22 
  foreman   -0.763  -2.88  -0.06  0.03  -0.697  -1.72  -0.11  0.02 
  blue-collar  master craftsman   -0.381  -1.04  -0.04  0.01  -0.295  -0.63  -0.06  0.01 
  white-collar  master craftsman  -0.313  -1.03  -0.03  0.01  -0.053  -0.13  -0.01  0.01 
  blue-collar worker with simple tasks  0.247  1.62  0.04  0.03  -0.576  -2.20  -0.10  0.03 
  blue-collar worker with difficult tasks  -0.029  -0.23  0.00  0.05  -0.089  -0.47  -0.02  0.06 
  blue-collar worker working autonomously    -0.527  -4.54  -0.05  0.14  -0.616  -3.71  -0.11  0.14 
  blue-collar worker with executive functions   -0.551  -4.88  -0.05  0.19  -0.729  -4.52  -0.14  0.20 
 
 
 
   152 
Table 28 continued... 
Men  Tenure £ £ £ £10 years  Tenure £ £ £ £2 years 
  Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X   Coef  t-value  M.E.  X  
Industrial sector (Reference: other services)                  
  Craft   -0.213  -2.59  -0.03  0.28  -0.296  -2.48  -0.07  0.29 
  Trade  -0.177  -1.92  -0.02  0.15  -0.041  -0.32  -0.01  0.16 
  Media   0.189  0.65  0.03  0.01  0.351  0.87  0.10  0.01 
  Logistic   -0.243  -1.47  -0.03  0.03  -0.351  -1.53  -0.07  0.04 
  Telecommunication  -0.205  -0.61  -0.02  0.01  -0.065  -0.16  -0.01  0.01 
  Financial intermediation   -0.056  -0.30  -0.01  0.03  -0.219  -0.71  -0.05  0.03 
  Health and social work   0.321  1.33  0.05  0.01  0.450  1.39  0.13  0.02 
  Electricity, gas and water supply   0.281  0.68  0.04  0.00  1.353  1.53  0.48  0.00 
Establishment size (Reference: 1-4 employees)                 
  5-9     employees   -0.002  -0.02  0.00  0.13  -0.055  -0.32  -0.01  0.16 
  10-49 employees  -0.148  -1.37  -0.02  0.30  -0.054  -0.36  -0.01  0.31 
  50-99 employees  0.060  0.49  0.01  0.12  0.165  0.95  0.04  0.12 
  100-499 employees  -0.201  -1.67  -0.02  0.19  -0.028  -0.16  -0.01  0.16 
  500-999 employees  -0.080  -0.52  -0.01  0.06  0.153  0.69  0.04  0.05 
  ³ 1000 employees  0.063  0.48  0.01  0.11  0.318  1.67  0.08  0.09 
Business situation of the establishment is good or very good  -0.156  -2.36  -0.02  0.76  -0.174  -1.77  -0.04  0.75 
Constant   9.340  4.15      8.320  2.60     
Log-Likelihood  -1171.5664  -594.14334 
Likelihood ratio test (p-value)  c
2 (59)   = 311.82  c
2 (59)   = 181.91 
No. of observations   4,435  1,421 
Notes: The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of continuous variables and for discrete changes of dummy variables from 0 to 1. 
Base category: 21-23 years old (specification with tenure £10 years), no formal qualification, no children, German nationality, not disabled, 
spouse not employed, never changed occupation, never moved due to job-related reasons, only one employer so far, quit previous job, never 
unemployed so far, not unemployed in the year taking up the job, living in West Berlin or Schleswig-Holstein, living in a rural area, field of occu-
pational qualification: no occupational qualification or occupational qualification in the service sector, Job position: labourer, industrial sector: 
other services, establishment size: 1-4 employees.  
Source: Own estimations based on the BIBB/IAB dataset 1998/99. 
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Table 29: Propensity Score – Women (Model C) 
Women  Tenure £ £ £ £10 years  Tenure £ £ £ £2 years 
  Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X   Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X  
Age (years)  -0.193  -1.18  -0.03  35.90  -0.102  -0.38  -0.03  34.86 
Age
2 / 1,000   4.321  0.97  0.62  1.37  4.193  0.47  1.05  1.29 
Age
3 / 100,000  -3.442  -0.86  -0.50  0.55  -4.578  -0.60  -1.15  0.51 
Qualification (Reference: no formal qualification)                   
  Vocational training  -0.229  -2.47  -0.03  0.67  -0.170  -1.24  -0.04  0.61 
  Vocational college   0.014  0.08  0.00  0.04  0.096  0.42  0.02  0.05 
  Master craftsman  -0.385  -2.13  -0.04  0.06  -0.198  -0.77  -0.04  0.05 
  Polytechnic  -0.264  -1.12  -0.03  0.03  -0.717  -1.74  -0.12  0.02 
  University  0.474  2.84  0.09  0.04  0.320  1.33  0.09  0.06 
Children < 6   0.007  0.07  0.00  0.16  0.117  0.90  0.03  0.18 
Children 6– 17   0.100  1.25  0.01  0.33  0.024  0.20  0.01  0.35 
Foreigner  0.003  0.02  0.00  0.05  -0.046  -0.24  -0.01  0.07 
Disabled  0.067  0.26  0.01  0.02  0.413  1.08  0.12  0.01 
Spouse employed  -0.123  -1.86  -0.02  0.55  -0.198  -1.98  -0.05  0.49 
Employment history                 
  Ever changed occupation?  -0.053  -0.74  -0.01  0.34  -0.067  -0.65  -0.02  0.40 
  Ever moved due to job-related reasons?  0.120  1.43  0.02  0.17  -0.006  -0.05  0.00  0.20 
  Two employers so far  -0.149  -1.47  -0.02  0.27  -0.502  -3.08  -0.11  0.25 
  Three employers so far  -0.163  -1.42  -0.02  0.21  -0.643  -3.62  -0.13  0.21 
  Four employers so far  -0.189  -1.44  -0.02  0.14  -0.470  -2.44  -0.10  0.16 
  Five or more employers so far  0.158  1.27  0.02  0.19  -0.254  -1.37  -0.06  0.26 
  Previous Job: Dismissed  -0.011  -0.10  0.00  0.09  -0.122  -0.79  -0.03  0.13 
  Previous Job: End of FTC  0.443  3.63  0.08  0.05  0.480  2.76  0.14  0.07 
  Previous Job: Closure of a firm  -0.006  -0.05  0.00  0.07  0.101  0.54  0.03  0.08 
  Once unemployed so far  -0.035  -0.39  0.00  0.26  -0.089  -0.69  -0.02  0.30 
  Twice unemployed so far  0.104  0.82  0.02  0.08  0.037  0.22  0.01  0.12 
  Three times unemployed so far  0.055  0.31  0.01  0.03  -0.141  -0.58  -0.03  0.05 
  Four or more times unemployed so far  0.120  0.53  0.02  0.02  0.049  0.17  0.01  0.03 
  Duration of last unemployment spell in months  0.009  3.83  0.00  3.93  0.005  1.38  0.00  5.15 
  Unemployed in the year taking up the job   0.132  1.33  0.02  0.14  0.252  1.86  0.07  0.21 
 
   154 
Table 29 continued... 
Women  Tenure £ £ £ £10 years  Tenure £ £ £ £2 years 
  Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X   Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X  
Regional (place of residence) variables                 
  log unemployment rate of the federal state  -1.219  -2.67  -0.17  2.34  -2.020  -2.63  -0.50  2.33 
  Hamburg  -0.330  -1.65  -0.04  0.04  -0.057  -0.19  -0.01  0.04 
  Lower Saxony  0.138  1.05  0.02  0.12  0.122  0.51  0.03  0.11 
  Bremen  0.476  1.87  0.09  0.02  0.497  1.26  0.15  0.02 
  North Rhine-Westphalia  -0.277  -2.12  -0.04  0.26  -0.212  -0.91  -0.05  0.28 
  Hesse  -0.627  -3.17  -0.06  0.09  -0.737  -2.14  -0.13  0.08 
  Rhineland-Palatinate  -0.771  -3.08  -0.06  0.04  -0.800  -1.98  -0.13  0.04 
  Baden-Wuerttemberg  -0.886  -3.38  -0.08  0.16  -1.110  -2.42  -0.18  0.16 
  Bavaria  -0.988  -3.85  -0.09  0.18  -1.258  -2.80  -0.21  0.19 
  Saarland  -0.497  -1.49  -0.05  0.01  -0.647  -1.26  -0.11  0.01 
  City (more than 50.000 inhabitants)  -0.127  -1.66  -0.02  0.49  -0.110  -0.95  -0.03  0.50 
  Surrounding area  -0.127  -1.29  -0.02  0.15  -0.029  -0.19  -0.01  0.15 
Field of occupational qualification                  
  Training in farming occupation   0.253  1.04  0.04  0.01  0.334  0.87  0.10  0.01 
  Training in industry occupation   0.260  2.24  0.04  0.08  0.411  2.45  0.12  0.09 
  Training in health occupation   -0.024  -0.18  0.00  0.10  -0.156  -0.79  -0.04  0.09 
   Training in technical occupation  -0.206  -1.03  -0.03  0.03  -0.359  -1.22  -0.07  0.04 
Job Position (reference labourer)                 
  Craftsman   -0.186  -0.98  -0.02  0.04  0.002  0.01  0.00  0.03 
  Blue-collar worker with simple tasks  0.107  0.85  0.02  0.09  -0.023  -0.12  -0.01  0.08 
  Blue-collar worker with difficult tasks  -0.007  -0.07  0.00  0.24  -0.058  -0.39  -0.01  0.24 
  Blue-collar worker working autonomously    -0.116  -1.07  -0.02  0.27  -0.053  -0.34  -0.01  0.27 
  Blue-collar worker with executive functions   -0.377  -2.85  -0.04  0.15  -0.258  -1.37  -0.06  0.14 
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Table 29 continued... 
Women  Tenure £ £ £ £10 years  Tenure £ £ £ £2 years 
  Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X   Coeff.  t-stat  Marg. eff.  X  
Industrial sector (Reference: other services)                  
  Craft   -0.030  -0.26  0.00  0.12  -0.015  -0.09  0.00  0.12 
  Trade  0.109  1.37  0.02  0.34  0.224  1.89  0.06  0.33 
  Media   -0.226  -0.77  -0.03  0.01  -0.462  -0.98  -0.09  0.02 
  Logistic   -0.013  -0.05  0.00  0.02  -0.043  -0.12  -0.01  0.02 
  Financial intermediation   -0.228  -1.14  -0.03  0.04  -0.266  -0.80  -0.06  0.03 
  Health and social work   0.034  0.25  0.00  0.11  0.297  1.59  0.08  0.10 
Establishment size (Reference: 1-4 employees)                 
  5-9     employees   0.102  1.00  0.01  0.21  0.203  1.40  0.05  0.21 
  10-49 employees  0.114  1.19  0.02  0.28  0.135  0.98  0.03  0.28 
  50-99 employees  0.222  1.75  0.04  0.09  0.290  1.60  0.08  0.09 
  100-499 employees  0.331  3.02  0.06  0.13  0.654  3.99  0.20  0.11 
  500-999 employees  0.613  3.64  0.13  0.03  0.926  3.38  0.31  0.03 
  ³ 1000 employees  0.154  0.94  0.02  0.05  0.635  2.48  0.20  0.04 
Business situation of the establishment is good or very good  -0.188  -2.71  -0.03  0.74  -0.277  -2.76  -0.07  0.68 
Constant   5.084  2.27      5.827  1.63     
Log-Likelihood  -1026.2121  -501.64542 
Likelihood ratio test (p-value)  c
2 (54)   = 210.36  c
2 (54)   = 112.22 
No. of observations   3,589  1,140 
Notes and Source: See Table 28.   156 
5.7  Effects of Fixed-Term Contracts: Results of the Matching Estimator  
In this subchapter, the estimated effects of FTCs are presented. First of all, in 
the next section evidence on the performance of different matching estimators 
with respect to their ability to balance differences in the conditioning variables 
are presented. 
5.7.1  Choice of the Matching Estimator and Checks on the Balancing 
Property 
As mentioned in Subchapter 5.5, three different matching estimators are com-
pared.141 The estimations are separately performed by sex and for different parts 
of the job tenure distribution, which is truncated from the right as described in 
Subchapter 5.5. Only Model A is used. The NN-matching approach is performed 
imposing a caliper (set to 0.001) which leads to a substantial loss of treated indi-
viduals (FTC workers).142  
As mentioned in Subchapter 3.5, a useful check on the matching quality is to 
test whether there  are any significant differences in the outcome  variables of 
treated and control group before the treatment (pre-program test). Since the data-
set consists only of one cross-section, no information on the outcome variables 
before the treatment is available. A possibility to obtain insights into the per-
formance of different matching estimators with respect to their ability to balance 
differences in the conditioning variables, is to compare the (unweighted) means 
of the standardised differences of all conditioning variables (see, for example, 
HUJER, CALIENDO, and THOMSEN, 2003).143 Note again that this is not a test on 
the validity of the CIA, but on the balancing property of the propensity score as 
presented in Eq. (48) above. 
The first and most important result of this exercise is that kernel-based match-
ing outperforms both the other approaches in terms of the mean standardised dif-
ferences (see Table 30 and Table 31).144 Altogether, the better matching quality 
of the kernel-based matching estimator is quite convincing. The bad performance 
of the NN-matching estimator (which has the worst performance in the sample 
for men) may be explained by the fact that there are not many untreated individu-
                                              
141 As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, all those matching estimators produce asymptotically the same esti-
mate (see BLACK and SMITH, 2003).  
142 Otherwise the performance is relatively poor.  
143 The standardised difference of a variable x is defined as 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 , x Var x Var x x - +  
  with Var1 and Var0 denoting the variance of x in the treated (1) and untreated (0) subsamples. The 
unweighted mean of the standardised difference is the average over the standardised differences of all 
conditioning variables X.  
144 Advice on the choice of the matching estimator can be found in FRÖLICH (2004) as well as BLACK 
and SMITH (2003).    157 
als  (relative  to  treated)  implying  that  often  no  sufficiently  similar  nearest 
neighbour is available. This is confirmed when looking at the effect of the trunca-
tion of the sample with respect to tenure (from tenure £10 to tenure £2 years): 
With increasing N1/N0 also the bias (mean standardised difference) increases. The 
fact that NN-matching with replacement is performed can be seen from the num-
ber of control persons NC in the tables: there are less control persons than treated 
persons resulting from control persons being used more than once. Given these 
findings, only the kernel-based matching estimator is applied for the analysis.  
The detailed findings on the balancing property of the kernel-based matching 
estimator  (Model  A)  are  presented  in  Table  32  for  men  and  in  Table  33  for 
women. For most variables the standardised difference is strongly reduced in the 
matched samples.   
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Table 30: Matching Quality (Unweighted Mean of Standardised Differences) – Men (Model A) 
  Before Matching  After Matching 
        NN-Matching (with caliper)  Kernel Matching  Local linear regression matching 
Tenure (years)  N1  N0  Mean std. 
diff. % 
NT  NC  Mean std. 
diff. % 
NT  NC  Mean std. 
diff. % 
NT  NC  Mean std. 
diff. % 
 Unrestricted  526  8,051  54.00  474  433  10.10  523  8,051  2.52  523  8,051  6.28 
   £ 10  453  4,457  26.43  407  357  4.23  451  4,457  3.40  451  4,457  5.11 
   £  8   433  3,663  21.20  389  345  9.95  431  3,663  1.83  431  3,663  7.41 
   £  6  409  2,886  20.06  364  321  8.38  408  2,886  2.26  408  2,886  9.14 
   £  4  362  2,130  19.89  305  265  15.03  359  2,130  2.23  359  2,130  13.32 
   £  2  294  1,245  17.32  207  176  11.05  291  1,245  2.04  291  1,245  5.32 
 
Table 31: Matching Quality (Unweighted Mean of Standardised Differences) – Women (Model A) 
  Before Matching        After Matching       
        NN-Matching (with caliper)  Kernel Matching  Local linear regression matching 
Tenure (years)  N1  N0  Mean std. 
diff. % 
NT  NC  Mean std. 
diff. % 
NT  NC  Mean std. 
diff. % 
NT  NC  Mean std. 
diff. % 
 Unrestricted  443  5,789  52.15  401  369  13.66  441  5,789  3.31  441  5,789  13.07 
   £ 10  392  3,776  38.83  353  319  8.73  390  3,776  5.44  390  3,776  14.80 
   £  8   368  3,169  35.56  333  296  3.60  366  3,169  3.01  366  3,169  5.49 
   £  6  338  2,548  33.03  286  251  6.33  336  2,548  4.73  336  2,548  15.60 
   £  4  301  1,870  31.15  246  224  11.96  299  1,870  1.24  299  1,870  13.98 
   £  2  238  1,053  21.66  171  147  10.29  238  1,053  2.37  238  1,053  6.33 
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Table 32: Means of Important Conditioning Variables (X) Before and After Kernel-Based Matching – Men (Model A) 
  Tenure £ £ £ £ 10  years  Tenure £ £ £ £ 2  years 
  Before Matching  After Matching  Before Matching  After Matching 
Variable  Treated  Un-
treated 
std.         
diff. % 
Treated  Controls  std.         
diff. % 
Treated  Un-
treated 
std.      
diff. % 
Treated  Controls  std.     
diff. % 
Age  34.038  35.169  13.4  34.090  34.054  0.4  34.045  33.966  0.9  34.038  33.907  1.6 
Vocational training  0.524  0.593  13.9  0.528  0.531  0.7  0.485  0.545  11.9  0.489  0.489  0.1 
Vocational college   0.051  0.028  11.8  0.049  0.047  0.8  0.060  0.027  16.4  0.053  0.057  2.0 
Master craftsman  0.076  0.110  11.5  0.077  0.077  0.1  0.094  0.112  5.8  0.095  0.098  1.2 
Polytechnic  0.041  0.051  5.0  0.041  0.039  0.9  0.049  0.063  6.2  0.049  0.044  2.2 
University  0.087  0.074  4.7  0.087  0.089  0.5  0.090  0.086  1.6  0.091  0.103  4.2 
Children < 6  0.155  0.254  24.7  0.156  0.157  0.2  0.154  0.229  19.0  0.155  0.157  0.5 
Children 6-17   0.247  0.258  2.5  0.249  0.240  2.0  0.248  0.226  5.2  0.246  0.231  3.6 
Foreigner  0.117  0.083  11.5  0.118  0.122  1.5  0.109  0.098  3.7  0.110  0.112  0.7 
Disabled  0.043  0.026  9.2  0.044  0.045  0.6  0.041  0.027  8.0  0.042  0.049  4.1 
Spouse employed  0.260  0.297  8.3  0.262  0.260  0.2  0.263  0.250  3.0  0.265  0.245  4.6 
Ever changed occupation  0.438  0.358  16.3  0.436  0.434  0.4  0.511  0.397  23.2  0.508  0.525  3.6 
Ever moved due to job-related reasons  0.252  0.249  0.6  0.251  0.251  0.1  0.259  0.261  0.5  0.261  0.270  2.0 
Two employers so far  0.206  0.250  10.4  0.208  0.217  2.1  0.154  0.227  18.6  0.155  0.162  1.7 
Three employers so far  0.183  0.221  9.5  0.185  0.188  0.7  0.169  0.228  14.7  0.170  0.182  2.9 
Four employers so far  0.135  0.139  1.1  0.136  0.137  0.2  0.158  0.137  5.9  0.159  0.148  3.3 
Five or more employers so far  0.310  0.217  21.2  0.305  0.291  3.2  0.395  0.303  19.3  0.390  0.379  2.4 
Previous job: dismissed  0.168  0.103  19.0  0.169  0.170  0.3  0.180  0.162  4.9  0.182  0.174  2.0 
Previous job: end of FTC  0.150  0.055  31.6  0.144  0.139  1.4  0.177  0.070  32.8  0.170  0.172  0.4 
Previous job: closure of a firm  0.104  0.098  2.0  0.105  0.107  0.5  0.113  0.113  0.2  0.114  0.106  2.5 
Once unemployed so far  0.247  0.243  0.9  0.249  0.265  3.8  0.274  0.291  3.7  0.277  0.297  4.5 
Twice unemployed so far  0.117  0.084  11.0  0.118  0.116  0.6  0.147  0.119  8.3  0.144  0.145  0.2 
Three times unemployed so far  0.056  0.042  6.7  0.056  0.058  0.8  0.071  0.056  6.2  0.072  0.072  0.2 
Four or more times unemployed so far  0.109  0.037  28.2  0.103  0.097  2.2  0.143  0.058  28.5  0.140  0.137  1.1 
Durat. of last unemployment spell in months  4.756  3.142  16.4  4.756  4.927  1.7  5.658  4.008  16.4  5.655  5.702  0.5 
Unemployed in the year taking up the job   0.300  0.162  33.2  0.295  0.296  0.4  0.414  0.240  37.6  0.409  0.412  0.6 
log regional unemployment rate  2.371  2.335  17.7  2.371  2.372  0.5  2.378  2.338  18.5  2.377  2.373  1.8 
City (more than 50.000 inhabitants)  0.560  0.482  15.6  0.559  0.552  1.4  0.590  0.500  18.1  0.587  0.578  1.9 
Surrounding area  0.102  0.158  16.8  0.103  0.107  1.3  0.109  0.147  11.4  0.110  0.115  1.6 
Training in farming occupation   0.010  0.014  3.4  0.010  0.009  1.5  0.011  0.016  3.7  0.011  0.008  2.8 
Training in industry occupation   0.379  0.452  14.9  0.382  0.378  0.9  0.387  0.419  6.5  0.390  0.384  1.2 
Training in health occupation   0.018  0.009  7.5  0.018  0.019  0.5  0.011  0.013  1.6  0.011  0.013  1.7 
Training in technical occupation   0.102  0.120  5.9  0.103  0.106  1.0  0.113  0.126  3.9  0.114  0.128  4.4   160 
Table 33: Means of Important Conditioning Variables (X) Before and After Kernel-Based Matching – Women (Model A) 
  Tenure £ £ £ £ 10  years  Tenure £ £ £ £ 2  years 
  Before Matching  After Matching  Before Matching  After Matching 
Variable  Treated  Untreated  std. 
diff. % 
Treated  Controls  std.         
diff. % 
Treated  Un-
treated 
std.      
diff. % 
Treated  Controls  std.     
diff. % 
Age  34.045  33.966  0.9  34.038  33.907  1.6  34.105  36.100  22.2  34.065  34.207  1.6 
Vocational training  0.485  0.545  11.9  0.489  0.489  0.1  0.580  0.675  19.8  0.581  0.582  0.2 
Vocational college   0.060  0.027  16.4  0.053  0.057  2.0  0.050  0.038  5.5  0.047  0.054  3.2 
Master craftsman  0.094  0.112  5.8  0.095  0.098  1.2  0.032  0.058  12.6  0.032  0.032  0.3 
Polytechnic  0.049  0.063  6.2  0.049  0.044  2.2  0.017  0.027  6.3  0.018  0.019  0.6 
University  0.090  0.086  1.6  0.091  0.103  4.2  0.073  0.042  13.5  0.074  0.073  0.5 
Children < 6  0.154  0.229  19.0  0.155  0.157  0.5  0.152  0.160  2.2  0.150  0.154  1.0 
Children 6-17   0.248  0.226  5.2  0.246  0.231  3.6  0.332  0.335  0.5  0.330  0.325  1.2 
Foreigner  0.109  0.098  3.7  0.110  0.112  0.7  0.061  0.049  5.4  0.062  0.065  1.2 
Disabled  0.041  0.027  8.0  0.042  0.049  4.1  0.017  0.015  2.1  0.018  0.014  2.6 
Spouse employed  0.263  0.250  3.0  0.265  0.245  4.6  0.464  0.556  18.6  0.466  0.466  0.0 
Ever changed occupation  0.511  0.397  23.2  0.508  0.525  3.6  0.341  0.343  0.5  0.342  0.348  1.3 
Ever moved due to job-related reasons  0.259  0.261  0.5  0.261  0.270  2.0  0.207  0.161  11.8  0.206  0.194  3.2 
Two employers so far  0.154  0.227  18.6  0.155  0.162  1.7  0.233  0.277  10.0  0.233  0.227  1.3 
Three employers so far  0.169  0.228  14.7  0.170  0.182  2.9  0.166  0.214  12.2  0.162  0.161  0.3 
Four employers so far  0.158  0.137  5.9  0.159  0.148  3.3  0.111  0.145  10.2  0.112  0.117  1.4 
Five or more employers so far  0.395  0.303  19.3  0.390  0.379  2.4  0.254  0.180  17.9  0.254  0.260  1.5 
Previous job: dismissed  0.180  0.162  4.9  0.182  0.174  2.0  0.090  0.088  0.9  0.091  0.093  0.4 
Previous job: end of FTC  0.177  0.070  32.8  0.170  0.172  0.4  0.108  0.044  24.2  0.103  0.103  0.1 
Previous job: closure of a firm  0.113  0.113  0.2  0.114  0.106  2.5  0.058  0.066  3.2  0.059  0.059  0.1 
Once unemployed so far  0.274  0.291  3.7  0.277  0.297  4.5  0.274  0.255  4.4  0.271  0.263  1.8 
Twice unemployed so far  0.147  0.119  8.3  0.144  0.145  0.2  0.105  0.074  10.9  0.100  0.106  2.1 
Three times unemployed so far  0.071  0.056  6.2  0.072  0.072  0.2  0.055  0.028  13.5  0.056  0.058  1.1 
Four or more times unemployed so far  0.143  0.058  28.5  0.140  0.137  1.1  0.032  0.014  12.4  0.032  0.037  2.9 
Durat. of last unemployment spell in months  5.658  4.008  16.4  5.655  5.702  0.5  7.636  3.538  25.6  6.496  6.581  0.5 
Unemployed in the year taking up the job   0.414  0.240  37.6  0.409  0.412  0.6  0.216  0.132  22.1  0.212  0.210  0.7 
log regional unemployment rate  2.378  2.338  18.5  2.377  2.373  1.8  2.379  2.334  21.4  2.379  2.380  0.4 
City (more than 50.000 inhabitants)  0.590  0.500  18.1  0.587  0.578  1.9  0.469  0.489  3.8  0.469  0.469  0.0 
Surrounding area  0.109  0.147  11.4  0.110  0.115  1.6  0.134  0.153  5.4  0.133  0.136  1.0 
Training in farming occupation   0.011  0.016  3.7  0.011  0.008  2.8  0.020  0.014  5.3  0.018  0.019  0.7 
Training in industry occupation   0.387  0.419  6.5  0.390  0.384  1.2  0.105  0.076  9.9  0.100  0.099  0.6 
Training in health occupation   0.011  0.013  1.6  0.011  0.013  1.7  0.087  0.106  6.4  0.088  0.084  1.4 
Training in technical occupation   0.113  0.126  3.9  0.114  0.128  4.4  0.023  0.036  7.5  0.024  0.022  0.7   161 
5.7.2  Effects of Fixed-Term Contracts for Men 
 
The estimated effects of FTCs on wages, subjective employment stability, and 
subjective  career  opportunities  are  presented  in  this  section.  Furthermore,  the 
results of Model A, B, and C are compared for different subsamples with respect 
to maximum job tenure.  
Homogeneous Effects for Men 
First of all, a comparison of the results can reveal whether and to what extent 
the estimated effects depend on the model specification (Model A, B, C), that is, 
the choice of the conditioning variables. Table 34 depicts the estimated ATT and 
ATU (measured in € and in percentages) on wages for different samples with a 
decreasing maximum tenure for Model A. The ATT is the difference between the 
average wage of FTC workers and the average estimated counterfactual wage. 
The ATU is the average wage loss permanent workers would have, if they were 
employed on FTCs instead.  
All wage effects estimated by Model A are negative, but in case of the sample 
with tenure £2 years not statistically significant (see Table 34). The insignifi-
cance of the effects for the sample with tenure £2 years results from the large 
standard errors which are likely to be caused by the reduced sample. The ATT 
ranges from -0.5 € (-4.6%) to -0.9 € (-7.5%). Including tenure into the balancing 
score (Model B), that is, imposing that the control group has (exactly) the same 
distribution  of  job  tenure,  leads  to  stronger  (statistically  significant)  negative 
wage effects but otherwise comparable patterns (see Table 35). The wage effects 
are now between -0.9 € (-8.0%) and -1.1 € (-9.8%). The same is true for Model C 
which additionally conditions on job and employer attributes. Now, the ATT is 
around -1.0 € (-9.5% to -7.9%, see Table 36). 
Thus different sets of conditioning variables lead to different results. However, 
these differences are not large and not statistically significant. Therefore, Model 
A is the preferred specification in the following since it is based on admissible 
conditional variables only (see the discussion in Subchapters 5.5).  
A further interesting finding from all models is that the estimated ATT is more 
negative, the longer the maximum job tenure is. Hence, the wage-tenure profile 
in permanent jobs is steeper than in comparable FTC jobs. This finding is in line 
with economic theory: FTC workers and their employers have less incentives to 
invest in firm-specific human capital during the FTC (see the discussion in Sec-
tion 5.2.2). Note that this is not a rejection of the hypothesis of FTCs as proba-
tionary periods as the underlying theory predicts a stronger wage increase after 
the FTC.    162 
In most cases the estimated ATT is larger than the estimated ATU. This result 
indicates that those workers enter into FTCs, whose contemporaneous wage loss 
from doing so, is lower on average.  
Table 34: Wage Effects of FTCs – Men (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Mean Wages in € 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT (€)   ATT (%)  ATU (€)  ATU (%)  NT 
£ 10  -0.86 
(0.28)  
***  -7.5  -1.29 
(0.41) 
***  -10.6  390 
             
£ 8  -0.76 
(0.30) 
**  -6.7  -1.02 
(-0.41) 
**  -8.5  371 
             
£ 6  -0.68 
(0.31) 
**  -6.0  -0.94 
(0.43) 
**  -7.9  351 
             
£ 4  -0.62 
(0.33) 
*  -5.6  -0.74 
(0.44) 
*  -6.4  315 
              
£ 2  -0.51 
(0.41) 
  -4.7  -0.55 
(0.47) 
  -4.8  264 
Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
Table 35: Wage Effects of FTCs – Men (Model B)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)  
  Mean Wages in € 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT (€)   ATT (%)  ATU (€)  ATU (%)  NT 
£ 10  -1.14 
(0.28) 
***  -9.8  -1.45 
(0.39) 
***  -11.9  392 
             
£ 2  -0.91 
(0.32) 
***  -8.0  -0.92 
(0.32) 
***  -8.1  265 
Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
Table 36: Wage Effects of FTCs – Men (Model C)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)  
  Mean Wages in € 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT (€)   ATT (%)  ATU (€)  ATU (%)  NT 
£ 10  -1.10 
(0.28) 
***  -9.5  -1.42 
(0.36) 
***  -11.7  391 
             
£ 2  -0.89 
(0.33) 
***  -7.9  -0.88 
(0.35) 
**  -7.7  263 
  Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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In Table 70 and Table 71 in the Appendix the ATT (Model A) of FTCs on usual 
weekly working hours and the probability of working part-time are depicted for 
men. On average, FTC jobs are associated with slightly shorter working hours 
and have no effect on the probability of working part-time. Thus the result by 
ENGELLANDT and RIPHAN (2003) for Switzerland (see Subchapter 5.3) cannot be 
replicated for Germany. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the negative wage 
effect of FTCs does not result from longer working hours at given monthly earn-
ings.     
Table 37 (Model A), Table 38 (Model B), and Table 39 (Model C) depict the es-
timated effects on subjective assessment of danger of being dismissed / failing to 
get the FTC renewed . In the following discussion, I focus on the first and the 
fourth category (very high danger, no danger at all) for the most part, in order to 
keep the interpretations simple.  
There are again no fundamental differences between the three models. The es-
timated ATT indicates that FTCs indeed lead to a higher subjective assessment of 
losing one’s job by approximately 20 percentage points. The ATT on the prob-
ability of perceiving no danger at all is about -12 percentage points. The follow-
ing discussion focuses on Model A (Table 37): While subjective job insecurity of 
permanent workers seems to decline with increasing job tenure (see Table 24 in 
Subchapter 5.4), the ATT of holding a FTC in the highest category (very high 
danger)  and  the  lowest  category  (no  danger  at  all)  is  hardly  affected  by  the 
choice of the sample with regard to tenure, that is, the ATT is almost constant. In 
the second category (high danger) there seems to be a tendency towards an in-
creasing ATT with increasing maximum tenure.  
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 Table 37: Effects of FTCs on Job Insecurity – Men (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of danger of being dismissed / 
failing to get the FTC renewed 
  Very high 
danger 
High danger  Rather low 
danger 
No danger at 
all 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
£10  20.1 
(2.4) 
***  11.2 
(2.3) 
***  -18.8 
(2.8) 
***  -12.5 
(2.2) 
*** 
             
£ 8  20.4 
(2.2) 
***  10.5 
(2.6) 
***  -18.5 
(3.0) 
***  -12.4 
(2.2) 
*** 
             
£ 6  20.8 
(2.6) 
***  10.2 
(2.7) 
***  -18.7 
(3.3) 
***  -12.3 
(2.5) 
*** 
             
£ 4  20.8 
(2.9) 
***  9.3 
(3.0) 
***  -15.7 
(3.5) 
***  -14.4 
(2.4) 
*** 
             
£ 2  20.3 
(3.1) 
***  8.1 
(3.5) 
**  -16.5 
(4.3) 
***  -11.9 
(2.9) 
*** 
  Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
Table 38: Effects of FTCs on Job Insecurity – Men (Model B)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of danger of being dismissed / 
failing to get the FTC renewed 
  Very high 
danger 
High danger  Rather low 
danger 
No danger at 
all 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
£10  19.1 
(2.5) 
***  10.8 
(2.5) 
***  -17.9 
(3.1) 
***  -12.0 
(2.4) 
*** 
             
£ 2  20.2 
(3.1) 
***  9.3 
(3.5) 
***  -18.7 
(4.4) 
***  -10.8 
(3.0) 
*** 
  Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
Table 39: Effects of FTCs on Job Insecurity – Men (Model C )   
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of danger of being dismissed / 
failing to get the FTC renewed 
  Very high 
danger 
High danger  Rather low 
danger 
No danger at 
all 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
£10  19.6 
(2.5) 
***  9.0 
(2.8) 
***  -18.6 
(3.4) 
***  -9.9  
(2.4) 
*** 
               
£ 2  20.3 
(3.0) 
***  6.9 
(3.9) 
*  -17.3  
(4.2) 
***  -10.0 
( 2.9) 
*** 
  Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.   165 
The results for the third outcome variable subjective assessment of career op-
portunities are depicted in Table 40 (Model A), Table 41 (Model B), and Table 42 
(Model C). It is again checked to which extent the different specifications affect 
the results. The results of Model A differ from both Model B and C, while the 
results from Model B and C are very similar. The similarity of Models B and C 
suggests that the differences in the results are driven by the inclusion of tenure 
into the balancing score, which imposes that permanent contracts workers are 
only used as control, if they have exactly the same tenure. Despite these differ-
ences, the results can be summarised as follows: The ATT of FTCs on the prob-
ability of being very satisfied with career opportunities is always negative for 
FTC workers, even though it is not statistically significant in the sample with 
tenure £2 years for Model A (Table 40). The positive ATT on the probability of 
being very dissatisfied with career opportunities is for all models between 8 and 
10 percentage points.  
 
Table 40: Effects of FTCs on Career Opportunities – Men (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of career opportunities 
  Very satisfied   “By and large” 
satisfied  
Rather dissat-
isfied 
Very dissatis-
fied  
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
£10  -2.6 
(1.4) 
*  -8.5 
(2.9) 
***  4.4 
(2.9) 
  7.1 
(2.1) 
*** 
             
£ 8  -2.5 
(1.4) 
*  -10.4 
(2.9) 
***  5.0 
(3.1) 
  7.9 
(2.1) 
*** 
             
£ 6  -3.1 
(1.5) 
**  -9.7 
(2.9) 
***  5.6 
(3.1) 
*  7.2 
(2.3) 
*** 
             
£ 4  -3.1 
(1.6) 
*  -11.1 
(3.4) 
***  6.1 
(3.4) 
*  8.0 
(2.4) 
*** 
             
£ 2  -1.9 
(1.8) 
  -9.8 
(4.0) 
**  3.1 
(3.8) 
  8.6 
(2.9) 
*** 
  Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 41: Effects of FTCs on Career Opportunities – Men (Model B)   
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of career opportunities 
  Very satisfied   “By and large” 
satisfied  
Rather dissat-
isfied  
Very dissatis-
fied  
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
    £10  -3.9 
(1.4) 
***  -13.1 
(2.8) 
***  8.3 
(2.3) 
***  8.6 
(2.0) 
*** 
                 
     £ 2  -3.9 
(1.9) 
**  -13.8 
(3.5) 
*  7.7 
(3.3) 
**  9.9 
(2.5) 
*** 
   Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
 
Table 42: Effects of FTCs on Career Opportunities – Men (Model C)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of career opportunities 
  Very satisfied   “By and large” 
satisfied  
Rather dissat-
isfied  
Very dissatis-
fied  
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
   £10  -3.6 
(1.4) 
***  -13.1 
(2.9) 
***  8.0 
(2.6) 
***  8.7 
(2.0) 
*** 
             
   £ 2  -3.5 
(1.8) 
*  -13.5 
(3.5) 
***  7.2 
(3.4) 
**  9.8 
(2.7) 
*** 
   Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
 
Summarising the results, it may be concluded that a FTC, on average, increases 
the probability that a worker regards his job as unstable and as a ‘dead end’, in 
comparison to a permanent contract worker with similar characteristics (Model 
A) in a similar job (Model C). Assuming that these subjective assessments are 
sufficiently correlated with the utility from the job, one can conclude that FTC 
jobs are ceteris paribus associated with lower utility than comparable permanent 
jobs. This utility loss is not simultaneously compensated for by higher wages. All 
specifications have shown that FTCs have no significant positive or even statisti-
cally significant negative effects on wages of about -5% up to -10%. 
Of course, the utility loss may in the long-run be compensated for by higher 
lifetime earnings (or utilities) or by other job-related factors (large internal labour 
market etc.). The latter is, however, less probable since Model C, which led to 
very similar results already conditions on a number of job and employer attrib-
utes. The question to be answered in the next subsection is how the estimated 
short-run wage effects differ between groups of workers. 
   167 
Heterogeneous Effects for Men 
In this subsection, heterogeneous ATTs with respect to important observable 
characteristics are estimated by Model A for the sample with tenure £10 years. In 
order to secure a sufficient number of observations to be available focussing on 
this relatively large sample is necessary. Nevertheless, the results should be in-
terpreted with caution as the number of observations becomes quite small.   
The results for the wage effects are depicted in Table 43. In order to provide an 
impression of the wage level in the respective subgroup, mean FTC wages are 
depicted in the first column. The ATT of FTCs on wages is more negative in 
large establishments in terms of absolute values (-1.34 € versus -0.78 €) as well 
as in percentages (-10.6% versus -7.3%). The result that there is no significant 
ATT on wages in the industry sector but in the trade sector seems to be puzz-
ling.145 One possible explanation may be that unions and works councils, pre-
venting employers to pay lower wages to FTC workers, play a more important 
role in the industry sector (see DANIEL and SOFER, 1998).  
With respect to formal qualification, the results are different compared to what 
has previously been found in other studies: there is no significantly negative ATT 
of FTCs on wages of workers without formal qualifications. All in all, there is a 
positive relationship between the wage penalty to FTCs and the level of formal 
qualification. For workers with university degree there is a significantly negative 
wage effect of -2.7 € (-17.2%), which is the most negative ATT found among the 
subgroups. Note that this result is quite stable and can also be obtained from 
Model B and Model C. To some extent, this result contradicts the finding by 
MERTENS and MCGINNITY (2003) that the lowest wage penalty to FTCs is in the 
upper quantiles of the wage distribution (see Subchapter 5.3).  
A possible interpretation is in line with the hypothesis posed in Section 5.2.4: 
Workers with university degree are more concerned about their careers and they 
have  a  sufficiently  high  probability  of  getting  their  contract  transformed  into 
permanent ones. Hence, they are willing to earn less than comparable permanent 
contract workers, since they will be compensated for with a sufficiently high 
probability in the future.     
The wage effects for different age groups indicate that workers younger than 32 
years face no significant wage penalty to FTCs. The results indicate that a sig-
nificantly negative wage effect can only be found for FTC workers being at least 
32 years old. This result is opposed to the prediction derived from the model by 
GIBBONS and MURPHY (1992), presented in Section 5.2.4.   
                                              
145 This industry definition of sectors results from the way of data collection in the interview. Persons are 
first asked to state whether their employer belongs to the ‘industry’, ‘craft’, ‘trade’, or ‘miscellane-
ous’ sector.  
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Table 43: Heterogeneous Wage Effects of FTCs – Men (Model A) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Mean Wages in € 
Tenure £ £ £ £10 years    FTC 
(€) 
ATT 
(€) 
  ATT 
(%) 
NT 
Small establishment  (< 50)    9.86  -0.78 
(0.45) 
*  -7.3  178 
Large establishment  (³ 50)    11.25  -1.34 
(0.40) 
***  -10.6  195 
Industry    10.57  -0.51 
(0.43) 
  -4.3  149 
Trade    9.89  -1.39 
(0.61) 
**  -12.3  50 
Without qualification    9.04  -0.24 
(0.70) 
  -2.6  83 
With qualification 
(including university degree) 
  10.96  -0.73 
(0.30) 
**  -6.2  308 
University / Polytechnic    13.37  -2.77 
(1.07) 
***  -17.2  45 
Age < 32    10.20  -0.24 
(0.47) 
  -2.3  184 
Age ³ 32    11.52  -1.38 
(0.28) 
***  -11.3  205 
         Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
 
 
The estimated ATT for the subjective outcome variables are depicted in Table 
74 and Table 75 in the Appendix. First of all, the limitations of subjective vari-
ables, discussed in Section 5.2.5, should be recalled. Taking them into account, 
the only conclusion which can be drawn from these results is that there are nega-
tive effects for nearly all subgroups of workers. There is one exception to the lat-
ter statement: FTC workers with university degree are not significantly less satis-
fied with career opportunities. Considering the strong negative wage effect for 
this group of workers, the result may again be interpreted as evidence in favour 
of hypothesis of a FTC job as an investment. However, the large standard errors 
of the estimated ATT for the subgroup of FTC workers with university degree 
may also result from the small sample size.     
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5.7.3  Effects of Fixed-Term Contracts for Women 
Homogeneous Effects for Women 
The estimated wage effects of FTCs for women are in many respects compara-
ble to the findings for men (see Table 44 for Model A, Table 45 for Model B, and 
Table 46 for Model C). Again, there are no substantial differences between the 
effects estimated by the different specifications. The ATT from Model A is in the 
range of -0.67€ up to -0.93€, corresponding to -7% up to -9.7% compared to the 
control group of permanent workers. Hence, the negative wage effect for women 
is stronger than the effect found for men in the previous section. In Table 44 it 
can be seen that there is a tendency for a decreasing negative ATT with increasing 
maximum job tenure. This is in contrast to the results for men in the previous 
section, where results that are more in favour of a positive relationship have been 
found. Just like the results for men, in most cases ATT >ATU, albeit not statisti-
cally significant.    
Again, the ATT (Model A) of FTCs on usual weekly working hours and the 
probability of working part-time are estimated (see Table 72 and Table 73 in the 
Appendix). On average, for women FTC jobs are neither associated with shorter 
working hours nor with a higher probability of working part-time, which contra-
dicts the findings from the descriptive analysis in Subchapter 5.4.  
 
Table 44: Wage Effects of FTCs – Women (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Mean Wages in € 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT (€)   ATT (%)  ATU (€)  ATU (%)  NT 
£10  -0.67 
(0.30) 
***  -7.0  -0.79 
(0.40) 
**  -8.3  339 
             
£8  -0.67 
(0.30) 
***  -7.1  -0.73 
(0.39) 
*  -7.4  316 
             
£6  -0.67 
(0.35) 
*  -7.1  -0.72 
(0.39) 
*  -8.2  293 
             
£4  -0.80 
(0.32) 
***  -8.5  -0.61 
(0.44) 
  -6.4  267 
             
£2  -0.93 
(0.49) 
*  -9.7  -0.99 
(0.53) 
*  -10.1  218 
    Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 45: Wage Effects of FTCs – Women (Model B) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Mean Wages in € 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT (€)     ATT (%)  ATU (€)    ATU (%)  NT 
£10  -0.95 
(0.35) 
***  -9.7  -0.82 
(0.35) 
**  -8.3  341 
             
£2  -1.16 
(0.48) 
***  -11.9  -1.18 
(0.45) 
***  -12.1  218 
    Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
 
Table 46: Wage Effects of FTCs – Women (Model C) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Mean Wages in € 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT (€)     ATT (%)  ATU (€)    ATU (%)  NT 
£10  -0.94 
(0.32) 
***  -9.6  -0.83 
(0.33) 
***  -8.4  338 
             
£2  -1.07 
(0.51) 
**  -11.0  -2.14 
(0.49) 
***  -21.9  216 
    Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
 
 
Table 47 depicts that FTCs have very strong and statistically significant effects 
on the subjective assessment of job security. Since Model B and Model C again 
do not lead to different results than Model A, they are not depicted. The probabil-
ity of perceiving very high danger of losing ones job increases by 24.5 percent-
age points due to holding a FTC instead of a permanent contract. The probability 
of perceiving that there is no danger at all decreases by 25 percentage points due 
to holding a FTC. Hence, the ATT seems to be stronger for women than for men, 
although a between group comparison is of limited use as discussed above.  
From Table 48 it becomes obvious that there are many statistically insignificant 
effects of FTCs on the assement of career opportunities. This is in contrast to the 
strongly negative results found for men. A possible explanation, besides the gen-
eral  limitation  of  subjective  indicators  (see  Section  5.2.5),  is  that  for  women 
FTCs seem to be stepping stones more often and, consequently, FTCs are to a 
less extent associated with a loss of career opportunities: In Subchapter 6.4, a 
slightly more positive (stepping stone) effect of entering into a FTC on the future 
employment opportunities is found for female unemployed. 
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  Table 47: Effects of FTCs on Job Insecurity – Women (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of danger of being dismissed / 
failing to get the FTC renewed 
  Very high 
danger 
High danger  Rather low  No danger at 
all 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
£10  19.3 
(2.3) 
***  12.5  
(2.5) 
***  -6.4  
(3.7) 
*  -23.1  
(2.2) 
*** 
              
£8  19.4 
(2.5) 
***  12.2  
(2.7) 
***  -9.2  
(3.2) 
***  -22.3  
(2.2) 
*** 
              
£6  19.8 
(2.7) 
***  11.8  
(2.8) 
***  -8.1  
(3.5) 
**  -23.5  
(2.2) 
*** 
              
£4  21.7 
(3.0) 
***  11.3  
(3.1) 
***  -8.7  
(3.8) 
**  -24.4  
(2.5) 
*** 
              
£2  24.5 
(3.2) 
***  12.2  
(3.3) 
***  -11.6  
(4.6) 
**  -25.1  
(3.0) 
*** 
  Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
 
Table 48: Effects of FTCs on Career Opportunities – Women (Model A) 
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of career opportunities 
  Very satisfied   “By and large” 
satisfied  
Rather dissat-
isfied  
Very dissatis-
fied  
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
£10  -1.7 
(1.5) 
  -7.9  
(3.3) 
**  1.9 
(3.1) 
  7.7  
(2.4) 
*** 
               
£ 8  -1.6 
(1.5) 
  -7.9  
(3.2) 
**  2.1 
(3.3) 
  7.4  
(2.5) 
*** 
               
£6  -1.6 
(1.7) 
  -6.5  
(3.6) 
*  0.4 
(3.4) 
  7.7  
(2.7) 
*** 
               
£4  -2.8 
(1.8) 
  -7.7  
(3.8) 
**  1.1 
(3.5) 
  9.3  
(2.8) 
*** 
                
£2  -2.1 
(2.4) 
  -5.6 
(4.5) 
  3.0 
(4.5) 
  5.6  
(3.2) 
* 
  Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Heterogeneous Effects for Women 
Table 49 displays the estimated effects of FTCs on wages for different sub-
groups of female workers. First of all, one should consider the small number of 
treated workers depicted in the last column. All in all, the results are very similar 
to those found for men. The largest absolute and relative negative ATT on wages 
is found again for workers with university degree.  With -2.9 € it corresponds to a 
wage penalty of more than 20% compared to the control group of permanent 
workers. In line with the results for men, there is no significant negative effect of 
FTCs on workers without qualification. 
The heterogeneous effects of FTCs on the subjective outcome variables are de-
picted in Table 76 and Table 77 in the Appendix. All groups of female FTC 
workers perceive a higher job insecurity. Again, there are only few statistically 
significant  effects  on  perceived  career  opportunities  in  different  subgroups  of 
female workers.  
Table 49: Heterogeneous Wage Effects of FTCs – Women (Model A) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Mean Wages in € 
Tenure £ £ £ £10 years    FTC 
(€) 
ATT 
(€) 
  ATT 
(%) 
NT 
Small establishment 
(<50 employees) 
  8.60  -0.58 
(0.50) 
  -6.3  193 
Large firm 
(³50 employees) 
  9.33  -1.33 
(0.38) 
***  -12.5  126 
Industry    9.11  -0.78 
(0.57) 
  -7.9  68 
Trade    8.90  -0.42 
(0.87) 
  -4.5  118 
Without qualification    8.41  0.15  
(0.74) 
  -1.8  80 
With qualification 
(including university degree) 
  9.05  -0.82  
(0.36) 
 
**  -8.3  257 
University / Polytechnic    11.08  -2.87 
(1.16) 
**  -20.6  27 
Age < 32 years    8.48  -0.59 
(0.53) 
  -6.5  143 
Age ³ 32 years    9.14  -0.82 
(0.47) 
*  -8.2  194 
    Notes: *** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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5.8  Summary and Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter has been to analyse the short-run effects of FTCs 
on the workers’ subjective assessment of working conditions and especially on 
wages. The underlying theoretical question is whether and to what extent work-
ers are compensated for the lower employment stability and lower career oppor-
tunities in FTC jobs by higher wages. If the assumptions of a perfect labour mar-
ket were fulfilled, one would expect, ceteris paribus, higher wages for FTCs. On 
the other hand, in the presence of asymmetric information on workers’ ability, 
hidden actions of workers, or career concerns there may be a contemporaneous 
wage loss which is compensated for in the long-run. Hence, the simple theory of 
compensating differentials, as presented in Subchapter 5.2, may be too restrictive 
since two important features of the labour market are not taken into account: 
asymmetric information and workers’ maximisation of lifetime utility or earn-
ings.  
The reasons for analysing the effects of FTCs on two subjective outcome vari-
ables (subjective assessment of the danger of losing one’s job and subjective as-
sessment of career opportunities) are threefold: First, it should be tested whether 
FTCs are really associated with drawbacks that are perceived by workers. Sec-
ond, subjective variables may be more strongly correlated with utility than objec-
tive measures. Third, job satisfaction has been found in other studies to be one of 
the main determinants of worker mobility and thus on-the-job search.   
The econometric analysis has been performed by interpreting a FTC as a treat-
ment (compared to the non-treatment state of holding a permanent contract) and 
by applying the potential-outcome approach, presented in Chapter 3. Estimating 
the effects of FTCs is associated with a further methodological problem which 
has rarely been addressed in the empirical literature on compensating differen-
tials: Many of the important variables determining wages can not be interpreted 
as admissible pre-treatment variables since they are determined simultaneously 
with the contract type, such as industry, firm size, and job position. In addition, 
job tenure is endogenous with respect to the type of contract. What has been done 
in this chapter, is to check the robustness of the results with respect to the inclu-
sion of tenure and other job-related covariates. Furthermore, the effect has been 
estimated for different subsamples of maximum job tenure.   
The results turn out to be quite robust with respect to the choice of conditioning 
variables and can be summarised as follows: (1.) FTCs raise the probability of 
workers to expect losing their job; (2.) FTCs decrease the probability of being 
(very) satisfied with career opportunities and increase the probability of  being 
(very) dissatisfied with career opportunities; (3.) FTCs are not associated with   174 
compensating wage differentials but the results are more in favour of a wage 
penalty to FTCs.146       
Depending on the specification, the wage effects of FTCs for men are between 
-4.7% and -9.8%, and for women between -7.0% and -11.9%. Interestingly, there 
is a negative relationship between the wage penalty to FTCs and the level of 
formal qualification. In particular, workers with a university degree have a much 
stronger negative wage effect, while there is no significantly negative effect for 
persons without a formal qualification. As workers with university degree may, 
in general, have better outside options, this result may be interpreted as evidence 
in favour of a prolonged probationary or, more general, investment period lead-
ing to higher wages in the long-run. Obviously, this has to be analysed by a lon-
gitudinal (dynamic) study in further research.   
It should again be stressed that this has been a microeconomic study ruling out 
general equilibrium effects (SUTVA, see Section 3.2.5). Hence, possible negative 
wage effects at the individual level should not be mixed up with negative effects 
of FTCs on aggregate wages at the macroeconomic level (being associated with 
positive employment effects). The augmented insider-outsider model by BENTO-
LILA  and  DOLADO  (1994)  shows  that  the  opposite  may  be  true  (see  Section 
5.2.2), that is, FTCs may increase the aggregate wage level.   
 
 
 
                                              
146 Compensation differentials also could not be found for other negative job-related aspects in Germany 
(see, for example, SCHMIDT and ZIMMERMANN, 1991).   175 
6  Do Fixed-Term Contracts Increase the Long-Term  
Employment Opportunities of the Unemployed? 
6.1  Overview: Are Fixed-Term Contracts Stepping Stones for the Un-
employed or Dead-Ends? 
One important political goal of the liberalisation of FTCs in the 1980s was that 
dismissal protection legislation was thought to reduce the re-employment prob-
abilities of the unemployed, particularly of those with adverse signals and those 
within the scope of the special protection against dismissal (see Subchapter 2.2). 
Thus FTCs, or temporary work in general, may increase the employment oppor-
tunities of the unemployed which are harmed by the firing costs due to employ-
ment protection for permanent workers. The rationale is simple: employers may 
be more willing to hire if they can fire easily (see ADDISON and TEIXEIRA, 2003 
and Subchapter 4.2). 
However, objections are raised to this view. FTC work may create a segmented 
labour market where the employment stability of permanent contract workers is 
raised by firms’ using temporary workers as a kind of buffer against transitory 
changes in the business environment. For some workers this may imply to be 
‘trapped’ in a cycle of recurrent periods of unemployment and FTC jobs (see 
BLANCHARD and LANDIER, 2002 and Subchapter 4.2). The temporary nature of 
the employment relationship could become the cause of subsequent unemploy-
ment periods and new FTC jobs (see TAUBMAN and WACHTER, 1986). This phe-
nomenon may be fostered by inferior access to training and lower career oppor-
tunities in FTC jobs (see BOOTH, FRANCESCONI, and FRANK, 2002, 2003 as well 
as Chapter 5). Thus the central issue is whether or not FTC work really increases 
the  long-run  employment  opportunities  of  the  unemployed  entering  into  FTC 
jobs in terms of future permanent employment relationships or employment in 
general. Put differently, should unemployed job searchers take up FTC jobs or 
should they keep on searching for permanent positions? Are FTC jobs ‘stepping 
stones’ for the unemployed or ‘dead ends’ (BOOTH, FRANCESCONI, and FRANK, 
2002)? While this topic has been touched on in Chapter 5 within a static frame-
work, this chapter analyses the dynamic aspect and focuses on the group of un-
employed job searchers.   
Here, the aim is to investigate the employment effects of FTCs for the unem-
ployed by using matching methods, which have been described in detail in Sec-
tion 3.3.1 and already applied in Chapter 5. The methodological contribution of 
the following econometric analysis is to estimate the propensity score by a dis-  176 
crete hazard rate model, which has been done only rarely so far.147 I will argue 
that this may have some advantages – at least in this application. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next subchapter provides some 
considerations on the theoretical framework. The empirical analysis is divided 
into two parts: Subchapter 6.3 analyses the differences in the determinants of 
transitions from unemployment to FTC and permanent jobs by hazard rate mod-
els. The hazard rate model for the transition to FTC jobs is used to estimate the 
propensity score in Subchapter 6.4, and the results are used evaluate the long-
term employment effects of entering into FTCs by a matching estimator. Sub-
chapter 6.5 draws conclusions. 
 
6.2  Theoretical Considerations 
First, some basic concepts related to job search theory and unemployment dura-
tion analysis are introduced. Using these concepts and taking the empirical re-
sults of Chapter 5 into account, it is discussed under which conditions unem-
ployed job searchers may be willing to accept FTC job offers. Finally, the theo-
retical literature is reviewed with respect to suggestions under which conditions 
FTCs may serve as stepping stones to permanent employment. 
6.2.1  Basic Concepts: Job Search Theory and Determinants of Unem-
ployment Duration 
A framework for analysing the determinants of unemployment duration is the 
job search theory. This is also applied to describe the conditions for accepting 
FTC job offers. The probability of an unemployed worker i leaving unemploy-
ment to a specific job after a certain unemployment duration t  is the hazard rate 
( ) i h t .  The hazard rate can be expressed in terms of the probability of receiving a 
specific  job  offer  i x   times  the  probability  that  the  offer  is  acceptable 
( ) ( ) 1
R
i i F w t -    , where   ( ) ( )
R
i i F w t  is the cumulated wage offer distribution and 
( )
R
i w t  is the reservation wage (see MORTENSEN, 1986: 862).148  
In steady states an unambiguous relationship between the hazard rate and the 
proportion of long-term unemployed (or other unemployment durations) occurs. 
As shown by MACHIN and MANNING (1999), the proportion of long-term unem-
                                              
147 To the best of my knowledge, there are only two studies using hazard rate models for the estimation 
of the propensity score (see BRODATY, CRÉPON, and FOUGÈRE, 2001 and SIANESI, 2004). Recently 
this approach has been formally justified by FREDRIKSSON and JOHANSSON (2003).  
148 This arrival rate of job offers in standard search models can be further decomposed into the flow of 
vacancies times the probability that the worker becomes aware of a vacancy times the probability that 
the worker actually is offered the job.     177 
ployed in total unemployment in steady-states149 is (1.) negatively affected by 
the average hazard rate from unemployment at any duration of unemployment 
and (2.) positively affected by the degree of negative duration dependence. Point 
(1.) means that if it is possible to increase the hazard rate from unemployment at 
any duration of unemployment (for example for the short-term unemployed), the 
proportion of long-term unemployed decreases.150 Point (2.) highlights the im-
portance of the effect of the duration of the current unemployment spell on the 
individual hazard rate. If the individual hazard rate (after controlling for ob-
served and unobserved heterogeneity) depends on the unemployment duration, 
there is duration dependence in the hazard rate. Negative (positive) duration de-
pendence means that the hazard rate decreases (increases) with unemployment 
duration. Based on empirical evidence the focus of the debate has concentrated 
on negative duration dependence.  
As derived by MACHIN and MANNING (1999), negative duration dependence of 
an individual hazard rate  ( ) i h t  may stem from the following (partly interdepend-
ent) factors (see also STEINER, 2001): 
–  the job offer arrival rate  i x  decreases with the unemployment duration t; 
–  the wage offer distribution  ( ) ( )
R
i i F w t  shifts to the left with increasing unem-
ployment duration; 
–  the worker’s search intensity decreases with unemployment duration; 
–  the decline in the reservation wage  ( )
R
i w t  is too low to  balance  the three 
points mentioned above.  
The job offer arrival rate may decline with unemployment duration either due 
to  a  deterioration  of  human  capital  (see  PISSARIDES,  1992)  or  due  to  stigma   
effects of unemployment duration (see LOCKWOOD, 1991 and the following sec-
tion). Even if the reservation wage falls with unemployment duration, it can be 
shown that the negative effect is not equalised for the most common assumptions 
on the wage offer distribution (see MACHIN and MANNING, 1999).151 If the wage 
offer distribution is more reduced with unemployment duration than the reserva-
tion wage, the hazard rate declines.  
If the search intensity of the unemployed is reduced with unemployment dura-
tion, the job offer arrival rate also declines with duration. The reason most often 
                                              
149 Here, steady state means that the inflow rates  into unemployment and the outflow rates out of unem-
ployment are constant. If one does not impose this assumption, two further basic results appear: The 
proportion of long-term unemployed is lower if the inflow into unemployment was particularly high 
in the recent past, and the proportion of long-term unemployed is higher if the outflow rate was par-
ticularly low in the recent past.   
150 Of course, also the overall level of unemployment decreases. It is well-known that the unemployment 
rate is determined at a given constant unemployment level by the average risk of becoming unem-
ployed times the average unemployment duration times the average number of individual unemploy-
ment spells (see FRANZ, 2003: 353).  
151 There are various reasons to assume the reservation wage to be decreasing in unemployment dura-
tion, for example, due to ageing within a finite time horizon model (see FRANZ, 2003: 213).   178 
mentioned for the decline in the search intensity in the literature are discourage-
ment effects (see FRANZ, 2003: Chapter 7).   
6.2.2  Under Which Conditions Do Job Searchers Enter into Fixed-Term 
Contract Jobs? 
The results of Chapter 5 are in line with the hypothesis that workers entering 
into FTC jobs perceive their unemployment risk to be higher than comparable 
workers entering into permanent contract jobs. Furthermore, one can argue that 
temporary employment relationships are associated with a loss of returns to job 
seniority.152 Descriptive statistics on the duration of employment spells after the 
transition from unemployment to FTCs or permanent contracts respectively, be-
ing also in line with this statement, are provided in Table 78 in the Appendix.  
Available empirical studies and the results of Chapter 5 suggest that FTC work-
ers do not receive wage premiums to compensate for these risks but even lower 
wages. As discussed in detail in Subchapter 5.2, these empirical results do not 
conflict with economic theory if departures from the assumptions of a perfect 
market are considered.  
The question arises when and under which conditions unemployed job search-
ers are willing to enter into FTCs instead of continue searching for a permanent 
job. To the best of my knowledge, there is no job search model explicitly taking 
FTC  and  permanent  contract  jobs  into  account.  Nevertheless,  some  basic  job 
search models can be discussed in order to gain some insights into the underlying 
behaviour and to obtain theory-based hypotheses.     
BURDETT and MORTENSEN (1980) augment the standard sequential job search 
model with a job-specific random dismissal probability without explicitly taking 
FTCs and permanent contracts into account. If one assumes that failing to get the 
contract renewed is associated with an adverse signal for potential future em-
ployers (for example, if non-renewal due to unfavourable business development 
or due to low worker’s ability is not distinguishable), the reservation wage is in-
creasing with the dismissal probability.153 Therefore, the reservation wage with 
regard to FTC jobs is, ceteris paribus, higher than the reservation wage with re-
gard to permanent contract jobs (see GROOT, 1990; BOVER and GÓMEZ, 2003). 
The reservation wage with regard to FTC jobs decreases, however, with the ex-
pected probability that the contract is transformed into a permanent one by the 
employer. Nevertheless, the acceptability of FTC job offers is, ceteris paribus, 
lower than the acceptability of permanent contract job offers.   
                                              
152 A result often found in wage regressions is that job seniority has a significantly positive effect on 
wages. One explanation for this result is the accumulation of firm specific human capital during em-
ployment (see PISSARIDES, 1994).  
153 BURDETT and MORTENSEN’s (1980) general proposition is that the reservation wage is increasing in 
the dismissal probability if the return to search after being dismissed from the job is less than the ex-
pected return to search before the job was taken up. A general proof that the reservation wage de-
pends on the type of job (offer) can be found in WEITZMAN (1979).    179 
If the reservation wage decreases with unemployment duration, the probability 
of a FTC job to be acceptable increases with unemployment duration as well. 
Note that there may be further reasons for job searchers to reduce their reserva-
tion wages and accept FTC job offers. They may, for example, have to meet tem-
porary declines in family income, particularly when other family members have 
lost their jobs. This highlights that the acceptability of jobs is not only influenced 
by individual characteristics (and labour market conditions) but also by factors 
related to the general household situation.  
Within the job search framework unemployment compensation is interpreted as 
a reduction of the opportunity costs of unemployment (see MORTENSEN, 1986). 
By  increasing  the  reservation  wage  unemployment  compensation  reduces  the 
acceptability of job offers. Given the assumptions about the reservation wages 
with regard to FTCs and permanent contracts, the probability of accepting a FTC 
job offer is more reduced than the probability of accepting a permanent contract 
job offer (see BOVER and GÓMEZ, 2003). Put differently, given a certain prob-
ability  of  permanent  contract  job  offers,  unemployed  without  unemployment 
compensation are more willing to accept FTCs than unemployed receiving un-
employment compensation.154  
Outside the framework of job search theory this result can also be derived from 
the model by VAN DE KLUNDERT (1990). In his model, unemployment results 
from the assumption that queuing for a ‘primary’ job is preferred to a ‘secondary’ 
job, if the utility derived from unemployment compensation, combined with the 
status of searching for a proper, that is, primary job, exceeds the utility derived 
from a secondary job. Besides the effects of subjective factors such as ‘status in 
the labour market’, the model highlights the effects of unemployment compensa-
tion: If the amount of benefit is relatively high and depends on the previous wage 
rate, unemployed persons may prefer to wait for a suitable primary job. Hence, 
previous high-wage primary (permanent) jobs increase unemployment duration 
and decrease the probability of entering into low-wage secondary (temporary) 
jobs. In particular, as entrants into the labour market (younger workers or women 
after maternity leave) are often not entitled to unemployment compensation and 
have no determined idea about their ‘labour market status’, they are more likely 
to enter into FTCs. Unemployed who were previously employed on a permanent 
basis may hesitate to accept a FTC job offer. This may lead to various types of 
state dependence.     
In Subchapter 5.2 the role of asymmetric information on workers’ ability is de-
scribed in detail. If incomplete information plays an important role, the employ-
ment histories of job searchers may serve as signals. References from previous 
employers and the reputation of previous jobs may reveal information on the 
ability (or further unobservable characteristics) of the worker. If the employment 
                                              
154 According to this argumentation, unemployment compensation could be interpreted as a subsidy for 
the search for ‘good’ (permanent) jobs.    180 
history involves adverse signals, employers with permanent contract vacancies 
may hesitate to offer permanent jobs to these job-searchers (see PEETERS, 1999). 
If the unemployment duration is an adverse signal155, then, within the job search 
framework, the offer rate for permanent contract jobs may decrease relative to 
the offer rate for FTC jobs with increasing unemployment duration. Given that 
the relative FTC job offer rate and the relative acceptability of FTC offers in-
crease with unemployment duration, the duration dependence of the FTC hazard 
rate should be empirically more positive (or less negative) than the duration de-
pendence of the permanent contract hazard rate (see GROOT, 1990). 
Particularly, older dual labour market theories predict that the temporary nature 
of an employment relationship is the cause of subsequent unemployment and 
temporary jobs (see TAUBMANN and WACHTER, 1986). Thus interpreting FTC 
jobs as ‘secondary’ and permanent contract jobs as ‘primary’ implies that having 
been employed on a FTC in the past may be an adverse signal for future employ-
ers, at least if the jobs are associated with unfavourable attributes.156 This state-
ment is also compatible with more recent theoretical models on signalling effects 
(see MA and WEISS, 1993; MCCORMICK, 1990). Hence, workers who previously 
held a FTC job have a higher probability of re-entering into a FTC job as they 
receive fewer permanent contract job offers.  
However, the  matching model by CANZIANI and PETRONGOLO (2001) high-
lights that the stigma attached to being dismissed increases in firing costs. Since 
the information on the worker’s productivity is imperfect, the firm’s hiring deci-
sion also depends on the worker’s employment history including the reasons for 
the end of the previous job. Hence, having been dismissed (despite high firing 
costs) decreases the re-employment prospects. Since the termination of a FTC is 
not associated with firing costs, entering into unemployment after a FTC job is a 
less adverse signal.  
The availability of job offers increases with a job searcher’s regional mobility 
and the acceptability of commuting time. Obviously, both should be lower for 
mothers with young children. Therefore, they may be more inclined to accept 
FTC job offers.  
So far, the possibility of on-the-job search has been neglected. As repeatedly 
mentioned in the previous chapters, it is likely that FTCs promote on-the-job 
search in comparison to permanent contract jobs since rational workers anticipate 
the higher risk of job losses (see BOERI, 1999). If one, furthermore, assumes that 
FTCs increase the arrival rate of job offers (due to networking etc., see next sec-
tion) or improves the wage offer distribution by enhancing human capital (see 
                                              
155 LOCKWOOD’S (1991) theoretical model shows that if it is costly for employers to test workers, they 
may use unemployment duration as a signal on which the employment decision is based.  
156 “...secondary employment may be regarded as a kind of stigma that bars access to the primary sec-
tor.” (MCDONALD and SOLOW, 1985: 1124).   181 
next section), entering into a FTC job may be an optimal search strategy.157 On-
the-job search may also render re-entering into FTCs after a previous FTC and a 
subsequent unemployment spell as an optimal strategy.  
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that in most cases job searchers 
accept FTC job offers after having failed to get a permanent job, and if they ex-
pect a permanent job offer only with a sufficiently low probability. Hence, the 
decision to accept a FTC offer is sequential over time.  
The most realistic view seems to be to interpret FTC jobs (similar to training) 
as a kind of investment under uncertainty for the unemployed workers. The in-
vestment consists of the lower contemporaneous utility during the job in com-
parison to the hypothetical situation of the individual finding a permanent job in 
the next period. The returns of this investment depend on the expected stream of 
future earnings or utility (including unemployment benefit), that is, expected life-
time earnings or utility. Furthermore, the profitability of the investment depends 
on the counterfactual  transition rate to  permanent jobs and the counterfactual 
stream of future earnings or utility from permanent jobs.    
6.2.3  Why Should Fixed-Term Contracts be Stepping Stones Towards 
Permanent Positions? 
Why and under which conditions may FTCs be stepping stones towards perma-
nent positions, that is, increase the long-term employment opportunities of those 
entering into FTCs?  
During FTC jobs there may be more investments in (general and specific) hu-
man  capital  (in  comparison  to  the  hypothetical  situation  that  the  person  had 
stayed  unemployed),  even  if  there  is  no  formal  training.  This  may  raise  the 
worker’s employment opportunities at the same or other employers. The latter is 
associated with a shift in the wage offer distribution to the right. However, firms 
may invest less in FTC workers than in permanent contract workers since they 
recognise  the  shorter  expected  job  tenure  (see  BOOTH,  FRANCESCONI,  and 
FRANK, 2003 and Chapter 5). Therefore, the opposite effect may also be possible: 
If the unemployed person had not accepted the FTC job offer in a certain period, 
she or he might have got a permanent contract job offer in the next period with 
better training and career opportunities. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, FTCs may be used as a prolonged proba-
tionary  period  in  order  to  overcome  the  problem  of  asymmetric  information. 
Thus FTCs may serve as a screening device. This may help unemployed persons 
with adverse signals,  who would otherwise get permanent contract job  offers 
only with a low probability (see PEETERS, 1999). After the expiration of the FTC 
and after sufficient information on the worker’s ability is collected, the worker 
may get a permanent contract job offer from the same employer. This may be 
                                              
157 The argument is based on HECKMAN, LALONDE, and SMITH (1999), who present a model which in-
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especially true if FTCs induce a sorting mechanism as shown in the model by 
LOH (1994) described in Subchapter 5.2.  
FTC jobs may promote on-the-job search (see BOERI, 1999). So it seems plau-
sible to state that the job search intensity may not be much lower than during un-
employment and strictly  higher than in permanent contract jobs.  If, however, 
search intensity was lower than during unemployment, FTCs could decrease the 
probability of receiving permanent contract job offers compared to unemploy-
ment.  
FTC workers may be able to enlarge their social network within the firm or 
even the industry in which they are employed (see VAN DEN BERG, HOLM, and 
VAN OURS, 2002). This may increase the workers’ knowledge of (future) vacan-
cies and may again help other employers to collect (otherwise unobserved) in-
formation on the workers’ productivity.   
For on-the-job-searchers a FTC job may also be a positive signal to other em-
ployers, again in comparison to the situation in which the person had stayed un-
employed and thus had possibly been affected by negative ‘stigma effects’ due to 
unemployment. However, in order to be a credible positive signal the cost of 
finding a FTC jobs must be higher (in the broad sense of search costs) for low 
ability workers (see GERFIN, LECHNER, and STEIGER, 2002). The harder it is to 
get a FTC job, the better is the signal to potential future employers. But again, 
entering into a FTC job may have the opposite effect, that is, it may signal that 
the person did not receive any offers for permanent contract jobs. This may be 
especially true for recurrent FTC spells. Hence, temporary jobs may be ‘stigma-
tised’ (see MA and WEISS, 1993). Given that FTCs are associated with a negative 
wage differential, they may be an adverse signal especially for highly qualified 
workers (see MCCORMICK, 1990). 
The matching and labour demand modes discussed in Subchapter 4.2, also de-
scribe the determinants of FTCs being stepping stones. A FTC job may be a 
stepping stone to a permanent job, if firing costs of permanent workers are not 
too high, and if relative hiring and firing costs of FTCs are not too low. Put dif-
ferently, if it is much easier for a job searcher to get a FTC than a permanent con-
tract, the FTC job is less likely to be a stepping stone.    183 
6.3  Fixed-Term Contracts and the Re-Employment Probabilities of the 
Unemployed 
6.3.1  Introduction 
One objective of the liberalisation of FTCs was to increase the re-employment 
probabilities of the unemployed, especially those with adverse signals and those 
who are within the scope of the special protection against dismissal (see Sub-
chapter 2.2). If this assumption is true, personal characteristics which are known 
to increase unemployment duration should affect the probability of getting low-
firing-cost FTC jobs (the FTC hazard rate) less than the probability of getting 
high-firing-cost permanent contract jobs (the permanent contract hazard rate).  
There  is,  however,  no  empirical  evidence  on  the  determinants  of  contract-
specific hazard rates for Germany available yet. Thus it has not been revealed 
what  makes  FTC  and  permanent  jobs  different  from  an  unemployed  job 
searcher’s point of view.  
This Subchapter analyses the role of individual unemployment duration and 
personal characteristics for the transitions from unemployment to FTC jobs ver-
sus permanent contract jobs within a competing risks hazard rate model. This is 
the starting point for the estimation of the propensity score in Subchapter 6.4.  
Distinguishing jobs by their type of contract is associated with some benefits. 
Firstly, it provides insights into the behaviour of job searchers and employers in 
the presence of contracts which differ in their firing costs. Secondly, pooling dif-
ferent types of jobs and contracts, what is usually done in hazard rate analyses, 
may induce a spurious negative duration dependence effect (see GROOT, 1990). 
Generally speaking, spurious negative duration dependence is usually attributed 
to  omitted  variables  (unobserved  heterogeneity).  Distinguishing  between  jobs 
may  capture  heterogeneity  by  allowing  coefficients  to  vary  across  different 
groups of individuals.158  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical attempt to distinguish 
between the destination states of FTCs and permanent contracts in unemploy-
ment duration analyses for Germany. It is shown that permanent contract jobs 
and FTC jobs are indeed behaviourally distinct states with respect to the search-
ers’ characteristics and regional labour market conditions. 
                                              
158 A  further  reason  why  this  analysis  may  be  useful  is  stressed  by  ATKINSON  and  MICKLEWRIGHT 
(1991). They highlight the importance of distinguishing between ‘regular’ and ‘marginal’ jobs in the 
analysis of the effects of unemployment compensation on the transition between unemployment and 
employment. It seems reasonable to expect unemployment compensation to have a different effect on 
the transition to FTC jobs than on the transition to permanent jobs. Unemployment compensation 
may be interpreted as a subsidy for the search for ‘good jobs’, i.e., regular jobs (see Section 6.2.2). 
Unfortunately, due to data restrictions it is not possible to model unemployment compensation in an 
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6.3.2  Previous Results: Unemployment Duration Analyses Distinguishing 
Between Employment Contracts 
The literature on unemployment duration has always recognised unemployment 
and inactivity to be behaviourally distinct states, but has generally failed to dis-
tinguish between different types of employment other than full-time and part-
time jobs (see PORTUGAL and ADDISON, 2003). To the best of my knowledge, 
there are only three studies which distinguish between FTC and permanent con-
tract jobs as destination states.  
For  the  Netherlands,  GROOT  (1990)  estimates  a  continuous  time  competing 
risks model distinguishing between permanent contract and FTC jobs. He finds 
higher educated and younger unemployed to enter FTCs with a higher probabil-
ity. The author explains the former with the assumption that individuals with 
higher human capital are less risk averse due to their better labour market pros-
pects. He finds no significant duration dependence effect, for neither the FTC 
hazard nor the permanent contract hazard. 
For Portugal, PORTUGAL and ADDISON (2003) estimate a discrete time compet-
ing risks model for six different exit states (full-time permanent contract jobs, 
full-time FTC jobs, part-time work, public employment jobs, self-employment, 
and  out-of-labour  force),  taking  unobserved  heterogeneity  into  account  by  a 
gamma distribution. The analysis focuses on the impacts of unemployment bene-
fits. The authors find strong disincentive effects of unemployment benefit for 
FTC as well as for permanent contract jobs, which are not significantly different 
between these two states. The authors conclude that being entitled to unemploy-
ment benefit does not help job searchers to find permanent jobs (otherwise the 
negative effect on the FTC hazard would have been stronger). Labour market 
entrants, workers having already been employed on FTCs in the past, and work-
ers who have had a large number of jobs, exit into FTCs with a higher probabil-
ity. A further result is that the permanent contract hazard rate is negatively asso-
ciated with the regional unemployment rate, while the unemployment rate seems 
to have no effect on the FTC hazard. Moreover, the duration dependence of the 
permanent contract hazard rate is much more negative than the duration depend-
ence of the FTC hazard rate. The interpretation suggested by the authors is that 
jobs searchers, initially looking for permanent jobs, switch to FTCs after a period 
of unsuccessful search. Note that this is in line with the theoretical predictions of 
Subchapter 6.2 that the decision to take up a FTC job is sequential over time.  
 BOVER and GÓMEZ (2003) use a discrete logistic hazard rate model without 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and distinguish between transitions to 
FTC and permanent contracts in an analysis for Spain. They also find stronger 
negative duration dependence for the FTC hazard rate than for the permanent 
contract hazard rate which is again compatible with the hypothesis mentioned.  
Even though the following studies do not analyse the transitions from unem-
ployment to FTC jobs, their results may be of particular importance. DEKKER   185 
(2000) analyses the effects of entering into unemployment from FTCs (versus 
permanent contracts) on unemployment duration by a discrete hazard rate model 
for Germany and the UK (without distinguishing between the type of contract 
after unemployment). If workers on FTCs were more active in on-the-job search 
than permanent contract workers, FTC workers should experience shorter spells 
of unemployment compared to permanent contract workers when losing their job. 
He finds evidence for a decreasing effect of previous FTCs on unemployment 
duration, which is in line with this hypothesis.  
 In order to test the hypothesis from their theoretical model (see Section 6.2.2), 
CANZIANI and PETRONGOLO (2001) distinguish between different causes for un-
employment  (end  of  non-seasonal  FTC,  end  of  seasonal  FTC,  quit,  and  dis-
missal) in a discrete hazard rate analysis (again without distinguishing between 
FTC and permanent contracts jobs as destination states) for the UK. To the extent 
that lower firing costs indeed lower the stigma attached to adverse employment 
histories, the authors would expect unemployment spells to be shorter after the 
termination of a FTC in comparison to the case of dismissal from a permanent 
position. They find that unemployed who terminated a FTC or quit their previous 
job experience significantly shorter unemployment spells than those who were 
dismissed. The negative effect of dismissal on unemployment duration seems to 
be stronger for older workers. The additional finding that unemployed who pre-
viously held a seasonal FTC (which is an inherently temporary job) have shorter 
unemployment spells than those who previously held a non-seasonal FTC, is in-
terpreted by CANZIANI and PETRONGOLO (2001) as evidence for the hypothesis 
that the failure to get a non-seasonal FTC renewed or converted into a permanent 
contract implies a negative signal, even though a less negative signal than being 
dismissed.     
GÜELL (2000) analyses the effects of the introduction of FTCs in Spain in the 
mid 1980s on the duration dependence of the hazard rate from unemployment to 
employment. This is done by comparing estimation results for the periods before 
and after the introduction of FTCs using a proportional hazard rate model with-
out controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. The results indicate that for short 
unemployment durations (up to 5 months) the probability of leaving unemploy-
ment has increased since the introduction of FTCs. In contrast, for long-term un-
employed the probability of leaving unemployment has been reduced. Put differ-
ently, the availability of FTCs has increased the re-employment probability of 
short-term  unemployed  and  has  decreased  the  re-employment  probabilities  of 
long-term unemployed. Assuming that the reduction in the hazard rate for long-
term unemployed is really caused by the introduction of FTCs159, this result may 
be explained by the theoretical matching model by BOERI (1999), which predicts 
that the reemployment chances of the unemployed are reduced by on-the-job-
                                              
159 As discussed in Section 3.4.1, before-after estimators are based on relatively restrictive identifying 
assumptions.   186 
search of FTC workers (see Subchapter 4.2). A further result is that unemployed 
who have become unemployed because their FTCs were terminated have shorter 
unemployment durations than those who lost their jobs due to other reasons. This 
is in line with the results of DEKKER (2000) as well as CANZIANI and PETRON-
GOLO (2001). 
6.3.3  Modelling Framework: Discrete Competing Risks Hazard Rate 
Model 
The central concept of duration analysis is the hazard rate. The hazard rate is 
the probability that an individual leaves unemployment at a certain time given 
that the individual has stayed unemployed until that time. Since unemployment 
spells are measured on a monthly basis in the underlying dataset (GSOEP, see 
Section 6.3.4), a discrete time hazard rate model instead of a continuous time 
hazard rate model is specified.160 It can be shown that the two approaches yield 
similar results (see NARENDRANATHAN and STEWART, 1993). Different destina-
tion states are distinguished, i.e., an independent competing risks model is esti-
mated. Four destination (exit) states are taken into account: FTC jobs, permanent 
contract jobs (including self-employment)161, on-the-job training (including ap-
prenticeship), and out-of-labour force (including school and university).  
The amount of time spent in unemployment before a transition to another state 
or  right-censoring  occurs  is  denoted  by  T.162  Let  unemployment  duration  be 
grouped into t discrete intervals. T = t if the transition occurs during the interval 
[ ) 1, t t I I -  and T>t  if the spell is (right-)censored (see STEINER, 2001).  
ik T  denotes the time (number of months) an individual i (with  { } 1... i N Î ) has 
spent in her or his k-th unemployment spell (with  { } 1... i k K Î ) before the transi-
tion to another state or right-censoring occurs. The destination-specific hazard 
rate 
j
ik h  is the probability that an individual i leaves her or his k-th unemployment 
spell for state j (with  { } 1,2,3,4 jÎ ) during [ ) 1, t t I I - , given that the spell has lasted 
until the beginning of t-1, and given a vector of observable explanatory variables 
( ) ik x t  either measured at the beginning of the interval or being time-constant. 
Furthermore, there may be unobserved variables  i e , which are discussed below. 
                                              
160 For other examples of discrete time hazard rate models for unemployment duration analysis using the 
GSOEP see HUJER and SCHNEIDER (1996); HUJER, MAURER, and WELLNER (1999); LAUER (2003); 
and STEINER (2001). See LANCASTER (1990); DEVINE and KIEFER (1991); and VAN DEN BERG (2001) 
for a presentation of continuous models.  
161 Due to the sample size a further differentiation between self-employment and paid employment is not 
feasible. For an analysis of the hazard rate into self-employment in West Germany see REIZE (2004). 
Furthermore, the distinction between the types of contracts implies that a differentiation between full-
time and part-time work is not feasible due to the limited sample size.   
162 Right-censoring means that during the period in which the individual is observed, the transition out of 
the current state does not occur (the spell end date is unknown), so that the total length of time be-
tween entry into and exit from the state is unknown.   187 
The destination-specific hazard rate can be written as (see FAHRMEIR and TUTZ, 
2001; STEINER, 2001; LAUER, 2003) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , Pr , , ,
j
ik ik i ik ik ik i h t x t T t D j T t x t e e = = = ³
      
(49) 
with  
1   if transition to FTC occurs;
2  if transition to permanent contract occurs;
3  if transition to training occurs;
4  if transition to out-of-labour force occurs.
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In the next step, a functional form for the hazard rate has to be specified. Fol-
lowing  a  couple  of  studies  using  discrete  time  models,  a  logistic  hazard  rate 
model (also called proportional odds model) is used. Modelling all destination 
states simultaneously leads to the multinomial logit model with random effects 
(see  STEINER,  2001;  FAHRMEIR  and  TUTZ,  2001;  BOVER  and  GÓMEZ,  2003; 
LAUER, 2003): 163    
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The vectors of destination-specific parameters to be estimated are denoted by  j b¢. 
The so-called baseline hazard  ( ) j t a  describes the effect of unemployment dura-
tion on the transitions to the destination states j. An important issue is how to 
model the duration dependence of the hazard rate, i.e., the functional form of the 
baseline hazard  ( ) j t a . Following recent studies, a functional form assumption is 
avoided by specifying the baseline hazard with dummy variables (see STEINER, 
2001; BOVER, ARELLANO, and BENTOLIA, 2002). Since it is, due to the sample 
size, not possible to use a single dummy variable for each month, a so-called 
piecewise constant specification is used in which durations of unemployment are 
grouped together into seven categories and the hazard is assumed to be constant 
within those categories (see MACHIN and MANNING, 1999: 3112). The dummy 
variable specification of the baseline hazard allows the hazard rate to be non-
monotonic and have spikes at some durations.    
As shown by NARENDRANATHAN and STEWART (1993) as well as by BOVER 
and GÓMEZ (2003), the parameters  ( ) j t a  and  j b¢ in Eq. (50) can also be sepa-
rately estimated by four binary logit models for each destination state keeping 
the other states as right-censored.164 In principle, this is an implication of the In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption of the multinomial logit 
                                              
163 A formal derivation of the likelihood function, being based on the method proposed by JENKINS 
(1995), can be found in LAUER (2003).   
164 Of course, it is also possible to estimate a multinomial logit hazard rate model for two destination 
states (FTC and permanent contract) keeping the other states (training, out-of-labour force) as right-
censored.   188 
model (see Section 6.3.5). Both methods provide consistent estimates of the pa-
rameters, although the joint estimation by a multinomial logit is asymptotically 
more efficient.165 A possible advantage of separate estimations is that the pa-
rameters estimated for one of the alternatives are not affected by specification 
errors in the equations of the other alternatives (see BOVER and GÓMEZ, 2003). 
Besides the computational advantage (separate estimation is faster), this is the 
main reason to estimate the propensity score in Subchapter 6.4 by a single logis-
tic hazard rate model for the transition to FTC jobs. The results, presented in Sec-
tion 6.3.5, are estimated by the multinomial logit specification presented in Eq. 
(50). As expected, both approaches produce very similar results.  
It is well-known that omitting unobserved heterogeneity  i e  may bias the esti-
mated coefficients, particularly of the baseline hazard. This typically leads to the 
wrong impression of negative duration dependence (see MACHIN and MANNING, 
1999; LANCASTER, 1990; STEINER, 2001). In contrast, other coefficients seem 
not  to  be  affected  to  a  large  extent  (see  HAM  and  HAUSMAN,  1990;  MEYER 
1990).  
HECKMAN and SINGER (1984) show that estimates from hazard rate models are 
sensitive to the assumed distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. To address 
this concern, they propose a nonparametric method to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity  using  a  discrete  probability  distribution  (see  POWERS  and  XIE, 
2000: 195). This approach assumes that  i e  is an additive heterogeneity term and 
follows an m-point discrete distribution with masspoints  1 e ,…, m e  and associated 
probabilities  ( ) Pr q e , where  
( ) 1Pr 1
m
q q e
= = ∑ ,  ( ) 1Pr 0
m
q q q e e
= = ∑ ,  ( ) ( ) 0 q i E x t e = ,  ( )   1,..., q q m " = .  
The probabilities  ( ) Pr q e  of the masspoints can be interpreted as the proportion 
of the population falling into the q-th heterogeneity group. In practical imple-
mentation one begins with a few points and increases m until the fit of the model 
(evaluated  by  certain  information  criteria)  fails  to  improve  (see  BAKER  and 
MELINO, 2000). 
Due to the limited sample size, the analysis is performed for men and women 
together, which is a serious restriction given the well-known substantial differ-
ences in labour force behaviour. However, differences are taken into account as 
far as possible by allowing important variables to have a sex-specific impact, 
through corresponding interaction effects.   
6.3.4  Data Base and Variables 
The data base for the analysis in this Subchapter as well as Subchapter 6.4 is 
the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel  (GSOEP)  for  the  period  1991–2001.  The 
GSOEP is a representative household survey  of the German  population, con-
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ducted annually.166 A useful feature of the GSOEP is the availability of monthly 
information between annual interviews (so-called calendar). Different employ-
ment  states  are  covered.  This  information  is  gathered  through  a  retrospective 
questioning about what happened during particular months within the year pre-
ceding the interview.  
Unfortunately, the type of contract is not collected on a monthly basis in the 
GSOEP. The survey only asks for the type of contract in the current job at the 
date of the interview. The exact wording is: “Do you have an a priori temporary 
employment relationship or do you have a permanent employment contract?”167 
It is possible to generate monthly information, taking the regulation of FTCs into 
account: Employers are usually not allowed to employ a person with a FTC after 
having employed the same person with a permanent contract.168 Thus while it is 
allowed to transform a fixed-term contract into a permanent one, it is not allowed 
the other way around. Hence, if a person is currently employed with a FTC at her 
or his present employer, she or he was already hired on a fixed-term basis.  
Using this information, the type of contract is not defined for about 30% of all 
transitions from unemployment to employment. These undefined transitions are 
obviously more often short-term (that is the reason why they are not being ob-
served at the months of the interview), so it is likely that FTC spells are missing 
disproportionally often, which may induce a selection problem.169  
It is possible to reduce the amount of undefined transitions to about 18% by us-
ing another variable in the dataset including the reason for the end of the last em-
ployment spell (due to the expiration of a FTC or an apprenticeship contract). 
However,  using  this  information  one  identifies  “unsuccessful”  FTCs  with  a 
higher probability, i.e., those FTCs which do not lead to a long-term employment 
relationship with the same employer. For this reason, the latter information is not 
used for the definition of employment spells. Following ZIJL, HEYMA, and VAN 
                                              
166 Details on the GSOEP can be obtained from the web-server of the German Institute of Economic 
Research (DIW) in Berlin (http://www.diw-berlin.de/soep/). 
167 Until 1995 only employees who reported job changes were asked this question. This is no problem 
for the definition of the transition from unemployment to FTC jobs (see also the discussion in Section 
6.4.4). 
168 Exceptions to this rule are FTCs which are justified by the objective reason ‘at the request of the 
employee’ (see Subchapter 2.2). 
169 To check the significance of this problem, a maximum-likelihood probit model with sample selection 
was estimated (see VAN DE VEN and VAN PRAGG, 1981). In the first probit equation, the transition to 
any type of employment (including undefined spells) is analysed, in the second probit equation the 
FTC hazard rate. The error terms of both equations are assumed to be jointly normally distributed. If 
the correlation of the error terms is not zero, a separate estimation of the FTC hazard rate leads to bi-
ased results. This is checked by performing LR-tests. Various estimations with different exclusion re-
strictions were performed. Since all LR-tests in all specifications showed that the correlation of the 
error terms is not significantly different from zero, it may be concluded that the estimated FTC haz-
ard rate model is probably not biased by the sampling scheme since the selection effects are either 
captured by observable variables, or there is no selection bias at all.    190 
DEN BERG (2004), unemployment spells ending in employment spells with unde-
fined type of employment contract are simply excluded from the analysis. 
For the interpretation of the results one should keep in mind that very short 
FTC spells are likely to be underrepresented. These short-term spells may, on the 
one hand, be ‘precarious’ FTC jobs in the sense that they are associated with a 
short contract duration. On the other hand, there may be short FTC spells leading 
to permanent positions at the same employer after a short time which are mis-
classified as jobs starting with a permanent contract.  
The estimation sample consists of individuals registered as unemployed for at 
least one month between January 1991 and December 2000. In order to obtain an 
inflow  sample  only  spells  are  used  which  start  after  January  1991,  i.e.,  left-
censored spells are excluded (see HUJER, MAURER, and WELLNER, 1999). Since 
several formal and informal early-retirement measures exist in Germany, only 
persons not older than 58 years are included. The minimum age for being in the 
sample is 18 years. One may argue that this is, given the comparatively long pe-
riod of education in Germany, too young to ensure that only unemployed persons 
are included who are really job searchers. However, it is interesting to include 
younger workers since temporary jobs may be important for the transition from 
school or apprenticeship to work (see RYAN, 2001). Due to the limited sample 
size the public sector is not excluded.  
In order to distinguish regular FTCs from public employment measures, the lat-
ter are defined as unemployment spells in the analyses. This definition seems to 
be reasonable as a certain duration of unemployment usually is a necessary con-
dition for participation. Table 50 displays the number of transitions and the aver-
age duration of the unemployment spells. 
Table 50: Duration of Completed Unemployment Spells by Kind of Transition 
Transition to   Mean   Standard 
Deviation 
25 percen-
tile 
Median  75 per-
centile 
No. 
FTC  8.766  9.078          3  6  11  349 
Permanent contract  8.087  7.891  3  6  10  767 
Training   8.936  9.027  3  6  11  235 
Out-of-labour-force  12.589  12.486  4  9  15  597 
Note: The figures are based on the estimation sample of the duration models estimated in this 
Subchapter. 
Source: Own estimations based on the GSOEP.  
 
An overview of the explanatory variables being mostly time varying is de-
picted in Table 51. In addition to demographic characteristics (age, sex, national-
ity, disabilities, marital status), variables on formal qualification and previous 
labour market experience are included, which may be important signals for em-
ployers and which are likely to capture individual heterogeneity of the unem-
ployed job searchers. The duration of the last employment and unemployment 
spell  is  included  (accounting  for  possible  lagged  duration  dependence,  see   191 
HECKMAN and BORJAS, 1980). Furthermore, the number of previous unemploy-
ment  spells  is  included  in  order  to  control  for  ‘occurrence  dependence’.  For 
checking whether or not there is state dependence in the type of the employment 
contract, a dummy variable indicating if the person has ever held a FTC before 
and dummy variables describing the reason for the end of the last employment 
contract (‘due to end of a FTC or apprenticeship contract’ and ‘due to dismissal’) 
are included.  
The monthly federal state unemployment rate is included to control for regional 
labour market conditions.170 Further regional differences should be captured by 
regional dummies. However, they turn out to be insignificant in all specifications 
and are dropped. Furthermore, fixed time effects (annual dummy variables) as 
well as seasonal effects (quarterly dummy variables) are included. Descriptive 
statistics of the explanatory variables can be found in Table 79 in the Appendix.  
The  German  system  of  unemployment  compensation  consisted  of  two  parts 
during the period under observation, unemployment benefit (‘Arbeitslosengeld’) 
and unemployment assistance (‘Arbeitslosenhilfe’). A problem arises due to the 
fact that exact monthly income information (and therefore also unemployment 
benefit and assistance) is only available for the time before 1996. From 1996 on 
people were only asked whether or not they had received unemployment com-
pensation in the preceding calendar year and how much the monthly amount was. 
Thus there is a trade-off between the omission of important variables on the one 
hand, and significant measurement errors on the other. I decided to include only 
dummy variables indicating if an unemployed person receives no unemployment 
benefit or no unemployment assistance in the year of the unemployment spell. 
This is obviously a very crude measure. Furthermore, it neglects the fact that not 
the actual receipt but the potential benefit entitlement to unemployment compen-
sation is relevant for the reservation wage and the decision to accept a job offer 
(see HUNT, 1995).171 Variables affecting potential benefit entitlement (previous 
employment history) are directly included.  
The amount of unemployment benefit and assistance is also not directly mod-
elled since it is again not available on a monthly scale. Hence, the net income of 
the household (which is again collected for the preceding year) including unem-
ployment compensation but excluding earnings of the individual is included.172 
 
                                              
170 Obviously, it would be more suitable to use regional units, which approximate regional labour mar-
kets more accurate (for example travel-to-work-areas). Unfortunately, the necessary information is 
not included in the GSOEP.     
171 STEINER (1997) calculates the potential benefit entitlement by combining monthly calendar data and 
retrospectively collected employment information. This approach is not adopted in the subsequent 
analysis in order to avoid measurement errors. 
172 In other studies dealing with unemployment duration analysis more sophisticated approaches for the 
treatment of the unemployment compensation are applied (see, for example, STEINER,  2001 or REIZE, 
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Table 51: Explanatory Variables 
Variable  Definition  
Baseline hazard (unemploy-
ment duration) 
7 categories:  
1 month (base category), 2-3 months, 4-6 months, 7-9 months, 10-12 
months, 13-18 months,  ³19 months  
Formal qualification  Highest formal qualification: 
no occupational qualification (ohne Berufsausbildung) 
vocational qualification (Berufsausbildung / Lehre) (base category) 
master craftsman (Meister) 
university graduate (including polytechnic) (Uni- oder FH-Abschluss) 
Marital status, household com-
position 
Cohabitating couple (Base category) 
married 
no partner 
children  < 16 (dummy variable indicating children under age 16) 
Reason for end of previous job  quit last job (base category) 
end of FTC or apprenticeship contract 
dismissed 
Previous labour market state  employed (base category) 
out-of-labour-force  
training or school  
Duration of previous employ-
ment spell 
6 categories:  
1–2 months (base category), 3–5 months, 6–8 months, 9–11 months, 
12–20 months, ³ 21 months 
Previous unemployment  
experiences 
duration of previous unemployment spell (months) 
number of previous unemployment spells  
number of previous unemployment spells (squared) 
Already a FTC before  dummy variable indicating if the individual has ever been employed on 
a FTC before 
Public sector before  dummy variables indicating if the individual was previously employed in 
the public sector  
Log net household income  natural logarithm of the present net income of the household (collected 
for the preceding year) including unemployment benefit  and unem-
ployment assistance but excluding earned income by the individual 
No unemployment benefit  
No unemployment assistance 
not in receipt of any unemployment benefit (‘Arbeitslosengeld’) / assis-
tance (‘Arbeitslosenhilfe’) in the current year  
Log regional unemployment 
rate 
natural logarithm of the unemployment rate in the federal state (place 
of residence) on a monthly basis reported by the Federal Employment 
Office 
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6.3.5  Estimation Results of the Competing Risks Hazard Rate Model 
Note that the choice and specification of the included explanatory variables is 
rather motivated by the purpose to fulfil the CIA than by considerations concern-
ing the clarity of the results. For example, while the duration of the previous un-
employment spell is included as a continuous variable as a second order polyno-
mial, the duration of the previous employment spell is included as dummy vari-
ables. The decisions concerning the specification of explanatory variables result 
from specification tests (fit statistics, LR-tests), balancing property tests as al-
ready applied in Chapter 5, and pre-program tests (see Subchapter 3.5).  
The model is estimated both without unobserved individual heterogeneity ( i e  is 
restricted to be zero) and with unobserved heterogeneity as a kind of robustness 
check.173 However, in case of the specification with unobserved heterogeneity 
the  simultaneous  estimation  of  a  model  containing  all  destination  states  by 
maximum likelihood proved to be infeasible due to the amount of computing 
time. Therefore, in order to test the significance of unobserved heterogeneity, 
only two destination states are explicitly modelled in a first step, that is, the tran-
sition to FTC and permanent jobs, defining the other states as right-censored.  
The question arises how many mass points are appropriate for a correct specifi-
cation. Since the likelihood ratio test for the existence of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity is not applicable under the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity, the 
model with the highest Information Criterion is chosen (see BAKER and MELINO, 
2000; REIZE, 2004), defined as 
AIC    = ln likelihood – number of parameters  
BIC    = ln likelihood – number of parameters x ln(N)/2  
HQIC = ln likelihood – number of parameters x ln(ln(N)) 
with N denoting the number of observations.174  
Table 52: Model Choice on the Basis of Information Criteria  
     
Number of 
parameters  ln likelihood  AIC  BIC  HQIC 
No heterogeneity  110  -4522.521  -4632.521  -5073.333  -4775.97 
2 mass points  112  -4520.232  -4634.232  -5091.073  -4782.89 
Notes: Based on the estimations in Table 80. 
Source: Own estimations based on the GSOEP. 
 
Table 52 depicts that omitting the mass points maximises the information crite-
ria, i.e., controlling for unobserved heterogeneity does not lead to a better fit. The 
estimation results depicted in Table 80 in the Appendix document that control-
                                              
173 I thank my former colleague Frank Reize for putting his STATA programms for the HECKMAN and 
SINGER (1984) estimator at my disposal (see REIZE, 2004).  
174 AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion, HQIC denotes the Hannan-Quin Criterion, and BIC is the 
Bayesian Criterion.     194 
ling for unobserved heterogeneity does not alter the results. Focussing on the 
baseline hazard one can see that the level of the estimated coefficients is affected, 
but not the pattern. Given these results it is not controlled for unobserved hetero-
geneity in the following. 
In contrast, STEINER (2001) finds that three mass points for men and two mass 
points for women lead to the best fit. However, he does only take one exit state 
for men (employment) and two for women (employment and out-of-labour force) 
into account. Thus increasing the number of exit states may decrease the amount 
of omitted heterogeneity and, therefore, the necessity to model unobserved het-
erogeneity (see GROOT, 1990). A further explanation may be that various vari-
ables on previous labour market experiences are used in this analysis, which may 
capture unobserved heterogeneity as well.  
The estimation result of the multinomial logistic hazard rate model (with four 
destination states and without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity) are de-
picted in Table 81 in the Appendix. The log-likelihood ratio test proposed by 
CRAMER  and  RIDDER  (1991)  confirms  that  the  differences  in  the  destination-
specific regression coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, 
FTC and permanent contract jobs are indeed behaviourally distinct states. Fur-
thermore, a Hausman test on the IIA assumption of the multinomial logit is per-
formed (see HAUSMAN and MCFADDEN, 1984).175 The null hypothesis of inde-
pendence cannot be rejected at the 1% level, which suggests the applicability of 
the multinomial logit model.    
A further issue is the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. It is well-
known (and can be seen from differentiating Eq. (50) with respect to  ( ) ik x t ) that 
the coefficients estimated by multinomial logit models cannot be interpreted as 
marginal effects and that even the direction of the effects is not determined by the 
estimated coefficients (see WOOLDRIDGE, 2002). Therefore, relative risk ratios 
(odds ratios) are estimated defining exit into permanent contracts as base cate-
gory. These are depicted besides estimated marginal effects of the estimated co-
efficients (evaluated at the means of the X covariates and expressed as percent-
ages) in Table 53.176  
The following results seems to be of particular interest (Table 53): 
There is no clear-cut pattern of duration dependence in the transition to FTCs 
and permanent contracts (see the baseline hazard). If one focuses on long-term 
unemployed (at least 13 months), there is a tendency for positive duration de-
pendence in the FTC hazard rate and negative duration dependence in the perma-
                                              
175 IIA means “Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives” assumption, which is the major restriction to 
multinomial logit models. The IIA implies that the ratio of the choice probabilities of any two alterna-
tives is entirely unaffected by changing the characteristics of any other alternative or adding another 
alternative (see WOOLDRDIGE, 2002: Section 15.9.2).  
176 Due to the very time consuming calculations it turned out to be infeasible to calculate standard errors 
for the marginal effects. Therefore, the t-values of the corresponding coefficients (Table 81 in the 
Appendix) are reported.   195 
nent contract hazard rate. This result is in line with the theoretical considerations 
of  Section  6.2.2:  Unemployed  job-searchers  enter  into  FTC  jobs  after  having 
failed to get a permanent job or after not expecting to receive a permanent job 
offer with a sufficiently high probability any more.   
The variables end of previous job due to expiration of a FTC or apprenticeship 
contract and already a FTC before have significantly positive effects on the tran-
sition to FTCs, but not on the transition to permanent contracts. This result seems 
to be of particular relevance as DEKKER (2000) finds that having held a FTC be-
fore the unemployment spell increases the hazard rate and interprets this as evi-
dence in favour of more on-the-job search activities (see Section 6.3.2). CAN-
ZIANI and PETRONGOLO (2001) find that losing ones job due to the expiration of 
a FTC increases the hazard rate and interpret this as evidence in favour of their 
hypothesis that the termination of a FTC employment relationship is less stigma-
tised than being dismissed from a permanent contract job. However, the results 
depicted in Table 53 suggest that only the FTC hazard but not the permanent 
contract hazard rate increases.  
In the same way, end of previous job due to dismissal has a positive effect and 
end of previous job due to expiration of a FTC or apprenticeship contract has a 
negative effect on the permanent contract hazard rate. The results are more in line 
with theories predicting that FTCs are associated with an adverse signal, forcing 
workers to enter again into a FTC (see Section 6.2.2). There is, however, an al-
ternative interpretation: individuals who did not pass the transition from appren-
ticeship (which may also be interpreted as a kind of probationary period) to per-
manent contract employment within a firm have to enter into an additional proba-
tionary period, that is, a FTC (see RYAN, 2001).177  
The negative effect of the variable end of previous job due to dismissal on the 
relative risk of entering into a FTC job instead of a permanent contract job is also 
in line with prediction of the theoretical model by VAN DE KLUNDERT (1990), 
described in Section 6.2.2.  
Typical characteristics having been found to prolong unemployment duration in 
other studies, such as disabilities, being a foreigner, being mother with young 
children,178 do not affect the FTC hazard rate, but have a significantly negative 
effect on the permanent contract hazard rate. Put differently, the relative risk of 
entering into a FTC instead of a permanent contract is 2.0 for disabled persons 
(relative to persons without disabilities), 1.5 for foreigners (relative to Germans) 
and 1.9 for women with children (relative to men without children). The incen-
tive to hire disabled job searchers on FTCs (instead of on permanent contracts) is 
likely to be enforced by the special dismissal protection for these persons (see 
Subchapter 2.2). Furthermore, unemployed who previously were out of the la-
                                              
177 See MCGINNITY and MERTENS (2003) for a general discussion of the role of FTCs for the entry into 
the labour market for younger workers.   
178 See, for example, HUJER and SCHNEIDER (1996) as well as STEINER (2001).   196 
bour force or employed in the public sector enter into FTCs with a higher prob-
ability.  
The regional (monthly) unemployment rate affects the permanent job hazard 
rate more negatively than the FTC job hazard rate. The same is found by PORTU-
GAL and ADDISON (2003) for Portugal (see Section 6.3.2). Assuming that the 
unemployment rate serves as a proxy for regional labour demand, the result for 
the FTC hazard may be interpreted as the sum of two opposed effects: (1.) lower 
labour demand is associated with less job offers and thus a lower FTC hazard 
rate; (2.) given the lower labour demand (associated with less permanent job of-
fers) job searchers are more likely to accept FTC job offers. Assuming further-
more that the unemployment rate also serves as a proxy for the regional business 
conditions an interpretation in line with the empirical results of Subchapter 4.5 
would be that firms hire more workers on FTCs during economic downturn. Fi-
nally, firms may prefer a low turnover strategy using permanent workers in re-
gional labour markets with low unemployment rates in order to minimise search 
costs (see Subchapter 4.2).  
As  previously  mentioned,  the  estimated  positive  coefficients  of  the  dummy 
variables for not receiving unemployment benefit and assistance should not be 
interpreted as causal effects. However, the estimated baseline hazard may also be 
interpreted as being affected by an entitlement effect: There is a strong increase 
in the FTC hazard during months 10–12 of unemployment duration which is not 
associated with a similar increase in the permanent contract hazard rate (see the 
odds ratios for months 7–9 and months 10–12 in Table 53). As unemployment 
benefit is not controlled on a monthly basis, the unemployment benefit effect 
may partly be captured by the baseline hazard. For many individuals the entitle-
ment period for the receipt of unemployment benefit expires  after having re-
ceived it for 12 months (see STEINER, 1997). This is in line with the hypothesis 
that job searchers are more willing to accept FTC job offers once they are not 
entitled to unemployment benefit any more. Put differently, if the search subsidy 
(unemployment  benefit)  for  good  (permanent)  jobs  expires,  job  searchers  are 
willing to accept bad (FTC) job offers. However, this conclusion may be too far-
reaching given that the baseline hazard is likely to capture a number of unob-
served variables. 
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Table 53: Estimation Results of the (Multinomial Logistic) Competing Risks 
Hazard Rate Model With All Exit States  
– Marginal Effects and Relative Risk Ratios 
  X  
 
Exit into 
FTC 
Exit into           
PERM 
Relative Risk of 
entering into 
FTC versus 
PERM 
    Marg. eff. 
x 100 
“t-
stat” 
Marg. eff 
x 100 
“t-
stat” 
Odds 
ratio 
t-stat 
Baseline hazard               
   Month  2 – 3  0.153   0.539   3.39    2.424   8.04  0.680  -1.91 
   Month  4 – 6  0.168   0.481   3.01   1.802   6.15  0.775  -1.20 
   Month  7 – 9  0.121   0.286   1.65   2.225   6.29  0.584  -2.12 
   Month 10 – 12  0.086   0.933   3.88   2.270   5.51  0.948  -0.19 
   Month 13 – 18   0.106   0.544   2.43   2.833   6.57  0.628  -1.62 
   Month ³ 19  0.169   0.853   3.50   1.688   4.08  1.068   0.22 
Age    39.212  -0.129  -0.76  -0.278  -1.09  0.996  -0.02 
Age
2 / 1,000  17.092   0.520   1.10   1.084   1.55  1.038   0.05 
Age
3 / 100,000   80.778  -0.067  -1.60  -0.137  -2.23  0.993  -0.11 
No occupational qualification  0.421  -0.317  -2.96  -0.782  -4.73  1.045   0.27 
Master craftsman  0.045  -0.127  -0.58    0.311   0.90  0.729  -0.97 
University graduate  0.064   0.487   2.61     0.538   1.89  1.234   0.95 
Female  0.492  -0.019  -0.06   0.215   0.54  0.871  -0.35 
Disabled  0.117   0.093   0.54  -0.895  -3.36  2.004   2.63 
Foreigner  0.365   0.063   0.44  -0.630  -3.78  1.527   2.61 
Married  0.633   0.188   0.94  -0.072  -0.25  1.306   0.95 
Married x female  0.311  -0.297  -1.13  -0.121  -0.27  0.734  -0.80 
No partner   0.299  -0.198  -1.10  -0.539  -1.96  1.061   0.22 
No partner x female  0.147   0.537   1.65   0.629   1.38  1.249   0.58 
Children < 16  0.398  -0.082  -0.56   0.007  -0.02  0.903  -0.46 
Children x female  0.217    0.003   0.01  -0.983  -3.51  1.855   2.06 
Prev. job: end of FTC or apprenticeship  0.104   0.819   3.60   0.472   1.49  1.625   1.89 
Prev. job: end of FTC or appr. x female  0.053  -0.352  -1.86  -0.340  -0.91  0.725  -0.89 
Prev Job: dismissed  0.260   0.217   1.31   1.391   5.41  0.680  -1.74 
Prev Job: dismissed x female  0.119  -0.044  -0.19  -0.471  -1.61  1.253   0.70 
Out-of-labour-force before  0.196   0.526   1.93  -0.247  -0.59   1.936   1.91 
Out-of-labour-force before x female  0.128  -0.420  -1.82  -0.716  -1.67  0.845  -0.39 
Training or school before  0.127   0.449   2.39   0.414   1.62  1.274   1.06 
Duration of prev. unemployment spell  3.300  -0.015  -1.68  -0.018  -1.46  0.992  -0.62 
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... Table 53 continued 
  X  
 
Exit into 
FTC 
Exit into           
PERM 
Relative Risk of 
entering into 
FTC versus 
PERM 
    Marg. eff 
x 100 
“t-
stat” 
Marg. eff. 
x 100 
“t-
stat” 
odds 
ratio 
t-stat 
Prev. employment spell 3–5 months  0.047   0.953   3.43   0.822   2.27  1.500    1.43 
Prev. employment spell 6–8 months  0.055   0.642   2.53   -0.206  -0.51  2.002    2.32 
Prev. employment spell 9–11 months  0.029   0.282   1.09   2.055   4.44  0.631   -1.38 
Prev. employment spell 12–20 months  0.047   0.241   1.05   0.874   2.43   0.875   -0.45 
Prev. employment spell ³ 21 months  0.182    0.199   1.30   0.756   3.35  0.870   -0.69 
Already a FTC before  0.115   0.403   2.69   -0.280  -1.34  1.757    3.02 
Public sector before  0.102   0.358   2.25  -0.128  -0.53  1.544    2.13 
Number of prev. unemployment spells  0.818  -0.057  -0.78  -0.033  -0.28  0.952   -0.50 
Number of prev. unemployment spells
2  2.602   0.017   1.90   0.031   2.20  1.003    0.28 
Log net household income  7.253    -0.049  -2.65  -0.042  -1.38  0.965   -1.35 
No unemployment benefit  0.449   0.256   2.62   0.874   5.59  0.857   -1.04 
No unemployment assistance  0.808   0.619   5.19   1.690   8.40  0.744   -1.22 
Log regional unemployment rate   2.222  -0.046  -0.28  -1.108  -3.65  1.709    1.88 
Spell started in first quarter  0.347  -0.517  -4.46  -0.870  -4.69  0.845   -0.92 
Spell started in second quarter  0.273  -0.454  -3.88  -0.690  -3.77  0.813   -1.09 
Spell started in third quarter  0.209  -0.269  -2.27   -0.270  -1.39  0.819   -1.07 
1992  0.069   0.044   0.13   0.310   0.65  0.902   -0.19 
1993  0.104  -0.008  -0.00   -0.339  -0.72  1.203    0.34 
1994  0.134   0.415   0.94   0.058   0.16   1.472    0.75 
1995  0.135    0.237   0.58  -0.031  -0.02  1.312    0.52 
1996  0.141   0.214   0.50  -0.360  -0.78  1.549    0.83 
1997  0.139   0.196   0.48   0.214   0.45  1.110    0.20 
1998  0.116   0.894   1.71   0.042   0.16  2.108    1.42 
1999  0.088    0.751   1.51   0.967   1.79  1.265    0.45 
2000  0.048  1.924   2.93  3.254   4.56  1.209  0.37 
Note:  X  denotes means of explanatory variables. The marginal effects are calculated at the 
mean values of continuous variables and for discrete changes of dummy variables from 0 to 1. 
The “t-stat” stems from the corresponding coefficients in Table 81 in the Appendix. The odds 
ratio is the exponential of the corresponding coefficient defining “exit into permanent contracts” 
as base category. 
Reference category: men, cohabiting with a partner, vocational training, no children, not dis-
abled, German nationality, previous job quit, never a FTC job before, previous employment spell 
1-2 months, not out-of-labour before, not in training or school before, receives unemployment 
benefit or assistance, unemployment spell started in fourth quarter, calendar year is 1991, un-
employed for only 1 month. 
Source: Own estimations based on the GSOEP (see Table 81 in the Appendix). 
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6.3.6  Summary: Fixed-Term Contracts and the Re-Employment Prob-
abilities of the Unemployed 
The empirical findings of the competing risks hazard rate model can be summa-
rised as follows. Typical characteristics which have been found to prolong un-
employment duration in other studies, such as disabilities, being a foreigner, or 
being a mother with young children, do not affect the FTC hazard rate, but have a 
negative effect on the permanent contract hazard. Furthermore, the distinction 
between types of contracts has allowed to show that the duration dependence of 
the FTC hazard is rather positive (after 13 months of unemployment), whereas 
the duration dependence of the permanent contract hazard is rather negative. This 
is in line with the hypothesis in Subchapter 6.2 that job searchers enter into FTC 
jobs after having failed to receive permanent job offers. Thus FTCs may be ‘en-
try jobs’ for unemployed job searchers with low employment chances. However, 
it should be kept in mind that the analysis in this subchapter has not been based 
on a comparison with a counterfactual situation, that is, a world in which FTCs 
are not available. Such a counterfactual is not observable in the period under ob-
servation since all unemployed job searchers can enter into FTCs. Put differently, 
it  is  possible  that  the  same  workers  would  enter  into  permanent  contracts,  if 
FTCs were not available. In the same way, it is not possible to infer from the re-
sults anything about the effect of FTCs on duration dependence of the overall 
hazard rate.179 Hence, it is not possible to draw the conclusion that the existence 
of FTCs reduces unemployment duration. At most, the results can be interpreted 
as a first hint.   
Previous studies have found that having been employed on a FTC in the previ-
ous job decreases unemployment duration by increasing the transition rate from 
unemployment to employment (see Section 6.3.2). The theoretical interpretation 
of these results is either higher on-the-job search during FTC jobs, or reduced 
stigma in comparison to being dismissed from a permanent job. The distinction 
between types of contracts in the hazard rate analysis of this subchapter has re-
vealed that the positive effect on the hazard rate is only statistically significant 
for transitions to FTC jobs. Put differently, having previously been employed on 
a FTC decreases only the unemployment duration of those individuals who enter 
into a FTC again. This seems not to be compatible with the hypothesis of stigma 
due  to  firing  costs  of  permanent  contracts  as  suggested  by  CANZIANI  and 
PETRONGOLO (2001). This result is more in line with the predictions of dual la-
bour market theories, such as the model by VAN DE KLUNDERT (1990), discussed 
in Section 6.2.2.   
                                              
179 This is analysed by GÜELL (2000) for Spain using a before-after (the introduction of FTCs) approach 
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6.4  Effects of Entering into Fixed-Term Contract Jobs: Are Fixed-Term 
Contracts Stepping Stones? 
6.4.1  Introduction 
After having analysed what makes an unemployed entering into a FTC (instead 
of a permanent contract), this subchapter evaluates whether and to what extent 
FTCs serve as stepping stones. The subchapter is structured as follows. The next 
section summarises studies estimating the causal effect of entering into tempo-
rary  jobs  on  future  employment  opportunities.  Section  6.4.3  discusses  the 
econometric approach and particularly how a propensity score matching estima-
tor has to be augmented in order to fit into the application at hand. Section 6.4.5 
presents the estimation results of the propensity score and Section 6.4.6 presents 
the estimated effects of entering into FTCs on future employment prospects for 
the total sample and different subsamples of workers. A summary and discussion 
is provided in Section 6.4.7.   
6.4.2  Previous Studies: Causal Effects of Fixed-Term Contracts on Future 
Employment Prospects 
Currently, there are only few empirical studies attempting to identify the causal 
effects of entering into FTCs on future employment opportunities of job search-
ers. On the one hand, there are studies evaluating the employment effects of sub-
sidised temporary employment relationships which are promoted by public em-
ployment offices (see LECHNER et al. 2001; GERFIN, LECHNER, and STEIGER, 
2002). On the other hand, there are studies analysing the determinants of the du-
ration of unsubsidised180 temporary employment relationships (see, e.g., GÜELL 
and PETRONGOLO, 2003) and the determinants of the transition to other labour 
market  states  (see,  e.g.,  ALBA-RAMÌREZ,  1998;  GIESECKE  and  GROß,  2002; 
AMUEDO-DORANTES, 2000). Although the latter studies may shed light on the 
determinants of a temporary employment relationship to be successful in terms of 
the transition to a permanent contract job, they are not informative with respect to 
the question whether it is beneficial for an unemployed job searcher to take up a 
temporary  job  (in  terms  of  the  subsequent  employment  probability).  In  most 
studies there is no comparison with a suitable counterfactual to holding a FTC 
and thus causal statements are not possible. 
To the best of my knowledge, there are only five studies analysing the causal 
effects of unsubsidised FTC jobs on future employment opportunities. The study 
by BRODATY, CRÉPON, and FOUGÈRE (2001) compares the employment effects 
of youth employment programmes with FTCs in France by matching estimators. 
                                              
180 Here unsubsidised means that temporary jobs are not active labour market programmes in the sense 
that they are sponsored by the public employment office.      201 
It  turns  out  that  FTC  jobs  are  more  effective  than  employment  programmes. 
However, the study does not make a comparison to unemployed who do not par-
ticipate in any programme or who do not enter into FTCs, respectively.  
All the other studies apply multivariate hazard rate models comparing the direct 
transitions from unemployment to permanent contracts with indirect transitions 
via a FTC job. Selection on unobservables is taken into account by estimating a 
simultaneous model for all transitions and allowing the errors terms of the transi-
tions to be correlated. The multivariate hazard rate approaches, such as the one 
proposed by ABBRING and VAN DEN BERG (2003), have the advantage that the 
estimated effect is allowed to vary with the duration of the treatment (FTC job). 
This may lead to additional insights (see VAN DEN BERG, HOLM, and VAN OURS, 
2002):  Given  an  overall  positive  treatment  effect,  an  effect  increasing  with 
elapsed duration of the FTC can be interpreted as the result of accumulation of 
human capital or increasing net-working. If the treatment effect decreases with 
elapsed duration of the treatment, this may indicate a prevailing stigma effect.  
VAN DEN BERG, HOLM, and VAN OURS (2002) analyse a special kind of tempo-
rary job scheme in the Netherlands which is open for medical students searching 
for trainee positions to get work experience. The question is if these temporary 
jobs help students to get a position as a trainee more quickly. In order to deal 
with selection on unobervables, all possible transitions between the three states 
(searching, temporary job, and trainee position) are simultaneously estimated by 
a multivariate duration model. The temporary job is found to help students to get 
a trainee position faster. As there is evidence in favour of negative duration de-
pendence of the transition rate from the tempory job to the trainee position, the 
overall positve treatment effect is explained by positive signals for potential em-
ployers and not by human capital accumulation or networking.  
The same estimation approach is adopted by ZIJL, HEYMA, and VAN DEN BERG 
(2004) for the question whether FTCs are stepping stones for the unemployed in 
the Netherlands. Three destination states (unemployment, temporary jobs, per-
manent jobs) are taken into account and all possible transitions between them are 
modelled, again allowing the error terms to be correlated. It again turns out that 
FTCs are indeed stepping stones: unemployed find permanent positions  more 
quickly than without the intermediate FTC jobs. Since it is found that the transi-
tion from a FTC job to regular employment increases with job tenure, the authors 
conclude that the accumulation of human capital and the increasing size of the 
network may be relevant.  
CHALMERS and KALB (2000) analyse for Australia whether taking up a casual 
job (which is a broader definition than a FTC job) increases the probability of 
getting a permanent job. They apply the approach of VAN DEN BERG, HOLM, and 
VAN OURS (2002) and find stepping stone effects. The positive effect is greater 
for men and for less educated. Furthermore, in line with the studies already men-
tioned, they find that the positive effect is positively associated with the duration 
of the casual job.    202 
A multivariate hazard rate model is also applied by BONNAL, FOUGÈRE, and 
SÉRANDON (1997) for unemployed youth in France. It turns out that entering into 
a FTC job increases the probability of holding a permanent contract in the future.  
The results of the empirical studies can be summarised as follows: All studies 
using a clear-cut counterfactual (that is, a control group of untreated) find a step-
ping stone effect. Interestingly, the conclusion that FTCs lead to a segmented 
labour market is found only in studies which do not make use of a well-defined 
control group as an estimate for the counterfactual situation.   
6.4.3  Econometric Approach 
The previous subchapter has analysed the determinants of the transition from 
unemployment to FTC jobs. These estimates are used as a starting point for the 
estimation of the propensity score for the matching estimator. The question is: 
What effect do FTCs have on employment opportunities of the former unem-
ployed? This question can be restated: How do the employment opportunities of 
unemployed persons change due to the fact they enter into FTCs instead of con-
tinue searching? As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, one can apply matching 
methods in order to answer this question. Here, propensity score matching using 
a discrete hazard rate model for the estimation of the propensity score is applied. 
In the following subsections it is discussed why this is a reasonable approach.  
First of all, it is necessary to carefully define the treatment. In this analysis the 
treatment is defined as transition from unemployment to a FTC job. Hence, fur-
ther attributes of the FTC job, such as the duration of the contract, the wage, or 
the working conditions, are not taken into account, i.e., many very heterogeneous 
jobs are pooled into one treatment.181     
6.4.3.1  The Counterfactuals of Interest and the Policy Questions 
To apply the matching methods, described in Section 3.3.1, to the evaluation of 
the effects of FTCs one has to take the following features of the dataset into ac-
count (see Section 6.3.4 for a description of the dataset used): 
(1.) If an unemployed person does not enter into a FTC job after a certain unem-
ployment duration, she or he can enter into a FTC job in a later month, or in 
a following unemployment spell. Thus a person may function as a potential 
                                              
181 Note that focusing on previously unemployed individuals already reduces the heterogeneity in com-
parison to other studies dealing with the effects of FTCs. Furthermore, also in studies which evaluate 
different labour market programmes it is common to pool at least some measures into one category, 
since it is, for example, in case of training programmes impossible to interpret every type and topic of 
training as a separate treatment. Within an extension of the methodological framework used it would 
be possible to differentiate between different types of FTC jobs, for example, between jobs with long 
and short FTCs or jobs with low or high skill requirements (see LECHNER, 2001b for the foundation 
of the so-called multiple treatments approach). The scale of the dataset is, however, too small for the 
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control after a particular duration of unemployment as well as a treated per-
son at a later point in time.  
(2.) The starting date of the treatment is not unique, i.e., FTC jobs can be entered 
in each month between 1991 and 2000.  
(3.) The date of the inflow into unemployment is not unique. Hence, not only the 
starting date of the treatment differs but also the unemployment duration be-
fore the treatment.  
(4.) There is not only one possible treatment per person, but persons can enter 
into FTCs more than once (after becoming unemployed again). 
(5.) Due to the fact that an unemployed person who has entered into a FTC (and 
is therefore a treated person) can become unemployed again, she or he can 
also become a control for another treated person. 
The implications of these issues are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. It is 
explained why the application of hazard rate models for the estimation of the 
propensity score may be a suitable approach.  
Definition of the Counterfactual and the ‘Non-Treatment’ State 
After having defined the treatment as transition from unemployment to a FTC 
job the question arises what the appropriate counterfactual is. Point (1.) and Point 
(5.) mentioned above illustrate the necessity of having a clear-cut counterfactual. 
In general, one can think of two different counterfactuals linked to the decisions 
of job searchers, implying different policy questions (see the summary in Table 
54).182  
A first possible job searcher’s decision may be (depending on the characteris-
tics of the individual and the attributes of the desired job offers) never to enter 
into a FTC job. This would imply a non-treatment group of unemployed indi-
viduals who never enter into FTCs. This definition is in line with the design in 
most evaluation studies in which the control group consists of people who never 
participate in the evaluated programme (during the period under observation). 
The corresponding policy question is, whether the existence of the institution 
‘fixed-term contract’ helps unemployed to find stable (permanent contract) em-
ployment relationships. This kind of non-treatment definition is referred to as 
Definition 1 (DEF.1) in the following. Untreated individuals according to DEF.1 
are individuals who never enter into FTCs within the whole period of time they 
are observed in the dataset used.   
A second possible behaviour of job searchers, which is more in line with the 
concept of sequential job search discussed in Subchapter 6.2, may be to enter into 
FTCs after having failed to find a permanent contract job for several months of 
unemployment,  and  when expecting a permanent job offer only  with a suffi-
ciently low probability. This means that an untreated person with a particular un-
employment duration can become a treated person at a later point of time in his 
                                              
182 See HECKMAN, LALONDE, and SMITH (1999: Subchapter 3.2) for a general discussion on this issue.    204 
or her unemployment spell and can therefore be a treated person as well as a con-
trol person. SIANESI (2004) proposed this definition of non-treatment in the con-
text of the evaluation of active labour market policy in Sweden. The methodo-
logical problem is that almost every unemployed person in Sweden participates 
in a programme sooner or later, so the non-treatment DEF.1 seems not to be a 
reasonable concept. She states that the reason for an unemployed individual not 
to participate in a programme is that she or he has found a job before. Therefore, 
the participation decision is sequential over time. This, however, implies that in-
dividuals who have never participated are those who were successful in finding a 
(permanent) job before. Non-treatment DEF.1 may, therefore, bias the estimated 
treatment effect towards negative values since it implicitly conditions on the out-
come variable (see FREDRIKSSON and JOHANSSON, 2003).183   
The idea of a sequential participation decision can be applied to the evaluation 
of the effects of FTCs. Assuming a unique inflow date into unemployment for all 
individuals and letting  1 T  denote the duration of an unemployment spell before an 
individual exits into a FTC, the underlying question can be formulated as fol-
lows: Is it beneficial (in terms of future employment opportunities) to enter into a 
FTC  after  a  certain  duration  of  unemployment  1 T   in  comparison  to  continue 
searching for a permanent position? Throughout this subchapter, this definition 
of the non-treatment state and untreated persons are referred to as Definition 2 
(DEF.2). According to this definition untreated persons can be control persons 
after  a  particular  unemployment  duration  as  well  as  treated  persons  in  later 
months or in a later unemployment spell.184 Hence, the only requirement an un-
employed has to fulfil to be a potential control person for a person entering into a 
FTC in  1 T , is not to enter into a FTC if t £ 1 T . If t > 1 T , she or he may enter into a 
FTC job, or a permanent contract job, or may drop out of the labour force. It can 
be seen in Table 54 that DEF.2 implies an increased number of untreated (i.e., 
potential control) unemployment spells in comparison to DEF.1.    
The obvious drawback of DEF.2 is that it renders the definition of the ATT: It is 
not only the effect of entering into a FTC on those who enter into the FTC, but in 
addition the effect of entering into a FTC early (with respect to the unemploy-
ment duration) (see SIANESI, 2004).  
 
 
                                              
183 FREDRIKSSON and JOHANSSON (2003: 3) state about non-treatment DEF.1: “By defining the compari-
son group in this way one is implicitly conditioning on the outcome variable since those who do not 
enter in future time periods to a large extent consist of those who have had the luck of finding a job. 
Therefore, the conditional independence assumptions (…) do not hold and studies that define the 
comparison group in this way will generate estimates that are biased towards finding negative treat-
ment effects when, in fact, none exist.” 
184 A justification can be found in HECKMAN, LALONDE, and SMITH (1999: 83): “The same individual 
may be in both groups if that person is treated at one time and untreated at another.”    205 
Table 54: Definitions of the ‘Non-Treatment’ State and the Counterfactual 
 
Untreated persons   Counterfactual of         
interest 
Number of  
untreated  
Policy question 
DEF.1  Unemployed who 
do never enter into 
FTC jobs  
World without FTCs 
for individual i 
Spells: 1,271 
Persons: 1,041  
Does the existence of FTC 
jobs increase the long-term 
employment prospects of 
those unemployed who 
enter into FTCs? 
DEF.2  Unemployed who 
do not enter into 
FTC jobs, if unem-
ployment duration 
1 t T £   
World without FTC 
jobs up to the unem-
ployment duration 
1 t T >  for individual i  
Spells: 1,826 
Persons: 1,447  
Do unemployed persons 
taking the first opportunity 
(accepting a FTC job offer) 
enhance their future em-
ployment prospects in 
comparison to those who 
continue searching (for 
permanent contract jobs)? 
Note: The number of untreated refers to spells (and persons) with non-missing explanatory vari-
ables in the estimation of the propensity score during the period 1991–2000 which do not end in 
transitions to FTCs. 
 
Unknown Start of ‘Non-Treatment’  
A problem in every evaluation study using longitudinal data is that important 
time varying variables such as the unemployment duration prior to the treatment 
are not defined for the group of untreated individuals (see LECHNER, 2002 and 
HUJER, MAURER, and  WELLNER, 1998).  The unemployment duration prior to 
entering into the treatment (FTC) is by definition an unobserved counterfactual 
for untreated individuals.185 Thus it is not possible to simply include this variable 
in the propensity score equation (see SIANESI, 2004 and LECHNER, 2002).  
Estimating the propensity score by a hazard rate model is a simple solution to 
this problem. The hazard rate can be interpreted as the transition probability from 
unemployment to the treatment, conditional on having stayed unemployed for a 
number of months  1 T .186 Hence, by matching on the predicted hazard rate also 
the differences in the unemployment duration between treated and controls are 
balanced.  
 
 
 
                                              
185 Let T0i denote the hypothetical unemployment duration of an untreated individual i before entering 
into the treatment. Obviously, the counterfactuals  (T1i, Ci=0) and (T0i, Ci=1) are not observable.  
186 To the best of my knowledge, there are only two papers estimating the propensity score by a hazard 
rate model (see SIANESI, 2004 as well as BRODATY, CRÉPON, and FOUGÈRE, 2001). To be exact, 
SIANESI (2004) estimates for every period a probit conditional on having reached an unemployment 
duration, which corresponds to the period. “This approach is equivalent to a discrete hazard model, 
with all the estimated parameters allowed to be duration-specific” SIANESI (2004: 17).   206 
Repeated Treatments (Transitions from Unemployment to FTCs) 
As mentioned in point (4.) above, a person may enter into a FTC more than 
once.187 In the analyses it is not considered whether a treatment is the person’s 
first one or not. A repeated treatment is interpreted as if the person had never en-
tered into a FTC job from unemployment before. An alternative approach is to 
model repeated participation explicitly and to allow the repeated participation to 
have a different effect.188  
Since repeated transitions from unemployment to FTCs are rare events, it is not 
possible  to  perform  separate  analyses  for  repeated  treatments.  There  are  349 
treatments (transitions to FTCs) observed in the dataset. 295 of them are by per-
sons who enter into a FTC only once, 25 persons enter twice, and one person 
takes up four FTCs.  
A second alternative approach, which seems to be common practice, is to focus 
on the first treatment and to exclude a repeated treatment from the analysis or to 
include only those individuals who participate only once. This, however, may 
induce a selection bias since ‘unsuccessful’ FTC jobs (in terms of repeated tran-
sitions from unemployment to FTCs and vice versa) are systematically excluded. 
A similar line of argument applies to the untreated: using only the first unem-
ployment spell leads to sample selection towards ‘above average’ controls (see 
HAM and LALONDE, 1996: 184).  
Illustration of the Non-Treatment Definitions  
Table 55 depicts examples illustrating the considerations of the previous para-
graphs. A monthly time scale, corresponding to a certain calendar time, is as-
sumed.189  
Person 1 becomes unemployed (U) in month 2, after having been employed in 
period 1 (E). In month 7 the person is treated ( ), i.e., she or he enters into a 
FTC.190 The person is employed (without taking the type of contract into ac-
count) until month 13 and becomes unemployed again in month 14. In month 17 
she or he enters into a FTC again, i.e., she or he is treated. As stated in the previ-
ous paragraph, a person can be part of the treatment group more than once.191  
Person 2 is not in the sample (or the survey, respectively) until month 6, when 
she or he is employed. After having been unemployed for two months she or he 
                                              
187 This is called ‘dynamic treatments’ in the literature. Dynamic treatments are addressed in LECHNER 
and MIQUEL (2002). 
188 This is done, for example, by BERGEMANN, FITZENBERGER, and SPECKESSER (2004) for labour mar-
ket programmes in East Germany. 
189 For example, month 1 may be January 1991.  
190 Remember that treatment is defined as entering into a FTC from unemployment but not being em-
ployed on a FTC.   
191 The person is then considered as another person. This implies that it is equivalent for the analysis 
whether one observes two unemployed persons which each enter into a FTC once or whether one ob-
serves one person who enters into FTCs twice (after being unemployed again).   207 
enters into a FTC in month 9. Person 2 is a potential member of the control group 
for the first treatment of person 1, assuming non-treatment DEF.2. The estimated 
propensity scores may, however, be too different since the unemployment dura-
tions of both persons are very different in month 7.  
Person 3 is a potential control person for the first treatment of person 1. She or 
he  can  be  used  as  an  untreated  person  in  terms  of  both  definitions  of  non-
treatment since she or he never enters into a FTC. Finally, person 4 is a potential 
control group member for the second treatment of person 1 if DEF.2 is applied. 
Table 55: Definition of Treated and Untreated Individuals 
Month  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
Person 1  E  U  U  U  U  U  E  E  E  E  E  E  U  U  U  E  E  E 
Person 2  × × × ×  × × × ×  × × × ×  × × × ×  × × × ×  E  U  U  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E 
Person 3  E  U  U  U  U  U  U  P  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E  E 
Person 4  E  E  E  U  U  U  U  U  P  E  E  E  E  U  U  U  U  U    E 
Note: E = employed; U = unemployed ;  = entering into a FTC (treatment); P = entering into a 
permanent contract; × × × × = missing observation. 
 
6.4.3.2  Implementation of the Propensity Score Matching Estimator 
The main modification of the standard propensity score matching approach is to 
estimate the propensity score by a discrete time hazard rate model. Thus treated 
and untreated individuals are matched on the basis of the predicted transition 
probabilities from unemployment to FTCs, conditional on having stayed unem-
ployed for a certain number of months192 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr , 1 ,
FTC
k k k e t X t T t C X t T t º = = ³ .  
The notation corresponds to the one introduced in Section 6.3.3. In order to keep 
the notation simple, the propensity score is again denoted by e.  
The propensity score is estimated by a simple logistic model (without control-
ling for unobserved heterogeneity). The probability of leaving unemployment is 
estimated separately for the transition to FTCs, keeping the other exit states as 
right-censored at the time of completion (see Section 6.3.3). Variables which 
have no statistically significant effects on the FTC hazard rate are excluded from 
the equation. Remember that the CIA requires the vector X to contain all the vari-
ables that are thought to simultaneously influence participation and outcome (see 
Section  3.3.1).  Additionally  to  matching  on  the  estimated  propensity  score 
(which is the predicted hazard rate for every individual), it is imposed that indi-
viduals are matched only within the same calendar month τ, ensuring that treated 
                                              
192 Further discussions on this approach can be found in SIANESI (2004) as well as FREDRIKSSON and 
JOHANSSON (2003).   208 
and controls face the same economic environment. Hence, every single control 
person is in exactly the same calendar month as her or his corresponding treated 
person, and on average treated and control persons have a very similar unem-
ployment duration, given that the matching estimator balances out differences in 
the baseline hazard (unemployment duration). In the following, some further is-
sues are discussed in detail.  
As discussed in Section 6.3.4, it is likely that transitions to FTCs are systemati-
cally underrepresented in comparison to the population, since FTC employment 
spells are more often short-term and therefore more likely to be not defined. This 
may be interpreted as choice-based sampling. In general, the problem of choice-
based sampling occurs, if in the data used the probability of sampling a treated 
individual does not correspond to the population probability that an individual is 
a treated. What does choice-based sampling imply for propensity score matching 
estimation? If there is choice-based sampling, weights are required to estimate 
the  propensity  score  consistently  and  thus  the  causal  effect  (see  SMITH  and 
TODD, 2003). When the weights are unknown it can be shown that propensity 
score matching methods can still be applied by transforming the estimated pro-
pensity scores  e to odds ratios   ( ) 1 e e -  or log odds ratios, respectively, and by 
matching  on  these  instead.193  In  case  of  NN-matching  choice-based  sampling 
does not seem to be a severe problem: It does not matter whether matching is 
performed on the odds ratio or on the propensity score, because the ranking of 
the observations is the same and therefore the same neighbours are selected (see 
SMITH and TODD, 2003).194 However, for methods using the absolute distance 
between observations, such as kernel-based matching, it does matter. 
The relevance of the common support condition for matching estimators is ex-
tensively discussed in Section 3.3.1. In this chapter, the common support condi-
tion is imposed for every single calendar month τ. In concrete terms, for every 
month between 1991 and 2000 it is checked whether there is an overlap in the 
distribution of the estimated propensity score of treated and untreated persons. 
Following HECKMAN, ICHIMURA, and TODD (1997), treated persons outside the 
range of the distribution of the propensity score of untreated persons are ex-
cluded. Furthermore, the caliper is an additional approach to impose common 
support.  
The estimation of standard errors of the ATT is discussed in detail in Section 
3.3.1. Following LECHNER (2002) as well as HUJER, CALIENDO, and THOMSEN 
(2003), the standard errors are calculated using Eq. (19) in Section 3.3.1 since a 
bootstrapping approach turns out to be infeasible due to the calculation time. 
                                              
193 Ignoring choice-based sampling in the estimation of the propensity score is consistent since the odds 
ratio estimated using the incorrect weights (or no weights, respectively) is a scalar multiple of the true 
odds ratio, which is itself a monotonic transformation of the propensity score. 
194 Any transformation of the propensity score which preserves the order of the observations does not 
affect consistency of the NN-matching estimator (see LECHNER, 1998).   209 
Since matching with replacement is applied195, the number of times an untreated 
person is used as a control is taken into account in the calculation of the standard 
errors.   
Anticipatory effects are discussed in context of the before-after estimator in 
Subchapter 3.4. However, it is also relevant for the case that the propensity score 
is estimated by a hazard rate model, i.e., the transition rates to FTCs (or other 
jobs) may be affected by anticipatory effects. Several months before the actual 
transition occurs many job searchers know that they will take up a job soon and 
some  may already  have signed the employment contract. Anticipatory effects 
lead, ceteris paribus, to reduced FTC hazard rates during the months before the 
transition occurs. Thus it is likely that control persons with too low estimated 
propensity scores are matched. For example, if one assumes that persons with 
higher FTC hazard rates are those with more favourable characteristics (causing 
better employment opportunities), the estimated effect of FTCs (on future em-
ployment opportunities) is biased upwards, since the group of control persons has 
less  favourable  characteristics  on  average.  Since  the  treatment  affects  pre-
treatment variables, the CIA is violated.  
There is no clear-cut solution to this problem. One straightforward but arbitrary 
approach is to match treated and untreated persons on the basis of the estimated 
propensity score not by the month of transition, but some months earlier.196 Al-
though I could not find any evidence for a decline in the employment probability 
before the treatment, I try to avoid the violation of the CIA by assuming that an-
ticipatory effects do not start earlier than two months before the transition to the 
FTCs.  Thus  treated  and  control  persons  are  matched  two  months  before  the 
treatment occurs. If anticipatory effects are strong and start earlier, this is obvi-
ously only an incomplete solution to the problem. However, the results turn out 
to be quite robust with respect to different specifications concerning the month of 
matching.  
What does the SUTVA (see Section 3.2.5) imply for the analysis at hand? The 
fact that some individuals enter into FTCs  must not affect the labour  market 
situation of those individuals who do not so. For example, if entering into FTCs 
increases the individuals’ labour market chances, this should not be at the ex-
pense of those who do not enter into FTCs. However, this exactly corresponds to 
the predictions of the matching model by BOERI (1999), presented in Section 
4.2.4: Re-employment probabilities of the unemployed are reduced, since they 
have  to  compete  with  FTC  workers  on  existing  vacancies.  Furthermore,  the 
whole range of possibilities of how permanent contract jobs are substituted by 
FTC jobs and the impacts on wage formation are not taken into account (see 
Subchapter 4.2 and Section 5.2.2).  
                                              
195 Matching with replacement means that an untreated person can be used as a control for more than one 
treated person (see in Section 3.3.1). 
196 This approach is in line with interpretation of anticipatory effects as an earlier start of the treatment.    210 
Thus it is conceivable that a positive effect for participants estimated at the mi-
croeconomic level is based solely on redistribution of employment chances be-
tween treated and untreated individuals. While it is quite obvious that indirect 
and general equilibrium effects are relevant, it is ambiguous in which direction 
they affect the results from a macroeconomic point of view.  
6.4.4  Definition of the Outcome Variables 
An overview of the outcome variables used in the analysis can be found in 
Table 56. The first and probably most important outcome is the future probability 
of being employed on a permanent contract. Since the type of contract is only 
observed at the time of interview in the raw data (see Section 6.3.4), this outcome 
variable is measured annually. Thus the estimated ATT is the mean difference in 
the probability of being employed on a permanent contract between the treated 
and control group in the year following the next. The year of the interview fol-
lowing the transition is not taken into account because it is exactly the informa-
tion which is used to define the start of the employment spell as a FTC job or a 
permanent contract job in many cases. A further problem arises due to the fact 
that the question whether the present employment contract is temporary or per-
manent is not available for all waves of the panel study. Until 1995 only those 
persons were asked about the type of their contract who reported job changes. 
From 1995 onwards all necessary information is available. This is not a problem 
for the identification of transitions to FTCs or permanent contracts, that is, the 
estimation of the propensity score. It implies, however, that the first outcome 
variable is only measured from 1996 until 2001 (at least one year after the transi-
tion to the FTC). 
The second outcome measure is derived from the monthly calendar. The effect 
is  the  difference  in  the  employment  probability  between  treated  and  controls 
within each of the 36 months ensuing the treatment. Monthly data are only avail-
able until December 2000 (the monthly information is collected retrospectively) 
so that the monthly outcome variables are only available up to this date. Em-
ployment is now broadly defined as FTC and permanent contract employment as 
well as self-employment but not as training on-the-job. The third outcome vari-
able is again derived from the monthly calendar. The effect is the difference in 
the probability of registered unemployment between treated and controls within 
each of the 36 months following the treatment. The fourth outcome variable is 
the probability of being out-of-labour-force. Finally, the fifth outcome variable is 
the probability of being employed on a FTC in the year following the next. Note 
that this is an annually measured variable comparable with Outcome 1. Further-
more, Outcome 5 is not defined for non-treatment DEF.1, since DEF.1 requires 
that untreated individuals never enter into a FTC, i.e., the mean Outcome 5 of the 
untreated is fixed at zero.      211 
Table 56: Definition of the Outcome Variables 
Outcome 1    
1996–2001 
annually  
Probability of being employed on a permanent contract in the year follow-
ing the next, collected at the interview months. 
Outcome 2   
1991–2000 
monthly  
Probability of employment (all types of contracts apart from training-on-
the-job) within each of the following 36 months after the treatment. 
Outcome 3 
1991–2000 
monthly  
Probability of (registered) unemployment within each of the following 36 
months after the treatment. 
Outcome 4 
1991–2000 
monthly  
Probability  of  being  out-of-labour-force  (including  school  and  university) 
within each of the following 36 months after the treatment. 
Outcome 5 
1996–2001 
annually  
Probability of being employed on a FTC in the year following the next, 
collected at the interview months (DEF.2 only). 
 
A potential problem arises due to the fact that the outcome variables are not ob-
servable for all 36 months after the transitions to FTCs. Some persons do not an-
swer all questions (item non-response) and others drop out from the whole sur-
vey (sample attrition). For the outcome variables sample attrition is particularly 
important. Generally, there are two approaches to deal with this problem. Either, 
one uses only the balanced panel, i.e., one excludes all persons with incomplete 
information in the outcome variables, or one uses all available information and 
accepts  a  decreasing  number  of  observations  with  increasing  time-lag  to  the 
month of treatment (unbalanced panel).197   
Using the first approach, one has to assume that selection into the sample (the 
balanced panel) is random, i.e., the sample still represents the underlying popula-
tion. For the second approach, one has to assume that the probability of missing 
values  in  the  outcome  variables  are  the  same  for  the  treated  and  the  control 
group, i.e., the matching estimator balances the differences. This is unlikely if the 
probability of missing outcomes does not depend on the covariates which are 
included in the propensity score estimation.   
In order to get an impression of the problem of missing values, a variable for 
the unbalanced panel is defined, including the number of months with missing 
values during the following 36 months. Using the same NN-matching procedure 
as for the second outcome variable it is checked whether there are differences in 
the number of missing observations in the treated and matched control sample. It 
turns out that there is a mean difference which is, however, not statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level. The average number of missing months is 8.9 in the 
                                              
197 A further approach to deal with right-censoring is to estimate a hazard rate model on the matched 
samples (see HUJER, MAURER, and WELLNER, 1998).     212 
treated sample and 8.3 in the control sample. The corresponding t-statistic of 0.59 
indicates that the difference is not statistically significantly different from zero. 
One can conclude that there is sample attrition, but no strong evidence in favour 
of induced sample selection bias. Thus the unbalanced panel approach is pursued 
since the bias generated by simply dropping incomplete data may be worse than 
the bias due to a declining number of observations with an increasing time-lag to 
the treatment. Furthermore, using the unbalanced panel ensures a sufficient sam-
ple size. 
6.4.5  Estimation Results of the Propensity Score Equation (Discrete Haz-
ard Rate Model) 
Is it plausible to assume the CIA to be fulfilled?  Of course, it seems unrealistic 
to assume that all variables simultaneously affecting the FTC hazard and out-
come variables are included in the propensity score. Nevertheless, one may argue 
again that the variables relating to the individuals’ previous labour market ex-
periences  may  capture  unobserved  characteristics  of  the  unemployed.  Hence, 
again it is assumed that by balancing differences in X variables which are likely 
to be correlated with unobservables, also differences in unobservables are bal-
anced.  
The criterion finally used to find a specification of the propensity score is the 
pre-program test, i.e., the ability of the approach to balance out pre-treatment 
differences in the outcome variables (see Subchapter 3.5). The results of the pro-
pensity score estimation are depicted in Table 57. Since the results are basically 
the same as the results in Section 6.3.5, they are not discussed any further.  
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Table 57: Logistic Hazard Rate Model (Propensity Score Estimation) 
  Transition to FTC 
  Coeff.  t-stat. 
Baseline hazard     
   Month  2–3  0.475  2.82 
   Month  4–6  0.429  2.46 
   Month  7–9  0.231  1.08 
   Month 10–12  0.710  3.20 
   Month 13–18   0.420  1.74 
   Month ³ 19   0.691  3.00 
Age    -0.188  -0.92 
Age
2 / 1.000  0.730  1.29 
Age
3 / 100.000   -0.090  -1.80 
No occupational qualification  -0.329  -2.51 
Master craftsman  -0.165  -0.58 
University graduate  0.460  2.59 
Female  0.294  1.61 
Married  0.327  2.01 
Married x female  -0.698  -3.06 
Prev job: end of FTC or Apprenticeship  0.554  2.97 
Prev job: end of FTC or Apprenticeship x female  -0.457  -1.69 
Out-of-labour-force before  0.612  2.28 
Out-of-labour-force before x female  -0.725  -2.16 
Training or school before  0.445  2.38 
Duration of prev. unemployment spell  -0.016  -1.54 
Prev. employment spell 3–5 months  0.763  3.31 
Prev. employment spell 6–8 months  0.596  2.56 
Prev. employment spell 9–11 months  0.300  1.03 
Prev. employment spell 12–20 months  0.291  1.16 
Prev. employment spell ³ 21  months  0.247  1.41 
Already a FTC before  0.495  3.38 
Public sector before  0.393  2.48 
Number of prev. unemployment spells  -0.048  -0.59 
Number of prev. unemployment spells
2  0.015  1.48 
Log net household income  -0.058  -2.71 
No unemployment benefit  0.281  2.31 
No unemployment assistance  0.935  4.93 
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Table 57 continued... 
  Coeff.  t-stat. 
Log regional unemployment rate   0.117  0.57 
Spell started in first quarter  -0.684  -4.48 
Spell started in second quarter  -0.645  -4.01 
Spell started in third quarter  -0.402  -2.58 
Constant   -3.523  -1.46 
Numb. of Spells  349 
Numb. of Persons  321 
Numb. of Observations (person months)  23,151 
Log-likelihood  -1645.004 
c
2 (37)  330.62 
Notes: See Table 53. 
Sources: Own estimations based on the GSOEP. 
 
 
6.4.6  Estimation Results of the Matching Estimator 
For both definitions of untreated individuals (DEF.1 and DEF.2), simple NN-
matching (with caliper) is performed (see Box 4).198 The command ‘psmatch’ 
implemented by SIANESI (2001) in STATA 7.0 is used in a modified form, which 
imposes the common support condition for every calendar month and which al-
lows the propensity score to be estimated by a hazard rate model. Following 
LECHNER (1998), not the estimated probability but the linear index is predicted. 
The caliper is chosen by considering the trade-off between reducing the bias, on 
the one hand, and minimising the loss of (treated) observations, on the other. The 
caliper is set in most cases to  0.03 Y = , which turned out to be a reasonable com-
promise.  
In Subsection 6.4.6.2 the mean effects are reported, while Subsection 6.4.6.3 
presents the effects for subgroups of individuals. The next subsection presents 
some evidence on the matching quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
198 Furthermore, several kernel-based matching estimators have been checked (see Section 3.3.1 and 
Subchapter 5.5). It turns out, that NN-matching seems to be more suitable than different types of ker-
nel-based  matching  procedures  for  generating  appropriate  control  groups  in  the  sense  of  a  pre-
program test (see Subchapter 3.5). Therefore, the results of the kernel-based estimators are not pre-
sented and discussed as they do not lead to any additional insights.   215 
Box 4: Implementation of the Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
Step 1  Estimate a discrete (logistic) hazard rate model for the transition from unem-
ployment to FTCs (independent competing risks) by maximum likelihood. In-
clude all covariates X and a non-parametric (piece-wise constant) specification 
for the baseline hazard. 
Step 2  Predict the propensity score  
( ) ( ) Pr , 1 , k k e T t C X t T t º = = ³  for every individual,  
with T denoting the duration of the unemployment spell and k the number of 
the unemployment spell of the individual. 
Step 3  For non-treatment DEF.1: Exclude individuals from the pool of untreated per-
sons who are treated at any time during the period under observation. 
Step 4  Impose common support for every month: Drop observations outside the sup-
port and the caliper. 
Step 5  NN-Matching: For every calendar month τ, match the untreated person j with 
the closest propensity score  i j e e -  to each treated person i, 2 months be-
fore the actual transition to FTC occurs. Untreated person j can be used as a 
control more than once (with replacement). 
Step 6  The ATT is the difference in the (weighted) mean outcomes of both groups. 
 
 
 
6.4.6.1  Matching Quality 
As mentioned above, the common support condition requires that for every un-
employed individual entering into a FTC a sufficiently similar untreated person 
in terms of the predicted propensity score should be available for each single 
month. The latter is necessary since matching is conditioned on the same calen-
dar month, i.e., treated and control persons are matched only within the same cal-
endar month. If there is no sufficiently similar untreated person available for a 
treated person, she or he cannot be used in the analysis and is excluded. Unfortu-
nately, this procedure leads to a significant loss of observations (see Table 58). A 
further substantial reduction of observations is a result of imposing the untreated 
to be within the caliper. As expected, less observations are lost in case of DEF.2. 
The difference of the samples of DEF.1 and DEF.2 implies that a comparison of 
the effects with regard to the untreated definition is possibly not meaningful (see 
Section 3.3.1 for a discussion).   
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Table 58: Loss of Treated Observations due to Common Support Requirement 
and Lack of Similar Untreated Within the Caliper (NN-Matching, Outcome 2) 
Number of treatments (transitions to FTCs)  DEF.1  DEF.2 
Before matching  349  349 
Within common support   304  339 
Within the caliper (after NN- matching)   239  282 
Table 59: Means of Important Pre-Treatment Variables (X) Before and After  
NN-Matching (DEF.1) 
  Before matching  After matching 
 
1 x   0 x   p-val
a  std. 
diff. 
%
b 
1 x   0 x   p-val
a  std. 
diff. 
%
b 
Propensity score  -3.695  -5.055  0.000  132.47  -3.998  -3.998  0.994  0.04 
Dur. of unemployment (baseline)   8.799  12.392  0.000  32.02  9.703  10.226  0.598  4.66 
Female   0.453  0.512  0.028  11.92  0.477  0.498  0.648  4.19 
Married  0.507  0.668  0.000  33.08  0.519  0.523  0.927  0.86 
Married ´ female  0.206  0.335  0.000  29.36  0.222  0.238  0.665  3.80 
Age  32.673  41.650  0.000  76.53  32.979  32.971  0.993  0.07 
Prev. job: end of FTC or appren-
ticeship 
0.244  0.055  0.000  54.67  0.172  0.134  0.253  10.94 
Prev. job: end of FTC or appren-
ticeship ´ female 
0.097  0.033  0.000  26.35  0.092  0.075  0.510  6.83 
Dur. of previous unempl. spell  2.739  3.207  0.310  6.30  3.285  2.707  0.367  7.78 
Dur. of previous empl. spell   13.146  16.579  0.091  10.43  13.431  15.489  0.473  6.25 
Out-of-labour-force before  0.129  0.225  0.000  25.42  0.146  0.197  0.146  13.25 
Training or school before  0.192  0.115  0.000  21.49  0.176  0.205  0.416  8.17 
Public service before  0.206  0.073  0.000  38.89  0.172  0.106  0.018  19.42 
University degree  0.163  0.042  0.000  40.83  0.084  0.059  0.287  8.44 
No occupational qualification  0.301  0.439  0.000  28.84  0.360  0.377  0.705  3.50 
Log household net income   6.793  7.302  0.000  20.48  7.008  6.939  0.765  2.77 
No unemployment benefit  0.476  0.439  0.175  7.30  0.444  0.531  0.055  17.64 
No unemployment assistance  0.883  0.815  0.001  18.87  0.849  0.870  0.511  5.86 
Log unemployment rate  2.256  2.205  0.006  18.82  2.257  2.236  0.318  7.99 
Number of observations  349  16,120        239  239     
Note: The 16,120 observations in the untreated group before matching correspond to 1,271 
spells and 1,041 individuals. 
aTwo-sample t-test with unequal variance: H0: 1 0 x x - =0. 
bStan-
dardised difference defined as  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 x Var x Var x x - +  with x denoting the re-
spective conditioning variable.   
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Table 60: Means of Important Pre-Treatment Variables (X) Before and After  
NN-Matching (DEF.2) 
  Before matching  After matching 
 
1 x   0 x   p-val
a  std. 
diff. 
%
b 
1 x   0 x   p-val
a  std. 
diff. 
%
b 
Propensity score  -3.695  -4.759  0.000  103.08  -3.871  -3.871  0.990  0.07 
Dur. of unemployment (baseline)   8.799  11.301  0.001  23.40  9.521  9.007  0.547  4.81 
Female   0.453  0.493  0.139  8.00  0.475  0.464  0.801  2.13 
Married  0.507  0.636  0.000  26.20  0.521  0.535  0.736  2.89 
Married ´ female  0.206  0.313  0.000  24.48  0.223  0.238  0.690  3.26 
Age  32.673  39.33  0.000  57.93  32.69  32.31  0.636  3.33 
Prev. job: end of FTC or appren-
ticeship 
0.244  0.101  0.000  38.25  0.199  0.213  0.678  3.82 
Prev. job: end of FTC or appren-
ticeship ´ female 
0.097  0.052  0.002  17.24  0.089  0.106  0.489  6.75 
Dur. of previous unempl. spell  2.739  3.313  0.188  8.01  3.089  3.145  0.923  0.79 
Dur. of previous empl. spell   13.146  15.77  0.168  8.32  12.73  15.53  0.259  8.89 
Out-of-labour-force before  0.129  0.198  0.001  18.80  0.142  0.138  0.904  0.96 
Training or school before  0.192  0.126  0.002  18.08  0.181  0.184  0.913  0.97 
Public service before  0.206  0.100  0.000  29.71  0.159  0.198  0.228  10.94 
University degree  0.163  0.062  0.000  32.45  0.110  0.092  0.486  5.66 
No occupational qualification  0.301  0.423  0.000  25.56  0.344  0.351  0.860  1.49 
Log household net income   6.793  7.264  0.001  18.98  7.033  6.919  0.590  4.60 
No unemployment benefit  0.476  0.449  0.318  5.37  0.482  0.489  0.867  1.42 
No unemployment assistance  0.883  0.806  0.003  21.22  0.862  0.858  0.904  0.98 
Log unemployment rate  2.256  2.222  0.020  12.76  2.273  2.275  0.907  0.97 
Number of observations  349  22,743      282  282     
Note: The 22,743 observations in the untreated group before matching correspond to 1,826 
unemployment spells and  1,447 individuals. 
aTwo-sample t-test as defined in the note of 
Table 59. 
bStandardised differences as defined in the note of Table 59. 
 
Does the NN-matching estimator balance pre-treatment differences in observ-
able variables X between the group of treated and the control group of untreated? 
To what extent is the balancing property of the propensity score matching esti-
mator fulfilled?199 In order to answer this question some statistics are presented 
in detail. Means of pre-treatment variables of treated  1 x  and untreated workers 
0 x ,  as  well  as  the  matched  FTCs  and  controls  are  depicted  in  Table  59  (for 
DEF.1)  and  Table  60  (for  DEF.2).  t-tests  indicate  that  the  differences  in  the 
means of nearly all conditioning variables X are not significantly different from 
zero in the matched sample, while there are important differences before match-
ing. This is also confirmed by the observation that the standardised differences of 
nearly all variables decline.  
                                              
199 See Subchapter 5.6 for a discussion of the balancing property of the propensity score.    218 
Differences between Table 59 (for DEF.1) and Table 60 (for DEF.2) are also of 
interest: It turns out that pre-treatment differences are balanced better in case of 
DEF.2. The obvious reason is that there are more potential control individuals 
available in case of DEF.2. Another reason may be that untreated persons accord-
ing to DEF.1 differ more from the treated since they do never participate. This 
hypothesis is in line with the finding that standardised differences before match-
ing are larger in Table 59 (for DEF.1) than in Table 60 (for DEF.2).   
Another important finding from Table 59 (for DEF.1) which is worthwhile to 
be mentioned is the fact that the sample of treated individuals after matching 
seems to be different from treated before matching with respect to the mean of its 
X variables. This is an unattractive implication of the common support condition 
(see Section 3.3.1).  
As discussed in Subchapter 3.5, the pre-program test consists of t-tests on the 
differences in the outcome variables between the group of treated and the group 
of control persons before the treatment (the transition to the FTC). This is tested 
up to 24 months before the treatment for the monthly measured outcome vari-
ables, and up to 3 years for the annually measured outcome variables. The results 
are depicted in the following subsection.  
6.4.6.2  Mean Effects of Fixed-Term Contracts 
In this subsection, the estimated ATTs for all outcome variables and for both 
definitions  of  non-treatment  are  reported.  First  of  all,  effects  on  the  monthly 
measured outcome variables (2, 3, and 4) are discussed. Since it turns out that the 
estimated ATTs under DEF.1 and DEF.2 differ less than expected, it does not 
seem to be necessary to consider the fact that DEF.2 renders the definition of the 
ATT when interpreting the results (see Subsection 6.4.3.1).    
Outcome 2 – Employment Probability  (1991–2000) 
Figure 7 (DEF.1) and Figure 8 (DEF.2) present the differences in employment 
probabilities between treated and control persons including a 95% confidence 
interval. Note that employment includes permanent contract jobs and FTC jobs, 
but excludes training. Zero on the time axis represents the month in which the 
treatment occurs, i.e., the transition from unemployment to a FTC job.  
The fact that the confidence intervals overlap the abscissas before the treatment 
(-24 up to -3 months) indicates that the pre-treatment differences in the employ-
ment probabilities are not statistically significant. Hence, the matching approach 
balances  pre-treatment  differences  in  the  employment  status  to  a  large  extent 
(pre-program test). Similar to the result found in the previous subsection, the per-
formance of the matching estimator seems to be slightly better in case of DEF.2. 
The figures for both definitions suggest that entering into FTC jobs increases 
the employment probability for up to 36 months after the transition. Of course, it 
is not surprising that there is a positive ATT in the first months after the treat-
ment. The result that there is still a significantly positive effect between 24 up 36   219 
months seems to be more relevant, given that most FTCs are not longer than 24 
months (see Subchapters 2.3 and 5.4). The similarities of the results in Figure 7 
(DEF.1) and Figure 8 (DEF.2) are surprising, given the dissimilarity of the con-
cepts. The effects in case of DEF.2 seem to be slightly more positive. To which 
extent the estimated positive employment effect is based on FTC or permanent 
contract jobs is assessed in a subsequent paragraph.  
Figure 7: Employment Effects – DEF.1 
                 
 
Figure 8: Employment Effects – DEF.2 
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Outcome 3 – Unemployment Probability (1991–2000) 
Again, it can be seen in Figure 9 and Figure 10 that there are almost no signifi-
cant differences in the pre-treatment probabilities of being registered unemployed 
in the matched samples for both non-treatment definitions. It seems to be puzz-
ling that approximately 17 months after the transition there are no significantly 
negative effects on the unemployment probability anymore, while Figure 7 and 
Figure 8 indicate that there are positive employment effects. The explanation ob-
viously has to be found in the effects on the probability of being out-of-labour-
force (see next paragraph). 
Figure 9: Unemployment Effects – DEF.1           
 
Figure 10: Unemployment Effects – DEF.2 
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Outcome 4 – Probability of Being Out-of-Labour-Force (1991–2000) 
As Figure 11 and Figure 12 indicate, entering into a FTC reduces the probabil-
ity of being out-of-labour-force within the ensuing 36 months. Therefore, one can 
conclude that the positive employment effect (Outcome 2) is not accompanied by 
a lower probability of registered unemployment in the long-run, but by a reduced 
probability  of  being-out-of  labour-force.  This  effect  is  likely  to  be  driven  by 
women, younger or elderly workers. FTCs may successfully be used by people 
(re-)entering the labour market.200 If they become unemployed after the expira-
tion of the contract, they are more strongly attached to the labour market since 
they have qualified for unemployment compensation and have possibly enhanced 
their employment prospects (through human capital investments), which reduces 
the probability of leaving the labour force. The effect seems to be larger in case 
of DEF.1. However, the differences between DEF.1 and DEF.2 are not statisti-
cally significant.  
 
Figure 11: Out-of-labour-force Effect – DEF.1         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
200 A result in Subchapter 6.3 is that unemployed job searchers who were previously out of labour force 
have a higher relative probability of entering into FTCs instead of entering into permanent contracts. 
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Figure 12: Out-of-Labour-Force Effect – DEF.2 
 
Outcome 1 – Probability of Holding a Permanent Contract (1996–2001)  
So far, it has only been revealed that entering from unemployment into a FTC 
increases the overall  employment probability  in the future without taking the 
type of employment contract into account. Now the question must be answered to 
what extent this higher future employment probability consists of permanent con-
tract jobs. The estimated ATT on the probability of holding a permanent contract 
for non-treatment DEF.1 is depicted in Table 61. The first column of Table 61 
depicts the development of the probability of holding a permanent contract of 
treated individuals before and after entering into a FTC. It indicates that almost 
45% of all employed individuals entering into a FTC hold a permanent contract 2 
years later.    
The estimated ATTs before the treatment (year -3 until year -1) indicate that 
even after matching there are some pre-treatment differences in the probability of 
holding a permanent contract between the treated and the control group, which 
are, however, not statistically significant.  
Up to 3 years after the transition to a FTC, the formerly unemployed raise their 
chances of holding a permanent contract. But only the positive effect of 11 per-
centage points 3 years after entering into the FTC is statistically significant. The 
effect 4 years after the transition is reported but should be interpreted with high-
est caution due to the substantial loss of observations.  
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Table 61: Probability of Being Employed on a Permanent Contract – DEF.1 
  All persons 
Year  Mean treated  Mean control  ATT  t-stat  Pairs 
- 3  0.439  0.426  0.012  0.156  82 
- 2  0.333  0.433  -0.100  -1.574  120 
- 1  0.194  0.250  -0.056  -1.199  160 
+ 2  0.448  0.437  0.011  0.214  174 
+ 3  0.578  0.468  0.110  1.926  154 
+ 4  0.575  0.500  0.075  1.090  106 
Note: Y  = 0.03. 
 
In Table 62 the estimated effects based on DEF.2 are reported. Again, there are 
some minor pre-treatment differences in the probability of holding a permanent 
contract, which are, however, smaller than in case of DEF.1. The effect is now 
more clear-cut: After 3 years 59.7% of all unemployed who had entered into 
FTCs hold permanent contracts. Only 43.5% of unemployed who had not entered 
into FTCs in a certain month (but possibly later) hold permanent contracts. The 
difference (ATT) of 16.1 percentage points is highly significant. 4 years after tak-
ing up a FTC job, the effect is still significantly positive at the 5% level.  
Table 62: Probability of Being Employed on a Permanent Contract – DEF.2    
  All persons 
Year   Mean treated  Mean control  ATT  t-stat  Pairs 
- 3  0.377  0.349  0.028  0.424  106 
- 2  0.312  0.347  -0.035  -0.619  144 
- 1  0.194  0.246  -0.052  -1.230  191 
+ 2  0.441  0.412  0.028  0.587  211 
+ 3  0.597  0.435  0.161  3.119  186 
+ 4  0.603  0.481  0.122  1.976  131 
Note: Y  = 0.03. 
Outcome 5 – Probability of Being Employed on a FTC (1996–2001)  
Outcome  5  (the  probability  of  holding  a  FTC)  is  the  counterpart  to  Out-
come 1.201 The matching procedure is able to balance out pre-treatment differ-
ences in the outcome variable to a large extent (see Table 63). It can be seen that 
entering into a FTC not only increases the probability of holding a permanent 
contract in the future, but also to hold a FTC again.  
Note that in the third and fourth year after the treatment the effect on the prob-
ability of holding a permanent contract (Table 62) is higher than the probability 
                                              
201 Remember that Outcome 5 is only defined for untreated DEF.2 (see Section 6.4.4).   224 
of holding a FTC (Table 63). The sum of the two effects (probability of holding a 
FTC and probability of holding a permanent contract) corresponds approximately 
to the overall employment effect depicted in Figure 8.  
This explains why there is no positive ATT with respect to the probability of 
holding  a  permanent  contract  2  years  after  entering  into  a  FTC  in  Table  62: 
While control persons may enter into a permanent job directly from unemploy-
ment, many treated individuals are still in their FTC jobs, for example, waiting to 
get their FTC transformed into a permanent one at the present employer. A very 
familiar mechanism is termed ‘lock-in effect’ in the literature on the evaluation 
of active labour market policy (see, e.g., VAN OURS, 2004).       
Table 63: Probability of Being Employed on a FTC – DEF.2   
  All Persons 
Year   Mean treated  Mean control  ATT  t-stat  Pairs 
- 3  0.104  0.075  0.028  0.715  106 
- 2  0.118  0.083  0.035  0.969  144 
- 1  0.136  0.115  0.021  0.614  191 
+ 2  0.313  0.142  0.171  4.239  211 
+ 3  0.134  0.097  0.037  1.123  186 
+ 4  0.137  0.061  0.076  2.060  131 
Note: Y = 0.03. 
 
6.4.6.3  Heterogeneous Effects of Fixed-Term Contracts 
Although it is not necessary for the application of matching estimators to as-
sume the ATT to be homogeneous across all individuals (see Subchapter 3.3), so 
far only mean effects have been presented. Therefore, sub-samples are imposed 
by including a dummy variable for the corresponding subgroups into the Maha-
lanobis distance, and the matching estimator described above are performed on 
these samples (see Section 3.3.1 for the methodological background). For many 
sub-samples, this approach turns out to be not suitable as the number of untreated 
individuals per month becomes too small leading to a poor performance in terms 
of the pre-program test. Thus only a differentiation by one single characteristic is 
possible. The effects for women, individuals with formal qualification, and indi-
viduals who are at least 32 years old are presented.  
Only non-treatment DEF.2 is used in order to ensure a sufficient number of un-
treated individuals, which may be justified by the fact that there have not been 
great  differences  in  the  mean  effects  between  the  two  definitions  of  non-
treatment. Nevertheless, the number of pairs becomes quite small as many treated 
persons  have  to  be  dropped  since  no  suitable  untreated  individuals  could  be 
found within the common support and the caliper. For this reason, the results 
should be interpreted with greatest caution and only as a “tendency”.    225 
Women 
It can be seen in Figure 13 that the observed pre-treatment employment prob-
ability  of women entering into FTCs is always between 2 and 10 percentage 
points higher than the control group, but not statistically significant. Neverthe-
less, one can conclude that women entering into FTCs have unobservable charac-
teristics which lead to slightly higher employment probabilities on average, and 
hence  the  CIA  may  be  violated.  Keeping  this  caveat  in  mind  and  comparing 
Figure 13 with Figure 8, it may be concluded that the employment effects are 
slightly higher for women than for the whole sample. Whether the same can be 
stated for the unemployment effects (Figure 14) remains unclear.    
A matter of particular interest are the effects on the probability of being out-of-
labour force. Comparing Figure 15 with Figure 12 and taking only the point es-
timates into account, one may conclude that the reduction of the probability of 
being out-of-labour force is at least temporarily stronger for women. The same 
seems to be true for the probability of holding a permanent contract: While for 
the whole sample the effect is 16 percentage points after 3 years (Table 62), the 
corresponding effect for women is approximately 22 percentage points (Table 
64). 
 
Figure 13: Employment Effects – Women (DEF.2) 
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Figure 14: Unemployment Effects – Women (DEF.2) 
 
 
Figure 15: Out-of-Labour Force Effect – Women (DEF.2) 
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Table 64: Probabilities of Being Employed on a Permanent Contract versus FTC  
–  Women (DEF.2) 
  Women 
  Outcome 1: Permanent contract  Outcome 5: FTC   
Year  Mean 
treated 
Mean 
control 
ATT  t-stat  Mean 
treated 
Mean 
control 
ATT  t-stat  Pairs 
-  3  0.290  0.258  0.032  0.274  0.097  0.065  0.032  0.451  31 
-  2  0.266  0.267  0.000  0.000  0.200  0.067  0.133  1.859  45 
-  1  0.161  0.194  -0.032  -0.467  0.210  0.048  0.161  0.058  62 
+ 2  0.537  0.373  0.164  1.903  0.194  0.030  0.164  3.087  67 
+ 3  0.563  0.333  0.229  2.295  0.125  0.042  0.083  1.479  48 
+ 4  0.600  0.429  0.171  1.435  0.114  0.029  0.086  1.392  35 
  Note: Y  = 0.03. 
 
Age ³ ³ ³ ³ 32 
It would be of particular interest to evaluate the effects of entering into a FTC 
on the employment opportunities of workers older than 58 years since they can 
be hired on FTCs without legal limitations (see Subchapter 2.2). Unfortunately, 
there are not enough observations available since the mean age of unemployed 
entering into FTCs is about 32 years. Therefore, only workers who are at least 32 
years old are used in the analysis. The results in comparison to the whole sample 
can be summarised as follows.  
The point estimates of the employment effects seem to be similar to the point 
estimates of effects for the whole sample (Figure 16 and Figure 8), even though 
the estimated effects are often not significant, which may result from the small 
sample size. The effects on the probability of being unemployed (Figure 17 and 
Figure  10)  and  the  probability  of  being  out-of-labour  force  look very  similar 
(Figure 18 and Figure 12), but again are not statistically significant. There are 
some differences with respect to the effects on the probability of holding perma-
nent contracts (Table 65 and Table 62) as well as the probability of holding FTCs 
(Table 65 and Table 63). It seems, however, not possible to derive any reliable 
and clear-cut conclusion from this comparison. 
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Figure 16: Employment Effects – Age ³32  (DEF.2) 
                       
 
Figure 17: Unemployment Effects – Age ³ 32 (DEF.2) 
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Figure 18: Out-of-Labour-Force Effects – Age ³32 (DEF.2) 
                    
Table 65: Probabilities of Being Employed on a Permanent Contract versus FTC  
– Age ³ 32  (DEF.2) 
  Age ³ 32 
  Outcome 1: Permanent contract  Outcome 5: FTC   
Year   Mean 
treated 
Mean 
control 
ATT  t-stat  Mean 
treated 
Mean 
control 
ATT  t-stat  Pairs 
- 3  0.551  0.367  0.184  1.837  0.082  0.082  0.000  0.000  49 
- 2  0.452  0.339  0.113  1.284  0.081  0.065  0.016  0.343  62 
- 1  0.238  0.250  -0.013  -0.183  0.075  0.05  0.025  0.650  80 
+ 2  0.533  0.373  0.160  1.981  0.147  0.067  0.080  1.589  75 
+ 3  0.517  0.466  0.052  0.553  0.138  0.052  0.086  1.588  58 
+ 4  0.541  0.405  0.135  1.159  0.108  0.054  0.054  0.844  37 
Note: Y  = 0.03. 
With Formal Qualification 
In this paragraph, only individuals are analysed which have completed at least a 
vocational training. This amounts to approximately 70% of all individuals enter-
ing into FTCs. Due to the number of observations, it is unfortunately not possible 
to focus on workers without formal qualification, which would be more interest-
ing from a policy-orientated point of view.  
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Comparing again the point estimates of the monthly measured outcome vari-
ables (Figure 19 with Figure 8,  Figure 20 with Figure 10, and Figure 21 with 
Figure 12), one may conclude that the effect for the sub-sample is slightly better 
in terms of enhancing employment prospects. Again, it is unclear which conclu-
sions can be drawn from a comparison of the ATTs with respect to Outcome 1 
and 5 (see Table 66): One insight may be that the stepping stone effect occurs 
earlier but is less lasting for workers with formal qualification.  
Figure 19: Employment Effects – Workers With Formal Qualification (DEF.2) 
 Figure 20: Unemployment Effects – Workers With Formal Qualification (DEF.2) 
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Figure 21: Out-of-Labour-Force Effects – Workers With Formal Qualification 
(DEF.2) 
                 
Table 66: Probabilities of Being Employed on a Permanent Contract versus FTC  
– Workers With Formal Qualification (DEF.2) 
  Workers With Formal Qualification 
  Outcome 1: Permanent contract  Outcome 5: FTC   
Year  Mean 
treated 
Mean 
control 
ATT  t-stat  Mean 
treated 
Mean 
control 
ATT  t-stat  Pairs 
- 3  0.400  0.400  0.000  0.000  0.100  0.100  0.000  0.000  40 
- 2  0.328  0.466  -0.138  -1.520  0.086  0.052  0.034  0.728  58 
- 1  0.203  0.278  -0.076  -1.098  0.114  0.114  0.000  0.000  79 
+ 2  0.599  0.401  0.198  3.624  0.138  0.060  0.078  2.363  167 
+ 3  0.585  0.492  0.093  1.424  0.136  0.059  0.076  1.967  118 
+ 4  0.533  0.453  0.080  0.976  0.147  0.004  0.106  2.268  75 
Note: Y = 0.016. 
 
6.4.7  Summary: Effects of Entering into Fixed-Term Contracts on the 
Long-Term Employment Opportunities of the Unemployed 
Subchapter 6.4 has investigated the effects of the transition from unemploy-
ment to FTC jobs on the individuals’ future employment opportunities in the 
West German labour market.  
First, it has been discussed in Subsection 6.4.3.1 that there are at least two rea-
sonable counterfactuals for individuals entering into FTC jobs after a certain un-
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employment duration. One counterfactual, most commonly applied in evaluation 
studies, is to compare a ‘world with FTCs’ with a ‘world without FTCs’ and de-
fine untreated persons as unemployed who never enter into FTCs during the pe-
riod under observation (termed DEF.1). A second counterfactual, which may be 
more in line with the idea of sequential job search (unemployed enter into FTCs 
after having failed to find a permanent job), is not to enter into a FTC up to a cer-
tain duration of unemployment, but possibly in a later month. This implies a 
comparison of unemployed entering into FTCs in a particular month of unem-
ployment duration with those unemployed who do not enter into FTCs up to the 
end of this month (termed DEF.2). Both definitions have been analysed in this 
Subchapter. Contrary to expectation, the estimation results differ only slightly 
between DEF.1 and DEF.2, which may, however, be driven by the small sample 
size. Therefore, the differences in the definitions are not emphasised when inter-
preting the results.    
Second, it has been discussed in Section 6.4.3 and shown in Section 6.4.6.1 that 
the estimation of the propensity score by a hazard rate model is a suitable ap-
proach since it seems to be more in the spirit of the sequential job search theory 
than the commonly used ‘static’ propensity score, and it is able to balance pre-
treatment differences between treated and untreated individuals in most cases.   
Third, it has been argued in Section 6.4.3, that the SUTVA is likely to be vio-
lated, since general equilibrium and indirect effects of unknown sign and magni-
tude are probable. One empirical study for Spain is in line with the hypothesis 
that  FTC  workers  reduce  re-employment  chances  of  long-term  unemployed 
through on-the-job search (see Section 6.4.2). These indirect and general equilib-
rium effects may imply that the estimated effects are not informative with regard 
to the economy as a whole.  
Fourth, it has been discussed in Section 6.3.4 that the sample used may lead to 
biased estimates caused by the way the information on the type of contract is col-
lected in the GSOEP. Short FTC employment spells are likely to be underrepre-
sented. While NN-matching is robust against the general case that treated indi-
viduals are over- or underrepresented in comparison to untreated individuals with 
regard to the underlying population (choice-based sampling), the results may still 
be biased by the selectivity with regard to the fact that shorter FTC spells are 
more likely to be excluded.  
Fifth, it has been shown in Subsection 6.4.6.1 that imposing the common sup-
port condition leads to a substantial loss of observations. This may imply that the 
estimated results are not informative with regard to the underlying population 
under certain conditions.  
Keeping these caveats in mind the results can be summarised as follows: Enter-
ing from unemployment into FTC jobs  
–  increases  the  future  overall  employment  probability  by  15–20  percentage 
points at least within the ensuing 36 months,    233 
–  increases the probability of holding a permanent contract 3 years later by 16 
percentage points,  
–  has only a negative effect on the risk of unemployment in the short-run (up to 
18 months), 
–  reduces the probability of leaving the labour force by 10 percentage points at 
least within the ensuing 36 months. 
Analyses  for  sub-groups  (women,  workers  older  than  32  years,  workers  with 
formal qualification) have revealed that unemployed women may benefit more 
from entering into FTCs than unemployed men. Slightly more positive effects 
have also been found for unemployed with formal qualification. These results 
should, however, be interpreted with caution since the samples for the analyses 
have been quite small. Probably, the most important finding of these analyses for 
sub-groups is that no result is contradictory to the estimated mean effects sum-
marised above. More detailed analyses would obviously be useful. To the best of 
my knowledge, there is, however, no larger panel dataset for Germany available 
including information on the type of contract.  
 
6.5  Conclusions 
The competing risks hazard rate model shows that typical characteristics which 
have been found to prolong unemployment duration in other studies, such as dis-
abilities, being a foreigner, being mother with young children, do not affect the 
FTC hazard rate, but have a negative effect on the permanent contract hazard. 
Moreover, while the probability to enter into permanent contract jobs decreases 
for long-term unemployed, long-term unemployment has no negative effect on 
the probability to take up a FTC. Thus FTCs may serve as entry jobs for job 
searchers with low employment chances, which would exactly correspond to one 
of the political goals of the liberalisation of FTCs. However, as previously men-
tioned, this statement should not be interpreted in the sense that FTCs reduce 
overall unemployment duration.  
Using a propensity score matching estimator it has been revealed that entering 
into  a  FTC  increases  the  individual  future  employment  probability  (including 
FTC and permanent contract jobs) and the probability of holding a permanent 
contract job, and decreases the probability  of leaving the labour force. These 
findings are compatible with the hypothesis that FTCs are stepping stones to-
wards permanent contract jobs.  
Some results of the hazard rate model and the matching approach are, however, 
also in line with dual labour market theories: Having held a FTC increases the 
probability of entering into a FTC and holding a FTC in the future. Entering into 
a FTC has no long-term negative effect on the unemployment probability, i.e., 
the effect vanishes after 18 months.    234 
Nevertheless, taking all the results together and considering that for no sub-
group a negative effect on labour market prospects could be detected, my conclu-
sion is that the stepping stone hypothesis cannot be rejected, at least at the micro-
economic level. This is also in line with the results found in other empirical stud-
ies discussed in Section 6.4.2. As mentioned there, all available empirical studies 
using a causal approach (that is, a control group of nonparticipants) find a step-
ping stone effect. The conclusion that FTCs lead to a segmented labour market is 
only found in empirical studies which do not ask counterfactual questions.  
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7  Summary and Conclusions 
In this study I have analysed the labour market effects of fixed-term contracts 
(FTCs) in West Germany. The study consists of empirical analyses using indi-
vidual level as well as establishment level datasets but also theoretical considera-
tions and discussions of previous empirical research. Except for the descriptive 
analysis in Subchapter 4.5, the empirical parts of the study have attempted to 
identify causal effects by microeconometric methods described in Chapter 3.  
The role of FTCs in labour demand has been analysed in Chapter 4. Economic 
theory suggests three categories of reasons why firms use FTCs. FTCs serve as 
buffer stock, that is, as an adjustment instrument to cope with demand or produc-
tivity shocks that may insulate the firms’ permanent workforce. FTCs are used as 
a screening device (prolonged probationary period) to overcome the problem of 
asymmetric information when hiring new employees. FTCs are used as a substi-
tute for permanent workers, that is, job positions that are inherently permanent 
are repeatedly filled by FTC workers. 
The empirical analysis could not reject any of these hypotheses. First of all, it 
has been found that FTCs are much more important for the German labour mar-
ket  as  commonly  thought  when  focussing  on  aggregate  employment  stocks. 
Moreover, the descriptive evidence seems to be in favour of the hypothesis that 
FTCs increase the overall flexibility of the labour market. Almost 43% of all hir-
ings are based on FTCs. The turnover of FTC workers accounts for almost 31% 
of the total worker turnover. FTCs are extensively used as an adjustment instru-
ment, which is reflected in the job turnover rate of FTCs being approximately six 
times larger than the job turnover rate of permanent workers.  
Even though the numbers are based on a descriptive analysis, and even though 
the hypothesis of the liberalisation of FTCs in 1985 having raised overall labour 
market flexibility (in terms of the adjustment speed of employment stocks) has 
been rejected by econometric analyses so far, I would deliberately conclude that 
FTCs are likely to increase labour market flexibility. The reasons for drawing 
this conclusion are twofold. Firstly, the previous econometric studies for Ger-
many  discussed  in  Subchapter  4.3  are  based  on  aggregate  employment  stock 
data, which are likely to conceal most of the dynamics at the firm level. Sec-
ondly, if FTC work was not increasing overall employment flexibility (e.g., in 
terms of worker flows or job flows at the firm level), this could only be driven by 
a decrease of the flexibility (increase in job stability) of permanent contract work 
which fully outweighs the increase in flexibility caused by FTCs. Although most 
theoretical  models predict a certain increase in the job stability of permanent 
work due to the use of FTCs (see Subchapter 4.3), to the best of my knowledge, 
clear-cut  empirical  evidence  in  favour  of  this  relationship  has  not  been  been 
found so far.     236 
A large proportion (40%) of hirings on FTCs and terminations of FTCs are not 
associated with net employment changes and, hence, FTCs may be used as sub-
stitutes for permanent workers to fill permanent positions. This conclusion is un-
derlined by the empirical result of a positive relationship between firing costs for 
permanent contract workers and the use of FTCs (see Subchapter 4.4). This rela-
tionship could not be found for the two other types of temporary work analysed.  
As one third of all FTC workers get their contract converted into a permanent 
one within the same establishment, the hypothesis of FTCs serving as prolonged 
probationary period cannot be rejected. Hence, the hypothesis of FTCs exclu-
sively being dead ends can clearly be rejected already at this stage. 
 In Chapter 5 I have analysed the short-term effects of FTCs on workers’ sub-
jective assessments of career opportunities and of job security as well as wages. 
The results can be summarised as follows: (1.) FTCs raise the subjective job in-
security;  (2.)  FTCs  decrease  satisfaction  with  career  opportunities;  (3.)  FTC 
workers do not receive a wage differential compensating for these disadvantages, 
but even a wage penalty. The first conclusion from these results is that FTC 
workers are indeed worse-off in the short-run compared to the situation they held 
permanent contracts. However, considering theoretical arguments as well as the 
heterogeneity of estimated effects with regard to formal qualification this conclu-
sion has to be recapitulated. For workers without qualification no significantly 
negative wage effect of FTCs could be detected, whereas workers with university 
degree have much lower wages when holding a FTC, but at the same time they 
do not assess their career opportunities as significantly worse than the control 
group of similar permanent contract workers. This underlines the idea that enter-
ing into a FTC job may be an investment in lifetime earnings or utility for several 
groups. In contrast, persons without a formal qualification may not be willing to 
accept FTC jobs with lower wages as they are less likely to serve as stepping 
stones for them. This conclusion is in line with the tendency found in Subchapter 
6.4  that  the  stepping  stone  effect  for  persons  with  qualification  seems  to  be 
stronger. To some extent these results contradict the results of older segmented 
labour market theories predicting low-qualified workers to be more negatively 
affected in terms of wages by a segmentation by the type of employment con-
tract. Further research has to analyse this issue of long-run compensation and 
maximisation of lifetime earnings by a longitudinal (dynamic) approach using 
panel data. The main reason for using a cross sectional dataset instead of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (which is the only individual level panel dataset 
available including information on the type of contract) for the analysis in Chap-
ter 5 is that it is large enough to allow reliable estimates of effects for subgroups 
of individuals.     
The results of the analyses of Chapter 6 are possibly the most important ones 
since two central policy goals of FTCs are touched. Typical characteristics which 
are known to prolong unemployment duration, such as disabilities, being a for-
eigner, or being mother with young children, do not affect the FTC hazard rate   237 
negatively. In contrast, these characteristics decrease the transition probability to 
permanent contract jobs. Hence, it is easier to get a FTC job than a permanent 
contract job for unemployed job searchers. More important: Having entered a 
FTC increases the probability of being employed in a permanent job later on. 
Hence, FTCs serve as stepping stones towards permanent jobs. This is in line 
with empirical studies for other countries using a causal approach. Interestingly, 
the result of FTCs leading to a segmented labour market, as predicted by many 
theoretical  models,  is  only  found  in  studies  which  do  not  make  use  of  well-
defined control groups to estimate the counterfactual outcome.  
Of course, these positive conclusions with respect to a stepping-stone effect 
have to be set off against possible adverse effects of FTCs. In this study only 
some negative short-run effects of FTCs at the micro level have been empirically 
revealed, that is, on wages, subjective job security, and subjective career oppor-
tunities. However, other microeconometric studies (especially for Spain) have 
found further adverse effects, such as lower productivity and human capital in-
vestments, more work related accidents, and even some evidence in favour of 
negative  effects  on  fertility  (see  DOLADO,  GARCÍA-SERRANO,  and  JIMENO, 
2002).  
Given the results of the theoretical models discussed, in addition to negative ef-
fects at the micro level there may be effects at the macro level, which are more 
likely to be negative than positive. During the course of this study I have high-
lighted the caveats of the empirical methods used. It has again to be stressed that 
the analyses have been of partial-analytical nature. All causal analyses presented 
are based on the assumption that the control units are not affected by the treat-
ments. It is however likely that substantial effects occur at the macroeconomic 
level. Many of the theoretical papers discussed take general equilibrium effects 
into account and come to negative results. Most indicate that the introduction of 
FTCs (a partial deregulation) has a number of adverse labour market effects (see 
Subchapter 4.2), so that the overall employment effect may even be negative.   
This leads to the central question that could not be addressed in this study: Is 
the liberalisation of types of temporary work (a partial deregulation) an alterna-
tive to an extensive reform of protection against dismissal legislation? The prob-
lem at the microeconomic level is that there is no counterfactual for the availabil-
ity of FTCs observable within countries. Hence, studies based on aggregate data 
or general equilibrium models would be useful to gain further insight into the 
labour market effects of FTCs and the question on the effects of the partial de-
regulation.  
A promising approach at the micro-level, which may lead to additional insights, 
is a difference-in-differences estimator based on a natural experiment (see Sec-
tion 3.2.4). The so-called “Hartz Reform” induced the following variation: The 
age threshold for hiring a person on a FTC without limitations was lowered from 
58 to 52 years in January 2003. This age group may be large enough for estimat-
ing the effects of the liberalisation of FTCs for the specific group on their em-  238 
ployment chances in comparison to the counterfactual FTCs were not liberalised, 
which can be estimated by the adjacent age groups not being within the scope of 
this reform. Analysing the effects of the reform is, however, left for future re-
search.     239 
8  Appendix 
Box 5: Institutional Background on Temporary Work Agency Work (until 1999) 
Until 1967, the supply of temporary workers by Temporary Work Agencies (TWAs) was 
forbidden, because the German Federal Employment Service had a monopoly on job place-
ment services. In 1967, a judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court repealed this regula-
tion in view of the constitutional right of freedom of occupation. The supply of workers by 
private agencies was subsequently regulated by the Act on the Supply of Workers by Tempo-
rary Employment Agencies of 1972. The main principle of the law is still valid today: the 
TWA has all the duties of an employer. With this provision, the legislator aimed at bringing 
the relation between the TWA and its employees onto the same level as the relation between 
a regular employer and its employees. To prevent the TWA from working as a job placement 
agency, additional conditions were included in the law. First, the employment contract be-
tween the TWA and the temporary worker has to be of unlimited duration. This stipulation 
was later given more concrete meaning by the Federal Employment Service. It required the 
contract between the worker and the TWA to be at least 25% or one day longer than the du-
ration of the first commission to a user enterprise. A second legal constraint for TWAs is the 
limit to the duration a worker is allowed to be commissioned to a user company. In the origi-
nal law, the maximum duration had been 3 months. With the Improvement of Employment 
Opportunities Act of 1985, the maximum duration was extended to 6 months. In 1994, the 
new Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act further increased this limitation to 9 
months. In addition, the Federal Employment Service’s monopoly of job placement was 
repealed in that year. Since then, TWAs have had the possibility both to supply temporary 
workers and to provide job placement services. Finally, the maximum cumulated duration 
was increased to 12 months by the Act on the Supply of Workers by Temporary Employ-
ment Agencies of 1997. The works council of the user establishment has to agree to the em-
ployment of TWA workers in the same way as in the case of recruitment of permanent work-
ers (§ 99 of the Works Constitution Act).  
 
Source: RUDOLPH and SCHRÖDER (1997) as well as JAHN (2002).   
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Table 67: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Sample   
– Dependent  Variables 
Variable  Data  Mean  Std. Dev.  Observations 
TWA Workers  overall  0.176  0.381  N  7,207 
(Dummy)  between    0.342  I  2,843 
  within    0.193 
i T  
2.731 
FTC Workers  overall  0.377  0.485  N  4,873 
(Dummy)  between    0.444  I  2,285 
  within    0.232 
i T  
2.277 
FL Workers  overall  0.114  0.317  N  6,303 
(Dummy)  between    0.279  I  2,928 
  within    0.185 
i T  
2.728 
Notes: N is the overall number of used observations, I is the number of establishments and  i T  
is the average number of times an establishment is observed in the sample. The between data 
are generated by calculating the means over time by establishment  i x . The within data are de-
fined as  it i x x x - + , where the overall mean  x  is added to equate the mean of all data (overall, 
between and within).  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel for West Germany 1993–1998. 
Table 68: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Sample  
– Independent Variables 
Variable  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min.  Max. 
Expected output change  0.027  0.220  -1.000  5.000 
Seasonal fluctuations (dummy)  0.292       
Collective wage agreement industry level (dummy)  0.693       
Collective wage agreement firm level (dummy)  0.093       
Works council (dummy)  0.462       
ICT investments (dummy)  0.521       
Other Investments (dummy)  0.258       
Share of workers with qualification  0.599  0.294  0.000  1.000 
Share of women  0.348  0.286  0.000  1.000 
Problems due to parental leave (dummy)  0.092       
Problems due to sickness (dummy)  0.177       
Notes: See previous table. All statistics are from the estimation samples. 
Source:  IAB Establishment Panel for West Germany 1993–1998. 
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Table 69: Probability of Being Employed on FTC (Omitting Federal State 
Dummies), Tenure£ 10 Years, Marginal Effects 
 
  Men  Women 
  Marg. eff.  t-stat  X   Marg. eff.  t-stat  X  
Age (years)  -0.083  -3.87  35.1  -0.034  -1.42  35.9 
Age
2 / 1,000   1.891  3.44  1.29  0.622  1.21  1.37 
Age
3 / 100,000  -1.520  -3.11  0.50  -0.508  -1.11  0.55 
Qualification (reference: no formal qualification)               
  Vocational training  -0.009  -0.65  0.59  -0.047  -3.54  0.67 
  Vocational college   0.045  1.66  0.03  -0.010  -0.42  0.04 
  Master craftsman  -0.020  -1.26  0.11  -0.054  -2.90  0.06 
  Polytechnic  0.001  0.05  0.05  -0.046  -1.79  0.03 
  University  0.037  1.71  0.07  0.030  1.17  0.04 
Children < 6   -0.037  -3.96  0.25  -0.007  -0.55  0.16 
Children 6–17   0.012  1.11  0.26  0.016  1.34  0.33 
Foreigner  0.023  1.59  0.09  0.002  0.12  0.05 
Disabled  0.042  1.70  0.03  0.006  0.16  0.02 
Spouse employed  -0.006  -0.65  0.29  -0.016  -1.61  0.55 
Employment history             
  Ever changed occupation  0.021  2.39  0.37  -0.006  -0.60  0.34 
  Ever moved due to job-related reasons  0.000  0.05  0.25  0.019  1.50  0.17 
  Two employers so far  0.005  0.36  0.25  -0.020  -1.38  0.27 
  Three employers so far  0.004  0.26  0.22  -0.023  -1.45  0.21 
  Four employers so far  0.018  0.99  0.14  -0.028  -1.63  0.14 
  Five or more employers so far  0.027  1.53  0.23  0.021  1.07  0.19 
  Previous Job: Dismissed  0.044  3.09  0.11  -0.006  -0.38  0.09 
  Previous Job: End of FTC  0.098  5.26  0.06  0.082  3.56  0.05 
  Previous Job: Closure of a firm  0.013  0.92  0.10  0.002  0.10  0.07 
  Once unemployed so far  -0.005  -0.44  0.24  -0.002  -0.12  0.26 
  Twice unemployed so far  0.009  0.58  0.09  0.023  1.15  0.08 
  Three times unemployed so far  -0.003  -0.13  0.04  0.019  0.66  0.03 
  Four or more times unemployed so far  0.075  3.14  0.04  0.036  0.93  0.02 
  Duration of last unemployment spell in months  0.000  0.81  3.29  0.002  4.12  3.93 
  Unemployed in the year taking up the job   0.042  3.34  0.17  0.021  1.33  0.14 
Regional (place of residence) variables             
 log unemployment rate of the federal state  0.043  2.26  2.34  0.092  4.09  2.34 
  City (more than 50.000 inhabitants)  0.006  0.64  0.49  -0.032  -2.98  0.49 
  Surrounding area  -0.022  -1.83  0.15  -0.022  -1.65  0.15 
Field of occupational qualification             
  Training in Farming occupation etc.  -0.033  -1.05  0.01  0.042  1.00  0.01 
  Training in industry occupation   -0.021  -2.00  0.45  0.037  1.97  0.08 
  Training in health occupation   0.049  1.19  0.01  -0.011  -0.70  0.10 
  Training in technical occupation   -0.006  -0.43  0.12  -0.028  -1.09  0.03 
             
Log-Likelihood  -1215.7468  -1050.6032 
Likelihood ratio   c
2 (35) = 223.45  c
2 (35) = 161.57 
No. of observations   4,350  3,589 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   242 
Table 70: Effects of FTCs on Mean Weekly Hours of Work – Men (Model A ) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Mean Weekly Working 
Hours 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT (hours)    NT 
   £10  -1.05 
(0.49)  
**  390 
       
    £2  -1.15 
(0.64) 
*  264 
 
 
Table 71: Effects of FTCs on Working Part-time – Men (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Part-time (%) 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT                
(%-points) 
  NT 
£10  1.21 
(1.34) 
  390 
       
£2  0.54 
(2.08) 
  264 
 
Table 72: Effects of FTCs on Mean Weekly Hours of Work – Women (Model A) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Mean Weekly Working 
Hours 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT (hours)    NT 
   £10  -0.73 
(0.57) 
  339 
       
    £2  0.88 
(0.93) 
  218 
 
Table 73: Effects of FTCs on Working Part-time – Women (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Part-time (%) 
Tenure 
(years) 
ATT                   
(%-points) 
  NT 
   £10  3.67 
(2.65) 
  339 
       
    £2  -1.27 
(3.70) 
  218 
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Table 74: Effects of FTCs on Job Insecurity – Men (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of danger of being dismissed / failing to get the 
FTC renewed 
  Very high danger  High danger  Rather low  
danger 
No danger at all 
Tenure  £ £ £ £10 years  FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
Small establishment 
(< 50) 
24.9  18.7 
(3.9) 
***  26.1  15.3 
(3.9) 
***  34.4  -21.4 
(5.1) 
***  14.6  -12.6 
(3.9) 
*** 
Large establishment (³50)  21.2  17.7 
(3.1) 
***  20.5  9.9 
(3.5) 
***  44.7  -14.0 
(4.6) 
***  13.5  -13.6 
(3.3) 
*** 
Industry  26.5  23.0 
(3.6) 
***  21.1  5.6 
(4.5) 
  40.6  -16.8 
(5.4) 
***  11.8  -11.8 
(3.8) 
*** 
Trade  23.3  19.2 
(7,2) 
***  13.9  1,8 
(6.2) 
  48.9  -7,1 
(9.9) 
  13.9  -13.9 
(7.8) 
* 
Without qualification  32.8  25.8 
(6.1) 
***  26.9  10.2 
(7.0) 
  29.8  -28.4 
(8.0) 
***  10.5  -7.6 
(4.9) 
 
With qualification  22.5  18.8 
(2.7) 
***  21.9  12.0 
(2.8) 
***  41.1  -17.9 
(3.3) 
***  15.0  -12.9 
(2.6) 
*** 
University / Polytechnic  16.3  14.5 
(6.2) 
**  20.9  14.5 
(7.7) 
**  39.6  -17.1 
(9.7) 
*  23.3  -11.8 
(10.5) 
 
Age < 32 years  23.0  19.1 
(3.3) 
***  17.2  4.7 
(3.9) 
  44.6  -13.2 
(5.2) 
**  15.3  -10.5 
(3.8) 
*** 
Age ³ 32 years  26.1  21.3 
(3.3) 
***  27.2  15.8 
(3.3) 
***  34.4  -24.4 
(3.9) 
***  12.5  -12.6 
(3.1) 
*** 
Notes: FTC (%) denotes the proportion of FTC workers choosing the respective category. 
*** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 75: Effects of FTCs on Career Opportunities – Men (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of career opportunities 
Tenure  £ £ £ £10 years  Very satisfied   “By and large” 
satisfied  
Rather dissatis-
fied  
Very dissatisfied  
  FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
Small establishment 
(< 50) 
3.5  -4.5  
(1.8) 
**  38.7  -13.3  
(4.5) 
***  40.4  8.3  
(4.3) 
*  17.4  9.5  
(3.2) 
*** 
Large establishment (³50)  6.2  -2.6 
(2.4) 
  46  -2.5 
(4.3) 
  35.0  0.5 
(4.4) 
  12.9  4.6 
(2.9) 
 
Industry  6.6  -0.9 
(2.5) 
  37.1  -12.8  
(4.8) 
***  44.1  10.5  
(5.0) 
**  13.2  3.2 
(3.5) 
 
Trade  8.3  0.5 
(5.0) 
  47.9  0.5  
(9.1) 
***  27.3  -7.7 
(9.6) 
  16.7  6.8 
(7.7) 
 
Without qualification  5.2  2.4 
(2.7) 
  33.3  -11.5  
(6.9) 
*  39.8  -0.7  
(7.1) 
  21.8  9.9  
(5.6) 
* 
With qualification  5.5  -3.2 
(1.5) 
**  43.8  -7.8  
(3.3) 
**  36.3  4.6 
(3.2) 
  14.9  6.9  
(2.3) 
*** 
University / Polytechnic  7.2  -9.1 
(6.2) 
  51.1  -3.0 
(5.4) 
  28.6  5.0 
(8.8) 
  7.1  1.1 
(4.9) 
 
Age < 32 years  5.6  -3.3 
(2.2) 
  42.1  -6.1 
(4.7) 
  37.1  2.4 
(4.3) 
  15.1  6.9 
(3.0) 
** 
Age ³ 32 years  5.3  -2.1 
(1.8) 
  41.3  -10.2 
(4.6) 
*  37.2  5.4 
(4.0) 
  16.2  6.9 
(3.1) 
** 
Notes: FTC (%) denotes the proportion of FTC workers choosing the respective category. 
*** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 76: Effects of FTCs on Job Insecurity – Women (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of danger of being dismissed / failing to get the 
FTC renewed 
Tenure  £ £ £ £10 years  Very high danger  High danger  Rather low dan-
ger 
No danger at all 
  FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT 
(%-points) 
Small establishment 
(< 50) 
26.1  21.7 
(12.3
) 
*  8.7  2.2 
(9.5) 
  60.8  17.1 
(16.5
) 
  4.3  -41.0  
(11.9
) 
*** 
Large establishment (³50)  22.5  19.5  
(4.1) 
***  21.7  13.1  
(4.3) 
***  45.9  -11.7  
(5.7) 
**  8.9  -19.9 
(7.1) 
*** 
Industry  27.9  23.5  
(6.5) 
***  24.6  11.1 
(7.2) 
  36.0  -22.4 
(8.2) 
***  11.5  -12.2  
(6.5) 
* 
Trade  23.3  19.2  
(6.4) 
***  13.9  1.8 
(7.1) 
  48.9  -7.1 
(10.4) 
  13.9  -13.9  
(8.1) 
* 
Without qualification  28.4  22.9  
(6.2) 
***  25.7  11.0  
(6.1) 
*  40.5  -10.7 
(8.2) 
  5.4  -23.2 
(5.5) 
*** 
With qualification  20.9  18.6  
(2.9) 
***  21.4  13.8  
(3.0) 
***  47.8  -8.3 
(3.5) 
**  9.8  -24.2 
(2.6) 
*** 
University / Polytechnic  26.1  21.7  
(12.8) 
*  8.7  2.2 
(9.8) 
  60.8  17.1 
(15.9) 
  4.3  -41.0 
(12.5) 
*** 
Age < 32 years  20.0  17.6 
(3.7) 
***  20.8  10.9 
(3.8) 
***  50.0  -6.9 
(5.2) 
  9.3  -21.6 
(3.8) 
*** 
Age ³ 32 years  24.2  20.4 
(3.3) 
***  22.5  13.0 
(3.1) 
***  44.4  -8.8 
(4.0) 
**  9.0  -24.5 
(2.9) 
*** 
Notes: FTC (%) denotes the proportion of FTC workers choosing the respective category. 
*** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   246 
Table 77: Effects of FTCs on Career Opportunities – Women (Model A)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Subjective assessment of career opportunities 
Tenure  £ £ £ £10 years  Very satisfied   “By and large” 
satisfied  
Rather dissatis-
fied  
Very dissatisfied  
  FTC 
(%) 
ATT  
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT  
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT  
(%-points) 
FTC 
(%) 
ATT  
(%-points) 
Small establishments  
(< 50) 
5.6  -1.2 
(2.0) 
  41.8  -10.1 
(4.2) 
***  36.1  5.1 
(4.1) 
  16.4  6.2 
(3.2) 
* 
Large establishment (³50)  3.5  -4.2 
(2.6) 
  46.5  -1.0 
(5.9) 
  34.3  -1.0 
(5.9) 
  15.8  6.3 
(4.0) 
 
Industry  3.4  -1.6 
(3.5) 
  45.7  -0.6 
(9.5) 
  33.9  -1.4 
(9.0) 
  17.0  3.6 
(7.1) 
 
Trade  4.6  -0.9 
(2.7) 
  41.2  -8.1 
(5.9) 
  35.5  2.0 
(5.8) 
  18.7  7.0 
(4.6) 
 
Without qualification  1.5  -4.0 
(2.7) 
  39.4  -1.8 
(8.3) 
  37.7  -1.7 
(8.6) 
  21.2  7.5 
(6.3) 
 
With qualification  6.3  -1.4 
(1.7) 
  42.5  -10.2 
(3.5) 
***  34.0  3.3 
(3.8) 
  17.2  8.4 
(2.5) 
*** 
University / Polytechnic  16.7  0.4 
(11.3) 
  29.2  -7.9 
(15.6) 
  45.9  7.2 
(16.6) 
  8.3  0.4 
(9.0) 
 
Age < 32 years  3.0  -7.8 
(2.4) 
***  45.1  -3.6 
(4.9) 
  36.1  4.7 
(5.3) 
  15.8  6.7 
(3.4) 
** 
Age ³ 32 years  6.8  2.4 
(2.0) 
  39.7  -12.0 
(4.3) 
***  34.7  0.4 
(4.0) 
  18.8  9.2 
(3.1) 
*** 
Notes: FTC (%) denotes the proportion of FTC workers choosing the respective category. 
*** (**,*) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 78: Duration of Continuous Employment Spells After the Transition from 
Unemployment to FTCs and Permanent Contracts in Months 
Employment spell 
starts with 
Mean   Min.  Max.  Standard 
Deviation 
25 per-
centile 
Median  75 per-
centile 
FTC  9.5          1  89  9.6  5  7  11 
Permanent contract  18.1  1  107  19.7  5  10  23 
Note: The employment spells may include FTC and permanent contracts at different employers. 
The figures are based on the estimation sample of the duration models in Subchapters 6.3. 
Right-censoring is not taken into account biasing the results towards zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 79: Means of Explanatory Variables by Kind of Transition  
Variables  Right-
censored 
unemploy-
ment spell 
Exit into 
FTC 
Exit into 
PERM 
Exit into 
Training  
Exit into 
out-of-
labour-
force  
Baseline hazard           
   Month  2 – 3  0.235  0.224  0.260  0.191  0.142 
   Month  4 – 6  0.115  0.198  0.196  0.221  0.176 
   Month  7 – 9  0.090  0.099  0.134  0.157  0.131 
   Month 10 – 12  0.038  0.093  0.081  0.089  0.144 
   Month 13 – 18   0.051  0.074  0.094  0.072   0.119 
   Month ³ 19  0.056  0.105  0.066   0.094  0.174 
Age    36.205 
(10.436) 
32.654 
(9.562) 
33.541 
(10.103) 
32.183 
(9.988) 
35.871 
(0.463) 
No occupational qualification  0.338  0.300  0.290  0.332  0.429 
Master craftsman  0.047  0.040  0.065  0.064  0.018 
University graduate  0.073  0.164  0.105  0.089  0.049 
Female  0.397  0.456  0.437  0.498  0.621 
Disabled  0.038  0.088  0.051  0.119  0.139 
Foreigner  0.261  0.314  0.264  0.179  0.310 
Married  0.620  0.504  0.528  0.426   0.600 
Married x female  0.261  0.204  0.224  0.238   0.439 
No partner   0.316  0.408  0.360  0.519   0.322 
No partner x female  0.111  0.210  0.160  0.247  0.132 
Children < 16  0.551  0.453  0.403  0.353  0.430 
Children x female  0.244  0.218  0.152   0.213  0.327 
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… Table 79 continued 
Variables  Right-
censored 
unemploy-
ment spell 
Exit into 
FTC 
Exit into 
PERM 
Exit into 
Training  
Exit into 
out-of-
labour-
force  
Prev job: end of FTC or apprenticeship  0.103  0.242  0.142  0.136  0.112 
Prev job: end of FTC or apprenticeship 
x female 
0.073  0.097  0.068  0.068  0.054 
Prev Job: dismissed  0.256  0.245  0.366  0.255   0.159 
Prev Job: dismissed x female  0.077  0.103  0.136  0.123  0.104 
Out-of-labour-force before   0.043  0.127  0.087  0.140  0.300 
Out-of-labour-force before x female  0.030  0.071  0.049  0.098  0.219 
Training or school before  0.081  0.190  0.170  0.302   0.161 
Duration of prev. unemployment spell  2.560 
(6.348) 
2.711 
(6.042) 
2.666 
(6.293) 
2.732 
(6.404) 
3.104 
(8.496) 
Prev. employment spell 3–5 months  0.056  0.085  0.064  0.051  0.062 
Prev. employment spell 6–8 months  0.103  0.085  0.049  0.034  0.060 
Prev. employment spell 9–11 months  0.137  0.045  0.068  0.055  0.022 
Prev. employment spell 12–20 months  0.081  0.065  0.077  0.055  0.033 
Prev. employment spell ³ 21 months  0.218  0.181  0.237  0.149  0.129 
Already a FTC before  0.150  0.269  0.151  0.115  0.102 
Public sector before  0.085  0.204  0.108  0.089  0.118 
Numb. of prev. unemployment spells  1.650 
(2.408) 
1.031 
(1.714) 
0.971 
(1.680) 
0.864 
(1.320) 
0.692 
(1.156) 
Log net household income   6.379 
(2.987) 
6.801 
(2.703) 
7.005 
(2.471) 
7.401 
(2.016) 
7.545 
(1.961) 
No unemployment benefit  0.449  0.473  0.445  0.468  0.628 
No unemployment assistance  0.910  0.884  0.925  0.898  0.930 
Log regional unemployment rate  2.217 
(0.271) 
2.252 
(0.271) 
2.193 
(0.284) 
2.242 
(0.294) 
2.228 
(0.270) 
Spell started in first quarter  0.269  0.261  0.263  0.260  0.397 
Spell started in second quarter  0.217  0.215  0.261   0.187   0.240 
Spell started in third quarter  0.215  0.241  0.242  0.370  0.191 
Number of transitions  234  349  767  235  597 
Number of persons   219  321  683  214  533 
Note: The figures are based on the estimation sample of the duration models in Subchapter 6.3. 
Standard deviations of metric variables are in parentheses.   
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Table 80: Estimation Results of the Multinomial Logistic Duration Model with 
Two Destination States  
  Without unobserved  
heterogeneity 
Heckman / Singer 
  Exit into 
FTC 
Exit into           
PERM 
Exit into           
FTC 
Exit into 
PERM 
  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat 
Baseline hazard                 
   Month  2 – 3  0.583  3.45  0.965  8.09  0.649  3.71  1.036  8.08 
   Month  4 – 6  0.536  3.05  0.788  6.19  0.643  3.42  0.906  6.22 
   Month  7 – 9  0.369  1.71  0.891  6.27  0.505  2.17  1.040  6.21 
   Month 10 – 12  0.863  3.85  0.902  5.39  1.030  4.17  1.085  5.48 
   Month 13 – 18   0.590  2.41  1.054  6.53  0.791  2.89  1.271  6.22 
   Month ³ 19   0.843  3.53  0.770  4.08  1.090  3.93  1.035  4.33 
Age    -0.160  -0.76  -0.152  -1.07  -0.184  -0.85  -0.174  -1.16 
Age
2 / 1.000  0.634  1.09  0.591  1.52  0.725  1.21  0.671  1.64 
Age
3 / 100.000   -0.082  -1.59  -0.074  -2.20  -0.092  -1.73  -0.084  -2.33 
No occupational qualification  -0.399  -2.96  -0.440  -4.69  -0.431  -3.08  -0.474  -4.65 
Master craftsman  -0.174  -0.61  0.143  0.87  -0.170  -0.57  0.156  0.90 
University graduate  0.472  2.59  0.268  1.92  0.477  2.53  0.278  1.89 
Woman  -0.015  -0.04  0.119  0.54  0.010  0.03  0.120  0.51 
Disabled  0.109  0.53  -0.586  -3.37  0.083  0.39  -0.617  -3.35 
Foreigner  0.052  0.38  -0.362  -3.75  0.035  0.25  -0.386  -3.74 
Married  0.215  0.90  -0.047  -0.29  0.219  0.9  -0.040  -0.23 
Married x woman  -0.355  -1.09  -0.047  -0.21  -0.402  -1.2  -0.071  -0.30 
No partner   -0.259  -1.13  -0.316  -2.00  -0.261  -1.12  -0.327  -1.97 
No partner x woman  0.532  1.65  0.324  1.44  0.525  1.59  0.337  1.43 
Children < 16  -0.090  -0.48  0.007  0.05  -0.081  -0.42  0.010  0.08 
Children x woman  -0.022  -0.09  -0.632  -3.59  -0.056  -0.22  -0.670  -3.58 
End of FTC or apprenticeship  0.738  3.60  0.252  1.49  0.758  3.57  0.262  1.46 
End of FTC or appr. x woman  -0.545  -1.89  -0.230  -0.98  -0.561  -1.88  -0.230  -0.93 
Dismissed  0.255  1.32  0.643  5.44  0.276  1.40  0.669  5.41 
Dismissed x woman  -0.055  -0.20  -0.280  -1.62  -0.053  -0.19  -0.280  -1.55 
Out-of-labour-force before  0.540  1.95  -0.124  -0.57  0.545  1.89  -0.122  -0.53 
Out-of-labour-force before x woman  -0.624  -1.80  -0.458  -1.65  -0.653  -1.81  -0.477  -1.63 
Training or school before  0.467  2.43  0.222  1.65  0.490  2.47  0.243  1.72 
Prev. employment spell 3–5 months  0.799  3.40  0.396  2.24  0.825  3.41  0.413  2.23 
Prev. employment spell 6–8 months  0.601  2.55  -0.100  -0.51  0.570  2.30  -0.133  -0.64 
Prev. employment spell 9–11 months  0.310  1.06  0.764  4.33  0.333  1.09  0.759  3.95 
Prev. employment spell 12–20 months  0.275  1.08  0.398  2.41  0.274  1.05  0.406  2.34 
Prev. employment spell ³ 21 months  0.231  1.31  0.366  3.33  0.235  1.30  0.371  3.15 
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... Table 80 continued 
  Without unobserved  
heterogeneity 
Heckman / Singer 
  Exit into 
FTC 
Exit into           
PERM 
Exit into           
FTC 
Exit into 
PERM 
  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat  Coeff.  t-stat 
Already a FTC before  0.408  2.70  -0.155  -1.30  0.415  2.66  -0.138  -1.11 
Public sector before  0.359  2.21  -0.070  -0.52  0.374  2.24  -0.062  -0.44 
Duration of prev. unemployment spell  -0.018  -1.66  -0.010  -1.45  -0.016  -1.40  -0.008  -1.07 
Number of prev. unemployment spells  -0.069  -0.82  -0.017  -0.28  -0.074  -0.79  -0.033  -0.48 
Number of prev. unemployment spells
2  0.020  1.91  0.016  2.19  0.019  1.50  0.018  1.89 
Log net household income  -0.058  -2.67  -0.022  -1.36  -0.059  -2.57  -0.025  -1.44 
No unemployment benefit  0.304  2.43  0.465  5.38  0.343  2.64  0.505  5.46 
No unemployment assistance  0.979  5.10  1.280  8.32  1.020  5.19  1.315  8.25 
Log regional unemployment rate   -0.078  -0.33  -0.612  -3.69  -0.113  -0.45  -0.660  -3.73 
Spell started in first quarter  -0.681  -4.45  -0.519  -4.73  -0.717  -4.54  -0.565  -4.86 
Spell started in second quarter  -0.630  -3.90  -0.431  -3.88  -0.658  -3.98  -0.459  -3.96 
Spell started in third quarter  -0.372  -2.37  -0.166  -1.48  -0.372  -2.32  -0.173  -1.48 
1992  0.056  0.11  0.167  0.65  0.057  0.11  0.163  0.62 
1993  -0.003  -0.01  -0.178  -0.68  -0.022  -0.05  -0.203  -0.75 
1994  0.424  0.93  0.046  0.18  0.404  0.87  0.023  0.09 
1995  0.272  0.59  -0.007  -0.03  0.257  0.55  -0.032  -0.12 
1996  0.232  0.50  -0.198  -0.74  0.219  0.46  -0.228  -0.83 
1997  0.222  0.47  0.125  0.47  0.201  0.42  0.100  0.36 
1998  0.786  1.71  0.045  0.17  0.785  1.68  0.035  0.13 
1999  0.711  1.52  0.478  1.81  0.720  1.52  0.482  1.77 
2000  1.323  2.89  1.134  4.48  1.357  2.92  1.163  4.42 
Constant   -3.645  -1.42  -1.875  -1.07  -2.868  -1.01  -1.041  -0.49 
1 e            -0.843  
( ) 1 Pr e            0.737  
2 e            2.614  
( ) 2 Pr e            0.263  
Log likelihood  -4,522.5214  -4,520.2315 
Note: e  and  ( ) Pr e  are the estimated mass points and probabilities of the nonparametrically 
estimated distribution of the unobserved individual heterogeneity components. Reference cate-
gory: men, cohabiting with a partner, vocational training, no children, not disabled, German na-
tionality, previous job quit, never a FTC job before, previous employment spell 1-2 months, not 
out-of-labour before, not in training or in school before, receives unemployment benefit or assis-
tance, unemployment spell started in fourth quarter, calendar year is 1991, unemployed for only 
one month. 
Source: Own estimations based on the GSOEP. 
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Table 81: Estimation Results of the Multinomial Logistic Duration Model with 
Four Destination States 
  Exit into 
FTC 
Exit into           
PERM 
Exit into      
Training  
Exit into out-
of-labour-
force 
  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat. 
Baseline hazard                 
   Month  2 – 3   0.573   3.39   0.958   8.04   0.603   2.74    0.600   3.60 
   Month  4 – 6   0.527   3.01   0.782   6.15   0.790   3.66    0.780   4.85 
   Month  7 – 9   0.355   1.65   0.893   6.29   0.964   4.05    0.875   5.05 
   Month 10 – 12   0.869   3.88    0.922   5.51   0.916   3.25    1.453   8.38 
   Month 13 – 18    0.593   2.43   1.059   6.57   0.613   2.01    1.211   6.65 
   Month ³19    0.835   3.50   0.770   4.08   0.808   2.67    1.320   7.36 
Age    -0.160  -0.76  -0.156  -1.09  -0.423  -1.73   -0.101  -0.70 
Age
2 / 1.000   0.639   1.10   0.602   1.55   1.403   2.04    0.067   0.17 
Age
3 / 100.000   -0.083  -1.60  -0.076  -2.23  -0.151  -2.45    0.005   0.14 
No occupational qualification   -0.399  -2.96  -0.444  -4.73  -0.362  -2.21   -0.148  -1.55 
Master craftsman   -0.168  -0.58   0.147   0.90   0.228   0.79   -0.863  -2.76 
University graduate   0.474   2.61   0.263   1.89   0.155   0.60   -0.246  -1.18 
Female  -0.017  -0.06   0.119   0.54  -0.651  -1.61    0.345   1.24 
Disabled   0.111   0.54  -0.584  -3.36   0.461   2.08    0.527   3.92 
Foreigner   0.060   0.44   -0.364  -3.78  -0.696  -3.74   -0.320  -3.13 
Married   0.226   0.94  -0.041  -0.25  -0.125  -0.43   -0.202  -0.92 
Married x female  -0.370  -1.13  -0.060  -0.27   0.386   0.95    0.371   1.33 
No partner   -0.252  -1.10  -0.310  -1.96   0.024   0.09    0.058   0.24 
No partner x female  0.532   1.65   0.310   1.38   0.816   2.09   -0.559  -1.94 
Children < 16  -0.104  -0.56  -0.003  -0.02  -0.494  -2.02   -0.206  -1.23 
Children x female   0.002   0.01  -0.616  -3.51   0.197   0.63    0.365   1.83 
Prev job: end of FTC or apprenticeship   0.738   3.60   0.252   1.49   0.020   0.07    0.478   2.29 
Prev job: end of FTC or appr. x female  -0.535  -1.86  -0.213  -0.91  -0.194  -0.47   -0.626  -2.18 
Prev Job: dismissed   0.252   1.31   0.638   5.41   0.049   0.21   -0.430  -2.10 
Prev Job: dismissed x female  -0.053  -0.19  -0.279  -1.61   0.153   0.47    0.232   0.93 
Out-of-labour-force before   0.536   1.93  -0.128  -0.59  -0.262  -0.70    0.400   2.02 
Out-of-labour-force before x female  -0.631  -1.82  -0.462  -1.67   0.033   0.08   -0.281  -1.29 
Training or school before   0.460   2.39   0.217   1.62   0.435   2.00    0.080   0.50 
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… Table 81 continued 
  Exit into 
FTC 
Exit into           
PERM 
Exit into      
Training  
Exit into out-
of-labour-
force 
  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat. 
Duration of prev. unemployment spell   -0.018  -1.68   -0.010  -1.46  -0.020  -1.57   -0.015  -2.41 
Prev. employment spell 3–5 months   0.805   3.43   0.399   2.27   0.131   0.39    0.518   2.54 
Prev. employment spell 6–8 months   0.595   2.53  -0.099  -0.51   -0.363  -0.91    0.598   2.91 
Prev. employment spell 9–11 months   0.320   1.09   0.781   4.44   0.585   1.78    0.128   0.42 
Prev. employment spell 12–20 months   0.267   1.05   0.401   2.43   0.084   0.25    0.078   0.30 
Prev. employment spell ³ 21 months    0.229   1.30   0.368   3.35  -0.018  -0.08    0.027   0.18 
Already ever FTC before   0.405   2.69  -0.159  -1.34   -0.333  -1.44   -0.039  -0.25 
Public sector before   0.363   2.25  -0.071  -0.53  -0.397  -1.57   -0.109  -0.77 
Number of prev. unemployment spells  -0.066  -0.78  -0.016  -0.28   0.216   1.58    0.090   1.02 
Number of prev. unemployment spells
2   0.020   1.90    0.016   2.20  -0.028  -1.09   -0.009  -0.56 
Log net household income  -0.058  -2.65  -0.022  -1.38   0.050   1.40    0.046   2.01 
No unemployment benefit   0.328   2.62    0.482   5.59   0.209   1.35    0.946   9.52 
No unemployment assistance   0.997   5.19   1.293   8.40   1.065   4.33    1.842 10.49 
Log regional unemployment rate   -0.068  -0.28  -0.604  -3.65  -0.044  -0.15   -0.104  -0.56 
Spell started in first quarter  -0.682  -4.46  -0.514  -4.69  -0.318  -1.57   -0.172  -1.36 
Spell started in second quarter  -0.625  -3.88  -0.418  -3.77  -0.378  -1.75   -0.253  -1.87 
Spell started in third quarter  -0.356  -2.27  -0.155  -1.39   0.512   2.69   -0.169  -1.20 
1992   0.065   0.13   0.168   0.65   0.369   0.75    0.398   0.99 
1993   -0.002  -0.00  -0.186  -0.72  -0.978  -1.76    0.680   1.75 
1994   0.428   0.94   0.041   0.16  -0.031  -0.06    0.301   0.76 
1995   0.266   0.58  -0.006  -0.02   0.140   0.29    0.408   1.04 
1996   0.231   0.50  -0.207  -0.78  -0.230  -0.47    0.053   0.13 
1997   0.226   0.48   0.121   0.45   0.031   0.06    0.379   0.94 
1998   0.789   1.71    0.043   0.16   0.117   0.24    0.522   1.30 
1999   0.706   1.51   0.471   1.79   0.582   1.20    0.838   2.11 
2000   1.342   2.93   1.152   4.56   1.366   2.93    1.381   3.49 
Constant   -3.719  -1.45  -1.874  -1.07  -1.501  -0.50  -4.663  -2.55 
Numb. of  Transition  349    767   235    597   
Numb. of Persons  321    683    214    533   
Numb. of Observations  23,151 
Log-likelihood  -8166.4056 
c
2 (216)  2096.67 
Source and Notes: see Table 80. 
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